Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
02ABUJA1190
2002-04-16 12:54:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Abuja
Cable title:  

NIGERIA ON BUSTANI -- HELP US CONVINCE AFRICA

Tags:  PARM PREL NI 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L ABUJA 001190 

SIPDIS


THE HAGUE FOR OPCW DEL (MIKULAK); LONDON FOR GURNEY


E.O. 12958: 15 APR 2012
TAGS: PARM PREL NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA ON BUSTANI -- HELP US CONVINCE AFRICA


ABUJA 1160 AND PREVIOUS (NOTAL)


CLASSIFIED BY CDA ANDREWS. REASON: 1.5(D).


C O N F I D E N T I A L ABUJA 001190

SIPDIS


THE HAGUE FOR OPCW DEL (MIKULAK); LONDON FOR GURNEY


E.O. 12958: 15 APR 2012
TAGS: PARM PREL NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA ON BUSTANI -- HELP US CONVINCE AFRICA


ABUJA 1160 AND PREVIOUS (NOTAL)


CLASSIFIED BY CDA ANDREWS. REASON: 1.5(D).



1. (C) DCM April 16 spoke with Dr. Hakeem Baba-Ahmed,
Chairman of Nigeria's National Council on the OPCW.
Baba-Ahmed said Nigeria intended to vote for Bustani's
removal and that he saw little likelihood of that
position changing. However, taking this stance had
put Nigeria "far from [its] natural allies...in the
African Group."



2. (C) Baba-Ahmed thought a "well-packaged approach"
in support of Bustani's removal "targeted at African
and Asian countries without a strategic interest in
OPCW" would reduce resistance to the USG initiative.
As leader of the African Group in the OPCW, Nigeria
now needed to bring along other countries. While
Nigeria had no strategic interest in the OPCW, it had
a strong strategic interest in sustaining its regional
leadership role and could not afford to be too far out
in front of too many other African countries, Baba-
Ahmed continued.



3. (C) Nigeria, through Ambassador Dosunmu-Awolowo in
The Hague, was endeavoring to convince other Africans
that Africa had nothing to gain by Bustani's retention
and that OPCW would face severe difficulties if the
U.S. were to withdraw support, Baba-Ahmed said.
Nigeria hoped that the USG would continue to lobby
other Africans energetically, highlighting that those
programs from which Africa benefits (international
cooperative assistance, training, recruitment of
staff, etc.) would suffer no negative impact from
Bustani's removal.



4. (C) Baba-Ahmed also asked DCM if there were
"strategic reasons" other than those outlined in
previous demarches for U.S. opposition to Bustani.
DCM briefly recapitulated our concerns, said he was
unaware of other considerations, and suggested that he
(Baba-Ahmed) or Dosunmu-Awolowo contact USDEL experts
if Nigeria had specific questions. Baba-Ahmed
reiterated that Nigeria had announced its position in
favor of removing Bustani and would be most unlikely
to change it. But the GON would have an additional
level of comfort if it felt certain it understood all
the issues, he added.



5. (C) Comment: There is a tendency here to look for
hidden agendas; USDEL may wish to seek out Baba-Ahmed
in The Hague (he plans to arrive morning of April 20).
Having taken a decision to support the USG on Bustani,
Nigeria is unlikely to change course. However, the
possibility cannot be ruled out completely if fellow
African countries exert strong pressure in the other
direction.
ANDREWS