Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
02ABUJA1850
2002-06-21 16:28:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Abuja
Cable title:  

NIGERIA: A RETURN TO REGIONAL ELECTORAL POLITICS

Tags:  PREL PGOV SOCI KDEM NI 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 ABUJA 001850 

SIPDIS


RIYADH FOR POL - R. HANKS
LONDON FOR GURNEY
PARIS FOR NEARY


E.O.12958: DECL: 06/14/12
TAGS: PREL PGOV SOCI KDEM NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: A RETURN TO REGIONAL ELECTORAL POLITICS


REF: A) ABUJA 852 B) ABUJA 1068


CLASSIFIED BY CHARGE TIM ANDREWS. REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D).


C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 ABUJA 001850

SIPDIS


RIYADH FOR POL - R. HANKS
LONDON FOR GURNEY
PARIS FOR NEARY


E.O.12958: DECL: 06/14/12
TAGS: PREL PGOV SOCI KDEM NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: A RETURN TO REGIONAL ELECTORAL POLITICS


REF: A) ABUJA 852 B) ABUJA 1068


CLASSIFIED BY CHARGE TIM ANDREWS. REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D).



1. (C) Summary: A current snapshot of presidential
electioneering shows two contesting strategies, one devised
by the President's camp, the other by his strongest
opposition. The President appears content to steamroll the
PDP nomination through tightening his grip on the party
apparatus. To win the general election, his team will
exploit the powers of incumbency, cut as many "mutual
support pacts" with other incumbents as possible, and
attempt to keep the opposition fragmented. On the other side
of the battlements, the most serious opposition strategy
hearkens to the regionally-centered electoral calculus of
the past. Powerbrokers are huddling to recreate the
Northwest-Southeast axis that formed the winning
presidential ticket in every election save 1993 and 1999.
However, selecting a ticket palatable to most key opposition
players will be difficult. Another possible twist is whether
the presidential candidate will be from the Southeast
(Igbo),with the running mate from the Northwest. Both
inherently cynical and overtly power-driven, these
strategies discount the average voter and eschew substantive
issues. In doing so, they throttle genuine democratization
and may exacerbate disillusionment among large segments of
public. End Summary.


--------------
A HISTORIC CHANCE BEING SPENT
--------------



2. (C) The 1999 election was as much a referendum against
continued military rule as it was a vote for Obasanjo.
Handed the blank canvas of this negative mandate, Obasanjo
came to office with high hopes on the public's part that he
could paint a picture of a more democratic, productive
Nigeria. However, he has failed to develop a positive
mandate, and his supporters increasingly cast the next
elections in negative terms also: Don't let the bad guys
come back.



3. (C) Reftel A mentioned that Obasanjo needed to devote
more attention to taking care of domestic policy imperatives
and mending political fences. This meant fewer journeys

abroad and more consultations at home. He apparently did not
read our cable. In June alone, he will take four
international trips, some of them with multiple
destinations. We have not heard reports of him saying
"sorry" to any of the political figures on whose toes he has
stepped during the past three years. His popularity
continues to flag. Recently a group of National Assembly
members from Obasanjo's PDP wrote party chairmen Ogbeh
threatening to bolt from the party if Obasanjo won the party
nomination. Ogbeh has reportedly told the President that 15
of the 21 PDP governors would prefer a different
Presidential nominee (This would be a blow to Obasanjo's
strategy. It also may be a reason that the Presidency
appears to be rethinking the utility of the deal Obasanjo
cut with the Governors to hold local government elections in
August.).



4. (C) Obasanjo has even managed to fall out with Senate
President Anyim, previously considered one of the most loyal
tools in the presidential shed. Anyim has tacitly supported
the recent impeachment motion against Obasanjo in the
Senate. While the motion will likely exhaust itself, the
estrangement of Anyim demonstrates Obasanjo has not lose his
penchant for turning friends into enemies.



5. (C) People acknowledge that he works hard but they
question his sincerity, priorities and effectiveness. For
many people, he gives the impression of a man feverishly
running in place when he is not running in a circle. Because
he is guilty of angering the high and disenchanting the
humble, he does not have much goodwill. For an incumbent
whose administration has not lived up to expectation, this
is a severe vulnerability. If he had retained sufficient
goodwill, it would be easy for people to excuse him by
reasoning that the job is very tough or that Obasanjo was
doing his best but has been ill served by his advisors.
Right now, most people see the federal government as an
extension of Obasanjo's personality and view its failures as
reflecting his own shortcomings.



6. (C) Outwardly, President Obasanjo seems oblivious to the
political discontent around him. Part of the reason may be
that his haughty character disallows much consideration of
what lesser humans think of him. Another reason is that, in
his political calculations, public opinion may not matter
all that much. An American political consultant would advise
Obasanjo that he needed to go out and win the people's minds
if not hearts. Yet, Obasanjo does not seem primed to reach
out and touch. The time is quickly dwindling for such a move
to be effective. Soon, the intended audience would view any
such overture as a last minute attempt to curry favor after
over three years of indifference.



7. (C) To his critics, Obasanjo has behaved like an autocrat
wearing democratic garments. What can be gleaned of his
campaign strategy at this stage tends to confirm the
characterization. The first rung of the game plan apparently
is to suppress serious internal challenge to Obasanjo's
renomination. This was the rationale behind the April
pilgrimage to Obasanjo's farm in Ota by PDP stalwarts to
"beg" the President to seek another term. That procession
was engineered by Works Minister Tony Anenih, Nigeria's
archetypal backroom politician. According to most observers,
Anenih has not seen a deal he could not cut nor run across a
principle he would not disavow if the price were right.
Anenih, now second in command of the reelection campaign
behind absentee Finance Minister Adamu Ciroma, is not above
brandishing threats as well. According to one Northern
governor, Anenih told PDP governors that they could expect
plums from the Presidency for their personal consumption if
they came out in support of Obasanjo. However, if they
failed, they could expect much harsher tidings. In an ironic
twist, the amoral Minister threatened state executives with
being called before the anti-corruption panel.



8. (C) To help entice governors and other elected officials
to support Obasanjo, the team wants to cut informal mutual
support agreements with as many incumbents as possible. This
tack seems to transcend party lines as the Obasanjo team has
apparently wooed a few AD governors and maybe one or two APP
state executives. Through these arrangements, the team hopes
to use the interests of state and local candidates to
campaign energetically on their own behalf at the grassroots
level to Obasanjo's advantage. Thus far, this is the closest
Obasanjo's strategy comes to reaching out to the electorate,
but it is essentially by proxy. While indirect rule was the
political system in colonial Nigeria, Obasanjo might just
add the term "indirect campaigning" to the national lexicon.



9. (C) The third leg of his strategy is to fragment the
opposition. Knowing that the toughest opposition is lodged
in the North, Anenih has tried to coax a few older Northern
politicians into the Obasanjo camp. The Obasanjo team has
also tried to thwart Igbo solidarity. Senior-level Igbos in
the Administration have tried to drive a wedge through Igbo
land by discouraging talk of an Igbo presidency in 2003.
Additionally, the President's team has welcomed the likes of
the odious Senator Arthur Nzeribe who left the APP for the
PDP. The rich and essentially selfish Nzeribe will back any
government in power, as long as the price is right. He has
publicly backed Obasanjo and will likely use his resources
to pull other Igbos toward Obasanjo. Last, Obasanjo critics
contend the Presidency, having lost the fight to restrict
this electoral cycle to the PDP, AD and APP, will now
pressure the Independent National Electoral Commission
(INEC) to register 5-10 new political parties. According to
this theory, his team wants numerous opposition parties to
prevent the President's foes from assembling under one roof.
The President's supporters reportedly paid some senior UNDP
and APP figures to scuttle the two parties' planned merger.


--------------
A COUNTER STRATEGY
--------------



10. (C) Obasanjo's failure to develop an electoral
constituency and to present a compelling vision for the
future has both afflicted and helped his opponents. Because
his cupboard is relatively bare, they have little need to
fill theirs. Obasanjo's inability has made it easy for his
detractors to sally backward and find their solutions in the
politics of the past. His enemies have embraced the tried
and tested strategy of forging an alliance of two of the
three politically strategic regions, namely the North and
the Southeast. Here, the North serves as a proxy for the
Northwest, traditionally the politically potent part of the
region.



11. Aside: Because of the importance affluence, status and
age play in Nigerian politics, most of the key players are
rich older men relatively conservative in outlook.
Unsurprisingly, many would find succor in the politics of
old rather than in diving into the uncertainly of a more
egalitarian set-up. In a different way, Obasanjo also is
guilty of superimposing the past on the present. Instead of
being the consensus-building democrat people craved,
Obasanjo has copied too liberally from how he ruled during
the late seventies. What was appropriate then is passe now.
Hailed as an enlightened military ruler years ago, he now is
criticized by many as a quasi-autocrat with only superficial
democratic attributes. End Aside.


--------------
ENEMIES TO THE NORTH OF HIM
--------------



12. (C) The North is where opposition runs deepest. Northern
elites feel shortchanged under Obasanjo and fear their
influence in national politics may be irretrievably lost
should Obasanjo win another four years. Strategy-minded
Northerners point out that the combination of Obasanjo-
Atiku, representing the Southwest and the Northeast,
respectively, is the antithesis of the regional axis that
controlled national politics previously. In that Obasanjo
has registered a lackluster performance and has allegedly
betrayed their support by ignoring their interests, these
Northerners see no reason not to revive the old political
combine. Theirs is essentially a two-step strategy.



13. (C) First, they seek to coalesce Northern opinion. The
vehicle for this endeavor is the Arewa Consultative Forum.
The ACF is not yet united, however, as the rejection by many
of Sokoto Governor Bafarawa's April speech to the ACF shows.
But most Northerners do not reject Bafarawa's sharply anti-
Obasanjo sentiment. The few Northerners who believe that the
President should be re-elected (usually saying he is the
least-bad person for the job) are coming under increasing
pressure to keep their views to themselves. After tepidly
endorsing Obasanjo earlier this year, Kaduna governor Ahmed
Makarfi has been under heavy pressure to recant. Once seen
as almost a shoe-in for reelection, Makarfi now faces strong
opposition that has the support of key ACF leaders. A
senior Northern politician claimed Makarfi and VP Atiku
Abubakar were essentially run out of Kafanchan, in southern
Kaduna State, during a recent campaign swing and that they
were politely ignored by most people in Makarfi, the
governor's home LGA. We cannot confirm this assertion.



14. (C) The second element of this plan is to reach out to
the Southeast and as an alternative, the South-South. (The
ethnic and political heterogeneity of the South-South makes
that region a less cohesive bloc and thus a much less
attractive partner.) Former Commonwealth Secretary General
Emeka Anyaoku recently told us a delegation of northerners,
including Sokoto's Bafarawa, visited him last year. They
proposed a Northwest-Southeast alliance with him as the
Presidential candidate. The gentlemanly Anyaoku declined the
offer, saying that he had no appetite for the hurly-burly of
Nigerian politics. However, there are more ambitious Igbo
politicians waiting to chomp on that hook, most notably
Shehu Shagari's Vice President, Alex Ekwueme. Ekwueme was to
have succeeded Shagari in 1987, but his dream died when
Muhammadu Buhari and Tunde Idiagbon seized power.


--------------
ENEMIES TO THE SOUTHEAST OF HIM
--------------



15. (C) The call for an Igbo president has matured from a
relative murmur to a loud clamor. The lead social-cultural
organization Ohaneze Ndigbo and other pan-Igbo groups have
met. While the groups have not issued official statements,
most leading members of the organizations have publicly
endorsed the call. Miscalculations by President Obasanjo and
Igbos in his administration unwittingly have fed the fire.
Early on, Transportation Minister Maduekwe had his eyes on
the governor's seat in Abia State. Other Igbos in the
Presidency wanted to undermine the growing popularity of
Abia Governor Kalu to prevent his draw at home from
eclipsing theirs. To combat this attack, which he felt had
the Obasanjo seal of approval, Kalu sounded the clarion for
an Igbo president. It was a masterstroke. By appealing to
the yearning of the Igbo, who feel they have not be fully
integrated into the political arena since the civil war,
Kalu made himself the unofficial spokesperson for the entire
tribe. This increased his popularity and made his detractors
seem to be ethnic traitors. An attack on Kalu was perceived
as an attack against the Igbo in general. Others began to
pick up the call for the presidency to come to the
Southeast. Now it has a life of its own, right at the heart
of political discussion in the Southeast.


--------------
WILL THE OPPOSITION TWAIN MEET?
--------------



16. (C) While aversion to Obasanjo is strong in both the
Northwest (and indeed most of the vast and populous former
Northern Region) and Southeast, striking a deal will be
difficult and will require many more late night negotiating
sessions. The Igbos know they will have to deal with the
North. However, they do not want to be the junior partner
once again. The Igbos want the lead this time.



16. (C) The wisest and most experienced Northern elders
(those no longer engaged in seeking political office)
believe that the North must not try to re-assume the
Presidency in 2003. They believe the best hope of sustaining
Northern influence until 2007 lies in supporting an older,
not too energetic Igbo (like Ekwueme) for President, with a
younger Northerner as VP-cum-power behind the throne). They
believe (probably correctly) that the Igbo will give 80-90%
of their votes nationwide to a co-ethnic. Fearing that
Obasanjo's supporters will try to rig elections, they view
the enormous internal Igbo diaspora as a natural army of
poll-watchers that will be able to keep the rigging to a
minimum. Ambitious Northerners who want the keys to Aso
Villa for themselves, however, ask why the old formula
(Shagari/Ekwueme (civil rule) and Babangida/Aikhomu
(military rule)) cannot serve as a tonic for the body
politic today. This debate will continue among Northern
actors for some time to come, but the trendline clearly
favors an Igbo lead.



17. (C) To bolster their position in talks with the North,
Igbo leaders are trying to line up the South-South's
support. However, getting the fractious South-South
politicians to agree on anything is difficult. Given
historical animosities that date back to the transatlantic
slave trade, getting South-South politicians to agree to
support an Igbo leader for national office is a Herculean
task. The South-South has, during Nigeria's post-colonial
history, more often aligned with the North, specifically in
order to advance the one interest upon which its diverse
peoples seemingly can agree -- resisting domination by the
more numerous and far more cohesive Igbo. For its part, the
North, in order to retain leverage, is also discussing a
South-South Presidency. Again, the possible candidates are
older, relatively non-controversial figures. Septuagenarian
Christian Onoh's name is one that surfaces occasionally.



18. (C) The predominantly Lagos-based Nigerian media harp on
Northern domination of national politics. But Northerners
have a different perspective. While conceding that generals
and politicians from the North have disproportionately held
the top job since independence, they argue that the North
has tried since 1993 to engender greater balance. The North
voted heavily for Abiola in 1993, they point out: Abiola
even won his Kano-based opponent's LGA. The North lined up
behind Obasanjo in 1999; even those opposed to Obasanjo and
the PDP backed a candidate from the Southwest, Olu Falae. In
return for their support of Obasanjo, they continue, their
interests have been ignored. This was the essence of
Bafarawa's screed. Many Northerners fear an Igbo Southerner,
once in office, would treat them as shabbily as has the
incumbent Yoruba Southerner. For the Igbo to achieve their
symbol of complete political rehabilitation, they will have
to allay those Northern fears. For historical reasons, the
time is not yet ripe for rapprochement between the Southwest
and the Southeast. So, without the North, an Igbo Presidency
will remain nothing more than a fond dream.



19. (C) A close Babangida associate told us recently that
Former Head of State Babangida is trying to broker a
solution. The proposed arrangement would reverse the
regional division of the ticket in 2007 but without the same
individuals on the ticket. IBB reportedly has Ekweume in
mind as President and Umaru Shinkafi as the preferred number
two. IBB reportedly has decided, for now, not to run. Given
their age and long experience in supporting roles, IBB
likely believes both Ekweume and Shinkafi will be pliable
"team players" and will not seek second terms. This tack
would preserve a "vacancy at Aso Rock" for 2007, by which
time, his supporters believe, the controversy surrounding
IBB will have abated. An Ekwueme/Shinkafi ticket would also
end most of the (limited) elite support for former Head of
State Buhari's candidacy.


--------------
WHERE HAVE ALL THE ISSUES GONE?
--------------



20. (C) All recent discussions with politicians invariably
center on the presidential campaign. Remarks of politicians
in both camps, while fecund with regard to power politics,
tend to be sterile when it comes to substantive issues such
as poverty alleviation and economic reform, not to mention
foreign policy. Most politicians' forays into substance are
brief and concentrate on the allegedly poor job that the
opponent will do or is doing. Daily newspapers and weekly
magazines are replete with reporting on the presidential
politicking. Yet, the dribble of ink devoted to actual
issues is minimal when compared to pool devoted to the
machinations of the political class.



21. (C) Upon observing the tenor and tactics of the
presidential campaign so far, further democratization will
require the gradual transformation of Nigeria's political
culture in two basic ways. First, the Nigerian political
system remains a very closed shop -- a person needs a lot of
money or personal connections to enter it. The elitism that
governs the current system must be eroded so that more
people from various walks of life can enhance the mix.
Second, political affiliations need to be based more on
issues and less on ethnic and regional considerations.
Realistically, this will take time and progress will be
gradual. However, it was hoped that the 2003 elections would
be another link in this concatenation of strengthening
Nigerian democracy. Sadly, this is not happening.



22. (C) The President's bare-knuckle strategy, personified
by the unprincipled Anenih, and the opposition's regional
axis approach, personified by the Machiavellian Babangida,
have placed the process of genuine democratization in
"spiritual deepfreeze." While neither side is devoid of
issue content, efforts to delineate substantive differences
are pro forma. The two camps operate on a different plane.
Basically, the President's campaign is using the party
machinery and the tools of office to create a nationwide
network of incumbents that will help each other get
reelected, with the connivance of hand-picked electoral
officials. On the other hand, the opposition is promoting
ethnic populism by appealing to the base instincts of two
(Igbo and Hausa/Fulani) of Nigeria's three main ethnic
groups. Thus, despite increasingly frenetic electioneering,
somehow the idea of crafting an appeal to entire Nigerian
electorate has been lost in shuffle. Because of this, many
people sense that, though the politicians are energetically
fighting each other, neither side is really fighting for the
interests of the average Nigerian or the country as a whole.


ANDREWS