NIGERIA: EMBASSY COMMENTS ON NARCOTICS ANALYSIS

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ABUJA 000235

SIPDIS


NOFORN


FOR INL A/S BEERS AND AF A/S KANSTEINER


E.O. 12958: DECL: 1.6X5, 1.6X6
TAGS: SNAR NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: EMBASSY COMMENTS ON NARCOTICS ANALYSIS
AND DRUG CERTIFICATION

Classified by Ambassador Howard F. Jeter; Reasons 1.6X5,
1.6X6.



1. (S/NF) The following are Embassy,s comments on the CIA
Assessment dated December 28, 2001 and entitled &Nigeria:
Avoiding Counterdrug Reforms.8 We understand the
assessment was first distributed at a January 4, 2002
INL-chaired interagency meeting on Nigeria,s certification.
The Embassy welcomes the opportunity to comment o nthe report
and its conclusions.


General Observation
--------------


2.(S/NF) The Embassy believes the assessment,s conclusion
that the GON lacks commitment to counter-narcotics law
enforcement is unsubstantiated and paints a misleading
picture of GON efforts during the past year. From our
perspective, a more appropriate conclusion would have been
that Nigeria continues to move in the right direction but
does, in facto, have a long way to go in overcoming serious
institutional and resource obstacles to a vigorous and
effective counter-narcotics strategy. However, given the
myriad demands on the GON,s finite resources, the degree of
progress and the level of resource allocation indicates
political commitment to counternarcotics that, albeit
incomplete, should be encouraged, not dismissively treated as
negligible.



3. (S/NF) In portraying the Obasanjo Administration as either
reticent or opposed (due to corruption) to improved drug
control efforts, the assessment has selectively culled from
open sources and Embassy reporting instead of weighing the
entirety of reporting to get a more accurate picture. The
notion that President Obasanjo has not supported
counter-narcotics reforms in the last year is simply not
true. In many meetings with the President, we have raised
our anti-drug concerns and Obasanjo has always responded
positively and quickly. Though the President seemed unaware
of the precise requirements of certification during an early
July meeting (Abuja 1547),he nonetheless responded
positively to the reforms that we encouraged, and
subsequnetly increased the budget of the NDLEA.



4. (S/NF) The following are comments linked to specific
points raised in the assessment:


--One Anti-Drug Agency. The assessment portrays the NDLEA,s
role as the sole law enforcement agency with an express
counter-narcotics mandate as a weakness in Nigeria,s
performance. This is not the case. We have never considered
this a deficiency and we have not encouraged the GON to
enlist other agencies in the anti-drug effort. Thus, the
assessment faults the GON for a perceived lapse of which they
have never been put on notice. Moreover, the NDLEA has a
dedicated staff far superior to that of Nigerian Customs,
Police or any other law enforcement agency. The NDLEA
receives greater resources and better training because of its
exclusive mandate. We support this specialization in drug
control efforts ) it is resource-efficient, limits potential
corruption, and it has been effective. Moreover, we should
not forget that we have the best access and relationship with
the NDLEA in the history of the Mission; only three years ago
we had difficulty meeting with the Chairman of the NDLEA, let
alone getting NDLEA to act.


-- The Vice President: While the Vice President,s alleged
corruption while in the Customs Service is common knowledge,
we have no evidence that Atiku was ever involved in abetting
drug smuggling. Nigeria,s ridiculously high tariffs make it
easy for Customs officers to get rich without involving
themselves in the drug trade. Moreover, we have never seen
any overt or covert attempt by the VP to undermine the NDLEA.
To the contrary, he has been helpful in pushing forward
NDLEA Chairman Lafiaji,s FY2002 request for an additional
two billion naira in capital expenditures for the NDLEA.


--Counter-Drug Positions: The assessment,s statement that
&In 2001 key positions in Nigeria,s counter-drug
bureaucracy went unfulfilled8 needs explanation. Ibrahim
Lame, for two years the Senior Special Assistant to the
President on Drugs and Financial Crimes, was relieved of his
duties in mid-2001. The position was subsequently abolished
because it was redundant and its utility was marginal. The
Senior Special Assistant had no control over resources or
personnel. He added little to policy formulation, and was
not a key player. A Director will head the far stronger
Financial Crimes Commission, which will control significant
resources and will have both policy coordination and
operational roles.
--Similarly, the statement that &promises to increase the
counter-drug budget were not kept8 is also inaccurate. The
Chairman of the Senate Committee of Drugs and Financial
Crimes, Lawal Shaibu, working closely with Chairman Lafiaji,
in early 2001 drafted a proposed supplementary budget request
of two billion naira (at the time about USD 20 million).
This was not/not the Federal Government,s request, but
rather a proposal emanating from the National Assembly.
Senator Shuaibu and other National Assembly supporters of the
NDLEA made this substantial request with the full expectation
that the Presidency could only grant a portion of it given
overall budgetary constraints. (Note: Shuaibu has again
made such a request for the FY2002 budget now being
considered )- 1.3 billion naira for the NDLEA. End Note)


--Lafiaji: Strong Staying Power. Chairman Bello Lafiaji has
already outlasted his past two predecessors and shows no sign
of leaving the job or waning in his enthusiasm, commitment
and performance. He has a high integrity rating. We have
seen no credible reports indicating any ties to suspected
drug traffickers, and as far as we know, Lafiaji is beyond
reproach. This stands in stark contrast to Lafiaji,s
predecessors. President Obasanjo has told us that he is
pleased with Lafiaji,s performance and he has repeated
expressed his support for the Chairman,s leadership, most
recently on National television December 18, 2001, when he
bestowed one of Nigeria,s highest honors ) the Order of the
Niger ) on the Chairman for his work.


--There has been no corroboration of the sensitive
intelligence report that Lafiaji is under threat of being
ousted by officials in the Presidency. Even if some in the
Presidency oppose Lafiaji, he clearly still enjoys the
President,s support. And that,s the point that should be
made. In fact, Lafiaji,s role and authority are likely to
grow with the passing of Attorney General Bola Ige from the
scene. (Ige was a very strong supporter of Lafiaji,s NDLEA
leadership.)


--Extradition: Nigeria has never extradited a U.S. fugitive
for drug trafficking ) the reference to U.S. extraditions
under the Abacha regime in 1994 is in error. Nigeria has,
however, rendered into USG custody several important USG
fugitives, including drug traffickers sent to U.S. trials in
1994 under General Abacha,s rule and international terrorist
(Egypt Air highjacking) Rezaq under Babaginda,s rule. Most
recently, in November 2000 President Obasanjo ordered the
rendition of four fugitives, including two drug traffickers
on the U.S. President,s list of 12 International Drug
Kingpins. The GON carried out these renditions with
considerable political risk because they wanted to meet our
requirements but knew that they could not comply under
current judicial arrangements, with corrupt judges in place.
The GON offered additional renditions, but we said that we
could not accept its methods in doing so.


--The Obasanjo administration has been and remains committed
to cooperation in turning over fugitives from U.S. justice.
The President and the late Attorney General often expressed
their conviction that Nigeria should not become a haven for
international criminals. Yet they conceded, and we have
acknowledged, that Nigeria cannot develop and
institutionalize an efficient extradition process that
provides all the adequate due process safeguards in the near
term. Sixteen consecutive years of military rule destroyed
the judiciary. We should not pressure a two year-old
democratically elected government to effectuate extradition
without due observance of the rule of law.


--The paramount importance of the rule of law is something
that we have been telling the Nigerians. Previously we
encouraged, even demanded, that Nigeria hand over -- using
whatever means necessary -- at least two fugitives in 2000.
Because we recognize the long-term importance of building an
appreciation for the rule of law, we no longer want to see
U.S. fugitives handed over in the way accepted before; we now
correctly encourage the Nigerians to develop a process that
observes procedural and substantive due process much like we
have in the United States. Thus, because of the balancing of
these rule-of-law and law enforcement considerations, we must
give the current Administration a more reasonable amount of
time before concluding that they are non-cooperative
regarding extradition.


--Corruption: The Obasanjo Administration has clearly
improved the fight against corruption in the past year. The
Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offenses
Commission (ICPC) celebrated its first birthday in September

2001. The Commission,s first group of dedicated staff )
investigators, prosecutors, and administrators ) was hired
in December 2001 and starts work on February 1, 2002. A
second batch of 200 will be hired in June 2002. Just last
week, Obasanjo reportedly approved a 2002 budget request for
the ICPC of one billion naira (USD 9 million) in capital
expenditures and 400 million naira (USD 3.6 million) in
operating expenses. Though this budget request must be
approved by the National Assembly, it represents a 250
percent increase over the USD five million given to the ICPC
for all of its expenses in 2001. Corruption


5.(S/NF)Comment: The end-of-the-year assessment of
Nigeria,s counter-drug performance does not give a complete
picture. Some of the report,s inaccuracies could have been
avoided if the report had been shared in draft with the field
prior to publication. Moreover, field visits by relevant
analysts should be encouraged in order to &ground truth8
reporting otherwise evaluated from a distance in Washington.


Certification in Perspective: Improvement since 2000?
-------------- --------------


6.(S/NF) As Washington readers are aware, in the recently
passed Foreign Operations Bill, Congress established a new
standard for narcotics certification -- those countries that
have not &failed demonstrably8 in their counternarcotics
efforts. Nigeria was granted full certification by the
President on March 1, 2001, passing a higher certification
standard. As detailed above and in many Embassy reporting
cables including reftels, the Obasanjo Administration has
made limited but substantial reforms on the counter-drug and
law enforcement fronts. While the significance of these
reforms ) some of them limited to pledges as of this writing
) can be debated, the argument that Nigeria has lost ground
in its anti-drug efforts since January 2001 is just not
credible.


7.(C) The Ambassador also notes that if the Department of
Justice and DEA had strong concerns about the GON,s drug
control performance, these were not apparent during Chairman
Lafiaji,s November 8 meeting at DEA Headquaters, which the
Ambassador attended. Instead, DEA officials praised the
NDLEA for improvements in its performance.


You Bet Things Look Better
--------------


8.(C/NF) Here,s our perspective on the last year of
counter-drug efforts. During the past year:


--Federal resources devoted to the anti-drug effort have
increased substantially;


--the NDLEA,s operational writ has expanded to all sea
ports;


--the amount of hard drugs seized rose 40 percent;


--arrests of drug traffickers rose 26 percent;


--drug-related convictions rose 51 percent;


--there were no acquittals in the 2,400 drug cases prosecuted;


--airport drug interdiction efforts are now so successful
that more seizures of heroin in U.S. ports of entry are made
from flights originating from Ghana rather than from Nigeria;


--The late Attorney General led a GON team to a Rome meeting
with the FATF to address international concerns over
Nigeria,s money laundering controls;


--the GON has moved quickly to strengthen money-laundering
legislation and form a centralized authority to fight
financial crimes ) all in response to USG and FATF concerns;


--the Joint NDLEA-DEA Task Force has been re-energized and is
now investigating a major Nigeria based trafficker; and


--the year-old Anti-Corruption Commission is gaining strength
and receiving more federal resources.


9.(S/NF) We set out certification benchmarks for the GON to
meet during 2001. All of these were either met fully or met
with a good faith effort. We should not make a certification
decision on the basis of whether we think many Nigerians are
&bad8 or whether the country has a large drug and organized
crime problem. These are not the criteria; the benchmarks
are. Nigeria has made the grade. It should be certified.




Jeter