Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
02ABUJA1910
2002-06-25 15:49:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Abuja
Cable title:  

NIGERIA: KANO AIR CRASH INVESTIGATION SLOWS; CAUSE

Tags:  EAIR CASC PREL NI 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABUJA 001910 

SIPDIS


DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO FAA, NTSB AND DOT
DOT FOR KEVIN SAMPLE
NTSB FOR DENNIS JONES
STATE FOR AF, AF/W, AF/PAS
NSC FOR AF DIRECTOR MICHAEL MILLER


E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/24/2007
TAGS: EAIR CASC PREL NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: KANO AIR CRASH INVESTIGATION SLOWS; CAUSE
STILL UNKNOWN


REF: A. ABUJA 1429

B. ABUJA 1486


CLASSIFIED BY CDA ANDREWS. REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D).


C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABUJA 001910

SIPDIS


DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO FAA, NTSB AND DOT
DOT FOR KEVIN SAMPLE
NTSB FOR DENNIS JONES
STATE FOR AF, AF/W, AF/PAS
NSC FOR AF DIRECTOR MICHAEL MILLER


E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/24/2007
TAGS: EAIR CASC PREL NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: KANO AIR CRASH INVESTIGATION SLOWS; CAUSE
STILL UNKNOWN


REF: A. ABUJA 1429

B. ABUJA 1486


CLASSIFIED BY CDA ANDREWS. REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D).



1. (C) Summary. Seven weeks after the May 4 crash of an EAS
BAC 1-11 in Kano, the GON response has lost momentum. NTSB
investigator Jones indicated official investigation was
substandard and likely to produce inaccurate results.
Aviation Minister Chikwe continues to change personnel and
bruit new policies, more out of concern to manage political
fallout than to find the truth. Some of these changes seem
positive, but we do not expect most to be significant. Much
water has passed under the bridge, so the true causes of the
May 4 crash may remain unknown. We should urge the GON to
fund oversight properly and to give its oversight body
greater independence. End Summary.


--------------
REAL REFORM OR PERFORMING FOR THE PUBLIC
--------------



2. (U) Minister of Aviation Dr. Kema Chikwe fired over 20
officials in the wake of the May 4 crash at Kano (Ref. A) of
a BAC 1-11 operated by Executive Air Services (EAS). The
Director General and Director of Airworthiness of the
Nigerian Civil Aviation Authority (NCAA),the Directors of
Engineering and Administration of the Federal Airports
Authority of Nigeria (FAAN) and two Directors of Air Traffic
Services from the Nigerian Airspace Management Agency (NAMA)
were among the those receiving pink slips. Media reports
suggest others may be on the way.



3. (U) The Minister has also promised to replace all flight
instructors at the Nigerian College of Aviation Technology
(NCAT) in Zaria with foreign experts, claiming the current
instructors are responsible for the failure of NCAT to
graduate students.



4. (U) Chikwe has also proposed banning all single aircraft
airline companies; they will have the option of merging with
other companies or going out of business. Complaining that
aircraft vendors in Miami were selling unfit aircraft at low
cost to Nigerian airlines, she has proposed that Nigerian

buyers obtain a certificate of airworthiness from countries
of origin before sales can be completed. Finally the Minister
has proposed reducing the number of licenses for aircraft
maintenance organizations to 20.



5. (C) Comment: The actions taken by Chikwe are a mixed bag.
Banning single aircraft companies could prove useful, but
only if proper maintenance regimes are instituted for the
remaining airlines. However, Assistant Director Remi Faminu,
of the Ministry of Aviation's Accident Investigation Bureau
(AIB),believes operators with one craft fleets will lease
additional craft as cheaply as possible in order to meet the
new minimum requirements. If so, this new regulation has the
potential to increase rather than decrease the number of
marginal air carriers. Faminu contends the proposal to reduce
the number of maintenance organizations is unrealistic. All
operators have their own maintenance crews; combining them
would be unworkable. Past attempts at similar remedies have
failed.



6. (C) Faminu also labeled the firings as purely political.
The crash gave Chikwe the opportunity to restructure the
affected agencies with fewer accusations than would have been
leveled under other circumstances. According to Faminu, the
proposal to staff the NCAT faculty with foreign experts to
train pilots is a good one, provided the college can pay
market salaries. According to Faminu one major reason for
the failure of the flight school is the high turnover of
instructors. Nigerian instructors are paid on the Federal
compensation scale. They quickly leave NCAT when offered
higher paying piloting jobs in the private sector. Finally,
evaluating aircraft at the time of sale and guaranteeing
their airworthiness is an important step. However, a regime
requiring proper maintenance after purchase is equally
important.


--------------
AN APPARENT RUSH TO JUDGMENT
--------------



7. (C) So far only one of the crashed plane's "black boxes"
has been found. The Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) is still
missing. Dennis Jones, of the National Transportation Safety
Board (NTSB),who visited Nigeria May 16-28, accompanied
POLCOUNS to a May 20 meeting with Minister Chikwe. She
claimed the CVR had been stolen from the crash site. Chikwe
also asserted that an engine on the crashed plane had been
clandestinely changed during a holiday with no oversight or
inspection.



8. (U) In the week after the crash, three separate panels
were announced to investigate the crash. Minister Chikwe
proposed a twelve-member panel, while the House and the
Senate in the National Assembly established separate
investigatory committees. These committees were given
impractical mandates to complete their investigations in two
or three weeks. So far the performance of the committees has
been uninspiring. For example the Senate committee used its
forum to condemn the conditions of Nigeria's airports which
seemed to be more an attempt by some Senators to get
advantageous press coverage while trying to roll the
political pork barrel their way.



9. (C) Jones, accompanied by Poloff and Econoff, met Director
K.K.O. Sagoe, Assistant Director Remi Faminu and Mr. C.O.
Awogbami of the AIB May 23. The AIB is the Nigerian
counterpart to the NTSB. The Nigerian investigators
complained that the three above-mentioned panels were
composed of non-professionals who were reaching unreliable
conclusions from erroneous assumptions. The National
Assembly committees, they believe, are using the tragedy as
an opportunity to score political points with their
constituencies. Even Chikwe's committee, they claim, did not
have sufficient expertise. They also claimed that it was
improper for her to constitute such a panel; under Nigerian
law, they said, only the Justice Minister can establish such
a panel. Moreover, the Justice Minister must wait until after
the AIB investigation is completed.



10. (C) While aspersing the special investigations, the AIB's
performance has not been exemplary. Faminu is leading the
investigation. The AIB team gave us the following preliminary
report: The BAC1-11 aircraft traversed the 2600m runway, the
60m of overrun area and an additional unpaved area of 150
meters prior to taking off. This is indicative of low
airspeed and points to the likelihood that the aircraft was
near stall from the time it took off. The plane most likely
went into a deep stall, which on the BAC1-11 can only be
recovered by descending nose down for several thousand feet.
The aircraft never reached an altitude of greater than a few
hundred feet. Sagoe examined the wreckage, and his
preliminary finding is that one engine failed. This
assessment is based on the way the engines were damaged and
the difference in the damage to the two engines.



11. (C) Faminu related some of the difficulties AIB faced in
attempting to conduct a thorough investigation.
Investigators were unable to survey the crash scene on May 4
because of mobs surrounding the site. Sagoe stated that the
first officials at the scene were beaten by the angry mob.
Consequently Faminu was unable to make diagrams or take
pictures of the initial crash scene. Since much of the crash
site was altered before the investigators could examine it,
crucial indicators were lost. Faminu hopes the Digital Flight
Data Recorder (DFDR) along with cargo weight and exact
readouts of weather conditions will reveal the information
necessary to help determine what happened. The Ministry does
not have the necessary equipment to interpret the recorder
data and will likely send it to the UK. Faminu stated in a
June 12 conversation that arrangements had been made to send
the DFDR to England and that he expected to have results by
the end of June. However, the DFDR had not been sent as of
June 25.



12. (U) Awogbami stated that recordings between the tower and
cockpit contained no communication after clearance for
takeoff was given. Faminu was unaware if radar readings were
available at the time of the crash. (Note: Media and Embassy
sources indicate that the radar at the Kano Airport has not
functioned for several years. The investigators were either
unaware of this or trying to save embarrassment by feigning
ignorance. End Note)



13. (C) The AIB, remains understaffed, under-funded and under
political pressure to find a quick answer. Jones was
concerned the political pressure might cause the AIB to
perform only a superficial investigation, obscuring the real
causes behind the crash. The initial work by AIB
investigators has been disappointing. AIB had no photos, or
diagrams from the crash site.



14. (C) Jones visited the Kano crash site and was able to
view the wreckage that had been recovered. While noting that
many factors unique to this crash prevented a perfect
investigation, Jones also noted the investigators had a
surprisingly casual attitude. They lacked enthusiasm and
failed to follow up on information. For instance, no
attempts at interviewing witnesses were made, and the chief
investigator was uninterested in efforts to reconstruct the
wreckage. Jones urged the investigators to have the data
recorder read and expressed dismay that the investigation was
being conducted without the vital information available from
this source.



15. (C) In Reftel B, Post supported Minister Chikwe's request
for assistance investigating the crash. After consulting
with Dennis Jones and Kevin Sample of DOT, Post recommended
to Minister Chikwe that aviation expert Ron Montgomery serve
on the crash investigation panel. However on June 6, the
Ministry asked that Montgomery delay his trip -- the panel
had been postponed indefinitely. Awodu said that the panel
could not be established until completion of the AIB
investigation.


--------------
COMMENT
--------------



16. (C) Many hoped the May 4 crash would shake the GON of its
lethargy regarding domestic air carriers. Initially, the GON
showed energy and said the right things. However, recent
signs indicate a flagging commitment. This is all the more
tragic since two major crashes have been barely averted, and
another small crash, killing five, has taken place since the
May 4 crash. While impossible at this date to identify the
real causes of the EAS crash, it is not difficult to identify
weaknesses in the Nigerian Government's handling of this
incident.



17. (C) Comment Continued: From all appearances, the Minister
of Aviation is more concerned about managing the political
fallout than in technical probity. Consequently, efforts to
investigate the crash and to examine the flight safety
standards of commercial carriers remains subject to political
pressures. We should continue to work with the Ministry in
its overall modernization program, despite the flaws in its
response to the crash. However, this incident underscores the
need not only for better funding and training of the AIB but
greater independence of the AIB from the Aviation Ministry
itself.
ANDREWS