NIGERIA: A/S KANSTEINER MEETING WITH

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ABUJA 002268

SIPDIS


LONDON FOR GURNEY
PARIS FOR NEARY


E.O.12958: DECL: 07/30/12
TAGS: PGOV PREL MASS MOPS TP CM NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: A/S KANSTEINER MEETING WITH
BATAGARAWA

CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR HOWARD F. JETER. REASON 1.5
(B) AND (D).



1. (C) Summary: During a July 24 meeting with
Minister of State For Defense (Army) Lawal Batagarawa,
A/S Kansteiner raised the inquiry into the 2001 Benue
state massacre, the recent legislative hold on WASP
funding, the Army's response to violence in Plateau
State that has claimed a soldier and police officer,
and prospects for violence in the upcoming elections.
Batagarawa requested USG help to defuse potential
trouble in Bakassi, assistance on debt relief and more
police training. In attendance at the meeting were
Ambassador Jeter, Kansteiner Senior Special Advisor
Jim Dunlop, Political Counselor, Pol/Mil officer and
DATT (notetaker). End summary.


--------------
BENUE INQUIRY -- NEED FOR PROGRESS
--------------



2. (C) A/S Kansteiner met Minister of State for
Defense (Army) Lawal Batagarawa at the Ambassador's
residence on the evening of 24 July, after his arrival
from Libreville. A/S Kansteiner informed Batagarawa of
Senator Feingold's decision to place a legislative
hold on the proposed $2m program for post-Operation
Focus Relief (OFR) sustainment for the five US-trained
Nigerian peacekeeping battalions. The legislative
action was prompted by the apparent lack of progress
in the inquiry into the army massacre of civilians in
Benue State last October. Kansteiner added that the
Commission seemed dilatory and its proceedings
appeared to be open-ended. He asked when the
proceedings would close. The Ambassador raised
concerns about the credibility of the Commission,
noting he was troubled by the delay in the Commission
actually going to the troubled areas to gather
evidence from local sources and people who could not
travel to Abuja. He also cited the Commission's lack
of prosecutorial power as a concern.



3. (C) Batagarawa responded that the lack of funding
delayed the initial start of the inquiry (Funding also
affected the start of a separate military
investigation on the events.) The shift of the
Commission from Abuja to the locus of the violence was
also impeded by lack of money. He agreed that the
Commission needed to visit the affected areas to give
the numbers of poor people who cannot to travel to
Abuja a chance to be heard and provide evidence.
Additionally, travel by the Commission would give its
members an opportunity to see first hand the sites of
violence. Constitutionally the Commission could not
have prosecutorial powers Batagarawa noted, but its
findings would be referred to the appropriate
authorities, including the Justice Ministry. The
facts gathered could be used as evidence at trial.
Batagarawa stated that the internal army inquiry would
take place but would never be made public; however, he
offered to privately brief the Embassy and/or Senator
Feingold on its findings. A/S Kansteiner noted that
the in-house investigation and briefing of USG
officials would be helpful. Batagarawa volunteered to
travel to the U.S. in August to meet Senator Feingold
to discuss the status of the investigation.


--------------
NIGERIAN CONCERNS-BAKASSI IS NUMBER ONE
--------------



4. (S) Minister Batagarawa expressed deep concern
about the Bakassi peninsula. The GON expected a
decision by the ICJ any time after September and
thought it would go against Nigeria. He pointed out
the difficult position the GON would be in
politically, particularly in the run-up to elections.
The GON needed a way out. "We don't want to go to
war. It would be bad for us, undermining our
credibility as a peacekeeper in the region." He
agreed with Ambassador Jeter's assessment that it
would also destabilize the region. The GON wanted to
negotiate a political solution in advance of the
decision, but Cameroon appeared disinterested.
President Obasanjo had made three separate attempts to
talk with Cameroon's Biya, but the latter rebuffed
Obasanjo each time. The Minister added that the GON
requested French President Chirac's assistance as an
intermediary. Chirac was unhelpful, stating there was
nothing he could do since he had little influence on
Biya.

5. (S) A/S Kansteiner replied that dialogue with
Cameroon was crucial, and needed to occur before the
ICJ decision. Afterwards, he said, the winner of the
judgment would not have any incentive to talk. The
A/S offered U.S. assistance in conveying messages to
the Cameroonians, but assessed our influence as much
less than that of the French. The Ambassador noted
that much of this problem was personality driven, as
Biya purposefully isolated himself and was intractable
and stubborn. (Note: This assertion was based on the
French Ambassador's and the GOF's assessment of Biya.)


--------------
OTHER POSSIBLE MILITARY VIOLENCE
--------------



6. (C) The Minister stated he had no information
outside of press accounts about the reported killing
of Sierra Leonean civilians by Nigerian peacekeepers
in Freetown. Regarding the continuing violence in
Plateau State and threats by military officers to
avenge the killings of a soldier there, the Minister
assured A/S Kansteiner that there would be no heavy-
handed response. Both A/S Kansteiner and the
Ambassador emphasized that an overzealous,
unrestrained response by the military would
essentially seal the fate of USG military cooperation
with Nigeria. The Minister explained the situation
had escalated beyond the police's ability to control,
requiring the military to restore order. In fact, the
Minister stated that the publicized military threat
had been taken out of context by a journalist covering
a meeting designed to help restore calm to the area.
The journalist had been thrown out of the meeting and
retaliated by writing a negative story. The Minister
noted that curbing the growth of armed banditry in the
area necessitated highly visible military maneuvers
and expressed concern about how such movements would
be exploited by an often irresponsible media.



7. (C) Comment: Security forces report groups of
violent bandits roving in Plateau and neighboring
states all the way to the Chadian border. There was a
recent firefight between army units and criminals in
northern Plateau State during which several bandits
were allegedly killed. However, the recent spike in
violence in Plateau cannot all be attributed to
criminality. Most of the recent violence has been
communal or election-related. End Comment.


--------------
ELECTIONS "ARE HEATING UP"
--------------



8. (C) Responding to A/S Kansteiner's question about
the election season, the Minister stated that things
were hot even though the season had not entered full
swing. Regarding electoral violence, he said he was
most concerned about the Southeast, where the spirit
of compromise is almost nonexistent and there is no
strong traditional social hierarchy to control the
parties. Batagarawa also expressed concerned about
parts of the Southwest and South-South (citing the
Chevron facility seizure) as well as Plateau State in
the Middle Belt. He added that he was much less
concerned with the rest of the Middle Belt or the
North. The Ambassador noted holding local government
elections on August 10 was logistically impossible,
and that November-December was a more realistic time-
frame. The Ambassador also predicted that significant
violence could be expected for the gubernatorial
elections. The Minister concurred with both
assessments. (Comment: Batagarawa was very concerned
about electoral violence because he knows all too well
that the army will be summoned to stem outbreaks
because the police have proven incapable. End Comment)


--------------
Debt Relief Once Again
--------------



9. (U) The Minister asked about debt relief for
Nigeria, noting its importance to the economy. A/S
Kansteiner replied there was very little chance for
debt relief now; its eventuality would depend on the
GON reaching agreement with the IMF and sustaining
economic reform.


--------------
More Help With Police Reform
--------------



10. (C) The Minister requested increased USG
assistance in building an effective police force. His
concern was that police ineffectiveness to contain
communal violence forced the military to intervene in
domestic security issues, increasing the potential for
the army to be accused of the excessive use of force.
He observed the police system currently allowed
officers with almost no training to rise to a high
rank, and that there was no vetting. This meant "bad
men" could enter the force with the expectation of
reaching its senior levels. Police ineffectiveness was
a systemic problem in need of a "MPRI"-style approach
to establish a training base and schools. He thought
the one full-time American slated to work in the
police headquarters as an advisor would be inadequate.



11. (C) The Ambassador pointed out that the full time
position was created solely to work on developing a
police training curriculum, to replace the
approximately sixty year old program currently being
used. He highlighted the problems we had to overcome
to start this program, citing police resistance to the
USG advisor having an office in police headquarters
and to the location of a national information database
at the headquarters. Batagarawa surmised the police
were afraid the USG would use the advisor and the
database "to spy" on them. The Ambassador noted that
establishing a viable curriculum to train the force
was a critical first step to reforming the police.



12. (C) A/S Kansteiner mentioned the Department had
earmarked an additional five million dollars for
police reform for Nigeria and stressed this was an
important indication of our commitment to help with
Nigerian police reform, given our usual policy
reluctance toward providing police reform assistance.
He added that we anticipate the money being available
in four or five months; down the road a new survey of
the overall police system and an action plan for its
improvement might be considered.


--------------
Ronco Support
--------------



13. (U) The Ambassador raised the issue of assistance
to the Ronco team working the clean-up of the Ikeja
ammunition transfer depot explosion. The Minister had
received Ronco's letter enumerating support
requirements; he stated the requests would be met
completely. He also accepted the Ambassador's
invitation to visit the site, noting they could also
visit the Oshodi resettlement center. (Note: The trip
is now planned for August 2.)


--------------
Sao Tome Patrol Boat
--------------



14. (C) A/S Kansteiner told Batagarawa that, while in
Libreville, he was informed Sao Tome's lone patrol
boat reportedly had been hijacked to Nigeria by
"pirates." The Assistant Secretary asked the Minster
about the existence of a defense cooperation agreement
between Nigeria and Sao Tome and whether Nigerian
troops were stationed there. The Minister was not
aware of the stolen patrol boat. He added that it was
unlikely Nigerian troops were already stationed in Sao
Tome because he thought the cooperation agreement had
not been formally concluded. He qualified his
statement, however, noting his knowledge may not be
current but that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had
the lead on this issue and could provide an accurate
update.


--------------
Comment
--------------



15. (S) The Minister of State for the Army is our
closest and most effective interlocutor at the
Ministry of Defense. He has become the main GON
interlocutor on the Benue inquiry. Regarding Benue, we
underscored the seriousness of a credible
investigation and we believe Batagarawa fully
understands our position. In addition to our pressing
him on Benue, the Army Minister has two other very
serious potential concerns that may fall into his and
the army's lap -- security for elections and Bakassi.
On these and numerous other issues, we believe
Batagarawa has the ear of the President. They probably
discussed how to broach the sensitive issue of Bakassi
with us. Batagarawa knew A/S Kansteiner would meet
President Obasanjo. Batagarawa's discussion on the
Bakassi was likely a primer for the subsequent
Obasanjo-Kansteiner meeting (Septel.) Obasanjo might
have wanted an indication of our position before
deciding whether to raise it with the Assistant
Secretary.

SIPDIS
JETER