Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
02ABUJA1448
2002-05-09 12:25:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Abuja
Cable title:  

NIGERIA: OPPOSITION PARTIES TALK MERGER

Tags:  PGOV KDEM PREL NI 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 001448 

SIPDIS


E.O.12958: DECL: 5/6/12
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PREL NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: OPPOSITION PARTIES TALK MERGER


REF: ABUJA 1324


CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR HOWARD F. JETER. REASON 1.5 (B)
AND (D).


C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 001448

SIPDIS


E.O.12958: DECL: 5/6/12
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PREL NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: OPPOSITION PARTIES TALK MERGER


REF: ABUJA 1324


CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR HOWARD F. JETER. REASON 1.5 (B)
AND (D).



1. (C) In reporting President Obasanjo's formal
announcement to seek reelection, reftel forecasted that
Obasanjo's statement would force his opponents to respond.
His political adversaries wasted little time making that
prediction come true.



2. (C) Most major daily newspapers have been reporting that
the APP and the yet-to-be-registered UNDP have been
immersed in merger talks since Obasanjo declared his
reelection bid. Significant progress has been made and the
conclusion of a formal agreement appears imminent. It is
possible that the NDP might also join the merger. If that
were to happen, it would create a potentially significant
rival to the ruling PDP in the North.



3. (C) According to Yaya Abubakar, a businessman, the
merger might be formalized this week. As part of the deal,
the existing party chairmen would resign, making way for a
new person not publicly affiliated with any of the existing
parties to emerge. The new chairman would likely be from
the Southwest. The way then would be open for the new party
to nominate a Presidential candidate from the North and a
running mate from the Southeast. The simultaneous
resignation of both (or all three) chairmen would create an
impression of a merger of equals. But Abubakar said the
entire deal could yet fall apart since each outgoing
chairman was trying to retain influence by picking the
(unified) successor chairman.



4. (C) Comment: A North/Southeast ticket would replicate
the winning formula in past elections. Additionally, this
partially responds to the noisy clamor from the Igboland
for a President of their own. Dangling the Vice Presidency
before them might attract Igbos who feel estranged from the
Obasanjo Administration and do not see much hope about
wresting the top job in the PDP since Vice President Atiku
is a Northerner. These Igbos might see the Vice Presidency
in 2003 as the stepping stone to the Presidency in 2007 or

2011. End Comment.



5. (C) Abubakar said that a recurring theme in the talks
among APP, UNDP and NDP was the need for a younger man to
assume the Presidency, someone under 50, someone such as

himself. Abubakar offered that there was some support for
airline owner Mohammed Buba Marwa, a retired brigadier
general and former military governor of Borno and Lagos
states. However, many discussants were sour on naming a
former military leader. They feared the electorate would
draw little distinction between them and the PDP if they
tapped another retired military officer to face former
General Obasanjo. However, Marwa was still a possibility as
his popularity in Lagos intrigued many of those in the
merger talks who want to hit Obasanjo, a Yoruba, hard in
his own electoral backyard.



6. (C) Comment: Some Northern powerbrokers are considering
trying to nominate an elderly Igbo (e.g., Alex Ekwueme) or
southern minority leader (e.g., C.C. Onoh) as the
Presidential candidate while bringing in a young Northerner
to run things behind the scenes as Vice President. End
Comment.



7. (C) During a May 1 conversation with PolCouns, National
Assembly Member Farouk Lawal confirmed that the President's
opponents have been talking feverishly. Lawal, allied with
Speaker Ghali Na'Abba as an Obasanjo foe within the PDP,
stated the opposition had been stymied by its inability to
find a credible consensus figure. Stoked by the President's
reelection declaration, sentiment for unity in the
opposition was at its crest. Lawal predicted opposition
forces had only a few weeks to select a candidate and
execute the formal merger. After that, centrifugal forces
of regionalism, religion and personal ambition would begin
to supercede the mutual opposition to Obasanjo, Lawal
remarked. He added that already Obasanjo operatives were
trying to sow discord among the participants in the merger
talks. Lawal asserted that if the parties do formally
merge, there likely would be a mass exodus of Obasanjo
opponents from the PDP to the new creation.



8. (C) Comment: That the parties have moved so quickly in
the merger talks illustrates the significance of the
opposition to an Obasanjo second term. However, the fine
points still pending to consummate the deal show the
difficulty in fusing divergent interests into an ABOP --
Anybody But Obasanjo Party. With former Head of State
Babangida second-in-command Augustus Aikhomu leading the
UNDP team, this development seems to have IBB's blessing,
if not his behind the scenes involvement. We heard from one
source that IBB was orchestrating this amalgam not to fight
Obasanjo but to form a party big enough to thwart former
Head of State Buhari's attempt to steam-roll the APP
nomination. Buhari's dislike of IBB is legendary, and IBB
clearly has more to fear from a Buhari first term than from
Obasanjo's retention.



9. (C) Regardless of the primary intention behind the
merger, it could pose a serious threat to Obasanjo if it
jells and selects a formidable candidate. The claim that
the prospective party wants a new face and wants to break
from the past rings hollow. The manner in which the party
is being formed and the attempt of a select group of
powerbrokers to pick the presidential candidate smack of
traditional Nigerian politics. Basically, this is a move by
Northern politicians, stung by what they feel has been
Obasanjo's disregard for their station and their support in
the 1999 election, to regain control of national politics.
In the end, with so many of the established players
involved and assuming their familiar roles as backroom
bargainers, this attempted merger appears to be the same
old card game played on a refurbished table. End comment.


JETER