NIGERIA: NSA MOHAMMED ON NIGERIAN FOREIGN POLICY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 000695

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/07/2012
TAGS: PREL PINS MASS MOPS CG SU BY ZI NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: NSA MOHAMMED ON NIGERIAN FOREIGN POLICY


Classified by Ambassador Howard F. Jeter; Reasons 1.5 (b) and
(d).



1. (U) This message was delayed in transmission, but contains
information that may be of value to end-users.



2. (C) SUMMARY: Ambassador Jeter and NSA Mohammed February 6
discussed the Ikeja cantonment tragedy and Nigeria's request
for large-scale EOD assistance. Mohammed also briefed the
Ambassador on measures taken in northern Nigeria to forestall
reprisals in the wake of the Yoruba-Hausa ethnic clashes in
Lagos. The two also discussed various regional conflicts. On
Sudan, Ambassador Jeter informed the NSA about Senator
Danforth's efforts to obtain the agreement of Bashir and
Garang to our proposed four confidence building measures; for
his part, Mohammed said that Nigeria was content with its
current behind-the-scenes role of nudging the parties toward
dialogue, whatever the forum. On DROC, Mohammed thought the
key to progress was to get Kabila, Bemba, and Onusumba to
talk, implying he did not think the Inter-Congolese Dialogue
would yield much fruit without these three reaching an
understanding. Mohammed stated Nigeria was deeply concerned
about Zimbabwe and that an avenue for a graceful Mugabe exit
was needed. Closer to home, Sierra Leone was on the mend
with the official declaration of the war's end. Meanwhile,
Charles Taylor, because of his own internal problems, was
being less of a problem elsewhere in the region. END SUMMARY.


===============
IKEJA AND LAGOS
===============



3. (C) After discussing the Ikeja explosion and President
Obasanjo's special appeal for assistance, Nigerian National
Security Advisor, retired LTG Aliyu Mohammed expressed his
concern about the ammunition depot in his hometown, Gusau
(Zamfara State). He said the depot had been there for years,
and the town grew around the site as the population expanded.
Now, instead of being on the outskirts, the depot was
practically in the middle of the state capital. He voiced
interest in an EOD support team assessing all munitions
facilities in Nigeria. (COMMENT: Such assessment visits are
now incorporated into the overall support concept of our EOD
assistance to Nigeria. END COMMENT.)



4. (C) When Ambassador Jeter expressed concern that the
Yoruba-Hausa conflict in Lagos could spark reprisal attacks
in the North, Mohammed retorted that the GON had enlisted the
support of Northern governors and traditional leaders to do
their statesmen-like best to make certain that there were no
violent repercussions in the North, as had happened in the
past. Additionally, the police were being visibly deployed
in strategic locations to deter incitement of violence.


===============
POLICE TRAINING
===============



5. (C) NSA Mohammed was grateful when the Ambassador informed
him the Embassy would begin a police-training program
including curricula development, a centralized criminal
database and the placement of a U.S. advisor in Police
Headquarters. He volunteered to inform the President
immediately.


=====================
FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES
=====================



6. (C) SUDAN: After stressing that our policy was not to
create another peace initiative in competition with IGAD or
the Egyptian initiative, Ambassador Jeter told Mohammed about
Special Envoy Danforth's January trip to the area and the
progress made, particularly on the Nuba mountains cease-fire.
Mohammed thought that maintenance and expansion of the
ceasefire was critical. After its plans to host an
all-Sudanese conference were aborted late last year, Nigeria
had been content with limiting its efforts to encouraging all
parties to communicate. Mohammed informed us that Tripoli
was trying to become more active in promoting the Egypt-Libya
Initiative (ELI). Tripoli had called a March /April meeting
on Sudan and had invited Nigeria to be an observer. The NSA
extended an invitation to Senator Danforth to visit Abuja on
any future trips to Africa.



7. (C) DROC: Mohammed said Nigeria continued to encourage
Osunumba and Bemba to meet Kabila. However, they continued
to balk at any venue where Kabila was accorded the status of
Head of State. They felt this gave Kabila an undeserved aura
of legitimacy when, in fact, he was handed power only because
of his father's demise. Since Kabila was not democratically
elected and because he controlled less than half the national
territory, Kabila should be treated as one of three equal
faction leaders.



8. (C) ZIMBABWE: Mohammed expressed strong concern about
Zimbabwe. He revealed that Obasanjo had hosted MDC President
Morgan Tsvangirai for two days in Abuja prior to the
President's late January trip to Harare. When President
Obasanjo met with Mugabe, according to the NSA, Obasanjo
recommended that Mugabe consider retirement. However, Mugabe
responded that he was committed to run, having passed the
point of no return with regard to keeping his word to his
followers. Mugabe said that he could only consider retiring
after winning the election. Mohammed opined that Mugabe was
old and that part of him wanted to leave politics, but the
other part feared his vulnerability to prosecution by his
opponents should he leave the Presidency. Moreover, Mugabe
and his henchmen were profiting from trade in Congolese
diamonds due to his close relationship with Kabila. This
lucrative interest would likely die once Mugabe left high
office. While eventually Mugabe must go, Mohammed wondered
how the MDC could govern if it came to power in the short
term. "All of the government structures in Zimbabwe,"
including the police and security services, were "100 percent
ZANU-PF," implying that any MDC government could be paralyzed
by a disloyal civil service and security apparatus.



9. (C) LIBERIA: "We don't trust Taylor," Mohammed said. If
the Liberian President had his druthers, he would try to sate
his large appetite for power at the expense of his neighbors.
However, Taylor has to think small now due to the pressures
on him. Worried about the LURD and afraid of being labeled a
terrorist supporter in the aftermath of September 11, Taylor
was trying to convince the world that he was reforming, to
preempt further international pressure and isolation.



10. (C) Mohammed also had no compliments for Burkina Faso's
Blaise Campaore. While Campaore had invited some of Taylor's
political opposition to set up shop in Burkina, the NSA did
not believe Campaore had broken from Taylor. Nigeria
continued to support holding an ECOWAS-sponsored Liberian
reconciliation meeting in Abuja as soon as this could be
arranged.
Jeter