NIGERIA'S ELECTORAL LAW CONTROVERSY CONTINUES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 003288

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/30/2011
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PINS NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA'S ELECTORAL LAW CONTROVERSY CONTINUES


REF: A. ABUJA 3228

B. ABUJA 3280


Classified by CDA Andrews. Reason: 1.5(d)



1. (C) Summary: President Obasanjo denies having added an
unpopular clause to the Election Law, asserting that some
legislators inserted the language after he had noted its
absence. A senior legislator privately conceded the point,
commenting that the legislators had grossly exceeded their
mandate. He thought Obasanjo would have to accept deletion
of the clause, but public comments suggest Nigeria's Head of
State is not yet there. If Obasanjo is conciliatory, it will
be good for Nigeria's nascent democracy. End Summary.



2. (U) Using his monthly radio program to respond to the
Nigerian Senate's rejection of the law intended to govern the
2003 electoral cycle (ref A),President Obasanjo said that he
had not inserted the unpopular Clause 80.1. This clause
requires any party other than the three registered now (PDP,
APP and AD) to prove itself at the local level before
contesting state and federal positions. As other parts of
the law extend the tenure of local governments from 2002
until 2003 and establish that local government elections will
be held after state and national contests, Clause 80.1 denies
any of the several new parties an opportunity to participate
in state or national elections before 2007. The clause drew
scathing public attacks from dozens of prominent Nigerians.
Even within the ruling PDP, there were many with strong
reservations. When it recently emerged (ref B) that Clause
80.1 had not featured in the version of the law passed by the
National Assembly and sent to the President for signature,
the pressure grew stronger.



3. (U) The Senate met in a special session on December 28
and took the position that Obasanjo had not acted on the bill
sent to him December 5. Since the 1999 Constitution gives
him 30 days to act, Senator Idris Abubakar pointed out during
debate, all the President need do is sign the bill that
originally came to him.



4. (U) Obasanjo December 29 publicly absolved himself of
having made a line-item amendment. He said that he had
simply called the attention of five members of the conference
committee to the omission from the bill of a clause endorsed
by the ruling PDP. The conferees had, Obasanjo continued,
asked him to send a letter stating his objections. They had
then adjourned to the home of Works and Housing Minister Tony
Anenih, Obasanjo said, adding, "What transpired there I would
not know." In the evening, the President concluded, the
legislators returned with a new version of the law. It
incorporated a requirement (Clause 80.1) that parties seeking
to contest state or national elections must first obtain ten
percent of the seats in local government councils (spread
across two-thirds of the states). Obasanjo noted that this
was a lower hurdle than the 15 percent threshold the PDP
caucus had agreed upon, but that he signed that second
version. Members of the House of Representatives December 30
argued that it was Senate President Anyim rather than Na'Abba
who had inserted the controversial clause.



5. (C) Comment: The President may conceivably have so
misunderstood constitutional requirements that he truly
thought a few members of the conference committee had the
authority to amend a bill after passage without submitting
the change for ratification. A senior legislator privately
confirmed December 29 that the President's account was
basically correct and said he could not understand how the
conference committee members had so grossly exceeded their
mandate. Whether it was Anyim or Na'Abba or some other
legislator who inserted Clause 80.1 matters little: Five
legislators and some Villa officials (perhaps including the
President) flouted Constitutional requirements to get the
result they wanted. The kindest conclusion one might draw is
that the legislators realized they had indeed forgotten to
include a passage that the party in control of both houses
wanted and rationalized the change as a technical fix that
would be broadly acceptable. The Nigerian public may be less
generous, however, since the redrafting took place at the
home of Anenih, notorious as a political fixer. Obasanjo has
long disliked Na'Abba and probably relished telling his
listeners that the House Speaker was among the legislators
who adjourned to Anenih's house.



6. (C) Comment Continued: If the President now recognizes
that the electoral law he signed is politically unviable and
accepts deletion of Clause 80.1, the controversy that has
bedeviled politics here for the past two weeks may prove
beneficial to Nigeria's nascent democracy. A clear object
lesson in the importance of proper democratic procedure will
have been delivered: It does not suffice for backroom
consensus to have been achieved; debate must take place in
public, and individual politicians must accept accountability
for their positions, not hide behind cloakroom consensus.
One of the most positive elements of the Senate's special
session was the Senators' decision to vote down a request for
executive session, thereby leaving their deliberations open
to journalists and cameras.

7. (C) Comment Continued: Obasanjo's remarks to reporters
about the Senate action ("Oh, they have rejected the Act.
That is their own prerogative. I am just hearing it now.
You are just telling me now.") are unfortunately reminiscent
of previous incidents of Executive-Legislative conflict where
the President continued to advocate his position despite
Constitutional questions. He has often prevailed, with other
participants in the political process left licking their
wounds. To paraphrase the senior legislator, Obasanjo is
essential to Nigerian democracy now because there is no other
person combining the (military) seniority to face down the
generals and the government experience (previously Head of
State) to crack the whip over unruly civilian politicians
when it occasionally becomes necessary. However, the senior
legislator added, Obasanjo's experience, seniority and
obduracy often make him too attentive to sycophants and lead
him to reject compromise, especially with people so junior to
him in years and experience.



8. (C) Comment Concluded: If Obasanjo is to complete the
democratic transition he began, he must gradually learn to
compromise with elected politicians. This electoral law
could be a test case. There is much at stake, but less than
many might claim. Assuming present trends continue for
another six to nine months, the PDP will dominate the 2003
election cycle. But Clause 80.1 would increase its dominance
by excluding energetic new challengers in some places where
the PDP ran strongly in 1999 but has since weakened. For
that very reason, the deletion of Clause 80.1 would be good
for the growth of democracy here, and correspondingly bad for
the interests of certain incumbents. Obasanjo will need to
balance his interest in satisfying them and his own innate
stubbornness against the imperatives of greater political
transparency, respect for process, and responsiveness to
public opinion.
Andrews