TFUS01: GOB SUPPORTS COALITION STRIKES AGAINST

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 GABORONE 003343

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/11/11
TAGS: PREL PTER BC
SUBJECT: TFUS01: GOB SUPPORTS COALITION STRIKES AGAINST
THE TALIBAN

REF: A) STATE 169975 B) STATE 175419

CLASSIFIED BY DCM LESLIE BASSETT FOR REASONS 1.5 (B)(D)



1. (C) SUMMARY: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE STATEMENTS BY THE GOB
TO DATE HAVE BEEN FULLY SUPPORTIVE OF USG ACTIONS AGAINST
TALIBAN MILITARY TARGETS. IN A 10/11 MEETING WITH THE
AMBASSADOR, MFA PERMANENT SECRETARY ERNEST MPOFU DEFENDED A
MORE CAUTIOUS APPROACH IN ORDER TO AVOID EXTREMIST
RETALIATION AGAINST BOTSWANA'S MISSIONS ABROAD, BUT
SUBSEQUENTLY CONCEDED THAT HIS MINISTER'S POLICY WAS TO
SUPPORT THE USG. MPOFU ALSO REPORTED THE CONVOCATION OF AN
AD-HOC COMMISSION TO COORDINATE GOB ACTIONS AGAINST
TERRORISM. END SUMMARY.

INITIAL REACTIONS FULLY SUPPORTIVE


2. (C) ON OCTOBER 8 VP IAN KHAMA PHONED THE AMBASSADOR TO
CONVEY HIS PERSONAL SUPPORT FOR THE COALITION EFFORT
AGAINST THE TALIBAN. HE APPLAUDED THE DECISION TO ACT,
ACCEPTED INDICATIONS THAT USAMA BIN LADEN WAS THE
PERPETRATOR, AND WISHED THE USG SUCCESS IN CARRYING OUT THE
ENGAGEMENT. ASKED IF HE WOULD MAKE HIS SUPPORT PUBLIC,
HOWEVER, KHAMA DEMURRED, SUGGESTING THIS WAS AN ISSUE FOR
THE FOREIGN MINISTRY, AND NOTING THAT BOTSWANA TENDS TO
TAKE A LOW PROFILE. THAT "DOESN'T MEAN IN ANY WAY WE'RE
NOT SUPPORTIVE," HE ADDED.


3. (U) OCTOBER 10 PRESS QUOTED FOREIGN MINISTER MERAFHE
OFFERING HIS COUNTRY'S FULL SUPPORT FOR THE U.S.-LED
STRIKES AGAINST THE TALIBAN. HE NOTED THE ACTION WAS NOT
PREMATURE, AS THOSE WHO HARBORED THE PERPETRATORS OF THE
SEPTEMBER 11 ATTACKS HAD BEEN GIVEN AMPLE TIME TO SURRENDER
BIN LADEN AND HIS SUPPORTERS. MERAFHE ONCE AGAINST
CHARACTERIZED THE SEPTEMBER 11 TRAGEDY AS AN ATTACK ON
HUMANITY AS A WHOLE.

MOVING PAST BUREAUCRATIC DOUBTS


4. (C) ON OCTOBER 11 MFA PERMANENT SECRETARY ERNEST MPOFU
REQUESTED A MEETING WITH THE AMBASSADOR TO DISCUSS GOB
RESPONSES TO THE SEPTEMBER 11 ATTACKS. HE PROVIDED THE
AMBASSADOR WITH THE STATEMENT WHICH HAD SERVED AS THE BASIS
FOR MERAFHE'S REMARKS. THE EXTREMELY CAUTIOUS DOCUMENT
REGRETS THAT AFGHANISTAN DID NOT SURRENDER THE SUSPECTED
PERPETRATORS, HOPES THAT USG ACTIONS ARE CONSISTENT WITH
THE UN CHARTER, AND EXPRESSES THE VIEW THAT THE ATTACKS
SHOULD BE OF MINIMAL DURATION. MPOFU DEFENDED THE WEAK
STATEMENT AS A NECESSARY HEDGE TO AVOID PROVOKING EXTREMIST
GROUPS. BOTSWANA'S MISSIONS WORLDWIDE ARE NOT SECURE, HE
POINTED OUT. IN CAPE TOWN THAT DAY, MPOFU ADDED, THERE WAS
A DEMONSTRATION AT THE BRITISH HIGH COMMISSION, CO-LOCATED
IN THE SAME BUILDING AS THE BOTSWANA MISSION. THE GOB
LACKS THE RESOURCES TO SECURE ITS OFFICIALS AND PREMISES;
IT CANNOT AFFORD TO PROVOKE EXTREMIST REACTIONS.


5. (C) PRESSED BY THE AMBASSADOR, MPOFU CONCEDED THAT THE
WEAKER STATEMENT WAS SUPERSEDED BY THE MINISTER'S STRONG
SUPPORT OF THE USG STRIKES AGAINST THE TALIBAN. THE
AMBASSADOR STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF CONTINUING SUCH
SUPPORT. HE PROVIDED COPIES OF A LETTER HE WROTE TO
PRESIDENT MOGAE 10/9 (AS A COVER TO PRESIDENT BUSH'S REPLY
TO PRESIDENT MOGAE'S LETTER OF CONDOLENCE) WHICH URGED THE
GOB TO REMAIN PUBLICLY SUPPORTIVE. THE AMBASSADOR ALSO
PROVIDED THE TEXT OF HIS 10/10 STATEMENT TO THE PRESS WHICH
ARGUED THE USG CASE AND CALLED FOR BROAD SUPPORT FROM
BOTSWANA.

FIRST COORDINATED ACTIONS FROM GOB ON TERRORISM


6. (C) MPOFU REPORTED THAT HE HAD RECENTLY CONVOKED AN
AD-HOC COMMISSION TO COORDINATE GOB RESPONSES TO TERRORISM
AND ITS FULFILLMENT OF ITS INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS. THE
COMMISSION INCLUDES THE BOTSWANA DEFENSE FORCE, THE POLICE
(INCLUDING ITS INTELLIGENCE AGENCY),CUSTOMS, IMMIGRATION,
THE CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY, THE BANK OF BOTSWANA, AND THE
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT. EACH AGENCY HAD BEEN TASKED WITH
SPECIFIC ISSUES WHICH WERE TO BE ADDRESSED IN THE NEAR
TERM; SEVERAL SUBCOMMITTEES LOOKING AT TRANSPORTATION,
AIRPORT ACCESS, AND FINANCIAL ISSUES WERE ALSO CREATED.
MPOFU WAS CONFIDENT THIS MECHANISM WOULD ALLOW BOTSWANA TO
REPORT FULL COMPLIANCE WITH UNSCR 1373 AS WELL AS ITS OTHER
INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS. IT WOULD ALSO IDENTIFY ANY
LOOPHOLES THAT NEEDED TO BE FILLED. HE OFFERED TO GIVE US
REGULAR UPDATES ON THE COMMISSION'S PROGRESS.

COOL ON REGIONAL EFFORTS


7. (C) THE AMBASSADOR QUERIED MPOFU ABOUT POSSIBLE
REGIONAL INITIATIVES, PERHAPS WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF SADC.
MPOFU SUGGESTED THAT FINANCIAL TRACKING EFFORTS WITHIN THE
REGION ASSUMED THAT FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS WERE PLENTIFUL -
- IN FACT BOTSWANA TRANSACTED PRIMARILY WITH SOUTH AFRICA.
HE SUGGESTED THAT SADC MIGHT BEST MOBILIZE ITSELF ON THE
FRINGES OF AN UPCOMING MEETING OF THE AD-HOC COMMISSION ON
UNITA SANCTIONS; THE SAME PLAYERS WOULD LIKELY DISCUSS THE
REPERCUSSIONS OF SEPTEMBER 11.


8. (C) MPOFU ALSO NOTED THE GOB HAD RECEIVED AN INVITATION
FOR A SUMMIT IN DAKAR NEXT WEEK TO DISCUSS TERRORISM IN
AFRICA. HIS VIEW WAS THAT THE PROPOSAL WAS NOT WELL-
DEFINED, AND THE GOB WOULD LIKELY NOT ATTEND. HE
UNDERSTOOD OTHER AFRICAN NATIONS WERE ALSO SKEPTICAL.
MPOFU AVERRED THAT PRESIDENT WADE'S REAL PURPOSE WAS TO
FOCUS ON TERRORISM INSIDE SENEGAL AND OTHER PARTS OF
AFRICA.


9. (C) COMMENT: MPOFU, THE HIGHEST-RANKING CAREER
DIPLOMAT IN THE BOTSWANA FOREIGN SERVICE, IS ALSO THE MOST
CAUTIOUS. IT IS DISAPPOINTING THAT THE TALKING POINTS FOR
MINISTER MERAFHE WERE SO WEAK; IT IS HEARTENING THAT HE
MOVED READILY PAST THEM TO FULLY SUPPORT USG ACTIONS.

LANGE