NIGERIA: AFENIFERE LEADER SAYS "NO" TO A NORTHERN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABUJA 003037

SIPDIS


LONDON FOR C.GURNEY -- PASS TO A/S KANSTEINER AND AMB.
JETER


E.O. 12958: 11/04/12
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PREL NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: AFENIFERE LEADER SAYS "NO" TO A NORTHERN
PRESIDENT


REF: ABUJA 2990


CLASSIFED BY AMBASSADOR HOWARD F. JETER. REASONS 1.5
(B) AND (D).



1. (C) SUMMARY: During an October 23 Lagos meeting
with Ambassador Jeter, Afenifere leader Senator
Abraham Adesanya labeled the impeachment threat
against Obasanjo a ruse to return national political
power to the North. Although not an Obasanjo
supporter, Adesanya was adamant that the Presidency
remain in Southern hands after the 2003 elections.
Adesanya felt a national conference was needed to
establish a national consensus before unbridled
political competition degenerated into something more
regrettable -- disunion. The Afenifere head believed a
key to alleviating the mounting tension surrounding
the 203 election was the swift enactment of a
constitutional amendment limiting the President and
Governors to one five-year term in office. End Summary


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OBASANJO TRICKED THE NORTH; NOW THEY WANT HIS JOB
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2. (C) On October 23, Ambassador Jeter met Senator
Adesanya, head of "Afenifere," the preeminent Yoruba
socio-cultural organization, at Adesanya's Lagos
residence. Adesanya was joined by former Babangida era
Foreign Minister A. Bola Akinyemi (1985-87),now a
close Adesanya aide. Ambassador Jeter was accompanied
by his Staff Assistant and PolCouns.



3. (C) Adesanya, a rather spry and energetic
octogenarian, began the substantive discussion by
claiming that Obasanjo was wandering in a political no
man's land because he had broken rank with the
Northern establishment who "selected" him into office
in 1999. The North misread Obasanjo, thinking he was
the same malleable Head of State who allowed his
deputy Shehu Yar'Adua, a Northerner, to call many of
the shots from 1976-79. In his second coming, Obasanjo
was bent on being his own man, to the chagrin of
Northern king makers who thought their electoral
support had tied enough strings to Obasanjo to control
him, Adesanya postulated.


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TIME FOR A NATIONAL CONFERENCE IS NOW!
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4. (C) While visibly delighted that Obasanjo's
bullheadedness had foiled these perceived Northern
machinations, Adesanya nonetheless criticized
Obasanjo's stubbornness in not embracing the idea of a
national conference. Obasanjo was out of step with
dominant thought in his own Southwestern region,
Adesanya complained. The President's lack of
commanding support in Yorubaland was traceable, to a
large extent, to his ambivalence regarding a national
conference. Obasanjo was apprehensive the conference,
once convened, might veer from the stated purpose of
Nigerian unity to become the prelude to Nigeria's
dismemberment.



5. (C) Yet, most Yorubas supported the idea and still
wanted Nigeria to remain united; however, Adesanya
explained that his people were absolutely tired of
investing more in Nigeria than what they derived from
it while other areas (i.e. the North) gave little and
got much. A national conference was needed to
establish the heretofore-elusive national consensus.
The conference also was required to determine "who we
are and what we will do" as Nigerians, he expounded.
Without such a harmonizing conference, a terrible day
of reckoning awaited the country, Adesanya forecasted.



6. (C) Adesanya dismissed the present constitution and
its 1979 antecedent as not fitting the bill. Both
instruments were, in part, the work of conferences of
eminent persons. However, these conferences were
convened and controlled by then reigning military
governments. Moreover, military Heads of State,
including Obasanjo in 1979, could and did unilaterally
change the documents presented to him by the
deliberative assembly. Because these constitutions
were, from their inception, subject to the caprice of
a single individual, the documents never gained the
sanctity and the respect usually reposed in the
parchment containing a nation's organic law.
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PATRIOTS TO THE RESCUE
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7. (C) Adesanya, also a key member of the "Patriots"
by virtue of his leadership of Afenifere, said he
endorsed the Patriots' public statement asking
Obasanjo to forego a second term. While asking
Obasanjo not to seek reelection, he stressed the
Patriots had opposed the impeachment threat against
Obasanjo. "Why did the House wait so long to object to
Obasanjo's alleged wrongdoings?" queried Adesanya.
Due to their prolonged silence on some matters and
active complacency on others, the House " was
estopped" from fustigating the President to the point
of seeking his removal. If Obasanjo must go, the
lawmakers should go as well, declared Adesanya. At
this late stage in the electoral calendar, the
Patriots believed that impeachment was remarkably ill
timed. Adesanya denigrated impeachment advocates as
political "troublemakers" bent on shifting power from
the Southwest back to the North, since VP Atiku would
have assumed the Presidency upon Obasanjo's removal.



8. (C) The Northern politicians mistakenly thought
they could threaten Obasanjo with impeachment because
they supported his 1999 election more than his own
Yoruba clan. However, on becoming President, Obasanjo
also came to represent the South's ability to govern
the nation. Thus, impeachment was not just about
Obasanjo and his alleged wrongs. Northern moves to
impeach him were tantamount to a coup in the eyes of
the South and thus had kindled regional antagonism,
Adesanya declared.


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A SOUTHERN PRESIDENT, JUST NOT OBASANJO
--------------



9. (C) The Patriots believed power should remain in
Southern hands after the coming election. Adesanya
explained the group was established several years ago
by Southwestern and Southeastern politicians
frustrated that the North had controlled national
politics by playing the two Southern zones against
each other. In the Patriots, the Southwest was
represented mainly by members of Afenifere and the
Southeast by Ohaneze Ndigbo. Later, the Union of
Delta States brought the South-South into the fold.
Membership was also extended to some key opinion
makers from the Middle Belt as well.


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FIVE TIMES ONE IS BETTER THAN FOUR TIMES TWO
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10. (C) The Patriots backed the proposed
constitutional amendment of one five-year term for the
President and State Governors, believing the change
would reduce political tension. Adesanya claimed that
politics was becoming too rabid because many office-
holders sought to secure second terms even in the face
of adamant, powerful opposition against their return.
The only way to avoid spiraling tension was to
constitutionalize the one-term requirement. The
former Senator commented that the requirement had the
salutary benefit of postponing elections for a year --
hopefully giving the woefully unprepared Independent
National Electoral Commission time to plan for
elections in 2004 instead of early 2003.



11. (C) Adesanya further explained that, if Obasanjo
were given an extra year but not allowed to contest
again, he would have an incentive to ensure that INEC
was effective and impartial. Obasanjo's political
legacy would not be based on his re-election but on
the quality of his oversight of the first successful
civilian-to-civilian election and transfer of power in
Nigeria's history. Adesanya felt the amendment could
be passed quickly, provided the State Legislatures
acted fast. However, he acknowledged that most State
Governors would oppose the measure and that, unlike
the President's relationship with the National
Assembly, the state executives exercised great
influence over their respective Houses of Assembly.


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NORTHERN CANDIDATES PROSPECTS IN THE SOUTH
--------------



12. (C) Responding to questions from Ambassador Jeter,
Adesanya predicted that VP Atiku would have trouble
gaining support in the Southwest if he wrestled the
PDP nomination from Obasanjo. While Obasanjo was not
highly popular, he was Yoruba and "this transcended
personality." Atiku's candidacy would be negatively
viewed as a premature " power shift" because
Northerners believed the Presidency was their
birthright and could not countenance seeing an
independent Southerner at the helm. Adesanya predicted
strong opposition would also confront Atiku in the
South-South and the Southeast.



13. (C) The Afenifere leader discounted that Atiku
could make inroads by selecting a Yoruba, such as
longtime Atiku friend Lagos State Governor Tinubu, as
his Vice Presidential running mate. Suggesting Tinubu
was already in Afenifere's doghouse, Adesanya quipped
Tinubu was having too much trouble running Lagos to
aspire to the headache of governing the rest of
Nigeria. Adesanya doubted if Tinubu would have the
effrontery to team with Atiku. Chuckling "we will
cross that bridge when we get to it," Adesanya left
the clear impression that he would relish the chance
to teach the Lagos Governor a few old-fashioned
lessons about internal Yoruba politics.



14. (C) Regarding former Head of State Babangida,
Adesanya said he would also find difficulty in the
Southwest. Adesanya expostulated that former Head of
State Mohammedu Buhari's candidacy was wholly bad and
incapable of generating support due to Buhari's
perceived Northern Moslem chauvinism. (Comment: Former
Babangida Foreign Minister Akinyemi told the
Ambassador in an aside before the meeting with
Adesanya that Babangida would win 40 percent of the
vote in the Southwest. While the old guard might
oppose Babangida, Akinyemi thought Babangida would be
supported by numbers of the younger-generation
politicians and the professional class. The extensive
network Babangida had developed and the favors doled
out over the years would help immensely in the
Southwest, Akinyemi thought. End Comment.)



15. (C) Adesanya contended that any Southern
politician perceived as a front man for Northern
interests would have a difficult time gaining support
in the Southwest. Reports that Alex Ekwueme was being
courted as a potential candidate by the Northern
establishment would hurt the esteemed Igbo in the
Southwest, Adesany gauged. The South, particularly the
Southwest, will no longer be duped by Northern
political maneuvering, Adesanya concluded.


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Comment
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16. (C) Senator Adesanya had the look and energy level
of a man a score or more younger than his eighty
years. (Adesanya recently celebrated his 80th
birthday.) Regarding President Obasanjo, Adesanya gave
a Yoruba perspective markedly different from that of
the Ooni of Ife's unabashed support for the President
(reftel). While both men claim to represent the true
Yoruba perspective, the Ooni saw Obasanjo as
indispensable to Nigeria's stability; Adesanya said
Obasanjo could go but the Presidency must remain below
Nigeria's Mason-Dixon line, at least, for the next
presidential term.



17. (C) The point on which both the Ooni and Adesanya
agree is that Northern politicians are attempting to
recapture power in 2003. Both men are allied in
asserting that the Yoruba Southwest will react
vehemently to this prospective retaking of political
power by the North. End Comment.
ANDREWS