NIGERIA: DIVERGENT GON VIEWS ON LIBERIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABUJA 001805

SIPDIS


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E.O.12958: DECL: 06/10/12
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS XY LI NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: DIVERGENT GON VIEWS ON LIBERIA

REF: STATE 102686


CLASSIFIED BY CHARGE ANDREWS. REASON 1.5 (B) and (D).



1. (C) Summary: Recent discussions with two senior GON
officials reveal GON ambivalence on Liberia.
Vacillating between two divergent philosophical
approaches, Nigeria's position on Liberia is fluid and
not fixed to any coherent strategy. One contending
belief, championed by Special Advisor on Conflict
Resolution Uwechue and based on a vague pan-African
romanticism, is that the Liberian conflict can be
extinguished and Charles Taylor can be converted
through discussion and neutral mediation. The other
perspective, advanced by Presidential Special Advisor
Ad'obe Obe, is tougher and edgier. This approach also
starts with discussions but here Nigeria assumes the
role of interested power not selfless mediator. If a
party refuses Abuja's counsel, Nigeria sees a
rejection of its sub-regional primacy and will draw
distance between itself and that party. Because
President Taylor recently rebuffed Obasanjo's offer to
visit Abuja, the Obe viewpoint is currently ascendant.
Because of Taylor's contumacy, Nigeria is willing, for
the time being, to let the Liberian President continue
to feel the press of the LURD at his back. End
Summary.


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HAVE CONFLICT, WILL TALK
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2. (C) During a conversation in late May with
PolCouns, Special Presidential Advisor for Conflict
Resolution, Ambassador Ralph Uwechue, extolled
continued dialogue and mediation to resolve the
Liberian crisis. Uwechue contended progress would not
have visited Sierra Leone but for the GON policy of
dialogue with Taylor. Everyone knew the path to peace
in Sierra Leone went through Monrovia because of
Taylor's mentoring of the RUF. Nigeria could have
ostracized Taylor and sought a military solution
against the RUF. This, Uwechue expostulated, would
have led to prolonged but inclusive fighting -- a
perennial military stalemate. Uwechue mentioned that
constant entreaties and overtures by Obasanjo asking
Taylor to urge the RUF to cooperate in the peace
process transformed the Liberian leader from chaperone
of RUF mayhem to encouraging the group to down their
weapons and take to the electoral hustings.



3. (C) Although noting the contributions of Britain's
muscular presence in Sierra Leone, UNAMSIL and the UN
sanctions to the peace process, Uwechue remained loyal
to his credo that dialogue was the most critical
factor in the peace process. Now, he saw the need to
employ the same tool to work with Taylor in his own
front yard. Acknowledging the task in Liberia would be
more difficult because the stakes for Taylor were
higher, Uwechue advocated that Nigeria continue to
talk to Taylor. Nigeria recognized the importance of
dialogue in resolving African conflicts, including
Liberia, he declared. Breaking the line of
communication was anathema. Although this method
seemed circuitous and time-consuming, it simply was
not enough to develop a plan for peace; to be succeed,
one must develop a plan for how to make Taylor believe
that he has developed the plan for peace. The more
Taylor feels that other countries are not interested
in toppling him and think he is capable of good, the
more reasonable he will be. While Taylor's book of
misdeeds is voluminous, he is neither a devil nor are
many of the rest of us saints, Uwechue posited.



4. (C) Uwechue urged the USG to exploit Taylor's
current predicament diplomatically. LURD success has
rendered him off-balance; in his weakened political
state, Taylor will be more amenable to compromise,
Uwechue offered. However, if the international
community remains relatively mute in the face of an
apparently tumescent LURD, he will suspect
international support for the insurgents. Taylor's
paranoia would increase, bringing more fighting and
suppression of domestic dissent in its wake.



5. (C) Uwechue thought we should implement a policy
of what could be termed "positive containment." Under
this strategem, we would inform Taylor that his ouster
is not our objective but he must cease encroachments
into neighboring real estate. If extra-territorial
ambitions continued to rule him, we would actively
oppose these designs; as long as he desisted from
cross-border misconduct, Taylor could expect our
indifference, at the very least, even in the face of
some degree of continued misrule at home. Moreover,
willingness for political and economic openness at
home could turn that benign indifference -- matching
each constructive, reform-oriented step on his part by
one on ours -- into a more positive engagement. Part
of that positive engagement would include pressing
Guinea to be a much less gracious host to the LURD.



6. (C) In the final analysis, Uwechue claimed,
Liberia was not amenable to a military solution. The
prospect of chronic stalemate between the LURD and the
GOL was depressing. The political pedigree of the
LURD leadership was equally frightening; that group
promised to govern no better than Taylor, if they
managed to oust him.


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PAX NIGERIANA, TAKE IT OR LEAVE IT
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7. (C) Both in tenor and substance, Presidential
Advisor Obe's view of Liberia differed significantly
from Uwechue's. Obe recalled President Obasanjo trying
to consult with and counsel Taylor; yet Monrovia
remained deaf to Abuja's voice. Now, President
Obasanjo has little patience or sympathy for Taylor,
Obe contended.



8. (C) Obe saw almost no possibility for peaceful
resolution in Liberia due to Taylor's intransigent
meanness. Embedded in Taylor's pathology is an innate
inability to follow reason when it does not
immediately sate of his appetite for power. When
confronted between what is rational and what he
desires, Taylor will choose the latter. Talk alone
cannot sway him. The offer of some political carrots
is unlikely to hold influence because Taylor wants to
own the entire farm. The only thing that attracts
Taylor's undivided attention is a demonstration of
force, Obe maintained. Obe doubted that Obasanjo would
attempt to reach out to Taylor any time soon. If he
does not want Nigeria's involvement in resolving this
crisis, he will not get it. Taylor has made this mess
for himself, now let him flail in it, Obe scoffed.


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COMMENT
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9. (C) In a certain sense, the views on Liberia
expressed by Uwechue and Obe reveal as much about
their personalities as their input into GON policy.
Uwechue is by nature ebullient and an optimist. There
are few people he dislikes; he would talk to a boulder
if told there was a slight chance it might budge. The
acerbic Obe has a much more cynical worldview, and not
everyone is his friend. Indeed, others at State House
sometimes call him the "Most Obnoxious Nigerian"
(given the number of other formidable contestants,
this is a truly stinging characterization with which
we do not really agree). Because of his avowed pan-
Africanism, Uwechue's stance on regional conflict
resolution has a precatory quality. Promotion of the
pan-Africanist ideal requires Nigeria to remain
involved in conflict resolution and continue to reach
out even when rebuffed. Not so with Obe. Unlike
Uwechue, he is not a staunch pan-Africanist, and there
is little space for romanticism in his creed. He does
not easily countenance insolence from Nigeria's lesser
neighbors. If another country crosses Nigeria, he is
prone write off that country.



10. (C) Both men profess to know and reflect
Obasanjo's GON views on Liberia, and, paradoxically,
we believe both are correct. Obasanjo operates as his
own foreign minister, particularly on Liberia.
Obasanjo's personality -- and his approach to Liberia
-- have elements of Uwechue's congeniality and Obe's
jagged edges. Angered by Taylor's stubbornness and
rejection of the invitation to visit Abuja (the second
rejection this year),Obasanjo currently is probably
closer to Obe's position. However, that might not last
long. Events in Liberia, further discussions with
other regional leaders, or something extraneous could
cause Obasanjo's mood to swing back toward engagement.



11. (C) Affecting all of this are the time constraints
imposed by the President's demanding schedule.
Obasanjo is has a busy travel itinerary for the
remainder of June and much of July. This could limit
the attention he gives Liberia during the next several
weeks. Moreover, as Nigeria's electoral season
steadily moves toward full swing, the desire and
opportunities to be fully engaged on Liberia will
diminish for Obasanjo, particularly with the need to
shore-up his re-nomination bid before the PDP national
convention slated for October.
ANDREWS