Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
02ABUJA426
2002-02-08 09:43:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Abuja
Cable title:  

NIGERIA: AN ARMY COLONEL ON DEMOCRACY AND THE

Tags:  PREL PGOV PINR NI 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 000426 

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 1.6X6
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: AN ARMY COLONEL ON DEMOCRACY AND THE
MILITARY


REF: LAGOS 212


Classified by Ambassador Howard F. Jeter; Reasons 1.6X6.


C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 000426

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 1.6X6
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: AN ARMY COLONEL ON DEMOCRACY AND THE
MILITARY


REF: LAGOS 212


Classified by Ambassador Howard F. Jeter; Reasons 1.6X6.



1. (C) SUMMARY: In an unusually frank discussion, Nigerian
Colonel and ECOWAS staff member M. Dixon Dikio (please
strictly protect) told PolMilOff that a major breakdown of
command led to reprisal attacks in Benue, and those attacks
were unjustifiable. In his view, LTG Malu's response to the
Benue situation served to highlight Malu's lack of
intellectual honesty, and furthermore, justified Malu's
removal as Chief of Army Staff. Touting both Operation Focus
Relief and ACRI, the Colonel said more of both were needed,
in Nigeria and throughout West Africa. Later, responding to
the explosions at the Ikeja cantonment, and reflecting on the
Benue events, he viscerally lamented a lack of accountability
in the Nigerian military. END SUMMARY.



2. (C) The Colonel spoke very highly of Operation Focus
Relief, and said his colleagues in the Nigerian Army were
impressed and wanted more. He spoke positively about the
benefits of ACRI (he had witnessed ACRI training),and had
been quietly trying to convince his military colleagues to
rethink Nigeria's past opposition to ACRI. In his
estimation, creating inter-operability between West African
militaries would be the key to stability in the sub-region
under the umbrella of ECOWAS. Both ACRI and Operation Focus
Relief would support this goal if provided systematically.
Moreover, these programs could be conduits for needed reforms
in regional militaries, he believed.



3. (C) The Colonel was visibly disgusted when asked about
violence in Benue last October. Turning first to LTG Samuel
Victor Malu (former Chief of Army Staff),he said, "If I had
any respect left for Malu before Benue, it is gone now." He
opined that President Obasanjo had erred when he selected
Malu as Chief of Army Staff. Obasanjo should have reached
deeper into the Army to avoid "corrupted" officers. Malu had
led the attacks that resulted in the destruction of Odi in
1999, which the Colonel described as a "slaughter." Then
Malu, as Chief of Army Staff, had publicly spoken out against
government policies. "Malu should have been removed

earlier," he said, "but when he began publicly criticizing
government policy, that was it."



4. (C) After Benue, the Colonel stated, Malu did not have the
intellectual honesty to admit the similarity with Odi.
PolMilOff referred to a magazine article where, in the same
breath, Malu had said that Nigeria had nothing to learn from
the U.S. on peacekeeping (OFR) and that the Nigerian Army had
no ability for peacekeeping (Benue). The Colonel replied,
"Exactly - intellectual dishonesty."



5. (C) PolMilOff noted that it appeared an order was given to
dispatch troops to Benue after the death of the 19 soldiers,
and that order had come from the Presidency, but it remained
undetermined whether a high-level order had been given to
raze villages and engage in reprisal attacks. The Colonel
stated there was a clear breakdown of command, which was
unacceptable. Chief of Army Staff, LTG Ogomudia was
responsible, whether he had given orders or not, and what had
happened was unjustifiable in a democracy. The Colonel
agreed that lack of civilian policing capacity led to the
Army's insertion in Benue, as in Odi. However, until the
police could handle violent civil disturbances, the Army
would continue to be called upon and more tragic incidents
could result (unless the army received sufficient training in
controlling civil disturbances),he reflected.



6. (C) The Colonel opined that the events in Benue, like
those in Odi, exacerbated the civil-military gap in Nigerian
society. They also indicated just how far command and
control had broken down. Describing the Nigerian Army as a
leper, he said, "Everyone knows it is there and is a human
being, but no one wants to touch it." While there is
widespread sulking in the military, and the GON is performing
badly on many fronts, he surmised that the Army, like a
seriously ill patient, was in no position to cause trouble.



7. (C) The Colonel argued that the creation of state police
forces in Nigeria could help manage insecurity. State police
forces would allow for better, more localized response to
crises. Countering the common argument that state forces
would become political tools in local politics, he reasoned
that the Inspector General of Police, who reports to the
President, and was far from immune to political pressure.
Moreover, he explained, state police commissioners had de
facto veto power over governors who were elected by the
people: They could choose to ignore Governors' orders simply
by saying that they were waiting for instructions from Abuja.
Simply put, the commissioners of police in each state were
already influenced by political considerations. Furthermore,
while fear of state police forces being unduly influenced was
a justifiable concern, that problem could be minimized
through better training and proper management.



8. (C) PolMilOff met the Colonel on a second occasion, after
the disaster at the Ikeja military cantonment. Visibly
distraught over the catastrophe, he stated that the
cantonment had been intended to receive and redistribute
ordnance unused after deployments such as those to Liberia
and Sierra Leone. However, because "nothing works in the
Army anymore," ordnance had never been redistributed as
planned. The disaster happened, like events in Benue, he
stated, because there was no accountability in the Nigerian
military. Someone must be held accountable, he said.



9. (C) COMMENT: Nothing the Colonel said was a revelation.
However, it is extremely uncommon for a Nigerian Army officer
to talk to a diplomat from a Western Embassy so candidly and
critically about his service and its behavior, and his
comments offer some insight into the mood of mid-level
Nigerian officers. Ironically, while strongly criticizing
LTG Malu, he echoed Malu's comments to the Ambassador
regarding the Army's inability to threaten Nigeria's nascent
democracy (reftel).
Jeter