IBB, ALIYU AND THE RACE FOR NIGERIA'S PRESIDENCY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ABUJA 001943

SIPDIS


NOFORN


E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/20/2017
TAGS: PGOV PINS PINR KDEM NI
SUBJECT: IBB, ALIYU AND THE RACE FOR NIGERIA'S PRESIDENCY

REF: A. ABUJA 1850

B. LAGOS 1273


CLASSIFIED BY CDA ANDREWS. REASON: 1.5(B) and (D)



1. (C) Summary: IBB is not running, for now, and neither is
Aliyu Mohammed, according to several political insiders. But
both retired generals are deeply frustrated with incumbent
retired general Olusegun Obasanjo. There are pressures on
IBB to run, but he carries heavy baggage. If the North can
coalesce around a consensus team, perhaps one headed by a
career civilian, OO will face a campaign trail as potholed as
most Nigerian roads. End Summary.



2. (C) Olusegun Obasanjo came to power in 1999 with the
support of fellow former military head of state Ibrahim
Badamasi Babangida (IBB) and an erstwhile Customs officer
named Atiku Abubakar. Atiku had inherited the political
machinery of the late Shehu Musa Yar'Adua, OO's deputy
following the assassination of Murtala Mohammed. Unlike
Obasanjo, Yar'Adua did not survive imprisonment by their
former subordinate, Sani Abacha, but his Peoples Democratic
Movement (PDM) evolved into the core of today's ruling
People's Democratic Party (PDP). Playing a strong supporting
role in the IBB camp was retired Lieutenant General Aliyu
Mohammed (political folklore has it that Mohammed helped
convince a skeptical Obasanjo that IBB was sincere when he
stated that he would support Obasanjo for president in 1999).
Aliyu, Oladipo Diya and Sani Abacha comprised the
triumvirate of active generals that told Interim National
Government Chairman Chief Ernest Shonekan to resign in late

1994. Abacha outmaneuvered Aliyu, taking the top job and
retiring his fellow Northerner. Diya held the number two job
under Abacha until he, like Obasanjo and Yar'Adua, was
convicted of coup-plotting. Today, Aliyu is Obasanjo's
National Security Advisor, Atiku is Vice President, and IBB
looms darkly in the background -- perennial potential
candidate, the dream of some and nightmare of others.
Together, they form the new (retired) generals' triumvirate
and will figure critically in Obasanjo's prospects for a
second term.



3. (C) From about September of last year, Nigeria was awash
with rumors that Obasanjo might drop Atiku in favor of a
running mate from the Northwest. Kaduna Governor Makarfi was
prominently mentioned, and his staff were busily preparing
their boss. The intensity of speculation grew as Obasanjo
repeatedly pushed back the official announcement of his
re-election plans. Obasanjo's eventual announcement that he
planned to retain Atiku on the ticket seemed lukewarm to many
observers here. Atiku himself privately acknowledged to CDA
June 24 that there had been some strains but averred that
everything had now been worked out. Another political
insider commented that cooler political minds had prevailed
in the struggle for Obasanjo's attention, convincing him that
he could not win without the political machinery Atiku
controls. Atiku privately alluded to this reality, noting
with some pride that this control and his winning the day on
the question of whether to fight for every state (septel) had
helped to attenuate political violence during the electoral
cycle thus far.



4. (S) More recently, rumors have been rife that Aliyu had
plans to run against his boss, either as a stalking horse for
IBB or as IBB's candidate. According to a political figure
close to Aliyu and IBB, Obasanjo decided to check out those
rumors by paying some Northern political figures, including
at least one governor, to approach Aliyu and urge him to run.
One of the men approached apparently told Aliyu. In early
June, the source continued, Aliyu asked for a meeting with
Obasanjo and Atiku (as witness) and complained bitterly that
Obasanjo had lacked sufficient respect for him to ask him his
intentions directly. He had put his life at risk to support
Obasanjo and had faithfully implemented Obasanjo's decisions,
Aliyu reportedly continued, so he deserved better than this
sort of skullduggery. Obasanjo quickly apologized, the
source concluded, but had lost stature in the eyes of both
Aliyu and Atiku as a result.



5. (C) CDA mentioned the rumors to Aliyu during a June 25
meeting and asked what he thought. Aliyu said he worked for
the President and was a member of the ruling party. He said
the rumors arose from a list the Arewa Consultative Forum
(ACF) had compiled of possible Northern contestants. ACF had
no one's mandate to produce such a list, Aliyu continued, but
its existence had led the backers of several nascent parties
to ask him to join them. He was not interested in joining
any party other than the PDP and had rebuffed all entreaties.
COMMENT: We note that Aliyu did not specifically rule out
running for President. END COMMENT.



6. (C) Several players from different parts of the political
spectrum have told us recently that IBB is not planning to
run against Obasanjo. However, an occasional IBB adviser
told Consulate General Lagos (ref B) that the former Head of
State would announce his candidacy on August 17, and two of
the newly-registered political parties (NDP and UNPP) want
IBB as their flag-bearer. IBB is also nervous about the
Buhari candidacy, fearing that the man he overthrew in 1985
would probably order his arrest within 24 hours of assuming
office. Babangida's strong ties to the elite would trump
Buhari's popularity with the Northern masses and preclude the
tiny possibility of Buhari (who would have great difficulty
attracting votes outside the far North) actually winning the
election. IBB is renowned for changing stories to suit his
changing audiences, so interlocutors tend to hear what IBB
thinks they want to hear. He's not running yet, but he's
clearly keeping his options open.



7. (S/NF) Meanwhile, British Deputy High Commissioner met
with Atiku, who said that the "triumvirate" would continue to
support Obasanjo for the time being. However, if he (Atiku)
decided to pull up stakes, he was sure Aliyu would come with
him. If Atiku and Aliyu were to switch their support to IBB,
a prospect we find unlikely given Atiku's own ambitions, OO
would have a very hard time winning anything resembling an
open and transparent election.



8. (C) Atiku told CDA privately that he felt the
Obasanjo-Atiku ticket would prevail. But Emeka Ihedioha, one
of his strategists, said immediately afterward that the
ticket was in deep trouble in the South; there were only
seven where the team could feel "comfortable." Outside the
Northeast, the North was mostly hostile territory - a point
on which most observers are in agreement.



9. (S/NF) Party Chairman Audu Ogbeh thought it likely IBB
was not himself quite sure which way to jump. Ogbeh pointed
out that IBB carried heavy baggage from his years in office.
Aside from the damage he inflicted on national institutions
(a point that influential Northern elder Liman Ciroma often
makes),IBB faced serious unresolved human rights charges,
notably complicity in the assassination of journalist Dele
Giwa. Moreover, Ogbeh continued, IBB's financial resources
were not of the magnitude many assumed; he had lost a fortune
when Aliyu Dasuki suddenly died (Aliyu Mohammed subsequently
married Dasuki's widow, Jamila) and probably could not
finance a Presidential campaign without significant help from
his friends. Ogbeh said IBB had specifically disavowed any
interest in the 2003 election in a recent private chat, but
Ogbeh just as quickly added that IBB could not be trusted to
speak frankly about his intentions. Ogbeh sharply criticized
President Obasanjo, however, saying that his penchant for
international travel and inattention to waste, corruption and
decaying terms of trade left the PDP vulnerable.



10. (C) COMMENT: Because IBB tends to say what people want
to hear, he has become many different things to different
people. His support in certain circles runs strong because
various groupings are vying to make him their leader. If IBB
eventually decides to run, he will have to choose his venue
from among three parties - ANPP, UNPP and NDP. The former
offers him a way to knock Buhari (his personal nightmare) out
of the running early. The other two are filled with people
desperate for his profile and presumed deep pockets as the
vehicle to ride to larger electoral success. Once he picks
(assuming he eventually decides to run),some of the
praise-singers will line up behind other candidates. He will
have to face more scrutiny and start answering at least a few
questions concretely. In the process, some who now see him
as their political messiah will grow disillusioned.



11. (C) Conversely, Obasanjo and Atiku are not in quite as
bad political shape as Ihedioha thinks. Yes, they are deeply
unpopular, and that is because their government has failed to
deliver material "democracy dividends" to most Nigerians.
But the opposition candidates who have announced intentions
thus far manifestly lack the potential to win national office
(Buhari has high name recognition but cannot overcome strong
negatives). Obasanjo and Atiku suffer because the country is
in poor shape and, as its leaders, they are being blamed. At
some point, parties will hold primaries and conventions and
nominate flag-bearers. To win, these individuals will have
to overcome the powerful perquisites available to incumbents,
and they will have to show disillusioned Nigerians why they
can do better than the incumbents have done. Since most, if
not all, of the likely challengers are tainted by service
with past non-performing governments, that task may prove
difficult to accomplish.



12. (C) The first 11 paragraphs of this message focus on
generals and retired generals. Generally, Nigerians are
tiring of retired generals. Cynical calculations of regional
balance will probably govern the selection of those who will
seriously challenge Obasanjo and Atiku for national office.
A Southeast-Northwest axis (ref A) would be the best choice
from that depressingly familiar perspective. But the party
that can come up with strong candidates who meet the needs of
regional balance while avoiding the temptation to recycle
former military rulers into the top slots of its ticket may
find it has what is needed to resonate with the electorate
and give the incumbents a run for their money.
ANDREWS