Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
02ABUJA1091
2002-04-08 16:29:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Abuja
Cable title:  

NIGERIA -- OBASANJO WARM TO MILITARY

Tags:  PREL PGOV MASS MARR EFIN NI 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ABUJA 001091 

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958:DECL: 1.6x6
TAGS: PREL PGOV MASS MARR EFIN NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA -- OBASANJO WARM TO MILITARY
ASSISTANCE BUT OVERHEATED ABOUT DEBT RELIEF


CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR HOWARD F. JETER. REASON
1.6x6.


C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ABUJA 001091

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958:DECL: 1.6x6
TAGS: PREL PGOV MASS MARR EFIN NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA -- OBASANJO WARM TO MILITARY
ASSISTANCE BUT OVERHEATED ABOUT DEBT RELIEF


CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR HOWARD F. JETER. REASON
1.6x6.



1. (C) Summary: During a late night April 3 meeting
with Ambassador Jeter, President Obasanjo gave a Janus-
faced performance. Affable and engaging at the onset,
he commended POTUS for quickly approving UXO assistance
to help with the Ikeja cantonment explosion. Obasanjo,
asserting the military assistance relationship was
vital, promised to allocate 3.5 million USD to continue
the MPRI program for another year. Conversely, he waxed
hot and frustrated over debt relief, even hurtling a
few expletives at the IMF. In between the two
extremes, Obasanjo explained he had tried to insulate
himself from USG pressure on Zimbabwe because he did
not want his decision perceived as capitulation to
Western arm-twisting. Despite recently appointing a
special mediator on Zimbabwe, Obasanjo was unexpectedly
dismissive of further personal engagement, stating that
"Zimbabwe was behind us." Joining President Obasanjo in
the meeting was Minister of State for Army Batagarawa.
PolCouns accompanied Ambassador Jeter. End summary.


-------------- --------------
THE MILITARY RELATIONSHIP -- KEEPING THE BALL ROLLING
-------------- --------------



2. (C) Ambassador Jeter began by expressing concern
about slippage in certain aspects of the military
assistance relationship due to Nigerian
unresponsiveness to our questions on some outstanding
issues. An animated Obasanjo interrupted the
Ambassador in mid-sentence, asserting that he was
getting along fine with President Bush "on most
fronts," but particularly on the military relationship.
Obasanjo stressed that being "a simple minded" man, he
would never forget the favor POTUS extended by quickly
approving Nigeria's emergency plea for UXO assistance.
Obasanjo declared he would "sacrifice" to keep the mil-
mil relationship on even keel.



3. (C) MPRI: Ambassador interjected that MPRI was an
important aspect of the relationship yet the GON was

still noncommittal on whether it wanted to continue the
program. Ambassador emphasized that MPRI was viewed in
Foggy Bottom, the Pentagon and on Capitol Hill as a key
barometer of Nigeria's commitment to military reform.
If MPRI were allowed to wither, Washington would
perceive the commitment to reform as weak. This would
have negative consequences for future military
assistance levels. Frowning and shaking his head from
side to side, Obasanjo posited that many in the
military just did not like MPRI. Initially, he
attributed their opposition to the "Malu Syndrome,"
referring to the former Chief of Army Staff who
vociferously opposed key elements of our military
assistance package, especially Operation Focus Relief.
However, Obasanjo admitted that opposition within the
services was more widespread than he previously had
gauged.



4. (C) Despite some continued opposition within the
uniformed military, Minister of State Batagarawa
thought MPRI was beneficial to streamlining the
military and constituted an important tool in
solidifying civilian control over the uniformed forces.
While strongly endorsing MPRI's continuation, he
attributed some of the opposition to personality
clashes between MPRI staff and senior Nigerian officers
when the program first began. He contended that some
MPRI personnel were cultural insensitive,
condescendingly rubbing GON general officers the wrong
way by not paying appropriate attention to the Nigerian
officers' seniority in rank and, in effect, appearing
to order these more senior Nigerian officers around.
Batagarawa contended that much of the original
frostiness had thawed and MPRI was steadily gaining
converts as more officers began to understand the
program. Obasanjo remarked if MPRI was the bellwether
of the assistance program, he would order MPRI to
continue. Batagarawa gently chimed that several months
ago he had written the President requesting approval to
extend MPRI but his letter remained unanswered. Looking
more perplexed than angry, the President dismissed the
Minister's comments with a wave of his hand.



5. (C) After several quick round-robin exchanges among
Obasanjo, Batagarawa and the Ambassador regarding the
level of funding needed to continue MPRI at its present
level, Obasanjo stated that he would wrest 3.5 million
USD from the treasury to extend the program. Ambassador
Jeter mentioned Chief of Defence Staff Admiral Ogohi
had indicated in a recent letter his intention to use
the 1.5 million USD in Nigeria's FMF account as its 50
percent contribution to finance a scaled-down MPRI.
Obasanjo iterated his promise to fund Nigeria's half of
the extension of the full scale MPRI program from the
regular budget, adding that he wanted to save the FMF
to help repair C-130s. However, the 3.5 million had not
been budgeted and Obasanjo wondered aloud from which
budgetary pocket would he take it.



6. (C) C-130s: Batagarawa echoed that the FMF monies
should be reserved for C-130 repair. Noting our receipt
of Batagarawa's letter concerning the C-130s,
Ambassador Jeter said we were preparing a reply but
that the letter's apparent insistence on "sole-
sourcing" the work to Lockheed- Martin may be
problematic due to our strong regulatory preference for
open bidding. Batagarawa replied that was not the
intention of the letter. He did not care who did the
work. His only concern was to the planes air-worthy.
Obasanjo endorsed his subordinate's response, adding
that having operable planes would be a concrete visible
benefit of the military relationship that would impress
the public and silence some critics. Also, it would
enable Nigeria to provide lift for its own peacekeeping
troops, an important step toward the goal of self-
sufficiency in PKO deployments.



7. (C) Obasanjo then provided a glimpse of his strategy
for Nigerian peacekeeping readiness. Thanking POTUS
this time for the five OFR-trained battalions, Obasanjo
said that he had asked POTUS for assistance in training
and equipping five additional battalions. Obasanjo
stated that his plan was to have a minimum of ten well-
trained, fully equipped battalions that he would
dedicate for peacekeeping operations, particularly
within ECOWAS but with the capacity (furnished by
operable C-130s) of deploying anywhere on the
continent. Obasanjo asserted that he would keep these
battalions intact and would work with us to provide
follow-on training to prevent these special battalions
from losing their edge.



8. (C) Ambassador Jeter mentioned that Washington was
contemplating the successor to ACRI and would be
soliciting Abuja's views with the hope that Nigeria
would participate this time around. Batagarawa added
that, in his December visit to Washington, DOD
officials informed him that the post-ACRI program might
be modeled closely after OFR. If so, he believed
Nigeria participation was almost assured.



9. (C) EOD: After the Ikeja explosions, it was
initially agreed that we would provide experts to
assess other munitions depots to alert the GON to
possible dangers and avoid a repeat tragedy. Thus,
Ambassador expressed surprise that Defense Minister
Danjuma had forbidden USG experts now in Nigeria from
conducting the safety assessments. Obasanjo scoffed at
Danjuma's reticence, stating that Danjuma and his
Service Chiefs were afraid that the CIA was trying to
spy on them. He laughed, "There was nothing that the
CIA wanted to know about Nigeria's armories that it did
not already know." Pointing to Batagarawa, Obasanjo
asked, although already knowing the answer, whether
Nigeria had people with the requisite expertise and
thus could afford the luxury of refusing the USG
assistance. After Batagarawa's negative reply,
Obasanjo instructed the Minister of State to make sure
the assessments went forward and requested Ambassador
Jeter to extend the stay of the experts beyond their
planned April 5 departure. (Note: The experts have
extended their TDY in Nigeria.)


--------------
ZIMBABWE
--------------



10. (C) Turning to Ambassador Jeter, Obasanjo groused
that Ambassador Jeter had not been coming to the Villa
for discussions as often as he should. Jeter responded
that he had been rejected on several occasions when he
sought meetings recently. Obasanjo chuckled, then
admitted the Ambassador's inability to land an
appointment was his own doing. The reason was
Zimbabwe. Obasanjo claimed he had sequestered himself
from us; he wanted to make his own decision regarding
Zimbabwe independent of Western pressure. Obasanjo
contended that he wanted to be able to tell the world
that whatever was his decision was his alone and not
the result of Western arm-twisting. (Obasanjo also
indicated that he had not discussed his decision with
other like-minded leaders, including South Africa's
Mbeki.) Because he kept his distance from the USG,
Obasanjo said he was able to talk frankly to President
Mugabe.



11. (C) However, implying that his conversation with
Mugabe had been more sympathetic that stern, Obasanjo
said that he told Mugabe that the decision of the
London meeting would be the best possible outcome
Mugabe could reasonably expect. Obasanjo continued
that he did not even confer with President Mbeki prior
to the London meeting. Obasanjo stressed that the
one-year suspension was inevitable given the
Commonwealth Observer Mission's conclusions about the
dismal quality of the Zimbabwean elections.



12. (C) At the Commonwealth meeting in AUSTRALIA, the
Heads of State agreed to adhere to the Observer Teams
report. Even though some observers rendered far less
critical reports, we still stuck to the Commonwealth
report at the London meeting, Obasanjo stated with
resignation. Now that the decision had been made,
Obasanjo opined, "Zimbabwe was now behind us." When
Ambassador Jeter tried to mention the need for
sustaining diplomatic pressure on Mugabe, Obasanjo
interjected that Zimbabwe may not be "behind you, but
was still behind us." (Comment: Clearly, Obasanjo was
not enamored with having to suspend Zimbabwe from the
Commonwealth and has tried to empathize with Mugabe.
In his first public statement in Nigeria on Zimbabwe
on March 29, Obasanjo expressed understanding for
Mugabe adding cryptically, but nonetheless
disturbingly, that he "shared some of the political
views" of Zimbabwe's ruler. End comment.)


--------------
DEBT RELIEF -- TELL US WHAT YOU REALLY THINK
--------------



13. (C) Abruptly changing the course of discussion,
Obasanjo declared that debt relief had become a sore
spot for him. "I have gone all around the world for
three years talking about this, but have not gotten
one cent in debt relief," he chafed. He recalled
encouraging discussions with POTUS last May about 10
percent debt reduction based on a "debt reduction-
environment" swap. When Ambassador Jeter reminded him
the concept was not viable because of oil company
opposition, Obasanjo responded that the USG should
simply write off the debt. The amount we owe the U.S.
was small and amounted to little more than an irritant
between two friendly nations. "Write it off, and let
me take on the other countries on their own," he
advised. Batagarawa commented that his meetings in
Washington last December gave him the impression that
the USG was willing to provide debt relief given
Nigeria's positive role in the post 9/11 world.
Obasanjo postulated that if the USG could manage to
work with Pakistan's military government on that
country's debt, Washington should be able work with a
democratic Nigeria.



14. (C) When Ambassador Jeter countered that the road
to debt relief required continued cooperation with the
IMF, Obasanjo bristled, "Oh, come on. I have worked
with them for three years and have gotten nothing."
Continuing more heatedly, he stated, "When a parent
wants to encourage a child, he gives a little piece of
candy for doing something right. Is the IMF telling
me I have done nothing right in three years?"
Springing from his chair, the President murmured "this
is the sort of thing that annoys me." Pausing after
taking a few steps toward the door, he declared in
what seemed to be more a fit of personal agitation
than a matter of national policy, "To hell with the
IMF!" On that note, the meeting ended.


--------------
COMMENT
--------------



15. (C) The meeting was vintage Obasanjo, with his
demeanor noticeably waxing and waning depending on the
subject. The discussion was useful in getting him to
focus on the military assistance relationship and
keeping that important cooperation on track. With
Batagarawa working more actively to bring the
ammunition depot safety assessments to fruition, we
are quickly seeing tangible benefits from that
discussion. Obasanjo's statements regarding Zimbabwe
suggest that, while Nigeria may still be engaged
diplomatically, he personally is not considering any
heavy lifting to move Mugabe toward political
reconciliation at present.



16. (C) On debt relief, Obasanjo apparently is feeling
the need for electoral deliverables. Critics have
publicly chastised him for taking 89 overseas trips
during his tenure thus far. He would like to silence
them and win some voters by saying the money for the
trips was well spent because Nigeria had achieved debt
relief not provided other debtor nations. This would
signal that Western creditors had bestowed on Nigeria
a special status primarily due to Obasanjo. For him,
the issue now may have become more political and
emotional than economic.



17. (C) During Canadian PM Chretien's visit here last
week, Obasanjo made debt relief the centerpiece of his
public statement on Chretien's visit. Obasanjo
sincerely believes Nigeria is entitled to relief and
will continue to press for special treatment
regardless of the paucity of major macro-economic
reforms his Government has actually implemented. We
have always contended that debt relief was at the
center of Obasanjo's foreign policy toward the West;
that contention is probably more compelling now than
ever.
JETER