Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
02ABUJA254
2002-01-28 14:37:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Abuja
Cable title:  

NIGERIA: SMALL ARMS/LIGHT WEAPONS

Tags:  PREL PARM KOMC NI ECOWAS 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABUJA 000254 

SIPDIS


DEPARTMENT FOR PM:JSHAUNFIELD, AF/RA:MBITTRICK, JWALSER,
AND L


E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/28/2012
TAGS: PREL PARM KOMC NI ECOWAS
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: SMALL ARMS/LIGHT WEAPONS

REF: A. 01 ABUJA 1244

B. 01 ABUJA 1249


Classified by Ambassador Howard F. Jeter; Reasons 1.5 (b/d).


C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABUJA 000254

SIPDIS


DEPARTMENT FOR PM:JSHAUNFIELD, AF/RA:MBITTRICK, JWALSER,
AND L


E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/28/2012
TAGS: PREL PARM KOMC NI ECOWAS
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: SMALL ARMS/LIGHT WEAPONS

REF: A. 01 ABUJA 1244

B. 01 ABUJA 1249


Classified by Ambassador Howard F. Jeter; Reasons 1.5 (b/d).



1. (U) This is an action request; Please see para 11.



2. (U) SUMMARY: During a January 3 conversation with
PolMilOff, the Chairman of the Nigerian Committee on the
ECOWAS Moratorium on Small Arms/Light Weapons (SA/LW) Musa
Yahaya said Nigeria was making progress combating SA/LW
proliferation, but much more needed to be done. He explained
a three-phase approach to informing government agencies and
the public about SA/LW, and outlined his committee's plans
for 2002, including additional destruction efforts and a
train-the-trainer program for agencies that manage borders.
Confirming that most illicit weapons enter Nigeria from
neighboring states, Yahaya asked that the USG (and other
supplier states) assist by having arms exporters comply with
the ECOWAS Moratorium, which requires a waiver from ECOWAS
before allowing export of SA/LW to Nigeria (and other ECOWAS
member-states). Yahaya also requested technical assistance
to develop an arms database for Nigeria. END SUMMARY.



3. (U) During a January 3 call by PolMilOff, Chairman of the
Nigerian National Committee on the ECOWAS Moratorium on Small
Arms/Light Weapons Musa Yahaya confirmed that Nigeria had
destroyed arms at the Defense Industries Corporation of
Nigeria (DICON) facility and dumped ammunition off the
continental shelf during July 2001. He stated that another
round of destruction would be underway soon, now that a
quantity of illicit arms sufficient for a destruction effort
had been collected by border agencies and the police.
Turning to ECOWAS efforts, Yahaya stated that eight of 15
ECOWAS members had fully implemented the moratorium, and that
the other seven needed only to update their national
legislation. (COMMENT: Yahaya may have been painting too
rosy a picture of most member-state actions. However, recent
actions he noted, such as Senegal's and The Gambia's
formation of national committees, in November and December

respectively, are noteworthy. END COMMENT.)



4. (U) Yahaya focused most of his remarks on the committee's
efforts on training and public education on the SA/LW issue.
(NOTE: Nigeria's national committee is seated within the
Ministry of Cooperation and Integration in Africa. END
NOTE.) He hoped to have three phases of training: the first
for military, security and border services; the second for
civil society, focusing on youth; and the third for the
country's opinion leaders, both political and traditional.
The first phase of training in Abuja in December was
postponed for lack of funds. Yahaya recalled the ECOWAS
SA/LW train-the-trainer event in November 2001 in Dakar
(supported by Canada),and said the first Nigerian training
phase would follow its format. By targeting the military,
security services and border agencies (such as immigration
and customs),Phase I was intended to increase Nigeria's
ability to prevent illicit SA/LW crossing porous borders.
(NOTE: Nigeria's SA/LW problems stem from illicit arms
smuggled from neighboring states, primarily Chad and
Cameroon, but also Benin. END NOTE.) Phase I training would
focus on: How to identify illicit arms shipments;
disarmament, demobilization and reintegration processes; the
legal aspect of the ECOWAS moratorium, particularly as they
relate to national laws; human rights law; the rights of
refugees; the scope of proliferation; cooperation between
armed forces and security agencies to reduce SA/LW
proliferation.



5. (U) What Nigeria most needed from supplier states, Yahaya
stated, was support in managing the legal flow of arms and
ammunition into ECOWAS countries. To import a quantity of
arms and ammunition to Nigeria, a dealer (who must be
licensed by the Presidency) sends a quantity and type
specific application to the Nigerian ECOWAS Moratorium
Committee, which seeks an ECOWAS waiver on the dealer's
behalf. ECOWAS sends the waiver application to
member-states. If there are no objections or comments after
one month the waiver is approved (Ref A). The dealer can
then import and sell the arms and ammunition, but must inform
the committee of the identity of all buyers and specific
information about the weapons purchased, such as serial
numbers and quantity.



6. (C) Yahaya explained that a database of weapons and
ammunition could enable the committee to play a positive role
in identifying weapons used in crime or other acts that
threaten security (a prime area of concern for Nigeria).
Speaking frankly, Yahaya admitted that no Nigerians had
applied for arms importation waivers yet, but the committee
had "a good idea" of who was importing arms, and planned to
work with the police and other security agencies in 2002 to
enforce the program. Dealers who did not follow the rules
would, at a minimum, lose their licenses. Meanwhile,
supplier states, such as the U.S., could help Nigeria by
confirming that importers had proper ECOWAS waivers before
allowing weapons shipments to Nigeria.



7. (U) Yahaya also requested technical assistance from donor
countries. Not only did the committee hope to create a
computer database of arms (containing the information on
legal imports described above),it wanted to establish zonal,
state, and eventually, local government area offices. While
he noted a need for financial assistance to hold seminars
such as Phase I of the train-the-trainer program, he also
requested technical assistance for training and computers to
establish the arms database and to equip zonal offices.
Finally, Yahaya mentioned vehicles, explaining that when an
illicit shipment is intercepted, his committee finds it
difficult to get from Abuja to the border crossing where the
shipment was captured.


=======
COMMENT
=======



8. (C) The impact of small arms on security in Nigeria should
not be underestimated (as the assassination of Minister of
Justice Bola Ige and recent inter-communal clashes confirm).
However, Nigeria has a very limited arms production capacity,
and, improvised single-shot long guns aside, what Nigeria
does produce is very expensive. Illicit arms enter Nigeria
primarily across porous borders from neighboring states, and
through illicit sea shipments through the ports. Ideally,
the police, immigration and customs service could carry out
the moratorium committee's work at the borders, obviating the
need for committee travel.



9. (C) Nigeria has made strides in meeting the "national
level" steps identified by the UN Conference on the Illicit
Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons of July 2001. These
accomplishments were already in the queue as a result of
previous ECOWAS efforts. For the ECOWAS moratorium to be
successful, weapon supplier states should seek to comply with
the ECOWAS approval process by confirming a waiver has been
received from ECOWAS before allowing the export of arms
shipments into the sub-region. While this will not stop the
illicit trade, it will give member-states knowledge of
weapons entering their territory and give them the ability to
track these weapons when used for criminal purposes.



10. (C) To help reduce the number of illicit arms entering
Nigeria, the USG could consider a two-prong approach. First,
to reduce the number of illicit weapons circulating in the
sub-region, we should consider assistance to ECOWAS
member-states (plus perhaps Chad and Cameroon) for arms
destruction, focusing first on states unable to fund
destruction on their own. The second task would be to
provide direct assistance to national ECOWAS Moratorium
Committees for train-the-trainer programs that enhance the
ability of enforcement agencies to carry out interdiction
(the military, police, State Security Service, immigration
and customs). This training assistance could be provided
bilaterally through national ECOWAS moratorium committees, or
for multiple states' border and security agencies through
ECOWAS. Helping to prevent illicit weapons and ammunition
from entering Nigeria, while also reducing the number of
illicit arms in the region-as-a-whole could begin to reduce
the availability of SA/LW in Nigeria, which in the long-term
should have a positive impact on security conditions here.



11. (C) ACTION REQUEST: We request that the Department
provide guidance on our policy regarding adherence to the
ECOWAS waiver mechanism prior to allowing arms exports from
the U.S. into the West African sub-region. Additionally,
Department may want to consider establishing a new procedure
to promote better cooperation with the ECOWAS mechanism. One
possible method would be to cable the information on an
export request to the Embassy in the importing state, which
might then confirm that a waiver has been granted through the
state's national committee. Embassy Abuja could also confirm
the waiver with the ECOWAS Secretariat, if a national
committee is not yet active. END ACTION REQUEST.
Jeter