Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
02AMMAN2396
2002-05-14 15:57:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Amman
Cable title:  

UNRWA DONORS MEETING HIGHLIGHTS CRISIS GRIPPING

Tags:  PREF PREL EAID KPAL KWBG IS JO 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 AMMAN 002396 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR PRM AND NEA; PLEASE PASS TO USAID

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/13/2012
TAGS: PREF PREL EAID KPAL KWBG IS JO
SUBJECT: UNRWA DONORS MEETING HIGHLIGHTS CRISIS GRIPPING
AGENCY


Classified By: DCM GREG BERRY, PER 1.5 (B) AND (D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 AMMAN 002396

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR PRM AND NEA; PLEASE PASS TO USAID

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/13/2012
TAGS: PREF PREL EAID KPAL KWBG IS JO
SUBJECT: UNRWA DONORS MEETING HIGHLIGHTS CRISIS GRIPPING
AGENCY


Classified By: DCM GREG BERRY, PER 1.5 (B) AND (D).


1. (SBU) Summary and comment: UNRWA's May 8-9 meeting of
major donors and host governments highlighted the crisis
gripping the humanitarian agency as a result of ongoing
Israeli-Palestinian tensions. Continued Israeli closures in
the West Bank and Gaza have severely hindered UNRWA's ability
to provide services and relief. Financially, UNRWA's General
Fund (basic services) programs are on solid ground, but its
emergency programs are severely underfunded. UNRWA warned
that damages resulting from the March-April Israeli offensive
will require USD 65 million in new emergency funding, in
addition to the USD 117 million emergency appeal launched in
January 2002. (USD 35 million of these needs should be met
by the UAE's pledge to rebuild Jenin refugee camp.) No
significant new contributions were announced at the meeting
and UNRWA confirmed in side discussions that Japan and
Denmark had cut their contributions.


2. (C) Summary and comment continued: If UNRWA is to
continue to be the primary refugee humanitarian assistance
provider in the West Bank and Gaza, continued, high-level
engagement on access issues will be crucial, as will
continued financial support. But as UNRWA's mandate becomes
even more intertwined with daily political pressures, we need
to help UNRWA focus on its humanitarian mandate and minimize
friction created by impolitic or ill-considered statements.
The key issue is access for the provision of humanitarian
relief -- any friction that gets in the way of that should be
minimized. End summary and comment.


3. (U) On May 8-9, UNRWA held its semiannual meeting of
major donors and host governments in Amman. The U.S.
delegation consisted of Charge Greg Berry, PRM PDAS Rich
Greene, PRM Program Officer Jan Levin and Regional Refcoord
Joan Polaschik.

LIMITED ACCESS CONTINUES TO HINDER UNRWA OPERATIONS
-------------- --------------


4. (SBU) UNRWA Commissioner General Peter Hansen opened the
meeting by telling donors that UNRWA had "never faced a more

difficult situation." With the majority of Palestinian
refugees in the West Bank and Gaza now living below the
poverty line, UNRWA's services are more important than ever
before. Yet Israeli denial of access to UNRWA and other
humanitarian relief agencies is making it extremely difficult
for UNRWA to meet its mandate. Hansen characterized recent
Israeli military operations as a "campaign against the camps"
and reported that the IDF had targeted UN facilities such as
schools and health centers, in violation of the UN's
privileges and immunities. 28 new UNRWA classrooms under
construction in Askar camp, for example, were destroyed by
the IDF in the April incursions.


5. (SBU) UNRWA West Bank Field Director Richard Cook
provided a detailed description of the hardships facing the
agency. Due to the closure-induced economic difficulties
plaguing the West Bank and Gaza since September 2000, Cook
reported that most Palestinian refugees were unable to stock
the food, medicines or savings to cope with the recent
Israeli military offensive. As a result, many more refugees
are now dependent on UNRWA for basic services.


6. (SBU) Cook said that UNRWA's humanitarian access is the
"worst" he has seen in recent years. (Cook is a veteran of
UNRWA relief operations in the first intifada.) UNRWA's West
Bank field office is operating at one-third of capacity, as
Palestinian staff cannot leave their homes to reach work.
Cook reported that UNRWA has the human resources necessary to
cope with the current emergency, but its talent is stuck in
Nablus, Bethlehem and Jenin. When UNRWA tried to move its
Palestinian staff members through the West Bank to respond to
the emergency, its employees were "arrested and abused" and
one employee was killed. (Note: With the exception of 13
international staff members, UNRWA relies on 4,200
Palestinian staff members to operate its schools, clinics and
relief services throughout the West Bank.) Cook believes the
closures will not be eased in the foreseeable future.


7. (SBU) Cook reported that UNRWA's coordination with the
IDF was "as good as possible at the top," but that
coordination broke down on the ground. He also said UNRWA
was having increasing difficulty getting any response to its
inquiries, either by phone or letter. Cook said the Israeli
authorities had stopped issuing permits to UNRWA staff --
including Jerusalem permits required for field office staff
-- "in violation of UN privileges and immunities." During
the March and April offensives, UNRWA vehicles and staff were
fired upon, and the IDF forcibly entered UN properties
including schools and vocational training centers. Cook said
the IDF "time and time again" used UNRWA buildings as
defensive positions and detention centers.
JENIN CAMP UPDATE
--------------


8. (C) UNRWA's first priority for Jenin camp reconstruction
is removal of unexploded ordnance (UXO). UNRWA is unable to
remove any of the rubble or rebuild the 800 destroyed
shelters until the large amounts of UXO in the camp have been
removed. Cook told donors the necessary equipment to remove
and dispose of UXO contains explosives and therefore --
according to Israeli authorities -- poses a security risk.
Although the Israeli government possesses the necessary
equipment to handle the UXO, it will not lend the equipment
to UNRWA unless it agrees to photograph and catalogue the
(presumably Palestinian-origin) UXO found in the camp. Cook
said UNRWA refuses to meet this condition, as it will impose
unnecessary and potentially life-threatening delays on the
removal of the ordnance. (In a separate conversation with
refcoord, Cook said other nations have offered to send the
equipment to UNRWA, but that Israel has said it would deny
entry for the equipment.)


9. (U) Once the UXO and rubble have been removed from Jenin
camp, UNRWA will begin the 18-month process of rebuilding the
camp. Deputy Syria Field Director Lex Takkenberg (manager of
the USG-funded Neirab housing project) has been dispatched to
Jenin to conduct a survey of Jenin camp residents' needs and
to oversee reconstruction efforts. ComGen Hansen reported
that the UAE has pledged USD 35 million to rebuild the camp.
Many donors expressed concern at the steep (USD 30,000) unit
costs implicit in the UAE's donation. UNRWA officials
assured donors that per-unit costs included rubble removal
and infrastructure repairs required to rebuild the camp.

EMERGENCY APPEAL UNDERFUNDED; NEW NEEDS ESTIMATED AT USD 65
MILLION
-------------- --------------


10. (U) Hansen reported that UNRWA's 2001 emergency appeals
were funded at 80 percent, a "respectable" showing for any
appeal. However, the USD 117 million appeal issued in
January 2002 was severely underfunded, with only USD 47
million received to date (including a USD 30 million
contribution from the U.S.). West Bank Director Cook
reported that UNRWA had not already run out of cash only
because continuing access difficulties had prevented the
agency from implementing most of its planned emergency
activities, such as temporary employment creation or remedial
education programs. Moreover, many of UNRWA's relief
activities during the April offensive (distribution of food,
water, blankets) were conducted using supplies donated by
Israeli Arabs and international volunteers from other UN
agencies.


11. (U) Based on its very preliminary assessment of damages
and social needs resulting from the Israeli incursions, UNRWA
believes it will need USD 65 million in additional emergency
funding, beyond the USD 117 million requested in the January
2002 appeal. Cook confirmed that the USD 65 million includes
the USD 35 million already pledged by the UAE to rebuild
Jenin refugee camp, leaving the unfunded new needs at USD 30
million. Therefore, with only USD 47 million in its
emergency coffers to date, UNRWA needs an estimated USD 100
million to continue its West Bank and Gaza emergency programs
through the end of the year. Hansen and Cook both cautioned
that the figure could be much greater if closures are
tightened or further military incursions occur. Hansen also
told donors UNRWA likely would need more international staff
to cover the functions normally performed by Palestinian
staff who cannot move freely through the West Bank and Gaza.

REGULAR PROGRAMS ON SOLID FINANCIAL GROUND, BUT PROJECT FUNDS
USED TO COVER CASH SHORTFALLS
-------------- --------------


12. (U) Reporting that UNRWA had ended the year 2001 with
the "highest budget growth in decades," Hansen told donors
that UNRWA had been able to repay USD 8.9 million in debt to
its project fund and set aside funding for a working capital
reserve. Nevertheless, UNRWA in 2002 expected a budget
deficit of USD 12.3 million, as its expected contributions
likely would not keep pace with the natural growth of the
refugee population. Hansen announced that two donors (later
identified as Japan and Denmark) planned to reduce their
contributions this year.


13. (U) Hansen also admitted to donors that UNRWA had used
its special project accounts to cover cash shortfalls and
meet basic operating expenses such as payroll. Hansen
asserted that UNRWA's use of special project funds for
general programs had not slowed project implementation. He
told donors that UNRWA's use of a unified cash account is
standard UN practice and allows the voluntarily funded agency
to keep operations running in spite of cash shortfalls.
Hansen also told donors UNRWA would be able to reduce its
project deficit more quickly if it could solve the PA VAT
problem.

MEETING ATMOSPHERICS
--------------


14. (C) Statements by all delegations -- donors and host
governments alike -- focused on the many difficulties UNRWA
faces in carrying out its mandate. Criticism of Israeli
targeting of humanitarian workers and restrictions upon
UNRWA's mobility was quite strong, as was implied criticism
of perceived U.S. failure to compel the GOI to provide
humanitarian access. In both his public statements and
private discussions with USG officials, Hansen at times
adopted a tone that seemed to push up against the limits of
UNRWA's strictly apolitical humanitarian mandate. While
Hansen's remarks certainly reflected an accurate assessment
of extremely difficult relations between UNRWA and Israeli
government, he needs to work with Israel to accomplish
humanitarian objectives.

COMMENT
--------------


15. (C) If UNRWA is to continue to be the primary refugee
humanitarian assistance provider in the West Bank and Gaza,
continued, high-level engagement on access issues will be
crucial, as will continued financial support. But as UNRWA's
mandate becomes even more intertwined with daily political
pressures, we also need to help UNRWA remain focused on its
humanitarian mandate and minimize friction created by
rhetorical statements. In private conversation, Hansen
himself acknowledged the importance of carefully crafting
UNRWA statements to avoid political quagmires, but his
rhetoric sometimes threatened to get the better of him. The
key point is the provision of humanitarian assistance;
unnecessary friction is not helpful in that regard.
Gnehm