NIGERIA: ECOWAS EXECSEC CHAMBAS'S VIEWS ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABUJA 001725

SIPDIS


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E.O.12958: DECL: 06/07/12
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS XY LI NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: ECOWAS EXECSEC CHAMBAS'S VIEWS ON
LIBERIA

CLASSIFIED BY CHARGE TIM ANDREWS. REASON 1.5 (B) and
(D).



1. (C) Summary: During two recent conversations with
Ambassador Jeter, the last on May 24, ECOWAS ExeSec
Chambas outlined the game-plan for Liberia developed
at the May 17 Heads of State meeting in Yamoussoukro.
Presidents Obasanjo and Wade were appointed to broker
political reconciliation and a GOL-LURD cease-fire
while an ECOWAS technical group would visit Liberia to
assess the security situation in order to advise Wade
and Obasanjo. Chambas realized a cease-fire would be
difficult; the LURD would demand political
compensation for its quiescence while the GOL would
resist any step insinuating legitimacy or territorial
control for the rebel group. Chambas worried that
mediation would be hampered by Obasanjo's domestic
electoral distractions and Wade's inexperience on
Liberia. Chambas also wondered how to coax Guinea to
play a constructive role. Chambas blamed Taylor's near
total expropriation of Liberia's political space as
the reason for a recrudescent LURD. In the end, Taylor
must loosen his stranglehold on the political process
for progress to be achieved. End Summary.



2. (C) During a May 24 late evening meeting, ECOWAS
ExeSec Chambas told Ambassador Jeter, joined by
PolCouns, that he had just concluded a two-hour
meeting, mostly devoted to Liberia, with President
Obasanjo. While relaxed and at times joking, Chambas
acknowledged the difficult terrain ahead and
understood the road to ending the fighting in Liberia
was twisting and all uphill.


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YAMOUSSOUKRO DID NOT MEET GOL EXPECTATIONS
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3. (C) Describing the dynamics at Yamoussoukro,
Chambas said the proposed resolution drafted by the
ECOWAS Ministerial Mediation and Security Council was
more favorable to the GOL then the final communique
issued by the Heads of State. The differences in the
documents also reflected the divergent tenors of the
meetings. While the foreign ministers were attracted
to the legal argument against the LURD for attacking
the elected, nominally democratic GOL, the political
heads showed diminished sympathy for the GOL position.
Thus, while the final communique shared key provisions
contained in the Ministers' draft, e.g. immediate
cease-fire, dispatch of a military assessment team and
political dialogue, the political leaders omitted the
strong condemnation of the LURD and the specific
reference to ECOMOG intervention in the absence of a
cease-fire.



4. (C) COMMENT: While not saying so explicitly,
Chambas implied that Liberian ForMin Captan, subbing
for President Taylor at Yamoussoukro, emerged from the
Heads of State meeting disappointed. The small but
symbolic diplomatic victory in his grasp at the
Ministerial had vanished. Instead of winning an
explicit castigation of the LURD as well as a
statement that ECOMOG might intervene on behalf of the
GOL, the final communique labeled both the LURD and
GOL "belligerents," thus making no moral
differentiation between the two sides. President
Wade's public statement immediately after the meeting
that ECOMOG intervention in Liberia was not
contemplated also irked Taylor. In the final analysis,
what the GOL achieved at Yamoussoukro was a
frustrating diplomatic stalemate. President Taylor's
refusal to accept the GON invitation to come to Abuja
after Yamoussoukro probably likely was a by-product of
that frustration. END COMMENT.



5. (C) The communique's nuances and its parsing
notwithstanding, obtaining the actual cease-fire would
be complicated, Chambas predicted. The LURD must be
convinced to stop but the group's accession would not
be without costs. Chambas's wondered, not if demands
would be made, but what LURD's demands might be.
Conversely, the GOL promised to be dogged in its
position that the LURD, being an insurgent adversary
of an elected government, did not have the standing to
make political demands on the GOL. Shortening the
distance between these positions would require
sustained diplomatic effort by ECOWAS, he offered.
Nigeria was key, as no other ECOWAS state could
approximate Nigeria's potential clout over the
Liberian actors.
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OBASANJO -- POLITICS AT HOME TRUMPS A STATESMAN ROLE
ABROAD
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6. (C) However, given the demands of the Nigerian
electoral season, the ExeSec was unsure whether
Obasanjo could devote adequate time to this cause.
Chambas thought Obasanjo should call the LURD leaders
to Abuja to open a dialogue with them; however,
Chambas had not conveyed the idea to Obasanjo because
he did not want to overtax the Nigerian leader's
schedule. Because of this caution, neither Obasanjo
nor Chambas personally have met any of the declared
LURD leaders. After discussing Obasanjo's ambitious
travel schedule for the summer, Chambas worried that
Obasanjo might not have the time to take advantage of
whatever positive momentum generated by the
Yamoussoukro meting. As the clock ticked toward the
PDP national convention slated for October and the
subsequent presidential campaign, Obasanjo's
concentration on Liberia would only further diminish.
Chambas speculated that Obasanjo should appoint a
Special Envoy but could not think of current player in
Obasanjo's foreign policy team with the requisite
stature and experience with Liberia to do the job
well.



7. (C) Chambas discounted the rumor that Nigeria was
supplying arms to the GOL, stating he saw no signs of
such closeness between Obasanjo and Taylor. He also
contended that establishing a "son of ECOMOG" for
Liberia was highly unlikely. The leaders did not show
stomach for this at the Summit. Moreover, domestic
considerations in the two most likely troop
contributing states precluded deployment. Electoral
considerations would discourage Obasanjo and President
Kufuor has his hands full with ethno-political trouble
in Northern Ghana.


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WADE -- HIS MIND AND HEART MAY BE ELSEWHERE
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8. (C) Chambas confided that the Senegalese President
Wade might not be very effective because neither Wade
nor his senior foreign policy advisors knew much about
Liberia. Despite his selection as ECOWAS Chairman,
Wade was more focused on Madagascar's presidential
tug-of-war than the political and security challenges
facing the Mano River Union's two Anglophone members.
Chambas mentioned that Wade was tasked with generating
diplomatic and, if needed, material support within the
international community for ECOWAS efforts on Liberia.
Chambas hoped the selection of senior UN official
Ibrahim Fall, also Senegalese, to head the UN's new
West Africa office located in Dakar would help
reorient Wade, particularly in helping Wade reach out
to the international community for assistance on
Liberia.


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GUINEA -- VIOLATOR AS WELL AS VICTIM?
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9. (C) Given that the LURD used Guinea as its primary
base, Chambas stated that ECOWAS needed to develop a
strategy that considered Guinea's role and interests.
Chambas mentioned the ECOWAS communique endorsed the
Rabat process but said the gesture was essentially pro
forma. While admitting no detailed knowledge of what
happened in Rabat, Chambas did not show great
confidence in that process. He recognized Conte had
serious security concerns due to Liberia's prior
aggression and that Conte's continued mistrust of and
deep animus for Taylor caused Conte to view the LURD
with benign indifference, at minimum. However, he
stated that ECOWAS needed to develop a strategy that
would respond to Conte's apprehension about Taylor's
hegemonic appetite but also pressure Conte to suppress
the LURD. Chambas fretted that although Conte
currently may have the upper hand on Taylor, the
Guinean was engaged in a risky gambit. Guinea has
significant domestic problems -- allowing a rag-tag
rebel force to inhabit portions of territory where
your government's control is thin could hand Conte
problems in the long run.



10. (C) COMMENT: In addition to seeing the LURD
contemned by ECOWAS Heads of State, a secondary GOL
objective at Yamoussoukro probably was to shift more
diplomatic pressure on Guinea to cease hosting the
LURD. However, because of perceptions that Taylor's
megalomania is both father and mother to most problems
within Liberia and between the two countries, the GOL
did not register much success tarring Guinea as the
sponsor of instability. END COMMENT.


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TAYLOR -- HE HAS THE WHOLE MESS IN HIS HANDS!
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11. (C) Despite the multiple aspects of this recent
Liberian crisis, its gestation lies in Taylor's
malevolent governance and his stiff opposition to the
development of a meaningful political opposition.
Chambas asserted that his efforts are based on the
assumption that Taylor is not incorrigible and can be
ultimately be turned in the right direction. However,
the Liberian's intransigence is testing that premise.
In the end, the ExeSec maintained Taylor must loosen
his grip and allow the opposition to operate freely.
The GOL must enter a dialogue aimed at creating the
conditions for fair elections. Chambas asserted that a
cease-fire without the GOL making concessions on the
political side would be untenable. The GOL would have
no incentive to change its ways after obtaining the
cease-fire. While the LURD presence was unfortunate
and should not be encouraged, it has put pressure on
Taylor that did not previously exist, he maintained.
The challenge is for ECOWAS to use that pressure in a
manner that is not misinterpreted as condoning the
LURD yet in a way that gets Taylor to accept
nonviolent political opposition at home.


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COMMENT
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12. (C) Himself formerly a rebel leader, who stalked
an unpopular Head of State, Taylor is now being
pursued by late President Doe's former associates.
This predicament smacks of karma. However, belief in
reciprocal justice alone will not solve this problem.
Diplomacy is needed. Save for not having opened a
formal line of communication with the LURD, Chambas
has a good grasp of the motivations, limitations and
interests of the players. (We have encouraged him to
develop that contact with the LURD. The longer they
are left unattended, the more recalcitrant they will
be when talks finally come.) ECOWAS has dispatched the
five-man technical team to Liberia, and their report
will help advise Presidents Wade and Obasanjo, Chambas
and the Ministerial Mediation and Security Council,
which will continue to play a role in ECOWAS efforts.
The Yamoussoukro communique provides a skeletal
framework for moving forward. ECOWAS must use that
framework to develop a strategy that puts the right
pressures on the LURD, the GOL and the political
opposition as well as offers them the right
incentives. While Chambas has not fleshed out the
details, his statements indicate that this will
require some type of linkage of a cease-fire to
political reform, particularly of the electoral
process.
ANDREWS