Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
01HANOI638
2001-03-19 09:36:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Hanoi
Cable title:  

LEADERSHIP OPTIONS BEING HASHED OUT IN CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM

Tags:  PGOV PREL ETRD VM DPOL 
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190936Z Mar 01

2001HANOI00638 - CONFIDENTIAL
 
 
 
 CONFIDENTIAL PTQ0652

PAGE 01 HANOI 00638 01 OF 06 190945Z 
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 SNIS-00 NISC-00 PMB-00 DSCC-00 DRL-02 G-00 NFAT-00 
 SAS-00 /010W
 ------------------D3E9C7 190946Z /38 
FM AMEMBASSY HANOI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2284
INFO NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J5/FPA// PRIORITY
DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY BEIJING 
AMCONSUL HONG KONG 
AMEMBASSY TOKYO 
AMEMBASSY PARIS
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 HANOI 000638 

SIPDIS

STATE ALSO FOR EAP/BCLTV, EB, DRL, INR
NSC FOR EAST ASIAN DIRECTORATE
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 HANOI 00638 01 OF 06 190945Z
STATE PASS USTR FOR DAUSTR DAMOND
SECDEF FOR ISA/LSTERN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/14/11
TAGS: PGOV PREL ETRD VM DPOL
SUBJECT: LEADERSHIP OPTIONS BEING HASHED OUT IN CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM

REF: STATE 40645 (C-AL1-00227)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 HANOI 000638

SIPDIS

STATE ALSO FOR EAP/BCLTV, EB, DRL, INR
NSC FOR EAST ASIAN DIRECTORATE
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 HANOI 00638 01 OF 06 190945Z
STATE PASS USTR FOR DAUSTR DAMOND
SECDEF FOR ISA/LSTERN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/14/11
TAGS: PGOV PREL ETRD VM DPOL
SUBJECT: LEADERSHIP OPTIONS BEING HASHED OUT IN CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM

REF: STATE 40645 (C-AL1-00227)


1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS JAMES BRUNO;
REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D).


2. (C) SUMMARY: VIETNAM'S CENTRAL COMMITTEE HAS BEEN
CLOISTERED AT COMMUNIST PARTY HEADQUARTERS THIS PAST
WEEK, DELIBERATING ON THE FATE OF GENERAL SECRETARY
PHIEU AND A NEW LEADERSHIP LINE-UP. IN THIS "SECOND
SESSION" OF THE 11TH PLENUM, THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE HAS
BEEN TRYING TO FORGE CONSENSUS SO THE OPENING OF THE
NINTH PARTY CONGRESS CAN BE FINALIZED AND, IF
POSSIBLE, A NEW "TROIKA" OF LEADERS FORMALIZED AT THAT
TIME. THE LATTER IS BY NO MEANS CERTAIN, THOUGH, AS A
BROAD MIX OF CANDIDATES IS BEING PUSHED BY DIFFERENT
GROUPS OF SENIOR LEADERS. MOREOVER, THE LEADERS HAVE
ALREADY ANNOUNCED THERE WILL BE AT LEAST ONE MORE
PLENUM BEFORE THE CONGRESS, AND COMMENTS IN THE MEDIA
ABOUT THE POLITICAL REPORT AND ECONOMIC PROGRAM
SUGGEST THEY ARE STILL BEING MODIFIED BY "GOOD IDEAS"
FROM THE LOCAL LEVELS. WE JUDGE IT LIKELY PHIEU WILL
BE REPLACED, THOUGH PERHAPS NOT AT THE CONGRESS IF A
SUCCESSOR CANNOT BE AGREED UPON. PHIEU REPORTEDLY IS
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 HANOI 00638 01 OF 06 190945Z
FIGHTING HARD FOR HIS POLITICAL LIFE; HIS SPEECH
OPENING THE PLENUM EMPHASIZED THE NEED FOR FUTURE
LEADERS TO BE OF THE HIGHEST INTEGRITY.


3. (C) SUMMARY (CONT'D): HANOI PARTY CHIEF TRONG, CPV
ORGANIZATION DIRECTOR AN, PRESIDENT LUONG AND NATIONAL
ASSEMBLY SPEAKER MANH ARE MOST FREQUENTLY MENTIONED AS
PHIEU'S POSSIBLE SUCCESSORS. DEPUTY PM DUNG SEEMS THE
MOST LIKELY OF THE SOUTHERN "REFORMERS" TO TAKE THE
PRIME MINISTER SLOT. THE FATE OF THE SENIOR ADVISORS
IS STILL UP IN THE AIR; THEY CONTINUE TO PLAY
PROMINENT ROLES IN THE JOCKEYING FOR NEW LEADERSHIP
SLOTS. WITH THEIR RESURGENT INFLUENCE, IT LOOKS
INCREASINGLY UNLIKELY THEY WILL GO QUIETLY INTO THE
NIGHT. WHOEVER IS LEFT STANDING IN THE POLITBURO AT
THE END, THIS COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP WILL CONTINUE TO
MUDDLE THROUGH WITH ITS GRADUAL APPROACH TO REFORM.

SINCE CONSENSUS PLAYS SUCH A PARAMOUNT ROLE IN THEIR
DECISION-MAKING, WE DO NOT EXPECT DRAMATIC CHANGES IN
THE SHORT TERM NO MATTER WHO IS CHOSEN. END SUMMARY.

PLENUM FOCUSED ON LEADERSHIP
--------------


4. (U) WITH THE THREE SENIOR ADVISORS LOOKING ON FROM
THE FRONT ROW, COMMUNIST PARTY OF VIETNAM (CPV)
GENERAL SECRETARY LE KHA PHIEU OPENED THE SECOND
SESSION OF THE 11TH PLENUM MARCH 13 BY NOTING THE
PARTY WOULD CONTINUE ITS DISCUSSION OF PERSONNEL
ISSUES FOR THE UPCOMING NINTH PARTY CONGRESS. PHIEU,
WIDELY BELIEVED TO BE FIGHTING FOR THIS POLITICAL
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 HANOI 00638 01 OF 06 190945Z
LIFE, SAID THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE NEEDED TO PUT FORWARD
LEADERSHIP CANDIDATES WHO "REPRESENT THE PARTY'S WILL
AND INTELLIGENCE AND WHO POSSESS ADEQUATE POLITICAL
AND MORAL BACKGROUND, A DEEP SENSE OF RESPONSIBILITY,
AND COMPETENCE IN LEADERSHIP AND IMPLEMENTATION OF
POLICIES." HE STRESSED IT WAS NECESSARY "TO ENSURE
INHERITANCE AND CONTINUITY OF PARTY LEADERSHIP AND
POLITICAL STABILITY" WHILE WORKING TO ADVANCE THE "DOI
MOI" RENOVATION PROCESS. PHIEU SAID IT WAS IMPORTANT
THAT THE NEW CENTRAL COMMITTEE MUST NOT INCLUDE ANYONE
OF BAD CHARACTER, GUILTY OF "OPPORTUNISM, GREED, POOR
DISCIPLINE, DISUNITY, BUREAUCRATISM, CORRUPTION,
INCOMPETENCE AND IRRESPONSIBILITY."


5. (U) IN ADDITION TO LEADERSHIP QUESTIONS, THE PLENUM
HAS FOCUSED ON THE KEY CPV DOCUMENTS TO BE PRESENTED
AT THE CONGRESS -- THE POLITICAL REPORT, 5-YEAR AND
10-YEAR ECONOMIC PLANS, AND THE PARTY STATUTE. IN HIS
REMARKS PHIEU NOTED THE CPV HAS RECEIVED HUNDREDS OF
LETTERS AND COMMENTS FROM THE GENERAL PUBLIC --
RANGING FROM STUDENTS TO RETIREES AND WAR VETERANS --
RESPONDING TO THE PARTY'S CALL FOR FEEDBACK ON THE
DRAFT POLITICAL REPORT RELEASED FEB. 3. PHIEU CLAIMED
THE CPV WILL COLLATE ALL THE IDEAS AND SUGGESTIONS
PRESENTED, AND WILL "INCORPORATE" THESE IDEAS IN
REVISING THE REPORT.


6. (SBU) IN HIS REMARKS, PHIEU NOTED THE CPV "DOES NOT
HAVE MUCH TIME FOR THIS PLENUM." TENTATIVELY THIS
PLENUM IS SCHEDULED TO GO UNTIL MARCH 20. PHIEU ALSO
CONFIRMED THAT A 12TH PLENUM WILL BE HELD BEFORE THE
CPV CONGRESS. REPORTS HAVE BEEN CIRCULATING FOR SOME
TIME IN HANOI THAT THE CONGRESS MIGHT BE HELD IN EARLY
APRIL, BUT BECAUSE OF APPARENT DIFFICULTY IN REACHING
AGREEMENT ON LEADERSHIP CHANGES, WE HAVE RECENTLY
HEARD REPORTS THE CONGRESS COULD SLIP TO JUNE. A BUSY
SCHEDULE OF ASEAN MEETINGS HANOI IS HOSTING IMPINGES
ON THE CALENDAR IF THERE IS MUCH DELAY. (HANOI IS
HOSTING ASEAN SENIOR OFFICIALS' MEETINGS IN MID-MAY,
WITH THE ASIAN MINISTERIAL, POST-MINISTERIAL AND ASEAN
REGIONAL FORUM MEETINGS IN LATE JULY.)

PHIEU ON THE DEFENSIVE
--------------


7. (C) ONE OF THE GREAT DRAMAS OF THIS PLENUM SESSION
IS THE FATE OF PHIEU AND WHETHER HE WILL BE ABLE TO
HOLD ON TO HIS JOB. IN OCTOBER LAST YEAR, THE THREE
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 HANOI 00638 02 OF 06 190946Z
SENIOR ADVISORS, INCLUDING HIS FORMER MENTOR LE DUC
ANH, CIRCULATED A LETTER AMONG THE LEADERSHIP ACCUSING
PHIEU OF LACKING ABILITY IN MANAGEMENT OF PARTY AND
STATE AFFAIRS. DIFFERENT THEORIES CIRCULATE IN HANOI
AS TO WHAT CAUSED ANH IN PARTICULAR TO TURN AGAINST
HIS FORMER PROTEGE. SOME HAVE SUGGESTED THAT PHIEU
LOCKED THE GVN INTO A BAD DEAL WITH THE CHINESE ON
BORDER DEMARCATION WITHOUT FULLY CONSULTING HIS
COLLEAGUES. OTHERS POINT TO HIS OVERALL LACK OF
MANAGEMENT ABILITY AND VISION. (COMMENT: WE BELIEVE A
KEY FACTOR MAY BE THAT PHIEU "OVERREACHED" IN HIS
EXPLORATORY EFFORTS TO ASSUME THE ROLE OF STATE
PRESIDENT AS WELL AS GENERAL SECRETARY, A LA JIANG
ZEMIN IN CHINA. SUCH A MOVE, WIDELY AND GENERALLY
FAVORABLY DISCUSSED UNTIL LAST FALL, WOULD HAVE BEEN A
DRAMATIC DEPARTURE FOR THE HIGHLY CONSENSUAL
LEADERSHIP OF THE CPV, WITH ITS LONG HISTORY OF A
CAREFULLY BALANCE AMONG SENIOR LEADERS. PHIEU MAY
HAVE LOST ANH'S SUPPORT AND THAT OF OTHER ADVISORS AND
POLITBURO LEADERS IN PART BECAUSE OF PERCEIVED HUBRIS
THAT HE WANTED TOO MUCH POWER. END COMMENT.)


8. (C) WHATEVER THE PROXIMATE CAUSE, IT APPEARS CLEAR
THAT ONCE THE SENIOR ADVISORS SIGNALED THEIR
DISAPPROVAL OF PHIEU'S PERFORMANCE, THIS OPENED THE
FLOODGATES TO DIFFERENT GROUPS WITHIN THE LEADERSHIP
WHO HAD VARIOUS GRIEVANCES AGAINST HIM. THESE
INCLUDE, ON THE ONE HAND, THE POWERFUL UNIFORMED
MILITARY, WHO HAVE NEVER CLAIMED PHIEU AS ONE OF THEIR
OWN. (NOTE: PHIEU MADE HIS CAREER AS A POLITICAL
COMMISSAR IN THE ARMY AND WAS SEEN AS NOT ADVANCING
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 HANOI 00638 02 OF 06 190946Z
THE MILITARY'S INTERESTS WHILE GENERAL SECRETARY. IN
THIS REGARD, THE SWEDISH DCM SAID SHE WAS RECENTLY AT
A GATHERING OF CPV AND MILITARY OFFICIALS WHOM SHE HAS
KNOWN FOR YEARS. THE EXTENT OF ANTIPATHY TO PHIEU WAS
STRIKING. IN HER PRESENCE, TWO OF THE MILITARY CADRE
SPOKE OUT PUBLICLY AND SAID HE NEEDED TO GO. END
NOTE.)


9. (C) REFORMERS, ON THE OTHER HAND, RESENT PHIEU'S
HIGHLY IDEOLOGICAL VIEWS AND HIS CAUTIOUS APPROACH TO
REFORM; THEY POINT TO HIS CLUMSY REMARKS TO PRESIDENT
CLINTON, HIS LACK OF VISION, AND HIS CONTINUAL HARPING
ON "SELF-CRITICISM," A STAPLE THROWBACK OF LENINIST
CONTROL. (OTHERS CRITICIZE THIS CAMPAIGN BECAUSE IT
HAS BEEN SO INEFFECTIVE IN DEALING WITH MALFEASANCE
AND CORRUPTION IN THE RANKS OF PARTY AND GOVERNMENT
OFFICIALS.) AND THERE ARE, OF COURSE, ALSO MANY
PERSONALISTIC REASONS WHY INDIVIDUAL LEADERS HAVE
GRIEVANCES AGAINST PHIEU; HE MADE ENEMIES, FOR
EXAMPLE, BY GOING AFTER ALLIES OF PM KHAI SUCH AS
NGUYEN THAI NGUYEN, WHO WAS ARRESTED AND CHARGED WITH
BEING A SPY FOR CHINA. (COMMENT: ARGUABLY, THE
PERSONALISTIC REASONS -- OF SELF-INTEREST, PERSONAL
RIVALRY AND GRIEVANCE -- MAY BE THE MOST INFLUENTIAL.
IDEOLOGY OFTEN SEEMS TO TAKE A BACK SEAT HERE TO OTHER
MOTIVATIONS. END COMMENT.)

JOCKEYING OVER THE BIG THREE
--------------


10. (C) THE WIDE RANGE OF OPPOSITION TO PHIEU SUGGESTS
HE WILL NOT SURVIVE LONG IN HIS POSITION. AFTER THE
FIRST SESSION OF THE 11TH PLENUM IN JANUARY, THERE
WERE CREDIBLE REPORTS HE HAD OFFERED TO STEP DOWN.
ONE ACCOUNT OF A STRAW POLL AMONG POLITBURO MEMBERS
REVEALED ONLY ONE MEMBER -- PHIEU HIMSELF --
SUPPORTING HIS CONTINUING IN HIS JOB. OTHER REPORTS
SUGGESTED OTHER POLITBURO MEMBERS -- INCLUDING
NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SPEAKER NONG DUC MANH, HANOI PARTY
CHIEF NGUYEN PHU TRONG, AND CPV ORGANIZATION DIRECTOR
NGUYEN VAN AN -- ENJOYED MUCH HIGHER JOB APPROVAL AND
WERE POSSIBLE CANDIDATES TO REPLACE HIM.


11. (C) IN THE PAST TWO MONTHS, HANOI HAS BUZZED WITH
WIDELY VARYING SCENARIOS ABOUT WHO AMONG THE POLITBURO
WOULD ASCEND TO PHIEU'S JOB, AS WELL AS THE OTHER TWO
"TROIKA" POSITIONS -- PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER.
THESE SCENARIOS REVOLVE AROUND DIFFERENT
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 HANOI 00638 03 OF 06 190946Z
CONFIGURATIONS OF THE FOLLOWING: HANOI PARTY CHIEF
TRONG, CPV ORGANIZATION DIRECTOR AN, PRESIDENT LUONG,
ASSEMBLY SPEAKER MANH, DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER DUNG, AND
HO CHI MINH CITY PARTY CHIEF NGUYEN MIEN TRIET.
TRONG, AN, LUONG AND MANH SEEM THE MOST CREDIBLE
CANDIDATES FOR GENERAL SECRETARY.


12. (C) WHILE NONE OF THESE LEADERS STANDS OUT AS A
PROHIBITIVE FAVORITE, TRONG CERTAINLY IS A LEADING
CONTENDER TO REPLACE PHIEU. TRONG HEADED THE CPV'S
IDEOLOGY DEPARTMENT AND BEFORE THAT WAS EDITOR OF THE
"COMMUNIST REVIEW." AS HANOI PARTY CHIEF HE OCCUPIES
A GOOD VANTAGE POINT FOR LOBBYING HIS CENTRAL
COMMITTEE COLLEAGUES. THIS PAST YEAR, TRONG HAS
SERVED AS HEAD OF THE PLATFORM COMMITTEE DRAFTING THE
COMPREHENSIVE POLITICAL REPORT FOR THE CPV CONGRESS.
HIS IS A STRONGLY IDEOLOGICAL VOICE THAT WOULD ENSURE
CONTINUITY AT THE TOP -- AND IDEOLOGICAL "BALANCE" TO
MORE TECHNOCRATIC MEMBERS LIKELY TO FILL THE OTHER TWO
SLOTS. WHEN HE MET THE AMBASSADOR LAST YEAR FOR A
COURTESY CALL AFTER MONTHS OF REQUESTS, TRONG REVEALED
LITTLE ABOUT HIMSELF. HE CHATTED STIFFLY ABOUT
DEVELOPMENTS IN HANOI AND HIS COMMENTS WERE TYPICAL OF
CPV JARGON. HIS DEMEANOR MATCHED HIS REPUTATION: ONE
OF THOSE SUSPICIOUS OF THE U.S. AND INSISTENT THAT
REFORM MUST BE CONSISTENT WITH VIETNAM'S SOCIALIST
HERITAGE.


13. (C) RECENTLY NGUYEN VAN AN, WHO HAS BEEN IN THE
SHADOWS OF INTERNAL CPV AFFAIRS FOR THE PAST SEVERAL
YEARS, HAS RE-EMERGED TO CHALLENGE FOR THE TOP CPV
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 HANOI 00638 03 OF 06 190946Z
SLOT. AN WAS A FINALIST FOR THE GENERAL SECRETARY
SLOT IN DECEMBER 1997, WHEN PHIEU WON OUT IN A CLOSE
VOTE WITHIN THE POLITBURO. AS HEAD OF THE CENTRAL
COMMITTEE'S ORGANIZATION DEPARTMENT, AN LIKEWISE
OCCUPIES AN IMPORTANT POST WITHIN THE PARTY AND
SOURCES SUGGEST HE HAS BECOME INCREASINGLY INVOLVED IN
PREPARATIONS FOR THE CONGRESS IN RECENT MONTHS. ONE
SOURCE WITH CLOSE FAMILY CONNECTIONS TO SENIOR CPV
LEADERS TOLD US THAT SENIOR ADVISORS LE DUC ANH AND VO
VAN KIET REPORTEDLY ARE UNITING BEHIND AN AS THEIR
FAVORED CANDIDATE FOR GENERAL SECRETARY. UNDER THIS
SCENARIO, IF AN ASCENDS TO THE TOP SPOT, THE THREE
SENIOR ADVISORS WOULD MAINTAIN THEIR POSITIONS AS
"EMINENCE GRIS" OVERSEEING MATTERS FROM THE WINGS.
(AT THIS POINT, IT IS UNCLEAR WHETHER THE SENIOR
ADVISORS WILL RETAIN THEIR FORMAL ROLES. ONE OF THE
REPORTED CONDITIONS RAISED EARLIER REGARDING PHIEU'S
DISMISSAL WAS FOR THE THREE ADVISORS TO STEP DOWN AND
FOR THOSE POSITIONS TO BE ABOLISHED. UP TO NOW,
HOWEVER, THEY CONTINUE TO EXERCISE CONSIDERABLE
INFLUENCE IN THE PRESENT DELIBERATIONS.) AS
DOCUMENTED IN PREVIOUS EMBASSY REPORTING ABOUT
POLITBURO MEMBERS, AN IS ONE OF THOSE LEADERS WHO IS
LARGELY HIDDEN FROM THE PUBLIC AND FOREIGN OBSERVERS.
WE DO NOT HAVE A GOOD TAKE ON HIS IDEOLOGICAL
BEARINGS.


14. (C) BOTH PRESIDENT LUONG AND NATIONAL ASSEMBLY
SPEAKER MANH HAVE BEEN MENTIONED REPEATEDLY IN THE
PAST MONTHS AS POSSIBLE CANDIDATES FOR OTHER TOP JOBS.
BOTH COULD BE POSSIBLE COMPROMISE CANDIDATES TO MOVE
TO GENERAL SECRETARY, ALTHOUGH NEITHER HAS THE PROFILE
ONE WOULD NORMALLY EXPECT FOR THE JOB. LUONG IS A
LOW-KEY TECHNOCRAT WHO LONG SERVED AS A DEPUTY PM AND
HAS GOTTEN GENERALLY GOOD REVIEWS FOR HIS SERVICE AS
PRESIDENT; MANH IS FINISHING TWO TERMS AS SPEAKER, AND
IS RANKED BY HIS PEERS AS ONE OF THE MORE POPULAR CPV
LEADERS. (COMMENT: NEITHER OF THESE TWO IS
PARTICULARLY DYNAMIC, BUT IN VIETNAM'S POLITICAL
CUPOLA, SOMETIMES "STEADY, SOLID BLANDNESS" IS AN
ATTRACTIVE ATTRIBUTE. END COMMENT.) MANH, AN ETHNIC
TAY WHO IS THE LONE MINORITY MEMBER IN THE POLITBURO,
COULD EITHER BENEFIT OR BE HURT BY LAST MONTH'S
DEMONSTRATIONS IN THE CENTRAL HIGHLANDS. SOME IN THE
CPV MAY SEE HIS ELEVATION -- EITHER TO GENERAL
SECRETARY OR PRESIDENT -- AS A WAY TO MAKE A SYMBOLIC

SIPDIS
GESTURE TO THE COUNTRY'S MINORITIES. ON THE OTHER
HAND, WE HAVE HEARD COMMENTS FROM ETHNIC KINH CADRE IN
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 HANOI 00638 04 OF 06 190946Z
HANOI THAT SUCH A MOVE WOULD NOT SIT WELL WITH THE
COUNTRY'S MAJORITY.


15. (C) DUNG, AS FIRST DEPUTY PM, IS THE MOST LOGICAL
CANDIDATE TO MOVE UP TO PRIME MINISTER, THOUGH SOME
RECENT SCENARIOS EVEN SUGGEST PM KHAI COULD BE
PERSUADED TO STAY ON IN THAT POSITION FOR A SHORT
INTERIM. DUNG, SEEN BY THE BUSINESS COMMUNITY AND
MANY WESTERN OBSERVERS AS ONE OF THE MOST PROMISING OF
THE NEXT GENERATION OF REFORMERS, REPORTEDLY MAY FACE
OPPOSITION AMONG MORE IDEOLOGICAL MEMBERS OF THE
LEADERSHIP. IDEOLOGICAL MEMBERS CAUTIOUS ON REFORM
MIGHT PREFER A POTENTIALLY LESS DYNAMIC PM; FOR THIS
GROUP, A "SAFER" CHOICE MIGHT BE THE TECHNOCRATIC
LUONG, WHO PREVIOUSLY SERVED AS DEPUTY PM. (NOTE: A
VIETNAMESE-AMERICAN WHO CLAIMS TO HAVE TAUGHT DUNG IN
ELEMENTARY SCHOOL INSISTS HE DID NOT GRADUATE FROM
JUNIOR HIGH SCHOOL. END NOTE.) ON THE OTHER HAND,
TRIET HAS EARNED STRONG KUDOS FROM THE REFORM CAMP FOR
HIS LEADERSHIP IN HCMC, AND HE IS A PLAUSIBLE
CANDIDATE, AS IS FORMER HCMC PARTY CHIEF TRUONG TAN
SANG, NOW IN HANOI AS HEAD OF THE CPV ECONOMIC
COMMISSION. ONE OF SANG'S 1997 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
CPV LEADERS TO DISCLOSE THEIR WEALTH HAS NOW BEEN
RESURRECTED FOR INCLUSION IN THIS YEAR'S CPV
DOCUMENTS.


16. (C) AS THE ABOVE SUGGESTS, THE RANGE OF
COMBINATIONS IS WIDE, AND IT IS BY NO MEANS CERTAIN
THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE WILL BE ABLE TO REACH AGREEMENT
ON SUCCESSORS TO THE CURRENT TEAM. IN FACT, GIVEN THE
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 HANOI 00638 04 OF 06 190946Z
DIFFICULTIES IN REACHING CONSENSUS AMONG DISPARATE
FACTIONS, WE HAVE HEARD FROM SEVERAL PARTY-CONNECTED
SOURCES THAT THE MOST LIKELY RESULT AT PRESENT IS THAT
THE CPV CONGRESS MAY BE DELAYED UNTIL JUNE, WITH THE
CURRENT THREE LEADERS REMAINING IN PLACE FOR THE TIME
BEING. THE POLISH AMBASSADOR HEARD FROM A SENIOR CPV
CONTACT THAT A JUNE CONGRESS LOOKS LIKELY AT THIS
POINT, AND IN FACT, PHIEU MAY INTENTIONALLY BE
DRAGGING OUT THE STALEMATE IN THE HOPES OF BUYING TIME
FOR HIM TO STAY IN PLACE BECAUSE OF DEADLOCK.

RETIREMENT COMING SOON FOR OTHERS IN THE POLITBURO
-------------- --------------


17. (C) WHEREAS THE FATE OF THE TOP THREE LEADERS
REMAINS UNCERTAIN, A NUMBER OF OTHER POLITBURO MEMBERS
CLEARLY ARE SLATED FOR RETIREMENT FROM THE POLITBURO.
(NAMING NEW LEADERS TO GOVERNMENT POSTS WOULD HAVE TO
BE "FORMALIZED" BY THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, THOUGH THE
REAL DECISIONS ARE TAKEN BY THE CPV.) THE CENTRAL
COMMITTEE DECIDED AT ITS LAST PLENUM SESSION TO
REQUIRE THOSE POLITBURO MEMBERS OVER 70 YEARS OLD TO
RETIRE (THOUGH IT LEFT OPEN THE POSSIBILITY OF A FEW
EXCEPTIONS) AND TO ENCOURAGE THOSE OVER 65 TO STEP
DOWN. AMONG THOSE REPORTEDLY RETIRING ARE FATHERLAND
FRONT HEAD PHAM THE DUYET, DEPUTY PM NGUYEN MANH CAM
(WHO HAD BEEN MENTIONED AS A POSSIBLE VICE PRESIDENT),
LONG-TIME HEAD OF THE HO CHI MINH POLITICAL ACADEMY
NGUYEN DUC BINH, AND CPV IDEOLOGY HEAD (AND FORMER
HANOI PARTY CHIEF) LE XUAN TUNG. DUYET'S STATUS HAS
BEEN DEBATED FOR MONTHS, BUT IT NOW APPEARS HE WILL BE
EASED OUT.


18. (C) RUMORS CIRCULATE ABOUT POSSIBLE RETIREMENT FOR
DEFENSE MINISTER PHAM VAN TRA AND MINISTER OF PUBLIC
SECURITY LE MINH HUONG. BOTH OF THEM HAVE RUMORED TO
BE ON THE WAY OUT BEFORE, BECAUSE OF AGE AND IN
HUONG'S CASE, REPORTS OF SOME HEALTH PROBLEMS.
HOWEVER, BOTH OF THEIR MINISTRIES ARE IMPORTANT
INSTITUTIONAL POWERS WITHIN THE VIETNAMESE LEADERSHIP,
AND THEIR SLOTS WOULD CERTAINLY BE FILLED BY THEIR
SUCCESSORS, IF THEY DO INDEED STEP DOWN. CHIEF OF THE
ARMY'S GENERAL STAFF LE VAN DUNG CERTAINLY IS A
CANDIDATE BY POSITION TO REPLACE TRA AS DEFENSE
MINISTER (AND THUS ON THE POLITBURO),BUT HE IS SEEN
AS UNSOPHISTICATED BY MANY OF HIS KEY PEERS. (DAO HAS
HEARD FROM SEVERAL SOURCES THAT DUNG EARNED HIS STARS
HEROICALLY ON THE BATTLEFIELD, BUT HIS PRESENT WORK AS
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 HANOI 00638 05 OF 06 190947Z
CHIEF OF STAFF SEEMS A VALIDATION OF THE "PETER
PRINCIPLE.") LT. GENERAL PHAM THANH NGAN IS WIDELY
SEEN AS A RISING FIGURE AMONG THE NATIONAL SECURITY
OFFICIALS IN THE CPV. HE HOLDS PHIEU'S OLD POSITION
AS POLITICAL COMMISSAR OF THE MILITARY; HE ALSO
PREVIOUSLY SERVED AS AIR FORCE COMMANDER. WE EXPECT
HE WILL REMAIN IN THE LEADERSHIP AND IS A CANDIDATE TO
RISE IN INFLUENCE. BECAUSE OF HIS CLOSE TIES TO
PHIEU, HOWEVER, HE MIGHT BE HURT BUREAUCRATICALLY IF
THE GENERAL SECRETARY IS FORCED TO STEP DOWN NOW.
CONVERSELY, HE MIGHT RISE AS A QUID PRO QUO FOR
PHIEU'S STEPPING DOWN.


19. (C) FOR OTHERS AMONG THE LEADERSHIP, IT IS EVEN
MORE DIFFICULT FOR US TO GAUGE. NGUYEN THI XUAN MY,
THE ONLY WOMAN EVER APPOINTED TO THE POLITBURO, IS IN
CHARGE OF THE CPV CONTROL COMMITTEE, AND IN THIS
CAPACITY COULD BE BLAMED FOR ONGOING CORRUPTION IN CPV
RANKS. ONE LONG-TIME FOREIGN OBSERVER PREDICTS SHE
WILL RETIRE. (HOWEVER, THE GVN HAS INDICATED ITS
INTEREST IN INCREASING THE NUMBER OF WOMEN IN THE
NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AND OTHER HIGHLY VISIBLE POSITIONS,
AND THIS SUGGESTS SHE MIGHT REMAIN -- OR BE REPLACED
BY ANOTHER PROMINENT WOMAN LEADER.) PHAN DIEN, PARTY
CHIEF IN DANANG, HAS PRESENTED A CONFIDENT IMAGE TO
WESTERN VISITORS WHO HAVE MET HIM IN RECENT MONTHS,
SUCH AS THE AUSTRALIAN AMBASSADOR, AND WE SPECULATE HE
WILL REMAIN ON THE POLITBURO.

POLICY CONTINUITY RATHER THAN DRAMATIC CHANGES
-------------- -
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 HANOI 00638 05 OF 06 190947Z


20. (C) WHAT WE HAVE SEEN OF THE POLITICAL REPORT AND
FIVE- AND TEN-YEAR ECONOMIC PLANS SUGGEST THERE WILL
BE NO DRAMATIC CHANGES COMING OUT OF THE PARTY
CONGRESS. AND IN FACT THAT IS WHAT ONE NORMALLY
EXPECTS OUT OF THIS POLITICAL SYSTEM. THE PARTY'S
ENTIRE PROCESS OF "CONSULTATION" OVER A WHOLE YEAR,
INVOLVING COMMENTS AND DISCUSSION BY CPV CADRE AT ALL
LEVELS AND BY OFFICIALLY SANCTIONED "PUBLIC" VOICES,
TENDS TO MAKE THE PARTY CONGRESS DOCUMENTS A BIT OF
ALL THINGS TO ALL PEOPLE. FOR EXAMPLE, THE POLITICAL
REPORT HAS SECTIONS ON EVERYTHING INCLUDING BUILDING
AND REFINING SOCIALISM, HOW TO REFORM SOES, HORTATORY
STATEMENTS ABOUT DEFENDING NATIONAL SECURITY, AND HOW
TO PROMOTE AN AUTHENTICALLY VIETNAMESE CULTURE
RENAISSANCE. TAKEN AS A WHOLE, IT DOESN'T GIVE MUCH
OF A GUIDE FOR SPECIFIC ACTION.


21. (C) AS WE HAVE NOTED BEFORE IN OUR REPORTING, ONE
OF THE POSITIVES WE SEE IN THE DOCUMENTS IS AN
INCREASED RECOGNITION OF VIETNAM'S NEEDS TO EMBRACE
THE POTENTIAL INHERENT IN THE "KNOWLEDGE-BASED
ECONOMY." THIS FOCUSES BOTH ON DEVELOPING AND
MARKETING VIETNAM'S HUMAN RESOURCES POTENTIAL IN TERMS
OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND THE TECHNICAL EXPERTISE
OF VIETNAMESE CITIZENS. THIS IS REFLECTED PRACTICALLY
IN THE GOVERNMENT'S NASCENT EFFORTS TO DEVELOP GREATER
CAPACITIES IN INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY, INCLUDING SUCH
INITIATIVES AS BREAKING GROUND ON HIGH-TECH PARKS IN
HO CHI MINH CITY AND HANOI AND IN EFFORTS TO REPLICATE
BANGALORE'S OUTSOURCING OF SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT, FOR
EXAMPLE.


22. (C) THE CONGRESS, HOWEVER, IS UNLIKELY TO RESULT
IN ANY DRAMATIC BOOST TO THE ECONOMIC REFORM AGENDA.
MUCH MORE INFLUENTIAL OVER TIME, BY FAR, WILL BE THE
ROLLING IMPLEMENTATION OF THE BILATERAL TRADE
AGREEMENT AS ECONOMIC REFORMERS IN KEY MINISTRIES AND
OFFICES (AND INDEED MORE PROGRESSIVE REGIONS SUCH AS
GREATER HO CHI MINH CITY) PRESS FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF
TARGETS IN THEIR AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY. BY
CONTRAST, THE CONGRESS IS MUCH MORE ABOUT CONTINUITY
THAN CHANGE. IN ADDITION, SEEMINGLY TOTALLY DIVORCED
FROM THE PARTY'S RHETORIC, THE GVN HAS SIGNED AN IN-
PRINCIPLE AGREEMENT ON A NEW STRUCTURAL PROGRAM WITH
THE IMF AND THE WORLD BANK. THE TIMING OF THE SIGNING
OF THIS AGREEMENT INDICATES THE REFORMERS WANT TO
ASSURE THE STRUCTURAL PROGRAM IS A "FAIT ACCOMPLI" FOR
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THE PARTY CONGRESS.


23. (C) REPORTS COMING OUT OF THE FIRST HALF OF THE
11TH PLENUM SUGGEST THAT THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE IS
LEANING TOWARD ABOLITION OF THE FIVE-MEMBER POLITBURO
STANDING BOARD AS UNWORKABLE AND INSTEAD RETURNING TO
A SECRETARIAT THAT WILL STAFF THE WORK OF THE
POLITBURO. WHAT THIS MEANS FOR DECISION-MAKING IS
UNCLEAR. DECISIONS BY THE WHOLE POLITBURO INSTEAD OF
A STANDING COMMITTEE WOULD NOT NECESSARILY BE ANY MORE
ENLIGHTENED, EFFECTIVE, OR TIMELY. AND, IT IS
UNCERTAIN WHETHER THE SECRETARIAT WOULD HAVE ANYTHING
OTHER THAN "STAFF" RESPONSIBILITIES.

COMMENT: MORE OF THE SAME
--------------


24. (C) COMMENT: IF ALL GOES ACCORDING TO FORM, THE
BIGGEST DECISION OF THIS PLENUM LIKELY WILL BE "NO
DECISION." WHILE WE JUDGE THERE IS GENERAL AGREEMENT
AMONG MOST OF THE CPV LEADERSHIP THAT PHIEU SHOULD GO,
IT IS MUCH LESS CLEAR A CONSENSUS CAN BE FORGED ON HIS
SUCCESSOR. THAT IS LIKELY TO TAKE SOME MORE TIME, AND
WE FIND VERY CREDIBLE THE REPORTS WE HEAR THAT THE
PARTY CONGRESS MAY SLIP UNTIL AS LATE AS JUNE. AND
EVEN THEN, THERE MAY BE NO AGREEMENT ON THE TOP SLOTS.
THE LACK OF CONSENSUS AMONG THIS STALEMATED
LEADERSHIP, WHICH IS ADDICTED TO "CONSENSUS" DECISIONS
THAT INVOLVE LEAST-COMMON-DENOMINATOR GRADUALISM,
SUGGESTS THE POSSIBILITY THAT AN UNPOPULAR PHIEU COULD
MANAGE TO HOLD ON FOR PERHAPS EVEN ANOTHER YEAR OR SO,
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BEING REPLACED WELL AFTER THE NINTH PARTY CONGRESS.
THE PRECEDENT EXISTS FOR SUCH A MIDTERM REPLACEMENT,
SINCE PHIEU HIMSELF WON OUT OVER AN IN A SPLIT
POLITBURO VOTE IN DECEMBER 1997, SOME 18 MONTHS AFTER
THE EIGHTH CONGRESS.


25. (C) IN ANY EVENT, ONE THING IS CERTAIN: THERE WILL
BE NO DRAMATIC POLICY CHANGES COMING OUT OF THE
COMMUNIST PARTY CONGRESS. WE WILL SEE A GRADUAL
CHANGE OF EMPHASIS, PERHAPS, AND IN TIME GENERATIONAL
CHANGE WILL BRING (HOPEFULLY) FRESHER PERSPECTIVES TO
THE FORE. BUT IN THE SHORT TERM, THE NEW COLLECTIVE
POLITBURO LIKELY WON'T ACT MUCH DIFFERENT THAN THE
CURRENT VERSION. IT WILL CONTINUE TO TRY TO BALANCE
THE DISPARATE "FACTIONS" OF THIS DIVIDED CPV BY
MUDDLING THROUGH WITH ITS OXYMORONIC "STATE-LED
MARKET-ORIENTED SOCIALIST DEVELOPMENT." END COMMENT.
HARTER

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