NIGERIA: ENGAGING ISLAM

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 ABUJA 001408

SIPDIS


E.O.12958: DECL: 5/2/12
TAGS: PREL PTER KPAO EFIN NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: ENGAGING ISLAM


REF: STATE 61142


CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR HOWARD F. JETER. REASON 1.5
(B) AND (D).



1. (C) Summary: By far the most strategically
important country in West Africa, Nigeria is a major
economic partner to the United States (oil imports)
and has been a cooperative player in conflict
resolution in the sub-region. Africa's most populous
state and largest democracy, Nigeria has supported the
war against terrorism, but most Muslims oppose our
policies in the Middle East. While Islamic
fundamentalism exists here, its followers constitute a
small minority. Most Nigerian Muslims are pro-
democracy and do not oppose the United States; they
are "conservative" Muslims. However, chronic
inequalities in the political economy could fertilize
radicalism. Northern Nigeria, where most Muslims live,
lags behind the South in education, economic activity
and modernization. Our policy objectives should be to
engage the Government to address the primarily socio-
economic problems that lead to radicalism. Mainly, we
need to promote economic growth in the non-oil
sectors, particularly agriculture. We also need to
promote education in the North. Lastly, we must
better educate Muslims about America, our foreign
policies and our approach to religious diversity and
tolerance at home. End Summary.


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OVERVIEW
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2. (U) Home to Africa's largest Muslim population,
Nigeria is not an "Islamic State" nor is radical Islam
a major current here. Roughly half of Nigeria's 120
million people are Muslim, 40 percent are Christian
with the remainder adhering to local traditional
religions. Mostly Sunni and followers of the Maliki
School, Nigeria's Muslims are primarily in the
Northern half of the country. The South is
predominately Christian except for the Southwest,
where the Yoruba ethnic group is split equally between
Muslim and Christian. Islam in West Africa was first
established in Nigeria (Borno) and the territorial
expansion of the Sokoto caliphate under Usman Dan
Fodio in the early 19th century is a source of pride
for many Muslims. Due to these historic antecedents,
Nigerian Muslims see Northern Nigeria as the epicenter
of Islam in West Africa.



3. (C) Most Nigerian Muslims are not anti-democratic.
After nearly 16 consecutive years of military
governments headed by Muslim generals, democracy
returned in 1999 with the election of President
Olusegun Obasanjo, a born-again Yoruba Christian who
professes a deeply held faith. The Muslim North
supported both the return of democratic rule and
Obasanjo's candidacy. Presidential elections are
slated for early 2003. While Obasanjo's support in the
North has waned, perhaps considerably, the vast
majority of Northerners still endorse democratic
civilian rule. Their estrangement from Obasanjo has
more to do with his perceived tribalism and nothing to
do with opposition to the democratic form of
government because of Islamic religious principles.



4. (C) Despite most Nigerians' pro-democratic outlook,
Islam in Nigeria presents important policy challenges
for the U.S. The most topical challenges have been
Muslim attitudes toward USG policies in the Middle
East and, to a much lesser extent, our military action
in Afghanistan. While Nigeria's Muslims condemn
terrorism and 9/11, many suspect that USG foreign
policy is inherently anti-Islamic because of the
United States' predominately Western political and
cultural heritage. Prominent Islamic figures have
sounded this theme and public demonstrations in Kano,
Katsina and Abuja against USG policy have occurred
recently.



5. (C) In addition to Muslim opposition to our
policies in the Middle East, the advent of criminal
Sharia codes in twelve Northern states, the incidence
of communal violence since 1999 and their implications
for democracy also impact long-term USG policy
interests in Nigeria. Paradoxically, the return of
democratic rule in 1999 facilitated the introduction
of criminal Sharia.



6. C) Criminal Sharia may appear to be a product of
Islamic radicalism. However, its emergence actually
resulted from the combination of political opportunism
and the socio-economic angst of large segments of the
population in the north where traditional legal
structures and law enforcement decayed due to neglect
by successive military regimes. In short, Sharia began
as a tack employed by embattled politicians to bolster
their popularity. However, these politicians
underestimated the populist reaction. Many Nigerians
have felt they were being left behind by the dynamics
of the global economy and modernity. (The IMF and, to
a lesser degree, the WTO are convenient bogeymen in
Nigeria.) Many Nigerians also have been frustrated by
homegrown inequities, particularly the gulf between
rich and poor. Moreover, they have been disappointed
in a secular justice system perceived as favoring the
affluent and allowing them to live above the law.
Additionally, Muslims worried about the spread of
evangelical Christianity into traditionally Muslim
areas.



7. (C) Against this backdrop, the call for Sharia is
more "conservative" and "defensive" than it is
radical. Feeling that change and modernity have been
more enervating than empowering, some Muslims have
looked with false nostalgia to a past that never
actually existed. For, the more historically minded,
Sharia harks back to when the Sokoto Caliphate was at
its zenith. For them, Sharia does not mean just harsh
criminal punishments; more importantly, it is the
avenue for the return of the practice of giving
charity to the poor (zakkat),the prohibition against
usury and the swift application of justice
notwithstanding one's station in life. In short,
Sharia's appeal is that the wealthy cannot be a law
unto themselves but they must help the common and the
poor. This may have serious political consequences for
the GON in the future, if action is not taken to
narrow economic disparities.



8. (C) Notwithstanding Sharia's primarily
"conservative" nature, it is evidence of incipient
political and economic fermentation in Nigeria.
Nigeria's small but incrementally growing circle of
Islamic radicals endorse Sharia's promulgation, seeing
it as a fillip to expand fundamentalism. Part of this
fermentation has been the level of communal violence
experienced since the return of democratic rule. Much
of the violence was sparked by competition between
ethnic groups over control of local government and
scarce resources such as land and water. However, the
violence often assumed a religious dimension when
competing ethnic groups were from different religions.



9. (C) Many Nigerians perceive a clash of religions
taking place in their country. Some staunch Muslims
talk of bringing Sharia into the Southwest, where
there are large numbers of co-religionists.
(Generally, the Yoruba Southwest has been tolerant,
with intermarriage between the faiths common.
However, there is evidence of growing religious
agitation in that region as in many other areas.)
Conversely, evangelical Christianity is a potent
stream, coursing into Northern areas that have been
the traditional reserve of Islam. The Evangelicals
received succor and funding from sister churches in
the West, including the United States. Likewise, some
Muslim fundamentalists receive support or training
from Iran, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Sudan, and Pakistan. In
many places in the Middle Belt, fundamentalist Islam
and Christianity collide. Exacerbating pre-existing
squabbles over control of resources and local
government, this clash of religious expansionism has
helped foment communal violence in many instances.
Compounding the clash of religions is the gap between
socio-economic conditions in the mainly Christian
South and the Muslim North. The North lags behind the
South in important areas like economic activity,
infrastructure, and education. These gaps feed the
perception that the North and, thus, Muslims are
losing ground due to the Christian Southerners closer
economic and cultural ties to the West.



10. (C) Herein lies the crux of Nigeria's challenge
with Islam. The fundamental problem facing the country
is economic; there is not enough bread, butter or
jobs. Yet, many Nigerians view events through a
religious prism. If poverty is not replaced by
economic growth over time, poor Muslims might begin to
see the Western-led modern economy as stacked against
them, in part due to their religious orientation.
Nigeria's conservative Islam could yield to the more
radical strain here that promotes anti-Americanism.
Since America stands at the military and economic
pinnacle, it would be easier to blame America for
purposely engineering their socio-economic stagnation
than to attribute their troubles to more proximate
domestic conditions at home.


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ECONOMIC REFORM
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11. (C) Economic and agricultural reform is one of the
Mission's primary objectives and accounts for
approximately $35 million in assistance this year.
Assistance has encouraged immediate economic reform in
some areas, with the GON undertaking significant steps
to privatize parastatals and liberalize the downstream
petroleum sector. However, the GON has been reluctant
to move forward on the exchange rate regime
(overvalued Naira),tariff reform, agricultural
policies, and fiscal discipline. The Mission supports
reform-minded private sector groups such as the
Nigerian-American Chamber of Commerce and Industry and
the Nigerian Economic Summit Group, and promotes
reform with larger bodies such as the Manufacturers
Association of Nigeria (MAN) and the Nigerian Chamber
of Commerce, Industry, Mining and Agriculture. In
addition to continuing current assistance, we
requested USD 5 million in ESF to fund a
public/private partnership in Kano, the North's
largest city. The home of tens of thousands of
unemployed youth, Kano is a potential source of
radicalism unless its depressed economy can improve.
Because of Kano's strategic importance, we want to
encourage private business to invest in the local
economy in order to promote economic growth and
generate employment opportunities for the jobless.
Additionally, we would like to increase technical
assistance to Nigeria's moribund agricultural sector.
Most Nigerians and most Northerners are employed in
this sector. Yet, agricultural production declined
under years of policy neglect by past military
governments. Improvement in agriculture will lift
Northern Nigeria's economy, provide food security and
help check radicalism.


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POLITICAL REFORM
--------------



12. (C) The biggest challenge to democracy is not
Islamic radicalism but the return of the military
should democracy be seen as dysfunctional, unable to
deliver practical dividends to the populace. With most
Nigerians already believing in democracy, our strategy
is to help secure democratization, primarily through
the conduct of fair elections in 2003, improving
governance and promoting the rule of law. The upcoming
Presidential and National Assembly elections are key
to democracy's longevity. Consequently, we are funding
technical assistance for the Independent National
Electoral Commission and the State Electoral
Commissions to help ensure they have the technical
expertise to conduct fair elections. Promoting good
governance, we have programs with the National
Assembly and several State Assemblies, including
Katsina and Adamawa in the North. We are also
assisting the Federal Government's special anti-
corruption unit. To help advance the rule of law and
administration of justice, we fund court management
programs for three State High Courts (including
Kaduna). We have also initiated a police-training
program that brings the concept of community policing
to Nigeria.


-- PROGRAM EFFECTIVENESS: Mission programs have
effectively assisted new democratic institutions adopt
better procedures and have helped place key issues,
such as women's rights and freedom of information, on
legislative agendas (the former more in the South than
in the North). Historically, however, we have paid
more attention and allocated more resources to
development in the Christian South than the Muslim
North.


-- REACTION OF HOST GOVERNMENT AND EFFECT ON OTHER
INITIATIVES: We have seen little negative reaction to
our programs. One exception was the publication of the
results of an USAID-funded public opinion survey
indicating that most Nigerians believed there was
significant corruption in the GON. At one point, GON
officials requested we issue a public disclaimer that
the survey was not a USG product but the work of
private academicians. Because of this incident, Post
will move delicately on USG-funded public awareness
projects dealing with corruption and other sensitive
issues. However, this incident has not impeded
assistance to the anti-corruption unit. There have
been some suspicion of U.S.-supported projects in the
North, especially those related to HIV/AIDS and polio
eradication. However, this suspicion is diminishing.


-- DONOR COORDINATION: Mission coordinates democracy
and governance assistance with other donors to avoid
duplication; this has helped overall donor efficiency.
With regard to the 2003 elections, we will work in
greater concert with other donors to coordinate our
policy positions and public and private diplomacy as
well as the assistance programs.


-- OPPOSITION FIGURES: Mission has regular contact
with opposition figures at all levels. There has been
no negative GON reaction to this engagement.
Sensitivity to contact with "the opposition" may grow
as the 2003 elections approach.


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EDUCATIONAL REFORM
--------------



13. (C) Education in Northern Nigeria lags behind the
rest of the country. We need to significantly increase
our assistance to education in the North, particularly
the universities located in the region. Currently,
Post provides information technology assistance to
Nigerian Universities. ECA information technology
programs have supported Bayero University, Ahmadu
Bello University, the University of Jos, and the
University of Ibadan. (Three of the four mentioned
universities are in the North.) The close ties with
universities developed by USIS and PAS over the years
have paid dividends. No Vice-Chancellor doubts our
commitment to helping Nigeria's universities. Yet,
while they know our "will," they do wonder about our
"wallet." There are several cost-effective steps that
we can take to further help the schools. More
programming in information technology should be
developed for the Northern universities. Also, book
and database grants need to be increased. We should
encourage more links to universities in the United
States through College/University Affiliation Programs
(CUAP). In addition to our assistance to universities,
the USAID-funded Literacy Enhancement Assistance
Programs (LEAP) aims to improve literacy and numeracy
in both Qur'anic and public schools. Last, extra
funding could be employed to improve vocational
education and literacy/numeracy in Northern cities
like Kano and Kaduna.


-- RESISTANCE TO CHANGING EDUCATIONAL PARADIGMS: While
the Nigerian government supports university autonomy,
the Union of University Academic Staff resists the
shift, fearing it will lead to budget cuts.
Universities have been urged to institute tuition
fees, a move students and parents vehemently oppose.


-- USG ALIGNMENT TO EDUCATIONAL REFORM: Universities
have openly opposed IMF loans for university reform.
The schools complain Nigeria should not borrow money
either from the World Bank or IMF because it would
give the IFIs control over university education in
Nigeria. While LEAP, the program to improve literacy
and numeracy in both Qur'anic and public schools, has
not been resisted by state and local governments, it
could be falsely characterized by some as an attempt
to manipulate Qur'anic education. Mindful of this
concern, we have worked with Islamic scholars in
developing the LEAP curriculum.


-- IMPORTANT EDUCATIONAL INDICATORS: Chronic student and
faculty strikes have adversely impacted Nigerian
universities. Due to extended strikes, full time
Nigerian students can spend six-eight years to obtain
a four-year degree. The brain drain affects the
quality of education. Although faculty salaries have
increased in the past few years, highly qualified
faculty continue to seek opportunities in other
sectors or overseas. Deteriorating infrastructure and
physical plant at the universities also hinder
education.


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CIVIL SOCIETY
--------------



14. (C) Mission has helped NGOS in the following
areas: freedom of information, electoral law reform,
anti-corruption legislation, women's rights, and
conflict mitigation in the important Northern cities
of Kano and Kaduna. Post would like additional
resources to expand conflict mitigation and inter-
faith dialogue in Kano and Kaduna to other areas of
the North and Middle Belt region. We would emphasize
the need for nonviolent political activity in the lead
up to the 2003 elections. In Kaduna and Kano, we also
would like to bring the conflict mitigation program
into the primary and secondary schools. Further
expanding our conflict mitigation efforts, additional
resources would help us institute a farmer/pastoralist
dialogue in select areas of the rural North to reduce
violence between farmers and cattle herders that
sparks much of the ethno-religious violence in many
areas. Additionally, we would like more funding to
provide basic civic education to women's groups and
youth organizations in the North. Establishment of
micro-credit programs for farmers and women's groups
will help employment and income generation. USAID also
is working with groups attempting to engage government
on constitutional reform.


-- PROGRAM EFFECTIVENESS: Mission has experienced
success in promoting dialogue and peace efforts in
communities where violence has occurred. This includes
inter-faith (Muslim-Christian) dialogue in Kaduna and
in Kano. Also, programs promoting women's
participation in local governance have been especially
effective, albeit more in the South than the North.
Post would like additional resources to expand
conflict mitigation and inter-faith dialogue in Kano
and Kaduna to other areas of the North and Middle Belt
region.


-- HOST GOVERNMENT REACTIONS: There have been no
negative GON reactions.


--NGOs OPEN TO USG INVOLVEMENT: A wide range of NGOs
are interested in USG funding and cooperation. Human
and political rights groups and health care
organizations are very open to USG involvement.
However, local Muslim clerics in rural communities in
several Northern states have actively opposed polio
vaccination efforts as "unIslamic."
Some Islamic leaders have also criticized family
planning activities.


--INVOLVEMENT WITH CIVIL SOCIETY AND
POLITICAL/ECONOMIC REFORM. Involvement with civil
society has advanced political and economic reform by
making government and leaders more responsive to the
concerns of average Nigerians through the advocacy and
oversight of these civil society groups.


-- WORKING WITH LOCAL OR INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
TO PROMOTE CIVIL SOCIETY: All civil society programs
are implemented through international NGOs working
with local NGOs. Although we do not try to conceal the
fact of USG funding, the indirect funding helps reduce
the perception that we are trying to manipulate local
NGOs.


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RELIGIOUS MODERATION AND TOLERANCE
--------------



15. (C) Post is engaged with Muslim organizations. We
also support inter-faith mediation programs. Using the
American Speaker Program, targeted mailings of policy
materials, and "Magama" (post's Hausa-language
magazine) we reach Muslim leaders, clerics,
communities, and centers of Islamic Studies.


--POST DIALOGUE WITH HOST GOVERNMENT ABOUT RELIGIOUS
ISSUES: Several clerics we reach through programs and
mailings are also government officials or participants
in a government-run interfaith committee. There also
has been policy dialogue with senior GON officials
about Sharia and ethno-religious communal violence.


--SUCCESSFUL CONTACTS AND PROGRAMS IN PROMOTING DEBATE
ON RELIGIOUS ISSUES/ COMBATING ANTI-AMERICANISM:
Regular meetings with key Muslim personalities to
discuss USG policies are helpful. Public statements
reiterating USG respect for Islam also carry weight.
The following programs serve to reach Muslim
communities: the International Visitor Program, the
American Speaker Program, the Fulbright Senior Scholar
and Student Program, the Humphrey Fellowship Program,
and programs organized by the Office of Citizen
Exchanges. The American Speaker program particularly
has been effective in promoting healthy exchanges of
views and in getting the American perspective across
to local audiences.


-- BEST PRACTICES: The Speaker program: Bringing a
Muslim-American to talk to Muslims about religious
issues/religious diversity has been more effective
than bringing a non-Muslim. A Muslim-American has
instant credibility that a non-Muslim does not. Short-
term educational and cultural exchange programs
directed at youth and teachers would help build
favorable attitudes, especially in Northern Nigeria.


--DEGREE OF INFLUENCE USG CAN EXERT ON INTERNAL
RELIGIOUS DEBATES: Although not nearly as dispositive
as domestic factors, our influence potentially can be
significant. Providing authoritative, credible voices
to discuss religious diversity/tolerance in United
States is a good step. We would like to initiate
single country group IV programs with themes such as
religious freedom in the United States, faith-based
solutions to social problems such as violence and
AIDS. Funding to establish links between Islamic
centers in Nigeria and the United States would
increase our influence. The VOA Hausa service can do
more programming about religious tolerance in America.
We should also explore select cultural events
compatible with the conservative social environment in
the North.


Additionally, private diplomacy encouraging tolerance
and dialogue also can influence key figures in both
Christian and Muslim communities. Events, such as the
very successful Iftar dinner the Ambassador hosted
last December, generated significant goodwill with
leading Muslims. The Iftar and other gatherings with
Muslim leaders should be replicated. Consistent and
regular dialogue that underscores our religious
impartiality will serve to enhance our influence.


-- GOVERNMENT TO GOVERNMENT ENGAGEMENT: This
traditionally has not been an effective avenue to
affect internal debate. However, in that the GON is
constitutionally required to be religiously neutral,
there is a potential for cooperation. However, the GON
usually prefers to conducts its own mediation without
outside help. Ambassador's and Mission outreach to
Northern state governments, some for the very first
time, is winning tremendous influence and access to
key Northern political elites.


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LOOKING AHEAD
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16.(C) The transfer of the Embassy from Lagos to Abuja
has already helped improve our contacts with the North
and we will continue to exploit the benefits that this
greater proximity provides. Mission further believes
that we can more effectively engage Nigeria's Muslim
community via some well-placed additional initiatives.
Perhaps the most time sensitive and crucial to
Nigeria's overall stability and support for democracy
is that we should provide adequate assistance to help
ensure that the 2003 electoral process is credible.
Over the longer haul, economic growth will be the most
effective bulwark against radicalism. In this regard,
we need to help bolster the agricultural sector and
help generate investment and trade in non-oil sectors
of the economy, particularly the North and its
principal city, Kano. To lay a stronger foundation for
the North's inclusion in the modern economy, we should
dedicate more resources to educational reform,
especially in Northern universities but also in
primary and secondary schools. The USG should also be
leading donor efforts in vocational training and
literacy/numeracy training. We should also seek ways
to expand inter-faith mediation efforts to promote
greater religious tolerance. We must also make greater
efforts to use public diplomacy, particularly visiting
speakers, to explain to Nigeria's Muslims our Middle
East Policy, the war on terrorism, and religious
diversity/tolerance in the United States.



17. (C) What we should not do is to be seen as too
judgmental and self-righteous on issues such as
Sharia. Our approach must understand that moderate and
progressive Muslims are working to bring Nigerian
Sharia in conformity with international human rights
standards. Our approach must be nuanced; we should
support their efforts through private diplomacy and
avoid categorical public statements about Sharia that
can be construed as anti-Islamic and that undermine
these progressive Muslims.
JETER