Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
01CARACAS182
2001-01-22 20:56:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Caracas
Cable title:  

CHAVEZ AND COLOMBIA: IT WON'T GET BETTER

Tags:  PREL VE CO 
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R 222056Z JAN 01
FM AMEMBASSY CARACAS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0854
AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 
INFO NSC WASHDC
DIA WASHDC
CIA WASHDC
USCINCSO MIAMI FL
USINT HAVANA 
AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 
AMEMBASSY LIMA 
AMEMBASSY LA PAZ 
AMEMBASSY QUITO 
AMEMBASSY PORT OF SPAIN 
AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 
AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 
AMEMBASSY MADRID 
AMEMBASSY MEXICO
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CARACAS 000182 

USOAS FOR SHANNON
USCINCSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/03/12
TAGS: PREL VE CO
SUBJECT: CHAVEZ AND COLOMBIA: IT WON'T GET BETTER

REF: A) CARACAS 0811 99, B) CARACAS 3265 00,
C) CARACAS 1940 00, D) CARACAS 3397 99,
E) CARACAS 3209 99, F) CARACAS 3133 99,
G) CARACAS 3101 99, H) CARACAS 2921 99,
I) CARACAS 2813 99, J) CARACAS 2813 99,
K) CARACAS 2813 99, L) CARACAS 2727 99,
M) CARACAS 0629 99

CLASSIFIED BY DONNA J. HRINAK, AMBASSADOR. REASONS: 1.5
(B) AND (D)

-------
SUMMARY
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CARACAS 000182

USOAS FOR SHANNON
USCINCSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/03/12
TAGS: PREL VE CO
SUBJECT: CHAVEZ AND COLOMBIA: IT WON'T GET BETTER

REF: A) CARACAS 0811 99, B) CARACAS 3265 00,
C) CARACAS 1940 00, D) CARACAS 3397 99,
E) CARACAS 3209 99, F) CARACAS 3133 99,
G) CARACAS 3101 99, H) CARACAS 2921 99,
I) CARACAS 2813 99, J) CARACAS 2813 99,
K) CARACAS 2813 99, L) CARACAS 2727 99,
M) CARACAS 0629 99

CLASSIFIED BY DONNA J. HRINAK, AMBASSADOR. REASONS: 1.5
(B) AND (D)

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) THE RIVALRY BETWEEN VENEZUELA AND COLOMBIA HAS BEEN
LONGSTANDING, WITH ROOTS REACHING BACK AS FAR AS THE BREAK-
UP OF GRAN COLOMBIA INTO SEPARATE STATES. OVER THE YEARS,
THE RIVALRY BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES - AND ESPECIALLY
BETWEEN THEIR RESPECTIVE MILITARIES - MANIFESTED ITSELF AS
A PERSISTENT TENSION. OVER TIME, HOWEVER, THESE TENSIONS
HAD BECOME INSTITUTIONALIZED AND MANAGED WITH GREAT EFFORT
AND ENERGY THROUGHOUT SUCCEEDING VENEZUELAN AND COLOMBIAN
GOVERNMENTS. FOR THE PAST TWO YEARS, HOWEVER, THESE
EFFORTS, AT LEAST ON THE VENEZUELAN SIDE OF THE BORDER,
HAVE TAKEN A BACK SEAT TO THE SIGNIFICANT AMBITIONS OF
VENEZUELA'S CURRENT LEADER, PRESIDENT HUGO CHAVEZ. RECENT
TENSIONS IN THE RELATIONSHIP ARE NOT JUST THE RESULT OF
MISCALCULATION OR INEXPERIENCE. THEY ARE ALSO A DIRECT
EXPRESSION OF DEEPLY-HELD CONVICTIONS BY CHAVEZ RELATING TO
HIS ROLE IN THE WORLD, THE DESIRABILITY OF SPREADING HIS
"BOLIVARIAN REVOLUTION" TO NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES, AND HIS
VIEW OF THE FARC AND ELN AS PHILOSOPHICAL KINSMEN IN THE
LATTER ENDEAVOR. WE SEE ZERO LIKELIHOOD OF THESE VIEWS --
AND RESULTING GOV BEHAVIOR -- CHANGING IN THE FUTURE, AND
ANTICIPATE FUTURE TENSIONS BETWEEN VENEZUELA AND COLOMBIA.
END SUMMARY.


--------------
A VERY BUMPY ROAD SO FAR
--------------


2. (C) THE FIRST SERIOUS DIPLOMATIC INCIDENT BETWEEN
VENEZUELA AND COLOMBIA OCCURRED JUST ONE MONTH INTO
PRESIDENT HUGO CHAVEZ'S PRESIDENCY, ON MACH 10, 1999,
DURING ONE OF CHAVEZ'S FIRST PRESS CONFERENCES, WHEN HE
MADE A STATEMENT WHICH APPEARED TO CONFER BELLIGERENT
STATUS ON THE FARC, MUCH TO THE COLOMBIAN GOVERNMENT'S
PUBLICLY EXPRESSED CONCERN AND CONSTERNATION. ALTHOUGH
FOREIGN MINISTER JOSE VICENTE RANGEL TRIED TO DOWNPLAY THE
INCIDENT, THE EVENT PROVED TO BE ONLY THE FIRST EPISODE OF
WHAT HAS BECOME AN OFT-REPEATED PATTERN IN VENEZUELAN-
COLOMBIAN RELATIONS: CHAVEZ OR RANGEL MAKES A REMARK WHICH
INSPIRES A SHARP PUBLIC REJECTION BY COLOMBIA. THE

VENEZUELANS EXPRESS SURPRISE AT THE COLOMBIAN REACTION,
INSISTING THERE WAS A MISUNDERSTANDING. THE COLOMBIANS LET
THE MATTER DROP, AND RELATIONS APPEAR TO RETURN TO THE
STATUS QUO ANTE, UNTIL A SIMILAR STATEMENT BY CHAVEZ OR
RANGEL STARTS THE CYCLE AGAIN.


3. (C) WE SAY "APPEAR" TO RETURN TO THE STATUS QUO ANTE
BECAUSE WE BELIEVE THAT THE INCIDENTS HAVE A CUMULATIVE
NEGATIVE EFFECT ON THE RELATIONSHIP. (NOTE: WE WOULD
WELCOME EMBASSY BOGOTA'S COMMENTS ON THIS.) FURTHERMORE,
THE CHAVEZ/RANGEL BEHAVIOR THAT LEADS TO THESE DUST-UPS
WITH VENEZUELA'S NEIGHBOR SHOWS NO SIGNS OF TAPERING OFF.
INDEED, THE MOST SERIOUS INCIDENT -- WHICH LED COLOMBIA TO
RECALL ITS AMBASSADOR FOR CONSULTATIONS -- TOOK PLACE ONLY
LAST NOVEMBER. (NOTE: THE INCIDENT INVOLVED APPEARANCE BY
SENIOR MEMBERS OF THE FARC AT A SEMINAR ON PLAN COLOMBIA
HELD IN THE NATIONAL LEGISLATIVE PALACE. THE SEMINAR WAS
SPONSORED BY THE VENEZUELAN REPRESENTATIVES TO THE LATIN
AMERICAN PARLIAMENT, BUT IN FACT, WE HAVE INFORMATION TO
THE EFFECT THAT THE GOV WAS FULLY INVOLVED IN FACILITATING
THE TRAVEL OF THE FARC MEMBERS.)


--------------
CHAVEZ'S LONGED-FOR ROLE IN THE PEACE PROCESS
--------------


4. (C) MANY OF THE STATEMENTS FROM CHAVEZ OR RANGEL THAT
HAVE CAUSED A NEGATIVE PUBLIC REACTION BY COLOMBIA INVOLVE
UNASKED-FOR SUGGESTIONS ABOUT THE PEACE PROCESS. THESE
STATEMENTS IN OUR VIEW REFLECT TWO STRONGLY-HELD
CONVICTIONS BY CHAVEZ: 1) THAT THE COLOMBIAN PEACE PROCESS
SHOULD BE INTERNATIONALIZED; 2) THAT HE SHOULD PLAY A MAJOR
ROLE IN ANY SUCH ESQUIPULAS-TYPE PROCESS. THE TWO IDEAS,
OF COURSE, ARE CLOSELY INTERRELATED. CHAVEZ APPEARS
SINCERELY CONVINCED THAT PASTRANA CAN'T DO THE JOB ALONE,
AND THAT INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION BETWEEN THE GOC AND THE
REBELS IS NECESSARY. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE IDEA OF A
STARRING ROLE FOR CHAVEZ CLEARLY CONNECTS WITH HIS MANIFEST
CONCEPTION OF HIMSELF AS A MAJOR THIRD WORLD LEADER, IN THE
FOREFRONT OF EFFORTS TO CREATE A "MULTIPOLAR" (V. U.S.-
DOMINATED "UNIPOLAR") WORLD. IT IS NATURAL THAT HE WOULD
SEE NEIGHBORING COLOMBIA, WITH ITS HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION
WITH SIMON BOLIVAR, AS A NATURAL PLACE FOR SUCH ACTIVISM ON
HIS PART. IT IS ALSO PERFECTLY RATIONAL FOR A VENEZUELAN
PRESIDENT TO BE CONCERNED ABOUT THE SITUATION IN COLOMBIA.
BUT WE DO NOT BELIEVE THE EGO-CENTERED ELEMENTS WE HAVE
DESCRIBED ABOVE CAN BE IGNORED IN ANALYZING CHAVEZ'S
POLICIES TOWARDS COLOMBIA.


--------------
WHOSE SIDE IS HE ON?
--------------


5. (C) THAT'S NOT AN EASY QUESTION TO ANSWER. THE OFFICIAL
GOV LINE, BOTH PUBLICLY AND IN PRIVATE TO US, IS THAT
VENEZUELA'S CONTACTS WITH THE COLOMBIAN REBELS ARE CENTERED
ON PROTECTING THE INTERESTS OF VENEZUELANS WHO SUFFER FROM
REBEL ACTIVITIES ON VENEZUELA'S SIDE OF THE COMPLETELY
POROUS BORDER: NEGOTIATING THE RELEASE OF KIDNAPPED
VENEZUELANS, ETC. CHAVEZ AND RANGEL HAVE RECENTLY ADMITTED
THAT RETIRED VENEZUELAN NAVY CAPTAIN RAMON RODRIGUEZ CHACIN
(LONG CLOSE TO CHAVEZ, WE BELIEVE) FROM TIME TO TIME
CARRIES OUT SPECIAL MISSIONS FOR THE GOV IN COLOMBIA
ITSELF. HOWEVER, CHAVEZ AND RANGEL ASSERT THAT THESE
MISSIONS ARE PURELY RELATED TO RELEASE OF KIDNAP VICTIMS
(RODRIGUEZ CHACIN HAS IN FACT NEGOTIATED THE FREEING OF
PERSONS HELD BY BOTH THE FARC AND THE ELN, INCLUDING A U.S.
CITIZEN HELD BY THE LATTER) AND THAT THE MISSIONS TAKE
PLACE WITH THE CONSENT OF THE COLOMBIAN GOVERNMENT, AND
SOMETIMES EVEN AT ITS REQUEST. ACTIONS SUCH AS PERMITTING
REBELS TO MEET WITH VARIOUS OTHER COLOMBIAN POLITICAL
LEADERS, OR ERSTWHILE LEADERS, IN THE PEACE-PROCESS ARE
JUSTIFIED AS DISINTERESTED GOOD OFFICES PROVIDED WITH GOC
KNOWLEDGE AND CONSENT AND AIMED AT PERMITTING COLOMBIANS
THEMSELVES TO WORK OUT A PEACEFUL, NEGOTIATED SOLUTION TO
THE INSURGENCIES.


6. (C) IN FACT, AS WE HAVE REPORTED IN VARIOUS OTHER
CHANNELS, WE BELIEVE THAT AT LEAST THE SYMPATHIES OF THE
GOV FOR THE REBELS ARE FAR GREATER THAN THE ABOVE-DESCRIBED
OFFICIAL LINE SUGGESTS. FROM HIS PUBLIC STATEMENTS ALONE,
IT IS CLEAR THAT CHAVEZ REGARDS THE FARC AND ELN AS
LEGITIMATE BELLIGERENTS, AND THAT ANY PEACE SETTLEMENT
SHOULD NOT JUST INVOLVE THEM TURNING IN THEIR ARMS AND
TRANSFORMING THEMSELVES MEEKLY INTO POLITICAL PARTIES.


7. (C) WHY WOULD CHAVEZ HOLD SUCH VIEWS? THE FIRST POINT
TO BEAR IN MIND IS THAT HOWEVER ELUSIVE THE CONCEPT OF HIS
"BOLIVARIAN REVOLUTION" MAY BE FOR OTHERS, IT IS ABSOLUTELY
CENTRAL TO HIS THINKING AND ACTIONS. ONE COMPONENT OF IT
IS A CHAMPIONING OF THE INTERESTS OF THE LOWER CLASSES
AGAINST ENTRENCHED ELITES. IF ONE SEES ON ONE SIDE LEFT-
WING GUERRILLA-FIGHTERS (WHOSE VERY IDENTITY AS SUCH IS
LIKELY TO APPEAL TO CHAVEZ'S ROMANTIC SIDE),AND ON THE
OTHER A COLOMBIAN POLITICAL SYSTEM WHICH -- AT LEAST TO
OBSERVERS IN CARACAS -- LOOKS VERY MUCH LIKE THE ONE CHAVEZ
DESTROYED IN VENEZUELA," IT IS NOT HARD TO SEE WHICH SIDE
HIS HEART LEANS TOWARD. WHETHER OR NOT HE SHARES ALL THE
OBJECTIVES OF THE REBELS, IT SEEMS THAT HE REGARDS THEM AS
AT LEAST PROTO-BOLIVARIANS, AND ALLIES IN THE GOAL WE
BELIEVE HE HOLDS OF SEEING A VERSION OF HIS PROGRAM IN
VENEZUELA SPREAD TO THE OTHER ANDEAN COUNTRIES, AND PERHAPS
BEYOND. WHILE CHAVEZ ISSUES FREQUENT PUBLIC EXPRESSIONS OF
CONCERN ABOUT THE SCOURGE OF NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING, HE
CONVENIENTLY IGNORES THE FARC'S SUBSTANTIAL CONNECTION TO
THE DRUG TRADE. FINALLY, IT IS NOT HARD TO IMAGINE WHAT
MIGHT BE THE ADVICE OF HIS CLOSE FRIEND FIDEL CASTRO
REGARDING THE MOST DESIRABLE OUTCOME IN COLOMBIA.


--------------
CHAVEZ AND PLAN COLOMBIA
--------------


8. (C) CHAVEZ AND HIS FOREIGN MINISTER HAVE MADE CLEAR
THEIR STRONG OBJECTION TO THE MILITARY COMPONENT OF PLAN
COLOMBIA, WHICH CHAVEZ RECENTLY REITERATED BY PUBLICLY
STATING THAT HIS POSITION "WOULD NOT CHANGE." THEY SAY IT
WILL SIMPLY INCREASE THE VIOLENCE IN COLOMBIA, CAUSE AN
INFLUX OF REFUGEES IN VENEZUELA, AND LEAD TO A POSSIBLE
TRANSFER TO THIS COUNTRY OF NARCOTRAFFICKING OPERATIONS
CURRENTLY LOCATED IN COLOMBIA, COMPLEMENTING UNDERLYING
CONCERNS ABOUT THE COLOMBIAN THREAT TO VENEZUELA. IT
SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THESE CONCERNS ARE SHARED ACROSS A
VERY BROAD SPECTRUM OF VENEZUELAN SOCIETY, INCLUDING AMONG
PERSONS STRONGLY OPPOSED TO OTHER CHAVEZ POLICIES RELATING
TO COLOMBIA.


--------------
THINGS WON'T GET BETTER
--------------


9. (C) IF OUR ABOVE ANALYSIS IS SUBSTANTIALLY CORRECT, THEN
IT IS PURE WISHFUL THINKING TO IMAGINE THAT CHAVEZ IS
MERELY ON SOME KIND OF AN UPWARD-TRENDING, ALBEIT SHALLOW,
LEARNING CURVE AS FAR AS HIS POLICIES TOWARDS COLOMBIA IS
CONCERNED. RATHER THAN BEING JUST INADVERTENT MISSTEPS
BORN OUT OF INEXPERIENCE, WE BELIEVE THOSE POLICIES STEM
FROM THE DEEPLY HELD CONVICTIONS AND OBJECTIVES WE HAVE
SOUGHT TO OUTLINE ABOVE. THEREFORE, DESPITE CHAVEZ'S
CONSTANT PROTESTATIONS OF HIS DESIRE FOR GOOD RELATIONS
WITH PASTRANA, WE BELIEVE THE CURRENT PATTERN OF GOV
BEHAVIOR IS UNLIKELY TO CHANGE, AND INDEED ITS NEGATIVE
ELEMENTS COULD EVEN BECOME MORE PRONOUNCED UNDER CERTAIN
SCENARIOS.


10. (C) VENEZUELAN-COLOMBIAN RELATIONS HAVE LONG BEEN
MARKED BY THE KIND OF SUSPICION WHICH SEEMS RELATIVELY
COMMON AMONG NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES IN THE HEMISPHERE. BUT
THAT SUSPICION HAS TRADITIONALLY BEEN MODERATED BY A
REALIZATION OF THE NEED FOR A MODUS VIVENDI. THIS IN TURN
LED TO THE CREATION OVER THE YEARS OF AN IMPRESSIVE NUMBER
OF POLITICAL BUFFER MECHANISMS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES,
INCLUDING A BI-NATIONAL COMMISSION INVOLVING THE
PARTICIPATION OF NUMEROUS MINISTRIES, STUDY GROUPS, AND IN
THE AREA OF COUNTER-NARCOTICS, INTELLIGENCE-SHARING
ARRANGEMENTS AND EXTRACTION AND INSERTION ASSISTANCE, AND
CROSS-BORDER PURSUIT COOPERATION. AT LEAST PARTIALLY AS A
RESULT OF RECENT DISTURBING BORDER INCIDENTS BETWEEN THE
TWO COUNTRIES' MILITARIES, THE VENEZUELAN-COLOMBIAN BORDER
AFFAIRS COMMISSION -- WHICH HAD FALLEN INTO DISUSE SINCE THE
BEGINNING OF THE CHAVEZ ADMINISTRATION -- IS SCHEDULED TO
MEET ON FEBRUARY 22. (NOTE: VENEZUELA SUSPENDED A
COMMISSION MEETING SCHEDULED FOR SEPTEMBER 2000.)


11. (C) CAN WE DO ANYTHING? OUR REPEATED URGINGS, MADE TO
CHAVEZ NOT MERELY BY THIS EMBASSY BUT BY HIGH LEVEL
VISITORS, TO THE EFFECT OF FOLLOWING A "NO SURPRISES" (FOR
PASTRANA) POLICY TOWARDS COLOMBIA HAVE UNFORTUNATELY BORNE
NO FRUIT TO DATE. NOR SHOULD THAT SURPRISE US, FOR
CHAVEZ'S CONCEPTION OF THE "UNIPOLAR" HEGEMONISTIC
STRIVINGS OF THE UNITED STATES -- OF WHICH HE SEES PLAN
COLOMBIA AS A PARTICULARLY CLEAR EXAMPLE -- MAKE US ABOUT
THE LAST SOURCE OF ADVICE HE IS LIKELY TO TURN TO FOR
MANAGING RELATIONS WITH COLOMBIA OR DEALING WITH THE
GUERILLAS (OR JUST ABOUT ANYTHING ELSE FOR THAT MATTER).
IN SHAPING HIS POLICIES TOWARDS COLOMBIA HE WILL CONTINUE -
- AT THE PRICE, WHICH HE SEEMS WILLING TO PAY, OF LIKELY
FUTURE CONFRONTATIONS WITH THE GOC -- TO FOLLOW HIS
BOLIVARIAN VISION. IT IS A VISION IN WHICH OUR COUNSEL HAS
NO PLACE.


HRINAK.


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