Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
02ABUJA3029
2002-11-05 16:18:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Abuja
Cable title:  

NIGERIA: PDP CHAIRMAN SAYS OBASANJO IS THE

Tags:  PGOV KDEM PREL NI 
pdf how-to read a cable
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ABUJA 003029 

SIPDIS


LONDON FOR C. GURNEY - PASS TO A/S KANSTEINER AND AMB.
JETER


E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/05/12
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PREL NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: PDP CHAIRMAN SAYS OBASANJO IS THE
ONLY GENUINE REFORM CANDIDATE


CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR HOWARD F. JETER. REASON:
1.5(B AND D).


C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ABUJA 003029

SIPDIS


LONDON FOR C. GURNEY - PASS TO A/S KANSTEINER AND AMB.
JETER


E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/05/12
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PREL NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: PDP CHAIRMAN SAYS OBASANJO IS THE
ONLY GENUINE REFORM CANDIDATE


CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR HOWARD F. JETER. REASON:
1.5(B AND D).



1. (C) SUMMARY: During an October 31 meeting with
Ambassador Jeter, PDP National Chairman Audu Ogbeh
correctly predicted the impeachment threat against
President Obasanjo would soon be resolved.
Nevertheless, the dispute had exacerbated North-South
tensions. Despite the President's lack of a
politician's charm, Ogbeh viewed Obasanjo as the only
leader with the fortitude and commitment to reform the
economy. Acknowledging the split between Obasanjo and
VP Atiku, Ogbeh believed that Atiku had not
conclusively decided to run, but was under heavy
pressure from his supporters to challenge Obasanjo.
Ogbeh planned to talk to Atiku in the next few days to
ascertain his intentions and counsel that challenging
Obasanjo could be destructive to the party and,
possibly, to the nation. Cautiously optimistic, Ogbeh
thought that the PDP would remain in tact despite its
feuding factions. END SUMMARY.



2. (C) During an October 30 late evening conversation
with Ambassador Jeter at the PDP Chairman's residence,
a relaxed but reflective Audu Ogbeh predicted the
impeachment threat was in its last days. He claimed
that many late nights counseling sessions with the
House leadership and the President had helped break
the impasse. Ogbeh recalled a late evening meeting a
few days earlier with House Speaker Na'Abba where the
recalcitrant parliamentarian signaled his willingness
to bury the impeachment hatchet. Ogbeh had also met
several other Northern legislators, warning them the
impeachment threat was accentuating North-South
antagonism at a time when Nigeria could ill afford
extra tension in the political arena. While Obasanjo
might not have won the Southwest in the 1999 election,
Yorubas saw the impeachment as much as an attack
against them as against Obasanjo, Ogbeh explained.
They felt the impeachment was an offspring of the same
Northern prejudice that annulled the June 1993
election won by a Yoruba, Moshood Abiola. (Comment:
On November 1, the impeachment drive came to an anti-
climatic end. That day an accord was reached whereby

the House agreed to shelve the impeachment threat
while the Presidency agreed to fund certain capital
projects and suspend some contentious privatization
sales. This agreement will be reported in greater
detail septel. End Comment.)



3. (C) Viewing impeachment from another angle, Ogbeh
contended that perhaps everyone had expected too much
of Obasanjo. Here was a man who, as military Head of
State, was chief executive, legislature and judiciary
merged into one. People correctly praised Obasanjo for
handing over to elected civilian government in 1979
because that act signified his respect for democracy.
However, it did not mean Obasanjo understood the day
to day practice of democracy, posited Ogbeh. It had
taken three years, capped by the latest impeachment
saga, but Obasanjo now was coming to terms with the
limitations of being an elected President.



4. (C) Ogbeh acknowledged that Obasanjo's gruff
manner has placed the President at odds with members
of the political elite. Nonetheless, he identified
Obasanjo as probably the only politician who would
implement reforms needed to diversify the economy,
address unemployment and make politics less of a zero-
sum contest by energizing and expanding the private
sector. Currently, most major businesses depend on
government contracts for their lifeblood. This
situation could not endure, Ogbeh warned. Already
over 80 percent of government's budget goes to
recurrent expenses, mostly salaries and pensions. Not
enough is devoted to productive, wealth-generating
activities. The amount required for recurrent
expenses would only grow over time, shrinking the
funds that could be devoted to capital projects and
needed construction.



5. (C) Ogbeh stressed that Nigeria gained
approximately 11 billion dollars annually from oil
exports, "4 billion less than the New York City's Fire
Department's annual budget." Over the long run, the
competition for oil money will become keener due to
population growth and the growth in the numbers of
businesses. We cannot run a government or a nation as
big as Nigeria on a budget smaller than that of a city
fire department, he asserted. It would be inimical
for the GON to solely rely on oil money as the
backbone of the national treasury in the long-term.
To escape this predicament, the nation and its people
needed to get to work, Ogbeh declared.



6. (C) Ogbeh claimed Obasanjo clearly understood the
need for economic growth and wealth creation.
Notwithstanding his reputation as a know-it-all, the
President was open to ideas for generating income,
especially in the agricultural sector. Conversely,
the twin concepts of economic reform and wealth
creation had escaped most Northern politicians,
including Vice President Atiku, Ogbeh contended. Save
for a few notable exceptions such as business magnate
Aliko Dangote, most Northerners thought that the
wealth was cash and they were singularly disinterested
in the prosaic drudgery of business development and
investment. Recalling a meeting with mostly Northern
PDP lawmakers, Ogbeh was ignored as he explained the
economic benefits of a cassava project the government
wanted to fund. The parliamentarians were bored with
talk about investment, agricultural production, export
earnings and the like. They only wanted to know
whether the project has money in it for them, Ogebeh
sadly recounted.



7. (C) Instead of investing in the productive economy,
Northerners would rather amass cash to engage in
conspicuous consumption. Because they spend money at
a handsome clip, the need to refill their pocketbooks
was incessant, continued Ogbeh. This cycle of
consumption and spending lent itself to a dependency
on government patronage and other loose practices to
extract money quickly from the public weal. Obasanjo's
attempt to close the spigot, reducing the generous
flow of public funds into unproductive and undeserving
private hands, threatened the way these Northern
politicians maintained both influence and affluence,
the PDP Chairman asserted. This reality underlies
much of the opposition to Obasanjo. Consequently, many
in the political elite would rejoice if Obasanjo were
replaced by a practitioner of politics-as-usual such
as VP Atiku, Ogbeh believed. However, the masses
would suffer more then they now do because Atiku's
commitment to economic reform was questionable. Since
he views Obasanjo as the only candidate sufficiently
wedded to transforming the economy, Ogbeh suggested he
might resign should Obasanjo not return as the PDP
standard-bearer.



8. (C) The PDP Chairman thought Atiku would challenge
Obasanjo for the PDP nomination. He also understood
an Obasanjo-Atiku tussle would severely test party
cohesion and exacerbate regional tensions within and
outside the party. Atiku was under intense pressure to
run, Ogbeh observed. This pressure might be causing
Atiku to overestimate his strength within the party.
Atiku thought he had the Southeast's support, but
three of the five governors in that zone supported
Obasanjo, according to the Chairman. Moreover,
Atiku's support in his own Northeastern region was not
deep. Atiku may get support from the Tivs in Benue
State who continue to seethe over the October 2001
killings in Zaki Biam and blame Obasanjo; however,
Atiku could not assume the entire Middle Belt had
moved into his corner. Atiku would have to write off
the Southwest, albeit that region might not be
critical. The Southwest will not produce many
convention delegates because the rival Alliance for
Democracy political party controlled Yorubaland
although it was Obasanjo's own ethnic backyard.



9. (C) However, Obasanjo recently gained support in
the South-South because of his sponsorship of the
recent resource allocation bill restoring to that area
revenues previously jeopardized as a result of a
Supreme Court decision earlier this year.
Furthermore, Ogbeh contended that many people would
view Atiku's challenge to Obasanjo as crass betrayal.
They would not want to reward him for attempting to
supplant his boss and, in doing so, setting a sad
precedent for Nigeria's new democracy. Perhaps, most
importantly, Atiku could not count on the Northwest.



10. (C) Ogbeh subscribed to the idea that key players
in the Northwest were cynically spurring Atiku's
candidacy in an attempt to ruin him politically. It
was possibly that a trap, to be sprung by Atiku's own
ambition, was being set. Many of Atiku's ersatz
supporters were bona fide Babangida men, detected
Ogbeh. The former Head of State and his minions wanted
to draw Atiku into the open field then scuttle his
drive for the PDP nomination. Babangida hoped to
eliminate Atiku presently and not contend with an
Atiku in 2007 who would be much stronger after
amassing four additional years of clout and resources
as the Vice President. If Atiku managed to capture the
PDP nomination, Ogbeh thought Babangida would then
enter the race as a candidate of one or an alliance of
the opposition parties. In addition to undermining
the chance for progress on economic and governmental
reform, a presidential contest reduced to these two
Northerners after only four years of Southern rule
would spark resentment in the South, Ogbeh maintained.



11. (C) Ogbeh noted that Atiku would have to resign if
he broke from Obasanjo. The resignation would give
Atiku more freedom to campaign, but he would also risk
losing relevance during the next few months. Atiku
had to realize that much of his influence derived from
his position; once the position was gone, some
influence and status would vanish with it. Moreover,
Atiku should expect Obasanjo and his new Vice
President to concentrate on dismantling Atiku's
machinery and support within the GON. The power of
incumbency would no longer be his; instead, it would
be used against him.



12. (C) Because he thought Atiku's candidacy would be
unwise, Ogbeh indicated he might seek a private
meeting with the VP to present his concerns about
Atiku running at this time.



13. (C) Despite the internecine wrestling within the
PDP, Ogbeh was confident the party would remain the
majority party provided it could patch some of its
differences and that the presidential race did not
become a genuine donnybrook. He saw the AD and ANPP
as weak and wracked by their fair share of internal
discord. The NPD and UNPP he described as artificial
parties waiting on Babangida to decide what he and
they should do.



14. (C) Ogbeh also discounted the recent clamor to
amend the constitution to provide for single five-year
terms for the president and state governors. While
this fix might reduce some of the current tension, its
passage was unlikely. Even if adopted by the National
Assembly, most State Governors opposed it and would
not pressure their State Assemblies no to pass it.
(Without the concurrence of 24 State Houses, the
measure will die.) For Ogbeh, the real problem was
not the term of office but more the commitment to good
governance of politicians. A politician faced with
one term could use the five years to enrich himself,
knowing he could not run again and thus did not have
to worry about his image with the electorate.
Morever, changing hands and, possibly, policy
direction every five years would undermine the
continuity that Nigeria's political system needed at
this juncture.


--------------
COMMENT
--------------



15. (C) Ogbeh is astute and, as PDP Chairman, realizes
he is in the middle of a brewing storm unless the
President and Vice President mend fences. Odds favor
continued discord and an Atiku challenge for the PDP
nomination. Ogbeh knows that a hard-fought Atiku-
Obasanjo contest can fragment the party. Even if the
party remained intact, such a contest will likely
leave the President and the VP as bitter enemies who
would continue to work against one another after the
PDP nomination was decided. Ogbeh holds economic
growth as the key to Nigeria's stability and future.
He might have stretched a bit in stating that Obasanjo
was the only reform-minded one among the major players
but Ogbeh is generally frank; we think he believed
what he said. Thus, he sees the upcoming election as
an implicit referendum on reform. Should Obasanjo eke
out victory, Nigeria will continue along this path,
albeit probably at its own halting pace. If Atiku,
Babangida or someone from the den of Nigeria's
traditional political elite captures national power,
economic and governmental reform will take a distant
back seat to the return of business and politics as
usual.


ANDREWS