Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
02ABUJA1485
2002-05-16 11:36:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Abuja
Cable title:  

NIGERIA: ABUBAKAR RIMI IS COMING TO TOWN

Tags:  PREL PGOV KDEM NI 
pdf how-to read a cable
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 001485 

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/10/2012
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: ABUBAKAR RIMI IS COMING TO TOWN

REF: A. ABUJA 852

B. ABUJA 882

C. ABUJA 1068

D. ABUJA 1159


CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR HOWARD F. JETER; REASONS 1.5 (d).


C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 001485

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/10/2012
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: ABUBAKAR RIMI IS COMING TO TOWN

REF: A. ABUJA 852

B. ABUJA 882

C. ABUJA 1068

D. ABUJA 1159


CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR HOWARD F. JETER; REASONS 1.5 (d).



1. (C) SUMMARY: During a May 3 meeting with Ambassador Jeter,
PDP maverick and long-shot Presidential aspirant Mohammed
Abubakar Rimi claimed he had heard a rumor that the Embassy
was warning American visitors not to see him because of his
alleged ties to terrorism. After the Ambassador dismissed
this misperception, the loquacious Presidential-hopeful got
off on another wrong track by requesting USG blessing of his
Presidential aspirations. The Ambassador told Rimi that we
were not in the business of endorsing Presidential candidates
in Nigeria, or elsewhere. However, we were concerned that
the upcoming Presidential elections be as free, fair and
non-violent as possible. Rimi plans to visit Washington, and
asked for our help in setting up meetings with USG officials.
Rimi's assistant Ujudud Shariff and PolMilOff sat in on the
meeting. END SUMMARY.


=============
NOT A BAD MAN
=============



2. (C) Rimi explained he wanted to see the Ambassador to
counter a rumor that he, Rimi, had heard. According to Rimi,
a source he would not name, had told him the Embassy was
warning AmCits not to meet with him, allegedly because Rimi
supported terrorism and Bin Laden. Countering these stories
of his alleged anti-American leanings, Rimi stated strong
support for U.S. efforts in Afghanistan, and condemned the
events of September 11. The Ambassador assured Rimi that at
no time had the Embassy blacklisted him, nor did we have any
basis to question his opposition to terrorism.


=====================
FACING OFF AGAINST OO
=====================



3. (C) Rimi then turned to the 2003 Presidential election.
Challenging Obasanjo for the PDP ticket, Rimi said that
Obasanjo had done little for development in the North while
projects in the South were numerous and moving forward.
Despite the resources Obasanjo was investing in the South,
Rimi predicted the President still could not claim much
support in his own home region in the Southwest. According
to Rimi, the Southwest believed Awolowo had won the election

in 1979, but then military Head-of-State Obasanjo declared
the North's Shehu Shagari the winner. Many Yoruba consider
this an act of ethnic treason. Rimi also complained that
Obasanjo had put Yorubas into most of the senior security
services positions and the majority of Ministerial posts, an
affront to Northerners who had overwhelmingly supported him
in the 1999 election. Rimi caviled that the Director General
of the Nigerian Television Authority (NTA) and the Director
General of the Federal Radio Commission of Nigeria (FRCN) had
joined Obasanjo's campaign publicity team, giving Obasanjo an
unfair media advantage over non-incumbents. (COMMENT: In an
act of singular political ineptness that won Rimi support and
sympathy he otherwise would never have, FRCN pulled Rimi's
paid political announcements from the air earlier this year.
END COMMENT.)



4. (C) When asked what he would do differently than Obasanjo
if he were President, Rimi said that first of all, he would
respect the constitution. He contended President Obasanjo
had shown disregard for both the constitution and the
National Assembly. Under a Rimi Presidency, consultation
with the legislature would be the watchword. Moreover,
Obasanjo had spent vast sums on the ID card project and the
national stadium; in contrast, Rimi said that he would focus
on agricultural and industrial development. (Rimi quoted
N10b and N30b, approximately USD100m and USD300m respectively
for the ID card and stadium. In reality, the full cost of
stadium project is probably more than that.) When asked
about privatization, Rimi, the Chairman of the Nigerian
Security Printing and Minting Company, which is on the block
to be privatized, dismissed the effort. "Most parastatals
are profitable," he said, implying that that factor was
sufficient reason for maintaining state control despite the
inefficiencies and inability to deliver reliable and
affordable services characteristic of most parastatals.
(COMMENT: By any commercial yardstick, most parastatals are
not profitable. END COMMENT.)


================
BLESSINGS SOUGHT
================



5. (C) Rimi declared that he believed the U.S. would not
interfere in the elections, but he also "knew" the U.S.
supported Obasanjo in 1999. Ambassador Jeter corrected Rimi,
making sure he did not leave the meeting still harboring this
perception. The Ambassador unambiguously told him that the
US strongly backed the democratic process, but did not
endorse any particular candidate. In any case, Rimi replied
that he "wished to come closer" to the USG, and planned to
travel to Washington soon and wanted to meet with some of our
officials. "I want Washington to know me," he stated. Rimi
then asked if the Embassy could help arrange meetings in
Washington for the first or second week of June with the
State Department, the CIA, and the White House ("President
Bush, if possible"). Ambassador Jeter replied that a meeting
with the President was not in the cards, however; calls at
State and the NSC might be possible. Jeter also suggested
Rimi meet Nigerian-Americans while in the U.S.


=======
COMMENT
=======



6. (C) Rimi came looking for both "a rumor disclaimer" and
"an electoral nod." We could give the former but Rimi almost
certainly knew that we could not and would not give the
latter. This is not the first time Rimi has sought U.S.
support; during Abacha's phony transition, Rimi asked for
money to back his candidacy. This unfortunate habit shows
his lack of understanding of the USG and his over-inflated
sense of his political gravity. Articulate and capable of
energizing a crowd, Rimi makes good copy and is a favorite of
the press. However, he is little more than a political
gadfly, known for his unguarded statements. Rimi's chances
of upsetting President Obasanjo for the PDP nomination are
slim. It is well known that Rimi is angry both about not
being given the Foreign Ministry and about not getting
lucrative contracts in return for his support to Obasanjo in

1999. Although his candidacy has little chance of gaining
traction outside of the Kano area, Rimi has become a symbol
of strong opposition to Obasanjo in the North. Rimi's
continued public sniping at the President will make it
difficult for Obasanjo to make inroads in this very key
region.
JETER