A SNAPSHOT OF OBASANJO'S ELECTORAL PROSPECTS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ABUJA 000852

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/14/2012
TAGS: PGOV PREL NI
SUBJECT: A SNAPSHOT OF OBASANJO'S ELECTORAL PROSPECTS

REF: ABUJA 829


Classified by CDA Andrews for reason 1.5 (d).



1. (C) Summary: Three years ago, Obasanjo rode into office
on a wave of optimism: Gone was the military; democratic rule
had returned. Now, with a year until the elections,
Obasanjo's prospects are uncertain. His abrupt manner,
callous public remarks, and unwillingness to listen have
alienated key opinion-makers and former supporters. If
elections were today, he might lose regions and votes won in
1999 and could well lose the entire contest if faced with
credible opposition. In fact, the PDP nomination is not a
sure bet, as House Speaker Ghali Na'Abba and others are
fomenting rebellion within the party to spoil Obasanjo's bid.
On the positive side for Obasanjo, the power of incumbency
is very formidable in Nigeria. Also, Obasanjo probably can
count on support in the Northeast as long as Vice President
Atiku remains on the ticket and might be able to finesse the
Southwest if he can reach a modus vivendi with Alliance for
Democracy (AD) Governors and moderates within the most
influential Yoruba organization, Afenifere. Ultimately, one
of his biggest electoral asset may be a negative one -- the
lack of an alternative around whom his various opponents can
easily rally. End Summary.


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WHERE ARE ALL MY FRIENDS
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2. (C) In 1999, President Obasanjo won a landslide victory,
with widespread support in the North and Southeast. Obasanjo
could not replicate that feat today, and he need not look
beyond the closest mirror to identify the main cause of his
diminished prospects. He came to office because others lent
their power bases and constituencies. However, as with any
loan, there was interest to be paid. Obasanjo owed his
powerful supporters access and the legitimate political
fruits that come with backing a winner in any democratic
system.



3. (C) Instead, Obasanjo increasingly has been a one-man
show. To many Nigerian political figures, Obasanjo is an
arrogant know-it-all who eschews dialogue, siphons
independent minds from the Administration and upbraids those
bold enough to express different points of view. When a
situation beckons suasion or cajolery, Obasanjo wields either
mace or mallet. He behaves like a general in civilian
President's clothing.



4. (C) A born again Christian, Obasanjo also has a
self-righteous, almost messianic streak. Part of him
believes he has been divinely anointed; thus, he need not
listen to the counsel of most mortals, especially given that
he has steered the Nigerian ship of State before. Since he
gives no ear to the counsel of others, they are unforgiving
in their evaluation of his performance. Unfortunately, the
Government's performance has earned it and him many demerits;
because he mostly has gone it alone, he must shoulder the
blame alone.


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The Election Map Does Not Lie
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5. (C) If hired by Obasanjo, a conscientious campaign
manager would suffer an acute migraine gazing at the
electoral map. Regions and groups Obasanjo carried by wide
margins in 1999 are tilting against him in the run-up to

2003. Regaining positive balance in these areas will take
guile, money and luck.


A) Where He is Weak:


-- Northwest: This is the political heart of the North. No
one has become Head of State without the support or
acquiescence of this region. Here, unfortunately, Obasanjo
has lost the most ground. He has alienated key figures like
former Heads of State Babangida, Abubakar, and Buhari. The
revered Emir of Kano has publicly criticized Obasanjo's
performance. The Arewa Consultative Forum (ACF),the
region's preeminent association of luminaries, is a house
divided regarding Obasanjo. However, the anti-Obasanjo camp
is more numerous, vocal and active. The powerful Arewa elite
still bristles over his removal of senior Northern officers
from the military. They also complain that his government is
corrupt, his economic mismanagement has decimated
agriculture, the paramount sector in that region, and that he
has given too many key positions to fellow Yorubas at the
expense of Northern interests (when the Southwest arrayed
against him in 1999). Last, a PDP gadfly, former Kano
Governor Abubakar Rimi is contesting for the Party's
nomination. While Rimi has a snowball's chance of winning,
Obasanjo may further offend Northerners if he mishandles
Rimi's challenge by attacking him too heavily since no one
likes to see a family member publicly upbraided by an
outsider.


-- Southeast: This area voted overwhelmingly for Obasanjo in

1999. Two reasons for Obasanjo's reversal of fortune are the
Administration's insensitivity to Igbo political aspirations
and perceived federal inattention to economic development in
the densely populated region. In addition to his politically
costly, yet unnecessary, war of words with popular Abia State
Governor Orji Kalu, Obasanjo has criticized
Igbo-organizations (Ohaneze Ndigbo, for example) for
undermining security and national unity. Other
Administration officials have been more acrid, labeling
soldiers who fought on the Biafran side of the civil war
"traitors" and deriding calls for an Igbo President as
foolish. (These calls are indirect attacks against the Yoruba
Obasanjo seeking a second term. Discarding the Obasanjo-Atiku
ticket, opens the door to an Igbo as number one or two on the
presidential ticket.) These statements by government
officials cut deep into Igbo sensitivities, giving substance
to Igbo grievances that they have not been reintegrated into
the national political system as full partners.


-- Middle Belt: The western Middle Belt, e. g. Niger and
Kwara, is tied to the Northwest. Obasanjo suffers the same
afflictions there as in the Northern heartland. In the
Eastern Middle Belt, he is in hot water with the Tivs, the
Middle Belt's most populous and politically agile group.
Tivs are bitter over the October 2001 massacre of Tiv
villagers by federal government troops. They also suspect the
Government of siding with their ethnic rivals, the Jukun,
because Defence Minister Danjuma, a close Obasanjo ally, is
Jukun. However, to Obasanjo's benefit,fundamentalist
Christians (whether Tiv or of another ethnicity) are numerous
in this area, and many would tend to vote Obasanjo over most
Muslim alternatives.



B. Finding Some Support:


-- Southwest: Obasanjo lost here in 1999; taking it this
time will require walking a delicate tightrope, something
Obasanjo does not do particularly well. Slain Justice
Minister Bola Ige, a stalwart of Yoruba politics, was making
inroads toward rehabilitating Obasanjo in this region despite
belonging to an opposition party (the AD). However, as Ige's
assassination shows, the Southwest is not monolithic, and
Yoruba politics can be fractious, even dangerous. Yet, many
Yorubas are willing to support Obasanjo out of ethnic unity;
they realize the President in 2003 either will be Obasanjo or
a non-Yoruba. However, Obasanjo's desire to control the
Southwest through the PDP fouls majority Yoruba sentiment.
It is a case of right ethnic group, wrong party. His best
bet for winning the region is to cut an "incumbents deal"
with AD Governors: in such a deal, he would promise not to
actively support their PDP opponents; in exchange the
Governors would tacitly endorse, at least not actively
oppose, him in their states. However, if he continues to
press for PDP primacy in these states, support based on
ethnic solidarity will yield to each AD governor's individual
interests in his political self-preservation. Initial signs
are not positive. One of Obasanjo's Special Advisers is
running for Governor of Ogun, and there is no sign that he
objects.


-- Northeast: Primarily because of Vice President Atiku, who
hails from Adamawa, the ticket should do well in the
Northeast. Yet, Atiku's loyalty may be frangible. Many
believe Atiku is double-dealing and would gladly pull the rug
from under Obasanjo if that would give Atiku the party's
nomination. In any event, the Northeast is not as pivotal as
the Northwest or Southeast, and Atiku still is in trouble
with many Northern leaders over his waffling over the
introduction of criminal Sharia in the North.



C. A Toss-Up


-- South/South: This area is tougher than the others to read
because there is no one dominant group. Obasanjo has some
powerful detractors here but also has wheeler-dealer Works
Minister Tony Anenih, an unabashed political operator who
apparently believes that, no matter how bad things are,
elections can be bought. While he may not be viewed with
much respect elsewhere, Anenih has sway here. Much will
depend on the deals Anenih can work with state governors and
other political leaders. Because most oil facilities are
here, revenue and resource allocation questions between the
federal and state governments will loom large in the lead-up
to elections.


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ENEMIES TO THE NORTH OF HIM
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7. (C) After Obasanjo, former Head of State Babangida is the
most discussed political figure in Nigeria. Because IBB
helped bankroll the President in 1999 and because he is one
of few Nigerians who casts a nationwide shadow, the
withdrawal of his support is a major blow. Obasanjo will be
hurt more if reports of Babangida's active opposition prove
true. A close associate of both Babangida and VP Atiku,
recently informed us that OO and IBB had a very stormy
telephone conversation in January after the President accused
Babangida of fueling National Assembly opposition to him.
The two hung up on each other. Reportedly, Obasanjo later
tried to make amends but Babangida has resisted detente.
Babangida is said to have responded with cold silence when
Atiku asked if he would back Obasanjo-Atiku in 2003. Several
IBB-for-President campaigns are underway. while the Man from
Minna does not acknowledge any of them, it is widely
believed he funds them, if for no other reason than to keep
the political pot bubbling. Babangida reportedly is also
funds two unregistered political parties, the UNDP and NDP,
both of which have support in the North and Southeast. The
Southeast is a region where Babangida has assiduously
cultivated support. Abacha-era Minister, former Senator from
Akwa Ibom and current UNDP stalwart Don Etiebet said in early
March that the party's Presidential nomination awaited
Babangida if he wanted it.



8. (C) Other Northern interests, including the ACF, are
sending out feelers to other areas of the country; their
liaison with groups in other regions, particularly the
Southeast, spells trouble for Obasanjo. ACF leaders have
journeyed to the Southeast several times, ostensibly to
discuss ethno-religious violence. The ACF has inserted
itself as a mediator in the Tiv-Jukun feud in the eastern
Middle Belt. In both cases, talks may have veered toward
politics and toward channeling local disgruntlement with
Obasanjo into real political opposition. In early March, it
was announced that Northern and Southeastern leaders would
meet in Abia State to discuss national unity and internal
violence. Curiously, leaders from the Southwest were not
invited to this session hosted by Obasanjo antagonist, Abia
Governor Orji Kalu, who also has links to Banbangida. This
line-up suggests that conference organizers may be exploring
the potent North-Southeast axis that has decided previous
Presidential elections while keeping Yoruba-centric
candidates, e.g. Awolowo, from realizing their aspirations.


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Enemies from Within
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9. (C) Obasanjo faces a growing rebellion within the PDP led
by House Speaker Na'Abba. Personal animosity dates back to
2000 when the Presidency unsuccessfully tried to dump Na'Abba
as Speaker. Since the electoral controversy erupted last
December, Na'Abba has challenged Obasanjo on a variety of
issue from fuel price hikes, the January police strike,
disclosure of Assembly Members salaries, to the federal
budget. Na'Abba orchestrated a public debate in the House
which blamed Obasanjo for Nigeria's woes and labeled his
leadership inept. That debate has the markings of the
opening salvo of a concerted effort to keep Obasanjo from the
party's nomination. Since then Na'Abba not only has
pinpricked Obasanjo whenever he can on substantive issues
like the budget and the threatened police strike, but the
Speaker has been at the forefront of efforts to unite party
dissidents in order to make a public statement against
Obasanjo's candidacy. Perhaps even more troubling for
Obasanjo, PDP Chairman Audu Ogbeh appears to be listening to
the malcontents. Recently, Ogbeh felt compelled to state
publicly that no candidate is preordained, and that he would
not allow any party nomination to be orchestrated in
frustration of the majority's will. (Having helped Ogbeh to
the Chairmanship less than six months ago, Obasanjo cannot
readily dump him now.)


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DON'T COUNT HIM OUT
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10. (C) . Given a few months of relative peace without major
communal violence, if the economy does not dip, and if he
learns to listen and accept a little help from his friends,
Obasanjo's popularity perhaps can bounce back. Additionally,
the aura of incumbency is very strong in Nigeria. While
everyone may grumble, the benefits that accrue from being
on the right side of that power and the hardships of being on
the wrong side will keep many people from breaking formation.
Last, some Obasanjo opponents hate each other as much as
they dislike the President. While agreeing Obasanjo should
walk the plank, they will have a tough time agreeing who
should take his place. The Obasanjo camp will try to exploit
these cleavages to keep the opposition from coalescing.


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COMMENT
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11. (C) Obasanjo is in deep trouble. His popularity has
declined and he is estranged from much of the political
class, particularly in the all-important North. Opponents
know that Obasanjo rode the bank accounts and goodwill of
others into office. With many of his former backers now
angered by his brusque manner and unremarkable job
performance, these opponents feel Obasanjo is very vulnerable
as they do not believe he has a loyal political machine or
constituency to call his own. However, by virtue of his very
office, Obasanjo has a political machine -- the federal
government. If used prudently, this is the most powerful,
influential machine in the nation.



12. (C) Comment Continued. For Obasanjo to bounce back will
require a level-headed strategy. The outlines of that
strategy must include an attempt to regain some support in
the North and Southeast by making amends with members of the
political elites in both regions who have not completely
written him off. Additionally, he will have to avoid
fighting with AD Governors and Afenifere in the Southwest.
Obasanjo should also try to douse the ardor of his strong
adversaries by breaking bread with some key figures that
oppose him. Last, and more importantly, he must govern
better. This means a lot less international junketing and a
stronger focus on two key domestic issues -- internal
insecurity/communal violence and the struggling economy,
particularly the near-moribund agricultural and manufacturing
sectors.
Andrews