THE GAMBIA -- JAMMEH'S WEST AFRICA POLICY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANJUL 000327

KINSHASA FOR D. TITUS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/16/11
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM LI SN GA
SUBJECT: THE GAMBIA -- JAMMEH'S WEST AFRICA POLICY

CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR GEORGE W. HALEY FOR
REASONS 1.5 B/D


1. (C) SUMMARY: ALTHOUGH HE HAS NOT DEVELOPED A
COHERENT STRATEGY FOR WEST AFRICAN REGIONAL
SECURITY, PRESIDENT JAMMEH WANTS TO BE A MORE
VISIBLE PLAYER IN SUB-REGIONAL DIPLOMACY.
NEVERTHELESS, JAMMEH IS KEEN ON DEVELOPING A
REPUTATION AS AN INFLUENTIAL PEACE BROKER. WITH
EFFORTS IN THE CASAMANCE STYMIED DUE TO SENEGALESE
PRESIDENT WADE'S SPHINX-LIKE SILENCE TO BANJUL'S
OVERTURES, JAMMEH PICTURES THE MANO RIVER AS HIS
NEW WADING POOL. SINCE PRESIDENT TAYLOR VISITED
BANJUL LATE MARCH, THE GAMBIA HAS BEEN MORE
INVOLVED IN ECOWAS DELIBERATIONS AND IN BILATERAL
CONTACTS WITH MONROVIA. THE SOPHOMORIC JAMMEH MAY
BE OVER HIS HEAD AND WIND UP FLAILING IN THE MANO
RIVER TURBULENCE. HIS INTERVENTION WILL LIKELY BE
INEFFECTUAL AND MAY ADD CONFUSION TO A MATTER
ALREADY FLUSH WITH TROUBLE. END SUMMARY.

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THE PERSON AS POLICY
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2. (C) THE GAMBIA HAS NO ARTICULATED SUB-REGION
FOREIGN POLICY NOR STRATEGY. JAMMEH AND COHORTS
HANDLE ISSUES ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS. THEY
APPARENTLY HAVE EMBRACED THE WORKING ASSUMPTION
THAT A COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY WOULD NOT EXCEED THE
SUM OF ITS COMPOSITE PARTS.


3. (C) THE LODESTAR OF GAMBIAN FOREIGN POLICY IS
JAMMEH'S APPETITE FOR INFLUENCE, HIS DESIRE TO BE A
SUB-REGIONAL PLAYER OF SOME ACCOUNT. BECAUSE THE
GAMBIA IS SMALL, WEAK AND POOR, JAMMEH HAS FEW
UTENSILS TO ACHIEVE HIS GOAL. THUS, HE HAS USED
THE GAMBIA'S RELATIVE DOMESTIC STABILITY AND ITS
INHERENT GEOPOLITICAL IMPUISSANCE TO WIGGLE HIMSELF
INTO THE MOLD OF A PEACE BROKER. HOWEVER, CREATION
OF A REGIONAL ARCHITECTURE OF DURABLE PEACE AND
CONFLICT PREVENTION SEEMS LESS AN IMPERATIVE THAN
BEING PERCEIVED AS A CHARISMATIC LEADER CAPABLE OF
ENGINEERING DRAMATIC BREAKTHROUGHS. DIPLOMACY AND
FOREIGN POLICY ARE CONDUCTED IN THE REALM OF
PERSONAL CONTACTS AND CHEMISTRY, NOT OBJECTIVE
NATIONAL INTERESTS. DRUM ROLLS AND FANFARE LOOM
MORE IMPORTANTLY THAN THE SUBSTANCE OF PEACE. THE
BIRTHPLACE OF GAMBIAN FOREIGN POLICY SEEMS TO BE
MORE INTESTINAL THAN INTELLECTUAL.


4. (C) THAT MILITARY CONFLICTS HAD VISITED GAMBIA'S
IMMEDIATE NEIGHBORS GAVE JAMMEH READY VENUES TO
PRACTICE HIS BRAND OF PERSONALIZED DIPLOMACY.
AFTER TRANSIENT SUCCESSES MEDIATING DISPUTES IN
GUINEA-BISSAU AND THE CASAMANCE IN 1999, JAMMEH'S
FOREIGN POLICY HAS FOUNDERED LATELY. HIS INFLUENCE
IN BISSAU AND DAKAR HAS WANED SINCE THE ELECTIONS
OF PRESIDENT YALA AND WADE, RESPECTIVELY. ALTHOUGH
YALA AND WADE HAVE THEIR INTERNAL PROBLEMS AND
THEIR DIFFERENCES WITH EACH OTHER, JAMMEH
INCREASINGLY HAS BEEN THE ODD MAN OUT IN THIS PART
OF THE WEST AFRICAN NEIGHBORHOOD.


5. (C) IN HIS LATEST ATTEMPT TO AVOID THIS DE FACTO
ISOLATION, JAMMEH HAS COURTED NOUAKCHOTT AS EVINCED
BY HIS EARLY MAY VISIT TO MAURITANIA WHERE SEVERAL
BILATERAL AGREEMENTS ON ECONOMIC COOPERATION WERE
EXECUTED. IN PART THE DALLIANCE WITH NOUAKCHOTT IS
A CLUMSY ATTEMPT TO MAKE DAKAR "JEALOUS" AND THUS
PAY MORE ATTENTION TO BANJUL.


6. (C) JAMMEH REMAINS FOCUSSED ON MAXIMIZING HIS
INFLUENCE IN THE CASAMANCE PEACE PROCESS.
CONSEQUENTLY, WADE'S INSCRUTABILITY HAS BEEN TOUGH
TO MAW. THE GAMBIAN FEARS THAT WADE IS
COMMUNICATING WITH MFDC MODERATES WHILE KEEPING THE
GAMBIA OUT OF THE LOOP. CONSEQUENTLY, THE DYNAMIC
BETWEEN WADE AND JAMMEH REMAINS PRIMARILY
CENTRIFUGAL. THE MORE WADE SEEMS TO KEEP JAMMEH
SIDELINED, THE MORE JAMMEH WANTS WADE TO FAIL.
BECAUSE OF HIS SUSCEPTIBILITY TO VAULT INDIVIDUAL
PIQUE OVER NATIONAL INTERESTS, JAMMEH MAY FEEL
COMPELLED TO SYMPATHIZE WITH MFDC HARDLINERS AND
THEIR MUSCLE-FLEXING REACTIONS TO WADE'S PEACE
STRATAGEM. AS LONG AS WADE DOES NOT LET THE GAMBIA
MEDIATE THE NEGOTIATIONS, JAMMEH'S ATTITUDE WILL BE
ONE OF SCHADENFREUDE NOT OF STATESMANSHIP IN
SCULPTING A GOOD NEIGHBOR POLICY THAT ACTUALLY
PROMOTES A CASAMANCE PEACE.

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WADING INTO DEEP WATER - THE MANO RIVER FRAY
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7. (C) DENIED HIS DESIRED ROLE IN THE CASAMANCE,
JAMMEH NOW PEERS AT THE MANO RIVER IMBROGLIO AS A
POTENTIAL VEHICLE TO SECURE HIS MANTLE AS PEACE
BROKER. JAMMEH IS ALSO ENERGIZED BY THE BELIEF
THAT HE HAS THE INSIDE TRACK ON THE ECOWAS CHAIR
ONCE PRESIDENT KONARE COMPLETES THIS TERM.
CURRENTLY, JAMMEH SEES NO BETTER WAY TO PREPARE
HIMSELF FOR THIS ASCENSION THAN VISIBLE INVOLVEMENT
IN THE MOST CRUCIAL ISSUE FACING THE SUB-REGION.
PRESIDENT TAYLOR'S LATE MARCH VISIT TO BANJUL WAS
NOT A WHIM. AGAINST THIS BACKDROP, TAYLOR LIKELY
HAD TWO RELATED OBJECTIVES. FIRST, HE RECOGNIZED
THAT JAMMEH MAY BE IN LINE FOR THE ECOWAS -- HE
WANTED TO CULTIVATE A PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP PRIOR
TO JAMMEH'S TENURE. SECOND, TAYLOR WANTED ECOWAS
TO BE A DIVIDED HOUSE REGARDING SANCTIONS AGAINST
LIBERIA. REALIZING THAT MOST ECOWAS COLLEAGUES ARE
AGAINST HIM, TAYLOR SEEKS A SYMPATHETIC MINORITY TO
PREVENT ECOWAS CONSENSUS WHICH, IN TURN, WILL
IMPEDE ANTI-LIBERIA ACTION BY THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY.


8. (C) ALSO, THE COMMONALTIES BETWEEN THE TAYLOR
AND JAMMEH CANNOT BE IGNORED. BOTH ARE DISLIKED BY
IMMEDIATE NEIGHBORS. BOTH BASICALLY ASSUMED POWER
BY THE MUSKET AND THUS ARE BETE NOIRE TO THEIR
COUNTRIES' POLITICAL INTELLIGENCIA. BOTH HAVE
STRONG ANTI-WESTERN STREAKS AND LONG STANDING TIES
TO LIBYA. TAYLOR AND BABA JOBE, ARGUABLY THE
SECOND MOST POWERFUL FIGURE IN THE GAMBIA, TRAINED
TOGETHER IN LIBYA IN THE 1980S. PREDICTABLY, JOBE
IS ENMESHED IN ALL FORMS OF SKULLDUGGERY. WE
SUSPECT TAYLOR AND HIS COMPANIONS MAY HAVE EXPLORED
WITH JAMMEH AND JOBE THE USE OF THE GAMBIA AS A
POSSIBLE BACK ALLEY FOR COMMERCE TO ESCAPE UN
SANCTIONS. BABA JOBE'S ALMOST INNATE CRIMINALITY
WOULD LEAD HIM TO ACCEPT SUCH AN OFFER. ALTHOUGH
HE WOULD HAVE BEEN ATTRACTED BY ANY BANGLES AND
TRINKETS TAYLOR MIGHT HAVE OFFERED, JAMMEH WOULD BE
MORE CAUTIOUS THAN JOBE. NONETHELESS, THE
DIPLOMATIC OPENING BETWEEN BANJUL AND MONROVIA
PAVES THE ROAD FOR MORE CONTACTS AND THIS INCREASES
THE CHANCE OF ILLICIT COMMERCE FOR THERE ARE FEW
THINGS THAT THE LIBERIAN TOUCHES WHICH DO NOT
BECOME SULLIED.


9. (C) ALREADY, THE GAMBIA'S VOCABULARY TOWARD
LIBERIA HAS CHANGED. MONTHS AGO, FM SEDAT JOBE
WOULD IMPRECATE TAYLOR THE MOMENT THE LIBERIAN
ISSUE WAS RAISED. DURING A MID-MAY CONVERSATION
WITH AMBASSADOR HALEY, JOBE GROANED THAT SANCTIONS
AGAINST LIBERIA WERE INIMICAL TO PEACE. JOBE
PROTESTED THAT TRAVEL SANCTIONS WERE PARTICULARLY
COUNTERPRODUCTIVE BECAUSE THEY WOULD PREVENT TAYLOR
FROM ATTENDING PEACE CONFERENCES. JOBE WENT SO FAR
AS TO LABEL GUINEAN PRESIDENT CONTE, NOT TAYLOR, AS
THE MAJOR OBSTACLE TO PEACE. (COMMENT: THAT JOBE
WOULD UTTER SUCH AN IMPOVERISHED RATIONALE REVEALS
THE EXTENT THAT HE HAS RECEIVED NEW MARCHING ORDERS
REGARDING LIBERIA. END COMMENT.)


10. (C) THE GAMBIANS, SEEMINGLY OBLIVIOUS TO THE
RECENT HISTORY OF THE TROUBLED MANO RIVER UNION,
APPARENTLY BELIEVE THEY CAN SUCCEED WHERE OTHERS
HAVE WRECKED -- IN DISCOVERING A FORMULA THAT WILL
PERSUADE TAYLOR TO NEGOTI9E IN GOOD FAITH. THE
FIRST STEP, ACCORDING TO THE GAMBIANS IS THE
HOLDING OF A TAYLOR-CONTE SUMMIT AIMED AT
PACIFICATION OF THE GUINEA-LIBERIA BORDER.
CONSEQUENTLY THE GAMBIANS BLAME CONTE'S REFUSAL TO
MEET TAYLOR AS THE MAJOR STUMBLING BLOCK TO THEIR
APPROACH. WE HAVE REMINDED THE GAMBIANS ABOUT THE
NUMEROUS MEETINGS ATTENDED BY BOTH CONTE AND TAYLOR
AND THE MANY COMMUNIQUQS BOTH HAVE SIGNED. EVERY
KNOWN PLATITUDE AND BROMIDE KNOWN TO DIPLOMATIC MAN
HAS BEEN USED -- TO NO AVAIL. WE ADVISED THAT
PUSHING FOR A SUMMIT IN THE ABSENCE OF ADEQUATE
PREPARATORY WORK WOULD RAISE EXPECTATIONS UNDULY.
DISAPPOINTMENT WAS INEVITABLE BECAUSE THE GULF
BETWEEN THE TWO LEADERS IS MUCH TOO VAST TO BRIDGE
IN ONE HIGHLY VISIBLE MEETING. INSTEAD, FOREIGN
MINISTERS AND TECHNICAL EXPERTS NEED TO MEET TO
LESSON THE DIFFERENCES AND IDENTIFY THOSE AREAS
NEEDING PRESIDENTIAL RESOLUTION. JOBE SAID HE
WOULD INCORPORATE THIS RECOMMENDATION IN THE
GAMBIA'S APPROACH. WE WILL SEE.


11. (C) COMMENT: IN BOTH THE CASAMANCE AND THE MANO
RIVER PROCESSES, THE GAMBIA SEEKS A DRAMATIC
BREAKTHROUGH. JAMMEH'S EFFORTS ARE DRIVEN MORE BY
HIS ITCH TO BE A STAR THAN HIS DESIRE TO BE A
STATESMAN. THEREFORE, HE SEEKS TO MAKE A BIG
SPLASH, GIVING SECONDARY CONSIDERATION TO WHETHER
HE IS JUMPING INTO SAFE WATERS OR A HOT CAULDRON.
EQUIPPED WITH NO REAL STRATEGY, JAMMEH'S EFFORTS
LIKELY WILL NOT ADVANCE PEACE IN THE CASAMANCE NOR
LIBERIA. UNFORTUNATELY, JAMMEH'S MEDDLING IN THE
MANO RIVER FISTICUFFS WILL LIKELY SERVE TAYLOR'S
AIMS. JAMMEH'S DIPLOMATIC EXPLOITS MAY CLOUD AND
WEAKEN ANY ECOWAS POLICY CONSENSUS REGARDING
SANCTIONS AGAINST LIBERIA. END COMMENT.


HALEY