Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
02ABUJA3324
2002-12-16 17:25:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Abuja
Cable title:  

NIGERIA: OBASANJO COOL TO PARIS SUMMIT ON

Tags:  PREL PGOV MOPS IV NI 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 003324 

SIPDIS


LONDON FOR GURNEY
PARIS FOR NEARY


E.O.12958: DECL: 12/15/12
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS IV NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: OBASANJO COOL TO PARIS SUMMIT ON
COTE D'IVOIRE


REF: STATE 256597


CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR HOWARD F.JETER. REASON 1.5
(B) and (D).


C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 003324

SIPDIS


LONDON FOR GURNEY
PARIS FOR NEARY


E.O.12958: DECL: 12/15/12
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS IV NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: OBASANJO COOL TO PARIS SUMMIT ON
COTE D'IVOIRE


REF: STATE 256597


CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR HOWARD F.JETER. REASON 1.5
(B) and (D).



1. (C) I spoke at length by phone on Saturday evening
with President Obasanjo on the French proposal to hold
a summit on Cote d'Ivoire. Obasanjo is opposed and I
think adamantly so, to the French proposal. He said
that, if invited, he would not attend. "They can hold
the summit, but I am not going; Nigeria will not be
represented," he bluntly declared. Cote d'Ivoire, he
contended, is an African problem that must be solved
by African leaders.



2. (C) Anticipating my question, a more statesmanlike
Obasanjo expressed gratitude to France (and the U.S.)
for helping to broker a meeting with Cameroonian
President Biya. However, Obasanjo added that he had
told Biya at their meeting in Geneva that he would not
meet again outside of the African continent, or for
that matter, outside of Cameroon or Nigeria.



3. (C) I explained the French were not trying to
overshadow ECOWAS peacemaking efforts, but rather they
conceived the summit as a logical extension of the
Lome peace process and as a way to inject it with
needed momentum. Obasanjo, however, would have none
of it. Instead, he inferred the French proposal was
Wade's idea because Wade was unhappy with Eyadema. The
French need to support the Lome process, not displace
it, he stressed. Obasanjo said would he raise this
objection with Wade when they meet on December 16.



4. (C) Obasanjo said a number of regional leaders had
called him to ask that he engage on Cote d'Ivoire.
The Ivorian Prime Minister had also visited Abuja to
ask that he intercede. Obasanjo said he had agreed,
and that first he was going to Kara to try to heal the
rift between Wade and Edayema. Wade and Kufuor would
join him there. Eyadema, he said, felt very badly
about the distance that had developed between himself
and Wade. From Kara, Obasanjo said he and the three
other leaders would go to Cote d'Ivoire to meet
Gbagbo. They would tell Gbagbo that ending the
rebellion would necessitate political compromise
because the essential problems were political not
military. The region would help if he wanted it; if
not, the region would stand aside. Obasanjo
emphasized, however, that if Gbagbo refused this offer
of assistance, Gbagbo himself would lose.



5. (C) I told the President that my impression was
the real leaders of the rebellion were not those who
were negotiating in Lome. Obasanjo agreed. He
recounted telling Eyadema he was wasting his time
negotiating with "sergeants" in Lome; instead, he
would have to "go behind the masks" and find out who
the real leaders might be, but agreed that Ouattara,
Bedie, and Guei's successor all needed to be at the
table.



6. (C) As our conversation ended, I told Obasanjo
that we recognized the domestic imperatives he faces,
but his engagement on Cote d' Ivoire could be
instrumental. Obasanjo said Nigeria is willing to
engage and is even willing to send troops "under the
right conditions." However, Nigeria would only engage
if asked; even then, it would want to avoid the
perception of being the region's primary policeman.



7. (C) Obasanjo promised to brief me on his return to
Abuja.



8. (C) Comment: The timing of the French initiative is
unfortunate from the Nigerian perspective. The idea
comes just as the Nigerians are revving up to assume a
more active role in the mediation process. In the
back of his mind, Obasanjo probably feels the Paris
summit was intended, at least in part, to limit
Nigeria's role and to underscore that France not
Nigeria or even ECOWAS remains the main underwriter of
security in Francophone West Africa. Second, despite
Obasanjo's "gratefulness" to the French for brokering
the meeting with Biya, Paris is not
the GON's favorite foreign capital at the moment.
Obasanjo still smarts from the ICJ decision on Bakassi
that many Nigerians believe the French played an
unhelpful role in crafting. He clearly does not want
to be seen as legitimizing the French by returning to
the scene of the notorious September 5 meeting where
he is reported to have agreed to implement the ICJ
ruling(the GON denies he made the commitment). Right
now, a trip to Paris might not play well with the
Nigerian public.
JETER