DEMARCHE: IRANIAN AIRCRAFT

S E C R E T AMMAN 002907

SIPDIS

NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/02/2012
TAGS: PREL PTER IR IS LE SA SY
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE: IRANIAN AIRCRAFT

REF: A. STATE 104864

B. AMMAN 2693

Classified By: AMBASSDADOR EDWARD W. GNEHM; REASONS, 1.5 (B),(C),AND (
D)


1. (S) THE DCM MADE THE POINTS IN REF A ON JUNE 2 TO ALI
AL-AYED, THE PERSONAL ASSISTANT TO FOREIGN MINISTER MUASHER.
AFTER REVIEWING THE SUBSTANCE OF THE AMBASSADOR'S DEMARCHE TO
THE MINISTER ON MAY 27 (REF B),THE DCM EXPRESSED OUR DEEP
CONCERN THAT THE IRANIAN PLANE HAD BEEN ALLOWED TO OVERFLY
JORDAN.


2. (S) POINTING OUT THAT THE JORDANIAN AUTHORITIES HAD
INTERCEPTED ARMS TRANSITING JORDAN IN RECENT MONTHS, THE DCM
ARGUED THAT IT WOULD BE BETTER FOR JORDAN TO BLOCK THE ARMS
FROM REACHING TERRORIST GROUPS IN THE FIRST PLACE THAN TO
LEAVE THE JOB ENTIRELY TO THE SECURITY SERVICES, HOWEVER
SUCCESSFUL THEY MAY HAVE BEEN IN THE PAST. HE SAID THE U.S.
IS REVIEWING ITS PROCEDURES FOR HANDLING THIS ISSUE, AND
URGED THAT THE JORDANIANS UNDERTAKE A PARALLEL REVIEW.


3. (S) AL-AYED POINTED OUT THAT JORDAN HAD BEEN IN THE
FOREFRONT IN SUPPORTING THE WAR ON TERRORISM. JORDAN WOULD
NOT BE DETERRED FROM COUNTERTERRORIST EFFORTS BY ANY FRICTION
WITH IRAN -- "WE DON'T CARE WHAT THEY THINK." HOWEVER,
AL-AYED WENT ON TO SAY:

-- THE IRANIAN AIRCRAFT WAS IN JORDANIAN AIRSPACE FOR ONLY A
FEW MINUTES. IT OVERFLEW SAUDI ARABIA FOR A MUCH LONGER TIME
BEFORE REACHING JORDAN. THE SAUDIS WERE THEREFORE BETTER
PLACED TO BLOCK THE FLIGHT THAN THE JORDANIANS. (THE DCM
MENTIONED THAT WE HAD APPROACHED THE SAUDIS, AND SAID THAT TO
BE EFFECTIVE THE EFFORT NEEDED TO BE COOPERATIVE, INVOLVING
ALL OUR FRIENDS IN THE REGION.)

-- OUR ALERT GAVE THE JORDANIANS VERY LITTLE TIME TO REACT.
(THE DCM AGREED THAT OUR CALL ON MAY 29 -- AFTER THE PLANE
WAS WELL ON ITS WAY -- CAME FAIRLY LATE, BUT ARGUED THAT THE
JORDANIANS MIGHT HAVE RECOGNIZED THE PROFILE OF THE IRANIAN
AIRCRAFT FROM OUR EARLIER DEMARCHE AND DENIED CLEARANCE OR
CONSULTED WITH US.)


4. (S) AL-AYED SAID HE WOULD TALK THROUGH OUR DEMARCHE WITH
THE MINISTER AND OTHERS AS APPROPRIATE. HE PROMISED A QUICK
POLICY RESPONSE. THE DCM REPEATED THAT WE WOULD WELCOME
SUGGESTIONS FOR MORE EFFECTIVE PROCEDURES, AND STRESSED THE
IMPORTANCE THAT WASHINGTON ATTACHES TO THE ISSUE.

COMMENT


5. (S/NF) AL-AYED HAS MENTIONED IN THE PAST THAT MOST OF OUR
ALERTS ON IRANIAN FLIGHTS TURN OUT TO BE FALSE ALARMS. THE
JORDANIANS MAY WELL FEAR THAT OUR INFORMATION IS AMBIGUOUS,
AND THAT BY DENYING FLIGHT CLEARANCE THEY COULD BE INVOLVING
THEMSELVES IN AN EMBARRASSING POLITICAL SITUATION. WE
RECOMMEND THAT WASHINGTON SHARE RELEVANT INFORMATION WITH THE
JORDANIANS (ORCA CONCURS). ON THE POLITICAL SIDE, THE
JORDANIANS WOULD CLEARLY BE MUCH MORE COMFORTABLE DENYING
OVERFLIGHT CLEARANCES IF THE SAUDIS TOOK SIMILAR ACTION.





Gnehm