USG OBJECTIVES IN THE NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS WITH VIETNAM

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HANOI 000762

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E.O. 12958: DECL:(INDEFINITE )
TAGS: PINR PGOV PREL VM
SUBJECT: USG OBJECTIVES IN THE NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS WITH VIETNAM


(U) CLASSIFIED BY DENNIS G. HARTER, DCM, 1.5 B AND D


1. (C) INTRODUCTION: THE FOLLOWING IS THE FIRST OF A
TWO-PART ANALYSIS OF THE STATE OF U.S.-VIETNAM
RELATIONS. IT FOCUSES ON THE BACKGROUND OF
"NORMALIZATION" AND WHAT HAS BEEN ACHIEVED TO MEET USG
AS WELL AS VIETNAMESE INTERESTS. IT WILL BE FOLLOWED
BY A SECOND MESSAGE THAT DELINEATES A SIGNIFICANT
NUMBER OF FRICTIONS IN THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP
WHICH HAVE DEVELOPED OVER THE LAST SEVERAL MONTHS.
THESE FRICTIONS ARE EXACERBATED BY THE RECENT AND
CONTINUING POWER STRUGGLE AMONG VIETNAMESE LEADERS
OVER PERSONAL STATUS AND STATURE IN THE COMMUNIST
PARTY HIERARCHY AND OVER THE PACE OF POLITICAL AND
ECONOMIC REFORM TO BE FOLLOWED IN THE COMING YEARS.
FAILURE TO TAKE NOTE OF THESE SENSITIVITIES IN
CARRYING OUT USG POLICY OBJECTIVES COULD RESULT IN A
SERIOUS SETBACK TO BILATERAL RELATIONS AND TO THE
SIGNIFICANT SUCCESS WE HAVE HAD IN BUILDING A NEW AND
CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONSHIP WITH A FORMER ENEMY. END
INTRODUCTION.


2. (C) LESS THAN FIFTEEN YEARS AGO, THE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN THE U.S. AND VIETNAM WAS ONE OF HOSTILITY.
VIETNAM'S DECISION TO INVADE CAMBODIA IN 1978 CREATED
AN INTERNATIONAL UPROAR. THE UNILATERAL U.S. EMBARGO
AND ISOLATION POLICY BECAME AN INTERNATIONAL POLICY,
EXCLUDING VIETNAM FROM VIRTUALLY ALL "NORMAL"
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DEALINGS. FROM A VERY SLOW BUT STEADY BEGINNING, THE
UNITED STATES AND VIETNAM HAVE TURNED THIS HOSTILITY
INTO AN UNPRECEDENTED SCOPE OF COOPERATION AND SHARED
BENEFIT. ANNUAL MISSION AND INTER-AGENCY REVIEWS OF
NATIONAL OBJECTIVES IN VIETNAM HAVE CONFIRMED THE HIGH
PRIORITY WE HAVE ATTACHED TO THEIR ACHIEVEMENT.


3. (C) THE SUCCESSES HAVE BEEN CONCLUDED VERY
QUICKLY, WITH MOST OF THE BENEFITS HAVING BEEN
ACHIEVED IN THE FIVE AND A HALF YEARS SINCE THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS. THUS, IT IS
PERHAPS NOT READILY PERCEIVED IN THE U.S. THAT THIS
RELATIONSHIP REMAINS FRAGILE AND STILL SUBJECT TO
BEING PULLED APART BY MISPERCEPTIONS OF POLICY ON BOTH
SIDES. VIETNAM'S LEADERSHIP STRUCTURE REMAINS IN A
STATE OF TRANSITION, MOVING FROM AN ELDER GENERATION
OF WAR-TIME HEROES TO A NATION WHERE THE QUESTIONS OF
EDUCATION, ECONOMIC WELL-BEING, AND INTERNATIONAL
INTEGRATION ARE FAR MORE IMPORTANT THAN IDEOLOGIES
BASED ON COMMUNIST THEORY. THE LEADERS ARE SENSITIVE
TO THE FEAR THAT U.S. FAILURE TO OVERTHROW VIETNAM'S
COMMUNIST STATE BY WAR HAS ONLY BEEN REPLACED BY A
"PLAN" TO DO SO THROUGH "PEACEFUL EVOLUTION" AND AN
UNDERMINING OF THE AUTHORITY OF THE COMMUNIST SYSTEM.


4. (C) THE LATE 1980'S COLLAPSE OF THE SOVIET UNION
AND EASTERN EUROPE'S COMMUNIST SYSTEM, CONVINCED
VIETNAM'S LEADERS THEY COULD NOT SURVIVE IN THE WORLD
WITHOUT ADJUSTING THE COUNTRY'S DOMESTIC POLICY (THE
GENESIS OF "DOI MOI" ECONOMIC REFORMS) AND ITS FOREIGN
POLICY (GETTING OUT OF CAMBODIA). THE USG REACTION,
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FORMULATED BY THEN PRESIDENT BUSH AND HIS ADVISORS,
WAS TO BUILD A STEP-BY-STEP EXPANSION OF OFFICIAL
CONTACTS WITH THE VIETNAMESE. THESE CONTACTS WERE
PREDICATED ON HANOI'S WITHDRAWAL FROM CAMBODIA AND THE
START-UP OF A DEMOCRATIC ELECTION PROCESS IN THAT
COUNTRY. THESE STEPS WERE PARALLELED BY A STRUCTURED
AND INTENSIFIED USG ATTENTION TO RESOLVING RESIDUAL
POW/MIA ISSUES WITH VIETNAMESE COOPERATION.


5. (C) THE EVOLUTION OF THIS PROCESS IN THE EARLY
1990'S RESULTED IN VIETNAM'S RESUMPTION AND INITIATION
OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS AROUND THE WORLD AND ITS
MEMBERSHIP IN ASEAN AND THE ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM
(ARF). VIETNAM BEG
AN A RAPPROCHEMENT WITH CHINA AND
SUBSEQUENT DIALOGUE WITH THE PRC LED TO THE CONCLUSION
OF A LAND AND GULF OF TONKIN BORDER DEMARCATION THAT
HAD VEXED THE TWO COUNTRIES FOR THOUSANDS OF YEARS.
VIETNAM WELCOMED INTERNATIONAL DONOR ASSISTANCE FROM
THE WORLD BANK, IMF, ADB AND A HOST OF BILATERAL
CONTRIBUTORS TO REBUILD ITS ECONOMY. VIETNAM'S
ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL REINTEGRATION TO THE WORLD AND
THE REGION SERVED TO DIMINISH THE AREAS OF CONTENTION
AND BUILD A NEW POSSIBILITY FOR COOPERATION AND PEACE
WHERE THERE HERETOFORE HAD BEEN ALMOST CONTINUOUS
CONFLICT SINCE WORLD WAR II. (OTHER PARTS OF THE
WORLD HAVE STILL NOT YET ACHIEVED THAT STABILITY SINCE
WORLD WAR II.)


6. (C) BILATERALLY WITH THE U.S., A SERIES OF
DIALOGUES TO IMPROVE MIA-RELATED WORK RESULTED IN THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF AN OFFICIAL USG PRESENCE IN HANOI FOR
THE FIRST TIME SINCE THE 1950'S. THIS PRESENCE
GRADUALLY PROGRESSED UNDER THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION
TO A STEP-BY-STEP OPENING UP OF DIRECT AND NORMAL
RELATIONS. FROM THE LIFTING OF THE TRADE EMBARGO IN
FEBRUARY OF 1994 TO THE ENTRANCE ON DUTY OF THE FIRST
AMBASSADOR IN MAY 1997, THE U.S. AND VIETNAM ENGAGED
IN A PROCESS OF NORMALIZING RELATIONS DESIGNED TO
BUILD CONFIDENCE ON BOTH SIDES ABOUT WHAT COULD BE
ACCOMPLISHED. IN ADDITION TO THE U.S. GOAL OF DEALING
WITH VIETNAM AS AN "INDEPENDENT" NATION, THE U.S. WAS
ALSO LOOKING MORE BROADLY AT A GROWING CONCERN ABOUT
CHINA'S MILITARY AND ECONOMIC MIGHT. THE U.S. SAW
VIETNAM AS A USEFUL "PARTNER" BECAUSE OF SHARED
CONCERNS OVER CHINA. VIETNAM'S INVOLVEMENT IN AND
WITH ASEAN WAS SEEN AS A WAY IN WHICH THE SOUTHWARD
ADVANCE OF CHINA'S INFLUENCE MIGHT BE LESS CERTAIN.


7. (C) THE DIRECT RESULT OF THIS ENGAGEMENT HAS BEEN
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A TWENTY PERCENT REDUCTION IN OUR LISTS OF UNACCOUNTED
FOR AMERICANS THROUGH REPATRIATION AND IDENTIFICATION
OF REMAINS AND AN EVEN MORE SIGNIFICANT CONCLUSION
CONSIDERED RECOVERABLE. VIETNAM'S MEMBERSHIP IN ASEAN
AND ARF WAS EXPANDED TO INCLUDE APEC IN 1998 AND OUR
INTERNATIONAL DIALOGUE AND COOPERATION NOW INCLUDES
SHARED VOTING AND CANDIDATE SUPPORT WITHIN UN
AGENCIES. EVEN BEFORE ESTABLISHING DIPLOMATIC
RELATIONS, THE TWO SIDES ENGAGED IN PRIVATE DISCUSSION
OF HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES OF CONCERN TO THE U.S. AND WE
HAVE SUBSEQUENTLY ADDED STRATEGIC POLICY TALKS AS WELL
AS SPECIFIC REVIEW OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ISSUES AS
SEPARATE DIALOGUES. WHILE WE STILL REMAIN FAR APART
ON OUR VIEWS OF BASIC FREEDOMS, VIETNAM'S RECORD ON
THESE FRONTS HAS BEEN ONE OF MEASURED IMPROVEMENT --
MORE INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS, MORE
ACTIVE INDIVIDUAL INVOLVEMENT IN RELIGIOUS WORSHIP,
MORE RELIGIOUS GROUPS OFFICIALLY SANCTIONED TO
OPERATE, AND FEWER INDIVIDUALS THROWN INTO PRISON
ARBITRARILY, TO NAME A FEW OF THE IMPROVEMENTS.


8. (C) U.S.-VIETNAM RELATIONS ALSO HAVE A MILITARY-
TO- MILITARY DIMENSION, A DIRECT RESULT OF USG
INTENTIONS TO REDUCE THE BASIS FOR SUSPICIONS BETWEEN
THE TWO MILITARIES. VIETNAMESE PARTICIPATION IN
MILITARY-RELATED PROGRAMS OPEN TO ASEAN MEMBERS AND
HIGH-LEVEL VISITS, INCLUDING THE VISIT OF THEN
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE COHEN HAVE PROVIDED OPPORTUNITIES
FOR THE TWO SIDES TO BETTER COMPREHEND THE OTHER'S
OBJECTIVES. THIS PROCESS OF BUILDING UNDERSTANDING
HAS BEEN SLOW, AND BOTH SIDES HAVE CERTAINLY CAREFULLY
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CALIBRATED EACH STEP IT WAS PREPARED TO TAKE. U.S.
PROVISION OF INFORMATION RELATED TO VIETNAM'S
BATTLEFIELD CASUALTIES, DISCUSSION OF CHEMICAL STORAGE
AND SPILL SITES, AND RELEASE OF GEOGRAPHICAL AND
TECHNICAL DATA RELATED TO AGENT ORANGE SPRAYING ALL
HELP TO DEAL WITH GVN SENSITIVITIES IN WHICH THE
MILITARY HAS TENDED TO TAKE AN ANTI-U.S. POSTURE OVER
THE YEARS.


9. (C) AS IT WAS RE-ENGAGING DIPLOMATICALLY WITH THE
U.S., VIETNAM WAS ALSO SHIFTING ITS ECONOMIC
PRIORITIES FOR NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT. HANOI'S
OBJECTIVES FOCUSED ON BUILDING MARKET-BASED MECHANISMS
INTO THE STATE-RUN ECONOMY AND OPENING UP TO FOREIGN
INVESTMENT. THIS PROCESS, IN TURN, LED TO THE
NEGOTIATION AND CONCLUSION OF A BILATERAL TRADE
.AGREEMENT (BTA). THIS AGREEMENT, A LANDMARK FOR BOTH
COUNTRIES, WOULD PROVIDE BOTH SIDES REAL BENEFITS IN
THE BILATERAL/INTERNATIONAL TRADING AND INVESTMENT
ARENA. THE BTA BECAME COMPANIONED WITH A VARIETY OF
OTHER ARRANGEMENTS INCLUDING AGREEMENTS ON IPR AND S&T
COOPERATION WHICH COLLECTIVELY WILL LEAD VIETNAM TO A
MORE TRANSPARENT SYSTEM WHICH CAN DIRECTLY CONTRIBUTE
TO A BETTER LIVELIHOOD FOR ITS PEOPLE. U.S. AID AND
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS ALSO BEGAN TO SHIFT
TO DISASTER MITIGATION, ENABLING VIETNAM FOR THE FIRST
TIME IN ITS HISTORY TO DEAL WITH THE RECURRING
PROBLEMS OF FLOODS, TYPHOONS, AND OTHER FORMS OF
NATURAL DISASTERS. PARTICIPATION IN THE GLOBAL U.S.
HUMANITARIAN DEMINING PROGRAM PROVIDED A CONCRETE
DEMONSTRATION OF U.S. INVOLVEMENT TO EASE THE
CONSEQUENCES OF WAR. AND, U.S. EDUCATION PROGRAMS
UNDER FULBRIGHT AND OTHER PRIVATE AND PUBLIC AUSPICES
HAVE CREATED THE FOUNDATION OF A YOUNGER GENERATION
WHICH LOOKS ON THE U.S. AS A SOURCE OF INSPIRATION AND
NOT OF DEVASTATION.


10. (C) THE AVENUE FOR FURTHER U.S.-VIETNAM
COOPERATION WAS OPENED WIDE AS A RESULT OF THE CLINTON
VISIT LAST NOVEMBER. PUTTING BOTH CLOSURE TO THE
WARTIME-ERA OF HOSTILITY AND ADVERTISING A WILLINGNESS
TO DEAL WITH VIETNAM'S NEW GENERATION OF YOUNG PEOPLE,
THE U.S. MESSAGE WAS ONE OF EMPOWERMENT BROUGHT ON BY
THE TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGES OF THE NEW CENTURY. IT WAS
A PROMISE OF ALMOST UNLIMITED SCOPE AND DURATION BASED
ON SHARED INTERESTS AND PERCEPTIONS FOR MODERNIZATION,
EXPANDED EDUCATION AND PROSPERITY. BUT THAT
OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE MORE PROGRESS HAS SUDDENLY SLIPPED
AWAY AND THERE ARE NOW MORE CLOSED WINDOWS TO
COOPERATION AS THE RESULT OF HOSTILE PERCEPTIONS OF
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U.S. ACTIONS AND MOTIVES AS WELL AS HOSTILE
PERCEPTIONS OF SOME OF VIETNAM'S ACTIVITIES.


11. (C) COMMENT: THE STILL FRAGILE NATURE OF THE
RELATIONSHIP HAS BEEN COMPLICATED BY POLITICAL
TENSIONS INHERENT IN THE VIETNAMESE TRANSITION. IT IS
ALSO HAMPERED BY PUBLIC AND PRIVATE PERCEPTIONS IN THE
U.S. THAT CONTINUE TO TREAT VIETNAM AS AN ENEMY. SOME
LEADERS IN VIETNAM NEED ONLY POINT TO ACTIONS BY
VIETNAMESE-AMERICANS OR OTHERS SEEKING TO REVITALIZE
PRE-1975 POSITIONS AGAINST THE HANOI AUTHORITIES TO
MAKE THEIR CASE. THEY ARGUE THESE ACTIONS REPRESENT
THE NATIONAL POLICY OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT.
FURTHERMORE, INDIVIDUAL ACTIONS BY THE USG OR ITS
AGENCIES ARE TRANSLATED AS REPRESENTING ONLY U.S.
VIEWS OF "RIGHT AND WRONG." THE ACTIONS ARE OFTEN THEN
CHARACTERIZED AS HOSTILE TO THE INTERESTS OF VIETNAM
OR AS INTERFERENCE IN VIETNAM'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS.


12. (C) THE COMBINATION OF THESE PERCEPTIONS HAS
RESULTED IN A NUMBER OF SIGNIFICANT FRICTIONS BETWEEN
THE TWO COUNTRIES THAT COULD JEOPARDIZE THE NATIONAL
PRIORITIES WE HAVE SET TO IMPROVE RELATIONS AND TO
MEET GLOBAL GOALS SUCH AS THE PROMOTION OF REGIONAL
STABILITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS OBSERVANCE. THE SECOND
MESSAGE ON THIS SUBJECT IDENTIFIES VIETNAM'S
PERCEPTIONS OF THESE SENSITIVE AREAS. U.S. FAILURE TO
PROCEED SENSITIVELY ON THESE ISSUES COULD JEOPARDIZE
THE BENEFITS THAT WE HAVE SO RECENTLY ACHIEVED AS THE
RESULT OF OUR NORMALIZATION EFFORTS.
PPETERSON
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