NIGERIA: ABUJA'S APPROACH TO THE DROC PEACE PROCESS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABUJA 000242

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/14/2011
TAGS: PREL PGOV CG NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: ABUJA'S APPROACH TO THE DROC PEACE PROCESS


REF: 01 ABUJA 2113


Classified by Ambassador Howard F. Jeter. Reasons 1.5 (b)
and (d)



1. (C) Summary: While cognizant of the complexities in the
DROC peace process, the GON nevertheless remains engaged and
appears more upbeat than last October when NSA Aliyu Mohammed
intimated Nigeria may extract itself from this diplomatic
morass(reftel) . However, Abuja did not walk, in part,
because it sees its role in the peace workout as evidence of
Nigeria's centrality to African diplomacy. The thrust of
Nigeria's efforts in DROC have been to cajole the Congolese
Big Three -) Kabila, Bemba and Onusumba -- toward agreement
on key issues such as the composition and duration of an
interim government, composition of the national army, a
cease-fire and the withdrawal of foreign forces from
Congolese soil. While supportive of the Inter-Congolese
Dialogue (ICD),Abuja's approach indicates that it sees
progress in the ICD as dependent on the Big Three reaching a
general understanding on these key issues. End summary.



2. (C) During a recent meeting with PolCouns, Special
Presidential Advisor on Conflict Resolution Ambassador Ralph
Uwechue provided an account of the December 7, 2001 meeting
of representatives of the Big Three in Abuja. Contrary to
public perception, the December meeting was not a product of
Abuja's insistence, the affable Uwechue maintained. The
meeting came at the Big Three's behest. Further, the
December session was actually "chaired" by the UN, with
Nigeria simply providing the venue. That the three sides saw
Abuja as a neutral site and agreed to meet here reflected the
GON's progress in establishing itself as an honest-broker.
(Comment: Uwechue likely massaged the truth a bit by stating
the GON did nothing to promote the meeting. There had been
plenty of GON prodding of the major Congolese factions in the
weeks and months before the meeting. Nevertheless, that the
three sides all felt relatively comfortable in coming to
Abuja is a point well taken. End Comment.) The tripartite
meeting resulted in a basic understanding on the procedures,
roster of invitees, and to a significant degree, the agenda
for the ICD set to resume in Sun City.



3. (C) Uwechue mentioned the parties also discussed the
vexatious issues of interim government composition and
longevity, reconstruction of a national army, and the
presence of foreign interlopers on Congolese soil. Uwechue
tried to dress this aspect of the meeting as neatly as
possible by claiming progress was made because no side
rejected the others' recommendations outright. Instead, they
all agreed to carry the others' positions back to their
principals for further study. Asked whether the lack of
acrimony represented actual progress or was just a display of
African etiquette not to spark a row when a guest in
another's home, Uwechue smiled, then admitted there was
substantial distance between the sides on these cardinal
political and military issues.



4. (C) Nonetheless, Uwechue asserted the December meeting had
been a net positive. Before the delegates returned to their
respective camps, Obasanjo hosted a dinner. During that
event, Obasanjo plied his special brand of diplomacy,
imploring each side to bridle personal ambition and
animosities in order to embrace compromise in the search for
something loftier -) national reconciliation and peace. The
evening was pitched with emotion, recalled Uwechue. Delegates
from each side, voices crackling with strong emotion,
promised to honor the charge President Obasanjo had given.



5. (C) Using these examples as a segue, Uwechue extolled the
efficacy of Nigerian diplomacy in the Congo. He discussed it
as labor intensive and centered on the Big Three. Uwechue
stated that, in the context of African diplomacy, building
personal relationships was essential to success. If a
protagonist considers you a friend he will listen and
consider proposals that he would reject if heard from a
stranger, claimed Uwechue. Moreover, the Congolese realized
that Nigeria had no vested national interests in the Congo
that would pollute its role as a honest-broker in the DROC.
Consequently, Uwechue asserted that President Obasanjo had
given him the mandate to build close relationships with the
Congolese trio. The Special Envoy declared that he speaks to
the three, particularly Onusumba and Bemba, regularly by
phone. Also, Uwechue recalled making numerous trips to the
Congo to see the players. Because of the relationships he
and Obasanjo had established with the trio, Uwechue believed
that Nigeria could push the sides toward peace, inch by slow
inch. However, Uwechue acknowledged this process would be
prolonged and time consuming. He predicted progress in
increments with little chance of major leaps forward.

6. (C) While defending the focus on faction heads, Uwechue
stated that Abuja supported the ICD. Nigeria's efforts
should be seen as collaborative with, not undermining the
larger deliberative mechanism. However, the reality of power
politics must be acknowledged, he stressed. Notwithstanding
the numbers that might attend the ICD, the Big Three will
primarily determine the success or failure of the peace
process in the DROC. If the Big Three agree on an issue, the
others will be hard pressed not to acquiesce. If the three
major armed groups oppose an idea, there will be little the
other groups can do to make the trio reverse course. Having
superior numbers of delegates around a conference table does
not alter the reality of the power equation on the ground, he
proffered.



7. (C) Regarding DROC's interfering neighbors, Uwechue
believed that Kagame was the most problematic. Rwanda's role
in the Congo was a result of objective security concerns as
well as Kagame's increscent ambition. Wanting to be a major
regional player, Kagame sought influence beyond Rwanda's
borders in any event. The DROC morass, given the
FAR/Interahamwe presence, provided ample justification for
interference. Under the guise of self-defense, Kagame has
sated his ambition by an intervention in DROC that exceeds
Rwanda's legitimate security concerns. Because of his
appetite for influence, the Rwandan was in no rush to alter
the status quo. Uwechue predicted Kagame would lean on his
clients, Bemba and Onusumba, to hew a hard-line instead of
encouraging them toward compromise.



8. (C) Uwechue felt Uganda's Museveni was less of a problem
than the man in Kigali. To a large degree, Museveni's
intrusion was derivative of Kagame's. Museveni could not
idle and risk being overshadowed by Kagame in the contest for
regional influence. In large measure, Museveni remained in
DROC to counterbalance his rival in Rwanda. If Kagame can be
coaxed to the exit door, Museveni would follow with litle
difficulty, Uwechue believed. Encouraging the disengagement
of both Kagame and Museveni were areas where Nigeria believed
the international community could best play a diplomatic
role, he stressed.



9. (C) In the lead-up to the Sun City ICD in late January,
the Special Advisor held out the possibility of a Big Three
meeting hosted by President Obasanjo in Abuja. During a
January 11 talk with Emboff, Lt. Col. Idris, Special
Assistant to the NSA and Lawal Hamadu of the NSA's Office,
confirmed that the GON might call a meeting of the Big Three
prior to the scheduled resumption of the ICD in late January.
Hamadu added that the ICD would again feature well over 300
delegates, and that the Mai Mai would attend but would attach
itself to a pre-existing ICD delegation and not go to the ICD
as a separate delegation. However, he added, that the
facilitator was scrambling to find money to pay for
conference expenses, such as transportation costs, that the
South Africans were not paying. (South Africa will absorb
the lodging and associated expenses.) Due to funding
questions, Hamadu predicted that commencement of the ICD
session in Sun City would be delayed.


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Comment
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10. (C) While supportive of the ICD, Abuja has focussed on
the leaders of the three armed groups. This implies a
decision that the ICD, given the financial, logistical, and
substantive challenges resulting from its large composition,
is an all too unwieldy and infrequent by deliberative
mechanism to tackle the most sensitive issues in the peace
process. Abuja believes establishing close personal rapport
with the three key leaders is the sine qua non to significant
progress on a cease-fire, agreement on the transition
government and on reconstructing the army. Consequently,
Abuja will continue to work the Big Three. Although the
Nigerians have not clearly articulated this, they apparently
believe this spadework with the Big Three actually
complements the ICD by forging progress in areas extremely
difficult for the ICD to handle. Under this informal
division of labor, Nigeria seemingly hopes the ICD will not
get bogged down in dealing with the "demilitarization" phase
of peace and will focus on issues that come up later, such as
elections and democratization.



11. (C) The danger exists that Nigeria's approach could be
perceived as creating a second negotiating track capable of
undermining the ICD or, worst, of presenting a potential
understanding among the Big Three as a fait accompli to the
ICD. While the danger exits, we think believe the Nigerians
are cognizant of the potential jeopardy and will take pains
to make sure it does not happen.
Jeter