Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
02ABUJA2991
2002-11-01 16:22:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Abuja
Cable title:  

NIGERIA: FORMER HEAD OF STATE ABUBAKAR THINKS

Tags:  PGOV PREL KDEM NI 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABUJA 002991 

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: 10/28/12
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: FORMER HEAD OF STATE ABUBAKAR THINKS
OBASANJO SHOULD GO!


CLASSIFIED BY HOWARD F. JETER. REASON 1.5 (D).


C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABUJA 002991

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: 10/28/12
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: FORMER HEAD OF STATE ABUBAKAR THINKS
OBASANJO SHOULD GO!


CLASSIFIED BY HOWARD F. JETER. REASON 1.5 (D).



1. (C) SUMMARY: According to former Head of State
Abdulsalami Abubakar, the October 10 dinner meeting
with Obasanjo, Babangida, VP Atiku, NSA Mohammed and
himself did not bridge differences between Obasanjo
and the others. Since no consensus on the way forward
was reached, Abubakar felt the best solution for
Nigeria's current electoral imbroglio was Obasanjo's
withdrawal from the Presidential contest. Obasanjo's
cardinal failing has been his lack of pragmatism in
attempting to govern a vast, complex and diverse
Nigeria as if he were on a one-man crusade, alienating
important political interests and the National
Assembly in his drive for reform. To Abubakar,
Obasanjo tried to change things too much, too quickly,
forgetting that an essential ingredient in Nigerian
politics was patronage. Abubakar considered VP Atiku a
strong possibility for the PDP Presidential
nomination. However, he disavowed any insider
knowledge on the inscrutable Babangida and his next
moves. End Summary.


-------------- --------------
--------------
OBASANJO, BABANGIDA AND OTHERS DINE BUT FAIL TO BREAK
BREAD
-------------- --------------
--------------



2. (C) During an October 18 afternoon with Ambassador
Jeter at the Ambassador's residence, former Head of
State Abubakar confirmed that Babangida, VP Atiku, NSA
Aliyu Mohammed and he dined with Obasanjo on October

10. Contrary to press reports that the meeting helped
reconcile the quintet, Abubakar described the session
as inconclusive. The meeting provided a chance to air
grievances and concerns, but the five men did not
agree on a way forward. (Note: Abubakar also
confirmed South African President Mbeki's apparently
unsuccessful efforts in late September and in October
to reconcile Obasanjo with Babangida and the others.
End Note.)



3. (C) Given the high anxiety and political tension
caused by the approaching elections, Abubakar thought
Obasanjo's exit from the Presidential sweepstakes was
the key to alleviating stress in the political system.
Due to his lack of political skills, Obasanjo had
alienated his friends and deepened the enmity of his
foes. The former military Head of State worried that

protracted squabbling over Obasanjo's succession bid
might cause further regional divisions pitting North
against South. Because he now was the lighting rod in
Nigerian politics, the best way forward was for
Obasanjo to stand aside, Abubakar declared.


--------------
OBASANJO, THE IMPOLITIC REFORMER
--------------



4. (C) Giving credit to Obasanjo for integrity, good
intentions, and a tireless work ethic, Abubakar
nonetheless blamed Obasanjo's decline on the
President's lack of political savvy and his impatient,
sometimes erratic push for reform. Obasanjo tried to
change too much, too quickly, without consulting and
trying to persuade others to embrace his actions.
Moreover, Abubakar said that Obasanjo presided over
government as his personal fiefdom where only his
opinions mattered. The President tried to control
everything, and no important decisions could be made
without him. By trying to do everything at once and by
not prioritizing, he had accomplished precious little,
Abubakar contended. Instead of turning the system on
its head, Obasanjo should have concentrated on three
or four key objectives. By trying to do everything,
he achieved nothing and had not major accomplishments
to show for all of his efforts.


--------------
PATRONAGE, THE KEY TO REELECTION
--------------



5. (C) Abubakar said that Obasanjo seriously
jeopardized his political future by alienating people
who had worked hard for his election. Obasanjo the
reformer had little sense of political reciprocity;
his refusal to return political favors was perceived
by many as rank ingratitude not principled reform
especially when some of Obasanjo's men, such as Works
and Housing Minister Tony Anenih, were involved in
corruption. Obasanjo should have realized that
Nigeria's political culture could not change
overnight. The people who helped Obasanjo expected
"some patronage." Patronage was an unavoidable fact of
life Nigerian politics. Obasanjo's dismissive remarks
that those who backed him in anticipation of favors
had made a "bad investment" had angered many political
investors.



6. (C) Now that Obasanjo was coming back to ask their
help in reelection drive, they were turning away from
him. Since their first investment in him was "bad,"
Abubakar said that Obasanjo's former supporters saw no
reason to support him again. Abubakar offered that
Obasanjo's drive for reform, coupled with an
exaggerated self-worth, blinded him to this crucial
political reality. In short, Obasanjo was not
pragmatic enough to be a good President, Abubakar
believed. (Comment: Abubakar was speaking from
personal experience. We have been told by one insider
of an occasion where Abubakar went to Obasanjo for
help -- we do not know if it was financial patronage.
However, we were told that Obasanjo abruptly showed
the former Head of State the door. End Comment.)
--------------
NOT TO IMPEACH BUT TO SIDELINE
--------------



7. (C) Because of Obasanjo, the PDP was tearing
itself apart, observed Abubakar. Obasanjo had set
himself against the National Assembly early in his
Administration. He had undermined its leadership and
belittled its role in governance. To a substantial
degree, the tables were now turned. In response to
the Ambassador's direct question, Abubakar thought the
impeachment threat was not intended to remove Obasanjo
from office but to deny him the PDPD renomination.
Again, this was a struggle in the realm of practical
politics, noted Abubakar. Assembly Members need to
bring some money and projects to their constituents to
help secure reelection; local voters only think a
politician is good if he can give them money or has
finagled a project or two for their community.



8. (C) By initially refusing to fund capital and other
constituency projects, Obasanjo was undermining
Assembly Members' reelection chances. When he finally
realized the political implications of the impeachment
threat, Obasanjo moved to fund many of these projects.
By then, however, so much bad blood had developed that
Obasanjo's corrective measures did not engender
goodwill. They caused bewilderment. People wondered
why it took Obasanjo so long to do the politically
obvious, Abubakar declared.



9. (C) Pointing out the numerous meetings that have
taken place in the past few weeks without yet
resolving the conflict between the President and his
antagonists within the PDP, Abubakar said party
officials were finding it difficult to identify common
ground between the two sides. Obasanjo created this
strong adversarial relationship because he disdained
the Assembly; now its members feel that either he or
they must go.



10. (C) Abubakar further commented that the schism
between Obasanjo and his Vice President was real.
While professing non-involvement in party politics,
Abubakar believed that a bid for the PDP nomination by
VP Atiku was a strong possibility. However, Abubakar
professed no knowledge of Babangida's next moves, even
though the two are neighbors and reportedly best
friends.


--------------
COMMENT
--------------



11. (C) The fence-mending dinner with Babangida,
Abubakar and others seems to have fallen short of
Obasanjo's expectations. If Abubakar is an accurate
barometer, the meeting may have brought home to
Obasanjo some of his past missteps, but it did not
bring the expressions of current and future support
Obasanjo wanted from the "big four." We concur with
Abubakar's assessment of Obasanjo's political
troubles: It is not so much Obasanjo's gruff exterior
but his miserliness. His weakness has been that he did
not, or could not, play "the game" according to local
rules.



12. (C) Abubakar's identification of patronage as the
fulcrum also helps place what may be at stake in the
coming election. In one corner, there is Obasanjo, the
often-inconsistent reformer who lacks political savvy.
In the other, there is a steady stream of people who
might be much better politicians than Obasanjo but
whose bonds to "politics as usual" are decidedly
stronger than their or Obasanjo's commitment to
reform.
JETER