NIGERIA WANTS TIME TO IMPLEMENT BAKASSI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 002813

SIPDIS


USCINCEUR FOR DCINC


E.O.12958: DECL: 09/30/2012
TAGS: PBTS PREL MOPS MARR PINS IV NI UV
SUBJECT: NIGERIA WANTS TIME TO IMPLEMENT BAKASSI
RULING


REFS: A) ABUJA 2800, B) ABUJA 2787,
C) USDAO ABUJA 2723, D) ABUJA 2721,
E) USDEL SECRETARY 36, F) YAOUNDE 3401,
G) STATE 196196


Classified by Ambassador Howard F. Jeter. Reasons:
1.5(b) and (d).



1. (C) Summary: MFA convokes Ambassador, asserts GON
will eschew force in Bakassi, whatever the ICJ
decides, as long as Cameroon does the same. However,
Abuja will want "time to study the verdict," a Joint
Implementation Committee and a second summit.
"Provocation" and "atrocities committed" by
Cameroonian gendarmes was Nigeria's justification for
putting military forces into Bakassi nearly a decade
ago, and other senior GON officials have sounded
harder lines. Hence, the MFA demarche is not entirely
reassuring as a bellwether of events to come. End
Summary.



2. (C) Acting on "instructions from a very high
level," MFA Permanent Secretary Dan Hart October 7
convoked the Ambassador to "apprise [Nigeria's]
friends of our reaction" to the impending ICJ ruling
on the Cameroon/Nigeria border. DCM accompanied the
Ambassador; Hart was alone. Hart said the importance
of the GON message was such that it should normally
have been conveyed by a Minister, but both Sule Lamido
and Dubem Onyia were abroad, so it fell to him.



3. (C) Intimating that Abuja believed that the ICJ's
decision would go against Nigeria, Hart said Nigeria
would "ask for time to study the verdict." The GON
sought a "joint implementation committee" to manage
the post-decision process and might ask UNSYG Annan
"to convene another summit." Nigeria would continue
with all confidence-building measures, ongoing and
planned, Hart assured.



4. (C) Ambassador Jeter replied that the USG looked
with favor on the revitalization of the Nigerian-
Cameroonian Bilateral Commission. Hart confirmed that
the September 29-30 Ministerial meeting in Abuja had
gone well. Hart explained that, contrary to some
media reports, Cameroonian President Paul Biya had
never been expected at the session. The State Visit
to Nigeria discussed during the 5 September bilateral
Summit in Paris was envisaged for later in the year.



5. (C) The Ambassador remarked that the Paris meeting
was a good start to a critical bilateral dialogue.
The U.S. knew of and appreciated Nigeria's previous
efforts to initiate bilateral negotiations, and we
commended the GOF and UNSYG for their facilitation of
discussions now underway. We hoped for continued
(bilateral) progress toward a mutually-acceptable
outcome, regardless of the verdict.



6. (C) Hart agreed that this process was "in the
African spirit of brotherhood" and averred that
Nigeria would continue to pursue it. "It cannot be
otherwise," he continued. "In view of the role we
play, we cannot be seen to be belligerent." However,
he warned, if Cameroon were to prove belligerent, "we
are capable of standing up for ourselves."



7. (C) Responding to a question from the Ambassador,
Hart opined that the French could have done more to
encourage bilateral dialogue. The economic
relationship between France and Nigeria should have
made France "more positively assertive earlier." But
Hart acknowledged the accuracy of French claims that
Biya was reclusive and often obdurate and commented
that a good personal relationship between Presidents
Chirac and Obasanjo had helped.



8. (C) COMMENT: The case before the ICJ covers the
border from Lake Chad to the Gulf of Guinea. However,
control of Bakassi and the adjacent waters lies at the
heart of the dispute. Hart's demarche suggests that
the GON intends to delay functional implementation of
an ICJ decision that goes against Nigeria on the core
Bakassi issue as long as it possibly can. Given the
stresses and constraints the ongoing electoral season
imposes, the GON stance should be understood in
Yaounde as about the most forthcoming Nigeria can be
at this time. Others in the GON, including the
influential Minister of Defense (REF A) and his senior
deputy (REF B) have taken much harder lines. As we
have reported previously, it is an article of faith
among most Nigerians, including their elected
representatives (REF B) that Bakassi is part of
Nigeria. No government facing a near-term election,
especially one as embattled as Obasanjo's, can afford
to concede the correctness of an ICJ decision that
goes against Nigeria. Given the ever-present danger
of a military skirmish or an incident between GOC
forces and Nigerian civilians escalating into
something worse -- a danger that will be heightened by
the decision, no matter its beneficiary -- the
importance of restraint and bilateral negotiations
(REF G) probably can never be repeated too often.



9. (C-Rel NATO) DATT COMMENT: Recent DAO Yaounde and
Abuja reporting contradicts Hart's assertion of a GOC
build-up of forces in the Bakassi.


JETER