Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
02ABUJA418
2002-02-07 14:56:00
SECRET
Embassy Abuja
Cable title:  

NIGERIA: TERRORIST LIST 9

Tags:  PREL PINS EFIN ECON TU NI 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T ABUJA 000418 

SIPDIS


FOR EB/ESC/ESP (GLASS),AF/EPS AND AF/W


E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/07/2012
TAGS: PREL PINS EFIN ECON TU NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: TERRORIST LIST 9

REF: (A) STATE 10592 (B) ABUJA 187 (C)
ANDREWS-EPSTEIN EMAIL 02/06/02


S E C R E T ABUJA 000418

SIPDIS


FOR EB/ESC/ESP (GLASS),AF/EPS AND AF/W


E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/07/2012
TAGS: PREL PINS EFIN ECON TU NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: TERRORIST LIST 9

REF: (A) STATE 10592 (B) ABUJA 187 (C)
ANDREWS-EPSTEIN EMAIL 02/06/02



1. (U) Classified by Ambassador Howard F. Jeter for reasons
1.5 (b) and (d).



2. (S) Mission officers met on February 6, per Ref C, to
discuss possible scenarios to lessen the negative impact of
freezing the assets of NASCO Nigeria and its affiliated
subsidiaries. We found no way to separate the NASCO holding
company in Turkey from its Nigerian subsidiaries, which
employ more than 1500 Nigerians directly and several times
that indirectly. Without entering into discussions with the
GON, we cannot begin to determine whether it would be
possible or feasible to stop funds generated in Nigeria from
reaching the Turkish holding company. We know very little
about NASCO's corporate structure.



3. (S) Ref B described Mission perspectives on the impact of
freezing NASCO's assets on the local Jos community in Plateau
State and on U.S. relations with Nigeria's Islamic
population. Since then, the political situation has
deteriorated. Last week,s explosion of the Lagos armory,
the President,s perceived insensitivity, however
unjustified, to the plight of more than a thousand killed and
injured and more than 12,000 displaced, and government
incompetence in rescue and clean up of the unexploded
ordinance have wounded the President seriously. This week's
attacks on northern Muslim Hausa by Yoruba vigilantes in
Lagos is being portrayed as ðnic cleansing8 on northern
Nigerian radio programs. Northern Muslims, who supported
Obasanjo in 1999, see him incapable of protecting them in
Lagos. Even mainstream northern politicians are speaking of
the inevitability of retaliatory attacks on Christians in
Kano and Kaduna. Nigerians with a historical perspective
remember that such attacks in Kano in 1966 were used as a
justification for the Igbo East to declare independence, the
act that led to the bloody Civil War. We do not expect
widespread conflict to break out here, but applying sanctions
at this time on NASCO -- a major manufacturing company and
employer -- could be used as further ammunition by Obasanjo's
detractors, worsening his already difficult position. In
short, it would be a very inopportune moment for the USG to
add to tensions in Nigeria, and applying sanctions to NASCO
would be seen as destabilizing.



4. (S) This Mission is not privy to the links between NASCO
and international terrorism. While most Nigerians roundly
condemn al-Qaeda, there is considerable support for Hamas --
not for its suicide bombers, but for its clinics and schools.
That support extends beyond the Muslim community (Nigerian
and expatriate alike) to the left-leaning intelligentsia
centered in Lagos. If, despite the information in paras one
to three (above) and ref B, a decision is made to list NASCO,
the Mission must have talking points for both public and
private use. If NASCO's links are to Hamas rather than
al-Qaeda or Abu Sayyaf, or the like, we and the GON would be
in for a very rough ride.
Jeter