NIGERIA WANTS TIME TO IMPLEMENT BAKASSI RULING

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ABUJA 002934

SIPDIS


NOFORN


E.O.12958: DECL:1.6X1; 1.6X6
TAGS: PBTS PREL MOPS MARR PINS IV NI UV
SUBJECT: NIGERIA WANTS TIME TO IMPLEMENT BAKASSI RULING

REFS: IIR 6 871 0599 02
- IIR 6 871 0004 03
- IIR 6 871 0617 02
- IIR 6 871 0005 03
- IIR 6 871 0008 03
- TD 314/42566-02
- TD 314/42626-02
- TD 314/41986-02
- Abuja 2800
- Abuja 2787
- Abuja 2813
- Abuja 2833
- Email Johnson/McKean 24 Oct 02
- FBIS Reston 240234Z OCT 02
- Yaounde 3537


Classified by multiple sources. Reasons: 1.5(a),(b) and
(d).



1. (S) Summary: Nigeria's Cabinet states its objections to
the ICJ ruling on Bakassi, suggests implementation will not
begin soon, and calls for more bilateral talks. Meanwhile,
the Armed Forces are simultaneously on high alert and a huge
shopping spree. We view GON words and actions as efforts to
force Cameroon to negotiate despite an international verdict
largely in Yaounde's favor. Nigeria controls about 70% of
Bakassi and will not withdraw now. GON hawks might like to
take the rest, but military action does not seem imminent.
However, the popular press is inciting the public against
Cameroon, and popular fervor is mounting. A minor incident
could spiral into a major confrontation. Engagement with
the GON is required to minimize that risk; we offer some
thoughts. End Summary.


Summary of Nigeria's Statement on Bakassi
--------------



2. (U) Nigeria's Federal Executive Council (Cabinet)
October 23 adopted a statement charging the ICJ with having
erred in its October 10 decision on the case concerning the
"Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria."
The six-page document asserted particularly that:
-- The UK never had sovereignty over Bakassi and therefore
could not have ceded it to Germany in 1913;
-- The ICJ decision was "purely political;"
-- The French, German and English judges should have
disqualified themselves because they "acted as judges in
their own cause;"
-- Nigeria's constitution explicitly recognizes Bakassi as
part of the Federation and, therefore, inalienable except by
amendment of the constitution;
-- Nigeria was "unable to accept the reasoning of the Court"
that the Maroua Declaration was binding, as Nigeria had
never ratified it; and
-- The ICJ ruling did not affect the right of innocent
passage (to Calabar) of Nigerian naval vessels.



3. (U) Notwithstanding headlines in most major news media
that Nigeria had "rejected" the ICJ ruling, the statement
carefully avoids blunt language. Rather, it argues that "a
lot of fundamental facts were not taken into consideration"
and "appeals to all [Nigerian] citizens at home and abroad
to remain calm, positive and constructive until we can find
a peaceful solution to the boundary issue between Nigeria
and Cameroon." The statement expresses appreciation to
UNSYG for offering his good offices to broker a meeting
similar to the September 5 meeting in Paris "with a view to
effecting reconciliation, normalization of relations and
good neighborliness. The GON also "thanks all leaders of
the international community who have expressed concern and
reassures them that [Nigeria] will spare no efforts to
maintain peace." However, the statement assures Nigerian
citizens that their interests will be protected. "For
Nigeria, ... it is a matter of the welfare and well-being of
her people on their land."


What Does it Mean (and Not Mean)?
--------------



4. (U) In other words, Nigeria does not explicitly "reject"
the ICJ decision, nor does it characterize the decision as a
whole as "unacceptable." The statement's wording is quite
careful to emphasize the interests of citizens rather than
the interests of possession of territory that may yield
valuable natural resources. Taken as a whole, however, the
statement does constitute a refusal to accept the ICJ's
reasoning and strongly implies a refusal to implement the
judgment itself.



5. (C) In a meeting with key Chiefs of Mission October 24,
Foreign Minister Sule Lamido contended that the statement
attributed to UNSYG's spokesman following the September 5
meeting held an important error: President Obasanjo had
never committed to implement the ICJ judgment; President
Biya had done so, and UNSYG's statement had then imputed
that commitment to Obasanjo as well. While this claim comes
a bit late in the sequence of events, it is interesting that
the GOC's brief statement of October 24 (Ref M) states that
President Biya agreed to conform to the decision "as the
United Nations Charter requires" and that Cameroon "remains
disposed to put in place the confidence-building measures
agreed at Paris between Presidents Obasanjo and Paul Biya."
The GOC goes on to "energetically hope that the Nigerian
Government will remain faithful to the undertakings freely
accepted on September 5." What Yaounde's statement does not
claim is that Obasanjo specifically agreed to implement the
ICJ's ruling. MFA Permanent Secretary Hart told the
Ambassador October 24 that Obasanjo had chosen not to
correct UNSYG's error because the GON did not want to
undermine Annan and was hoping to continue to draw on his
good offices to reach a mutually satisfactory resolution of
outstanding issues with Cameroon (See also para 11). Hart
went on to say that he did not agree with the issuance of
the October 24 statement. Rather, he believed the GON
should have continued to study the judgment...ad infinitum.



6. (C) Moreover, Hart had told the Ambassador October 7
(Ref K) that Abuja sought a "joint implementation committee"
to manage the post-decision process -- only to call back
October 10 (before the judgment was read) to clarify the GON
position (Ref L). Hart explained that Abuja preferred to
create a "Reconciliation and Good Neighborliness Committee."
We believed then, and still believe now, that the GON wants
to focus GOC attention on the potential benefits of vastly
improved overall bilateral relations in order to obtain
Yaounde's acquiescence in a gradual and very deliberate
implementation (or perhaps no implementation) of the aspects
of the ICJ judgment that trouble Abuja most.


Public Pressures Very Real
--------------



7. (U) Opinion runs against the ICJ decision by a ratio of
about 25:1, as measured by media reaction. Even those who
favor implementation (mostly lawyers) argue not from the
heart but from the precepts of international law and the
GON's decision not to dispute ICJ jurisdiction after the GOC
filed its suit. The lawyers are themselves a divided lot,
with well over half backing the GON. Some of the journalism
has become downright yellow, with recurring themes of
"brutal Cameroonian gendarmes" harassing and murdering
"innocent Nigerian fisherman" and robbing and raping their
wives and daughters. Popular nationalism is growing;
pressure on the GON to "do something" is real and rising.


Is the GON Leading or Following?
--------------



8. (C) A fundamental problem for the GON is that it never
prepared the Nigerian public for the eventuality of losing
the ICJ case -- even as the probability became clearer in
recent months. Former Foreign Minister Baba Gana Kingibe
told us just after the decision was announced that he had
argued against accepting ICJ jurisdiction when he was
Nigeria's top diplomat but that others, notably lawyer
Richard Akinjide (now one of the loudest advocates of
Nigeria refusing to implement the decision),had convinced
then Head of State Sani Abacha that Nigeria would win.
(COMMENT: We understand that Nigeria accepted compulsory
ICJ jurisdiction in 1965, so it would have had to withdraw
from the Court to prevent Cameroon's complaint from being
heard. END COMMENT.).



9. (S) Obasanjo and the GON do not want to wage war, but
neither can they "surrender" Bakassi to Cameroon. They must
negotiate a careful course between a bewildered and angry
public and a watchful, wary court of world opinion. The GON
has voiced to the GOF its position that any significant
French support for Cameroon would be viewed as an unfriendly
act. With far more business at stake in Nigeria than in
Cameroon but its credibility with francophone States also on
the line, Paris, too, must tread warily. Over the years,
London has tried repeatedly to lower Nigerian expectations
of a major legal victory. Nigerian officials have privately
expressed deep chagrin over what they perceive as a lack of
support from their former colonial ruler and have contrasted
this stance with their perception that Paris is solidly
behind Cameroon. Some have also criticized the U.S. It is
far from clear that GON officials understand Cameroon's case
is and always was much stronger. Indeed, Kingibe's account
of his fruitless effort to convince Abacha to object to ICJ
jurisdiction suggests that senior Nigerians' conviction that
Bakassi was "rightfully" Nigerian might have blinded them to
the principles of law that led the ICJ to conclude otherwise
(with just two judges dissenting, one Nigerian and one from
Sierra Leone). For now, the Nigerian public stands behind
its President in seeing the ICJ decision as a manifestation
of European neo-colonial intentions. The fact that the
ICJ's presiding judge is a French national is viewed as
"proof" of this alleged plot. British High Commissioner
Philip Thomas's public call for Nigeria to respect the ICJ's
ruling following a meeting with Lamido (Para 5) left many
Nigerians nonplussed. Meanwhile, the FCO was calling in
Nigeria's High Commissioner to press home London's view that
Obasanjo had undertaken at Paris to implement the ICJ ruling
and that the GON needed to do just that.


Getting the GON to Lead Constructively
--------------



10. (C) What the GON needs quickly in order to keep public
anger from exploding into more calls for military action --
some commentators are already beating the drums of war, but
they are, for now, in the minority -- is a sign from Yaounde
that it is willing to negotiate. The GOC may believe that
the ICJ victory gives it unassailably high moral ground, but
the GON sees the ICJ decision as advisory and non-binding.



11. (C) MFA Permanent Secretary Hart told the Ambassador
that the GON anticipated there would be another meeting in
Paris facilitated by UNSYG, probably in mid-November. If
this meeting takes place but the GON returns with little in
hand, pressure for unilateral action is likely to increase.
Nigerian jingoism could take over.



12. (C) An editorial in the Yaounde "Herald" (Ref N) called
for Cameroonian magnanimity in victory and urged Biya to pay
a "charm visit" to Abuja in short order. We believe the
"Herald" has the right concept and that an enduring peace
will require Yaounde to:
-- Agree to some form of joint administration that will
protect the interests of Bakassi's overwhelmingly Nigerian
inhabitants, to include access to fisheries;
-- Not attempt to prevent Nigeria from holding elections in
Bakassi early next year, better still facilitate them; and
-- Agree in principle to unrestricted Nigerian access to the
Cross River Channel and work toward a formal agreement in
that regard, perhaps with international guarantors.



13. (C) For its part, Nigeria could offer to exploit
onshore and offshore hydrocarbon deposits jointly at a ratio
heavily favorable to Cameroon; the oil and gas matter far
more to Cameroon, whose resources are limited, than to
Nigeria, whose huge gas reserves are largely untapped and
whose oil-production capacity in excess of probable OPEC
quotas is projected to grow steadily over the next decade.


Military Preparations
--------------



14. (S/NF) Senior Nigerians, including the Minister of
Defense (septel),have made it clear GON forces will not
budge from the portions of Bakassi they now control but that
they will fight back if Cameroon attacks. While Cameroon
may have no such intention, reporting from several sources
(Refs E and G give examples) indicates that Nigerian
intelligence services are warning policy-makers that Yaounde
is preparing to strike. Despite his claims in a letter to
President Bush, Obasanjo is reported in Ref H to have said
that Nigerian hesitation in reclaiming Bakassi would prove
"fatal" because Cameroon planned to "strike."



15. (S/NF) Nigeria's Constitution requires the President to
obtain the National Assembly's permission before engaging
Nigerian forces beyond its borders. In Ref H, a Senator is
reported to believe that the Senate would accede to such a
request. A Senator who was present at the October 11
Federal Security Council meeting where Bakassi was discussed
told us that he had told Obasanjo, both during the meeting
and privately, that the National Assembly would not support
a declaration of war. The Senator commented to us that the
legislators suspected that the talk of war was intended
primarily to rationalize the purchase of weapons systems the
Armed Forces did not really need. The only solution to its
conflict with Cameroon was for Nigeria to negotiate, the
Senator concluded.



16. (S/NF) The GON is moving to acquire weaponry that would
prove useful in an eventual Bakassi conflict, including 12
SU-27 ground-attack aircraft and 70-plus 35-foot shallow-
draft patrol boats (essentially large Zodiacs). This number
of boats would be sufficient to move simultaneously most of
the combat elements of all four battalions currently
deployed in Bakassi and its immediate vicinity and to
provide reinforcements and resupply. Also, the Nigerian
port of Calabar is closer to Bakassi through less dangerous
waters than is either Douala or Limbe. Any Cameroonians
attempting to resupply Bakassi would be vulnerable to attack
by Nigerian Alpha Jets, six of which are now operational,
with four more expected to return to service soon. Also,
Nigeria has procured additional Mi-35 attack helicopters,
including a one-year maintenance contract, from Russia.
(Refs A-E offer detail on the foregoing).



17. (S/NF) We have heard that the 20 battalion in Serti
(near the Cameroonian border but about 500 km from Bakassi),
which was scheduled to rotate to Sierra Leone, will stay in
its garrison, with the Katsina-based 35 battalion rotating
instead. However, Minister of Defense Danjuma October 25
again confirmed to the Ambassador his instructions to the
Chief of Army Staff to move the Serti battalion to Sierra
Leone (septel). We know that Nigerian forces across the
country have been at a state of heightened alert since early
October, and that those deployed to Bakassi are at their
highest state of peacetime alert.


Comment:
--------------



18. (S) As Obasanjo put it in his October 14 letter to
President Bush, "The situation is precarious politically.
We would need the assistance of all parties to ensure that
any form of confrontation or victor/vanquished posturing is
discouraged. ...I welcome...your good offices in
establishing further progress in the solution of the
problem." As long as Cameroon does nothing that impacts
negatively the rights and lives of Bakassi's inhabitants and
as long as there is at least an appearance of progress
toward a political solution that will restore the status quo
before the decision, the GON should be able to resist
pressure to act unilaterally. In their October 24 meeting,
MFA Permanent Secretary Hart confessed to the Ambassador
that the GON was indeed hoping for a restoration of the
status quo ante and the re-establishment of the 1993 border
demarcation committee.



19. (S) We believe that the GON is speaking in largely
conciliatory terms with the international community while
engaging in a major off-budget military build-up in order to
build and sustain direct and indirect pressure on Cameroon
to negotiate. Yaounde would be wise to do so. As we have
noted earlier in this message, the balance of forces in and
around Bakassi favors Abuja, and the Nigeria's relative
advantage is likely to grow.



20. (S) The GON does not want to face the international
condemnation (and possible French intervention) that would
result from it striking against Cameroon. Obasanjo also has
little to gain and much to lose under current circumstances;
already some of our contacts are suggesting in private that
he might want a war with Cameroon in order to be able to
invoke the constitutional provision that allows elections to
be deferred in time of war. We find this far-fetched, but
Obasanjo would have to deal with public allegations along
these lines should fighting break out.



21. (S) However, "the situation is precarious politically."
There is a long history of violent incidents between local
inhabitants (mostly Nigerians) and Cameroonian gendarmes.
Nigeria's popular press is fanning the embers of resentment.
Another incident would worsen the climate for dialogue, and
it could happen at any time.


What Should the USG Do?
--------------



22. (C) It would be useful for the USG to urge both parties
to this ongoing dispute -- the ICJ ruling has not effected a
political settlement both parties will accept -- to renew
their dialogue, both under the good offices of UNSYG and
directly. Senior Nigerians understand that full restoration
of the status quo ante will be difficult, if not impossible,
in the wake of the ICJ ruling. But neither they nor the
people of Nigeria will agree to (and implement) the major
changes the ICJ's ruling implies. Creative thinking and
effective confidence-building measures, along with patience
on both sides, are key requirements for the serious and
sustained bilateral engagement that is the only hope of true
resolution.
JETER