NIGERIA: OBASANJO'S IMPEACHMENT DRAMA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 ABUJA 002736

SIPDIS


LONDON FOR GURNEY
PARIS FOR NEARY


E.O.12958: DECL: 09/23/12
TAGS: PREL PGOV SOCI KDEM NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: OBASANJO'S IMPEACHMENT DRAMA


REF: ABUJA 2435


CLASSIFIED BY CDA ANDREWS. REASON 1.5 (B) AND (D).



1. (C) SUMMARY: Once dismissed as another hollow
threat by a feckless National Assembly, the ongoing
impeachment drama is now the central political issue
in Nigeria, eclipsing even voter registration.
Obasanjo's removal from office remains unlikely
however the odds against him are stronger than last
month when the impeachment threat was first issued.
With many in the once pro-Obasanjo Senate allying with
the President's foes in the Lower House, the plot has
developed into a serious effort to derail Obasanjo's
quest for a second term. The aim of most Assembly
Members is not Obasanjo's immediate removal from
office but to weaken him so that he drops his
reelection bid or fails at the PDP convention. At
first slow to respond, Obasanjo has begun some catch-
up politicking to solidify his remaining support.
Still, members of his staff privately worry the threat
cannot be easily extinguished because powerful anti-
Obasanjo interests are behind the effort. Legislators
claim good faith guides them but their critics assert
they are after Obasanjo because he opposes their
reelections and thus refused to fund "constituency
projects" Assembly incumbents had sought to bolster
their electoral prospects.



2. (C) Summary Cont: Concerned the National Assembly
did not fully appreciate the effect its move would
have on Nigeria's political stability, traditional
rulers, state governors, and religious leaders have
waded into the maelstrom, attempting to reconcile the
two sides, to little avail thus far. The impeachment
saga has brought the ethnic electoral battlements into
sharper focus. Almost all leaders from the Southwest
oppose impeachment while many Northern politicians
support the move, an ironic role reversal from the
1999 election in which Obasanjo's support base was the
North with the Southwest voting overwhelmingly for the
opposition. Clearly, the impeachment drama has
increased political tensions. A quick resolution where
Obasanjo acknowledges the need for a working
partnership with the National Assembly and the
Assembly drops the impeachment threat is in Nigeria's
best interests. This will require a spirit of
compromise heretofore lacking, particularly in the
Assembly. If this crisis continues, it will only
reinforce the zero-sum mentality that shapes too much
of political conduct in Nigeria. End Summary.


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PRESIDENT VS HOUSE -- TRYING TO UNBALANCE THE OTHER
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3. (C) The impeachment crisis primarily is the result
of four factors: 1) Obasanjo's unpopularity and
truncating political strength, 2) Assembly Members'
own electoral uncertainties, 3) Obasanjo's
unwillingness to implement politically popular deficit
spending on capital projects, and 4) Three and one-
half years of feuding and acrimony between the
President and the National Assembly, particularly the
House. There have been previous impeachment threats
against the President, each easily defused through a
combination of presidential cajolery, intimidation and
horse-trading, with some money changing hands as well.
These prior attempts were tactical designs to show
displeasure with the President's cursory treatment of
the National Assembly and to extract a few concessions
from him.



4. (C) The current impeachment saga also revolves
around money, but the stakes are higher. The
impeachment threat has graduated from an avenue to
gain lucre to a zero-sum electoral survival strategy
pitting the President against the National Assembly.
Thus, the price for ending this challenge will be more
costly and politically more labor intensive than the
resolutions that came before. It all boils down to
timing. With elections over the horizon, many National
Assembly members are struggling for their political
lives and sense President Obasanjo opposes their
reelection. In some cases, he has even worked within
the party to stifle their re-election bids; this is a
reason that the strongest advocates of impeachment
come from the President's own party.



5. (C) Viewing the President's actions through their
narrow electoral optic, Assembly members did not see
Obasanjo's refusal to finance budget-busting capital
projects as fiscal virtue; they saw the refusal as a
betrayal of the President's earlier pledge to funds
such projects and as a mortal blow to their reelection
strategies. Many of these Assembly Members correctly
sensed that Obasanjo's image was tarnished and his
armor had serious chinks: he is neither as strong nor
as popular as even one year ago. The best defense
against the attack of a weakened opponent is the
counterattack, they figured. Members claimed concerned
that Obasanjo's unpopularity would further diminish
their reelection chances should they be forced to
campaign with him on the party ticket. Thus, Assembly
Members came to view impeachment not as a means of
upholding the constitution but as a fight for their
political lives. In the Members' zero sum world,
Obasanjo's political survival equals their political
extinction.



6. (C) Because this is an election year and the
topography of the electoral playing field is at stake,
many influential and would be influential actors are
now interested in the National Assembly's battles with
the President. They are stoking the National
Assembly's ardor from behind the scenes. These players
are not champions of the National Assembly and largely
indifferent whether Obasanjo violated the
constitution. They are students of Machiavelli whose
political calculations will be maximized if Obasanjo
is further weakened or knocked out of the picture.
With Obasanjo sidelined, the playing field opens up.
These real and ersatz king-makers could then advance a
malleable presidential ticket more to their liking.



7. (C) Overestimating his own personal authority and
popularity as well as being inured by the prior
impeachment tempests that quickly receded, Obasanjo
was slow to recognize the severity underlying the
current threat. Underestimating the disruptive role an
incensed, unified and somewhat desperate House could
play, he waited several weeks before moving to protect
his flank. Once aware of the danger, he has conferred
several times with governors and other opinion leaders
from various parts of the country, including key
traditional rulers.



8. (C) He has also taken a carrot and stick approach
to the National Assembly. Wielding the hard wood, the
Presidency iterated the months-old threat of auditing
the Assembly's finances. A pro-Obasanjo House Member
petitioned the ICPC (anti-corruption commission) to
investigate implacable Obasanjo foe, House Speaker
Ghali Na'Abba. The petition against Na'Abba has some
traction, with the ICPC determining that the
allegations are plausible and that the Speaker must
respond. He is scheduled for questioning on September
24 but has also filed a lawsuit seeking to enjoin the
ICPC investigation. Further, there are credible
reports that Obasanjo is also trying to dislodge
Senate President Anyim from his leadership of the
upper Chamber. (Comment: If rumors are true, Na'Abba
may have cause to worry. He reportedly is a liberal
spender who has dipped into House coffers to reward
and maintain support within and beyond the House. He
also has been accused of unwarranted spending in order
to maintain the pomp and surroundings he feels befit
his high office. End Comment.)



9. (C) Dangling the carrot, Obasanjo recently sent a
supplemental budget to the House releasing funds for
"constituency projects," the very type the lawmakers
clamored for prior to their impeachment threat. To
shore Obasanjo's image with the public, the government
released civil servant back salaries for July and
August. He has also forwarded a bill to the Assembly
that would resolve the highly contentious oil resource
allocation dispute by eliminating the offshore/onshore
dichotomy currently on the books. This would restore
the revenue stream to South-South states, increasing
his stock in that key area and making it difficult
for the region's Assembly Members to vote against him.
He also reached a widely publicized agreement with the
National Labor Congress for a 12.5 percent pay raise
to begin next year. Now, organized labor should want
to keep him around to honor this personal pledge.



10. (C) Behind the scenes, Obasanjo spoke with
potential rival and former military Head of State
Ibrahim Babangida. According to a Babangida ally,
Babangida was deeply annoyed that Obasanjo summoned
him from Minna to Abuja only to accuse him of funding
the impeachment threat. Babangida's annoyance grew
when Obasanjo switched from tendering accusations to
entreating him to talk to rebellious House members.
Babangida reportedly told Obasanjo that it was the
President's responsibility to visit he House and break
bread with its leadership; he should not deploy
emissaries to conduct his bidding. Since this August
encounter, Babangida has made a few characteristically
nebulous public comments, the latest being that this
Executive-Legislative standoff was a healthy sign for
Nigeria's young democracy. (Comment: Both the French
Ambassador and British Deputy High Commissioner have
told Ambassador Jeter that the President's political
advisors continue to lament that Babangida is
directing the impeachment drive and that they are at a
loss as to stopping him. End Comment)


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TRADITIONAL LEADERS AND THE PDP -- CAN THEY FIX IT?
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11. (C) Obasanjo's appeal for support apparently fared
better with the traditional rulers than with the
former military Head of State. The Emir of Kano, one
of the North's two most influential rulers, made
statements opposing the impeachment. Recently, a group
of Nigeria's most respected traditional rulers
gathered in Abuja. Emerging from three days of
marathon sessions, the Ooni of Ife told Ambassador
Jeter that the rulers have reconciled the sides and
that the impeachment threat soon would fizzle.
(Comment. The preeminent Yoruba traditional leader,
the Ooni did not give the Ambassador details of the
alleged workout. The Ooni is a savvy veteran of the
Nigerian political trenches whose insider information
cannot be discounted; however, but he could be looking
at this through a decidedly pro-Obasanjo, Yoruba
prism. In any event, he told the Ambassador that the
ongoing move against Obasanjo was "all about money and
graft." Traditional rulers, he said, would not let
that happen. End Comment.)



12. (C) Given that the impetus for the impeachment
comes from PDP Assembly Members, the party's national
leadership has also the tried to reconcile what have
become the Presidential and Legislative factions of
the party. Thus far, these efforts have not born
visible fruit. Most Governors have also sided with
Obasanjo on this issue, some fearing the unwanted cue
their State Assemblies could take from this federal
episode; but the Governors can little influence the
Assembly. Assembly Members, particularly, Senators,
warily view their State's Executives, believing (often
accurately) the President and Governors are conspiring
to keep them from being reelected.



13. (C) Meanwhile, many groups and organizations have
added their respective wisdom or lack thereof to the
debate. How Nigerians view impeachment has largely
been a measure of whether or not they support
Obasanjo. Thus, with the exception of human rights
lawyer Gani Fawahenmi who offered pro bono legal
services to help the House against Obasanjo, the
strongest criticism of the impeachment has arisen from
the Yoruba Southwest, Obasanjo's ethnic home. Much of
the North and particularly members of the influential
Arewa Consultative Forum, whose opposition to Obasanjo
needs little introduction, have praised the House for
obeying its duty of protecting the country and the
constitution from Presidential arrogation.



14. (C) No one has been able to bridge the differences
between the President and National Assembly
leadership, particularly Speaker Na'Abba and more
recently Senate President Anyim. One of the problems
has been the propensity of both sides to talk
moderately in private but let rhetorical excess get
the better of their public statements. A few days
after a conciliatory private session with House
Members, Obasanjo publicly lambasted the effort
against him as a joke run amok and belittled the
Members as "jokers."



15. (C) Many House members were not in a joking mood
after Obasanjo's remarks. For them, Obasanjo's
stinging remarks came as a surprise after their
private session, obliterating any goodwill he wanted
to build. For a growing number, both Obasanjo's biting
comments and his conciliatory overtures were
immaterial. For this expanding circle of PDP hard-
liners, the Rubicon was passed the day they published
the seventeen charges against Obasanjo. Members of
the opposition ANPP support the impeachment efforts
because fits their party's interests and because there
so no downside for them individually. Many members of
the Southwest-dominated AD oppose the impeachment.



16. (U) House Spokesman, Rep. Farouk Lawan, announced
last week that 200 members had signed the 17-point
list of accusations against the President, with a goal
of 300 signatures. Lawan said that the House would be
prepared to pass the list of charges to the Senate by
September 20. (NOTE: 157 signatures are required to
initiate the procedure. End Note.)



17. (C) While formal transmission of the House charges
to the Senate is still pending, the Senate is already
is on stage and involved in the drama. Most likely the
House would not have embarked on this collision course
with the President unless assured of support by Senate
President Anyim, once a close presidential ally. A
few months ago, Obasanjo jeopardized his "governance
strategy" of maintaining a divided National Assembly
to advance an "electoral strategy" of allegiance with
State governors. Anyim and the Ebonyi State Governor
Sam Egwu were battling for control of the State PDP
apparatus. Obasanjo characteristically sided with the
Governor, and Anyim fell out with Obasanjo. Since
then, the Senate President has moved progressively
closer to Obasanjo nemesis, House Speaker Na'Abba.



18. (C) Anyim's feud with Egwu reflects the
adversarial relationship between many Senators and
their State Governors. In many States, Senators and
Governors have locked horns over control of the State
party machinery or who will be the next Governor.
Thus, an electoral strategy that aligns him with the
Governors has puts Obasanjo in ill humor with the
Senators. Furthering the acrimony between the
President and Senate, allies of President have been
accused of bribing Senators to oppose impeachment.
There have been media reports of Senators returning
the alleged bribes after being pressured by anti-
Obasanjo colleagues to come clean. A veteran
journalist recounted being told by Senator Jonathan
Zwingina that numerous Senators admitted to taking the
one million Naira payoffs. Nevertheless, Zwingina
claimed that most of those who accepted the bribes
would eventually vote against Obasanjo when the time
was ripe. Some claim that over 80 of the 109 Senators
now oppose Obasanjo. The Presidency has denied the
bribery charge. The Senate has established an ad hoc
committee to investigate the allegations.


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OBASANJO RISES TO HIS OWN DEFENSE
--------------



19. (U) On September 11, explicitly recognizing that
the impeachment drive had gathered unexpected
momentum, President Obasanjo issued a detailed defense
against the 17 charges brought against him. Obasanjo
explained he never deliberately violated the
constitution or used his office to enrich himself.
Obasanjo presented his response to a committee of PDP
members established to resolve this rift threatening
the basic unity of the party. Members of the PDP
committee indicated to us that they were unsatisfied
with his response. He refused to meet us for two
weeks, one member complained. His change of heart,
according to another, came only with the indication
that the House was moving ahead with the process.


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MOMENTUM FOR IMPEACHMENT GROWING
--------------



20. (C) A presidential advisor recently told
Ambassador Jeter the situation was increasingly
disturbing. While discounting a genuine legal basis
for impeachment, the advisor noted the President was
enmeshed in a political struggle, not a legal affair.
It boiled down to a matter of numbers, not
constitutionality or legality. Although he felt
Obasanjo would survive, the advisor predicted the
impeachment drive would not end soon. He saw
influential powerbrokers at the controls of this
attack. Moreover, he claimed clear evidence of vast
sums of money changing hands to finance the
impeachment move.



21. (C) In short, the advisor maintained impeachment
was all about money and reelection not breaches of the
constitution. By not playing pork-barrel politics,
i.e. earmarking funds for "constituency projects" the
Representatives could point to garner votes in the
upcoming elections, Obasanjo was harpooning their
reelection bids. Other Representatives knew they
would not win the party nomination again; they not
only wanted money but to extort Obasanjo into
supporting their re-nomination. Being sure losers
otherwise, they had nothing to lose by threatening
Obasanjo, There was little downside to this vindictive
misadventure, the advisor concluded.



22. (C) During an extended discussion at the
Ambassador's residence, British Deputy High
Commissioner Charles Bird stated that venality and
personal electoral considerations of House members,
not conscience, were the authors of the move to oust
Obasanjo. Like us, Bird felt the impeachment
initially was intended to weaken Obasanjo politically
and perhaps dissuade him from seeking the PDP re-
nomination. However, he claimed, the longer the threat
hovered, the more it assumed a life of its own. Now,
it has an independent momentum. Many members of the
House were now seized by the prospect of toppling
Obasanjo, rendering this the most serious of the
several impeachment threats Obasanjo has faced and the
most serious legislative challenge to the primacy of
the Executive since the 1999 return of civilian rule.
After the dust has settled, there would likely be a
tectonic shift in the power relationship between the
Executive and the Legislature, Bird thought. Either a
strengthened Legislature would achieve par with a
weakened Presidency or the current situation of a
powerful Presidency and a laconic Assembly would be
reinforced, he contended.



23. (C) What Bird did not say was that if Obasanjo
should ultimately surrendered to the demands of a
rent-seeking legislature, corruption and graft will
have carried the day. However, if Obasanjo prevails,
his antagonists in both Chambers will quickly become
political relics in 2003.


-------------- --
VICE PRESIDENT ATIKU -- THE PASSIVE BENEFICIARY
-------------- --



24. (C) VP Atiku is the primary beneficiary of the
impeachment drama. Initially, Atiku was being fingered
as the hand behind the scenes; that charge has not
stuck, with Obasanjo's people increasingly seeing
Babangida as the culprit. Nursing strong presidential
ambitions of his own, Atiku can watch passively from
the sidelines as the Assembly seeks to destroy
Obasanjo. Because their relationship has cooled, Atiku
longer feels impelled to energetically support
Obasanjo. Given Atiku's power within the party and
his popularity within the National Assembly, his
active support might have helped defuse the standoff.
However, Atiku knows he is next in line should
Obasanjo fall. Even if he survives, Obasanjo would be
too weak to fire Atiku as his running mate. Moreover,
Obasanjo might be injured to the extent that Atiku
could risk challenging him for the PDP nomination.
Thus, Atiku seems content to let others do the
fighting while he positions himself to take advantage
of whatever unfolds.


--------------
COMMENT
--------------



25. (C) Like most political phenomena, impeachment is
subjective; its propriety lies in the eye of the
beholder. Those who support Obasanjo, decry the
impeachment; those who decry Obasanjo, generally
support the impeachment. Despite their protestations
to the contrary, the legislators' motives are suspect.
What started the process was Obasanjo's reluctance to
open the government coffers so House members could
spread largesse come election time. Objectively,
perhaps the most serious allegation against the
President is his role in doctoring the 2001 electoral
law. This indiscretion is included in the bill of
particulars against the President but the House has
not focussed much attention on this charge. The
inattention is partially because some Senate and House
leaders were accomplices in this misdeed.



26. (C) House leaders claim over 200 Members have
signed the petition; only 157 signatures are needed to
initiate formal impeachment process. Two weeks after
the process is initiated, the constitution requires a
two-thirds vote of both Houses to advance the process
to a three-month investigation followed by another
two-thirds vote in both chambers if the investigation
supports the charges. It is still unlikely the pro-
impeachment forces can must two separate super-
majorities in both Houses. If they start the process
but do not garner enough votes, their threat vanishes
completely in two weeks. Obasanjo, while crippled,
would have his pyrrhic victory and could begin to lick
his wounds. By temporizing, they can keep the shadow
of uncertainty over Obasanjo until the PDP convention.



27. (C) By sustaining this threat over Obasanjo,
however, the House is steering Nigeria into a period
of deepening political instability at a time when
"normal electoral preparations" provide more than
enough anxiety. Nigeria would be best served by a
quick resolution where the President acknowledges his
"mistakes" and recognizes the need to have a strong
partnership with the legislature, thereby bolstering
the role of the Assembly and the principle of checks
and balances. In exchange, the legislators would agree
to bury the impeachment hatchet and let Obasanjo's
fate be decided at the party convention or by the
electorate. If so, the politicians would have
succeeded in snatching an important victory from the
jowls of this crisis. Since Obasanjo's opponents would
feel no compunction about rigging an election, they
also believe that he is unhindered by any moral
restraint about cheating (for himself or against
them). Because both sides mistrust each other,
conditions do not favor a statesmanlike compromise,
unfortunately.



28. (C) Since 1999, Nigeria has experienced too many
impeachment threats against the President and too much
presidential interference with the inner workings of
the National Assembly. These confrontations are
indicative of the inexperience and fragility of
Nigeria's democratic process, with one branch of
government jockeying to dominate the other. Thus,
should this crisis linger and deteriorate, it would
reinforce the belief that political differences are
not to be resolved by compromise but by marginalizing
and even removing opponents from office. The harmful,
zero-sum nature of Nigerian politics would persist,
further impeding the country's democratic development.
ANDREWS