NIGERIA: DEMARCHE AND DISCUSSION WITH NIGERIAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABUJA 003093

SIPDIS


AF FOR PDAS BELLAMY AND FOR AF/S


E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/06/2006
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL ECON NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: DEMARCHE AND DISCUSSION WITH NIGERIAN
SPECIAL ENVOY TO ZIMBABWE, EARNEST SHONEKAN


REF: STATE 202946


Classified by Ambassador Howard F. Jeter. Reasons 1.5 (b) and
(d).



1. (C) Summary: During a December 1 meeting with recently
appointed Nigerian Special Envoy to Zimbabwe Earnest
Shonekan, Ambassador Jeter raised reftel talking points while
also leaving a nonpaper and a copy of the SADC Parliamentary
Forum election norms. Pleased to hear our views, Shonekan
said he would factor our points in his upcoming discussions
in Harare next week. He promised to consult with frequency
and to share information with us. Acknowledging the weight
of the task before him, Shonekan thought that his good
personal rapport with Mugabe would help. Shonekan stated
that his new role was not to supercede Nigeria's
participation in the CMAG but to complement the Commonwealth
effort with subtle private diplomacy. The former Head of
State commented that he would urge Mugabe to desist from
inflammatory rhetoric and move deliberately toward better
economic management and a level playing-field for elections.
Shonekan believed that Mugabe was guilty of playing to the
hard-liners but was not wedded
to these extremists. Concerted diplomatic pressure, backed
by incentives for good behavior, had a better chance of
persuading Mugabe than the threat of sanctions, according to
Shonekan. End Summary.


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Talking To Mugabe
--------------



2. (?) At an afternoon meeting at Chief Shonekan's
colonial-era compound in Lagos appropriately named Lugard
House, Ambassador Jeter delivered reftel talking points and
discussed the election guidelines developed by the SADC
Parliamentary Forum. Jeter stressed that the September Abuja
Agreement had raised hopes that Zimbabwe would steer clear of
irrational action and walk the path toward responsible land
reform and democratic elections. Instead, the trajectory of
events had been negative. Political intimidation and the
truncation of civil liberties had intensified to the extent
that credible elections were unattainable in the current
atmosphere. Without a change of course, the Government of
Zimbabwe risked further international opprobrium for
manufacturing defective elections when the conduct of decent
elections were within the GOZ, grasp but for the requisite
political will.



3. (C) The Ambassador continued that mal-governance was
harming the economy, now bogged down by the weight of a
ninety percent inflation rate and the understandable
skittishness of would-be investors. Moreover, Zimbabwe's
excursion into divisive, strong-arm politics and economic
brinkmanship mocked the tenets of the New Partnership of
African Development (NEPAD) launched by President Obasanjo in
October. Harare's misconduct presented a challenge to NEPAD
credibility. Obasanjo and other leaders must do all they can
to prevent an important nation like Zimbabwe from flouting
NEPAD and undermining the group almost at its very inception.
Mugabe, Jeter underscored, was in danger of rewriting his
historical legacy from being an architect of Zimbabwe's
independence to being responsible for mortgaging the
country's future to misguided short-term political
expediencies.



4. (C) The affable Shonekan thanked the Ambassador for
sharing USG views and committed to keeping the lines of
communication open to us. Shonekan observed his appointment
as Special Envoy was not to supplant Foreign Minister Lamido
or the Commonwealth process. His role was to complement that
process by serving as a conduit for private, personalized
diplomacy between Abuja and Harare.



5. (C) While acknowledging the difficult task before him,
Shonekan believed he stood in Mugabe's good books and that
their congenial relationship would reap benefits down the
road. Recounting his days as civilian interim Head of State
between the khaki-garbed Babangida and Abacha regimes,
Shonekan retold his side-bar conversations with Mugabe during
Commonwealth and OAU meetings. In those days, it was Mugabe
sidling up to Shonekan, giving avuncular prodding to
democratize Nigeria. In a twist of fate, Shonekan would now
reciprocate with Mugabe.



6. (C) Shonekan mentioned he had visited Harare a few weeks
ago to present a letter from President Obasanjo to Mugabe.
In fact, his audience with Mugabe was scheduled immediately
after the Zimbabwean leader's tense session with the EU
delegation. Shonekan, sensing that Mugabe was already
bilious after the EU encounter, decided to change tactics,
leaving "the stick" in the antechamber. Shonekan joked that
Mugabe looked surprisingly well despite the recent sparring
he had been doing. After a laugh that broke the residual
tension still in the President's office, Shonekan contended
they held a substantive discussion free of rancor and
histrionics.



7. (C) Mugabe took issue with only one aspect of the letter
he presented from President Obasanjo, Shonekan declared.
Mugabe complained that Obasanjo's letter stated that Zimbabwe
had not honored its Abuja commitments, when the missive also
should have faulted London for not honoring its obligations.
Despite Mugabe's parsing of the letter's text, Shonekan found
him attentive and reasonable. Mugabe did not seem wedded to
the hard-line posture he often assumed in public, Shonekan
said. Much of Mugabe's hectoring was for domestic political
consumption. Mugabe was playing to the hard-liners to shore
up his support. Unfortunately, Mugabe had succumbed to
rhetorical excess. One of the first things Shonekan said he
would propose to Obasanjo was for Obasanjo to personally urge
Mugabe to moderate his public statements and those of his
senior officials.


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Elections
--------------



8. (C) Shonekan said he would review the SADC Parliamentary
Forum electoral norms and standards. If Zimbabwe has signed
its name to these standards, Shonekan asserted, Mugabe cannot
now turn away from what he had endorsed previously. Showing
particular concern about Zimbabwe's aversion to election
observers, Shonekan opined that observers were necessary;
elections without observers would raise a negative
presumption against the credibility of the exercise. Based
on his November conversations with Mugabe, Shonekan felt
Mugabe would ultimately relent on the issue of international
observers but would steadfastly resist an EU observer team,
since he now considered Brussels his mortal enemy.


--------------
The Season For Land Reform
--------------



9. (C) Shonekan did not envy the UNDP delegation's job. In
Zimbabwe during the team's visit, he remembered that they
were being pushed and tugged by sundry and divergent forces.
The team cannot write a report that will please everyone,
said Shonekan. From his talks in Harare, he knew that the
report will be critical of the GOZ. The task will be to
draft a non-political, technical report that, although
pointing a finger at the GOZ, did not ostracize Mugabe and
kept the door open to cooperation. At that point, it would
be up to the diplomatic community to cajole Mugabe towards
doing the right thing on land reform, and keeping him from
using the report to line his wastebasket.



10. (C) Ambassador Jeter reminded Shonekan that Mugabe
recently had moved faster in the wrong direction by amending
the Land Acquisition Act to accelerate farm seizures, as if
he wanted to rush wholesale seizures, perhaps to present them
to the international community as a fait accompli. Shonekan
accepted that this misguided legislation would complicate
efforts to formulate a balanced reform program but said
Nigeria would try to influence Mugabe to return to his pledge
of cooperation with the international community on this
important issue.


-------------- --------------
A Little More Prodding From Its Neighbors
-------------- --------------



11. (C) Shonekan maintained that resolution of the land
reform was vital not only for Zimbabwe but for the precedent
it sets for South Africa. South Africa has a large political
stake in Zimbabwe, he noted. Because of the historic
affinity between ZANU-PF and the ANC and the volatility in
South Africa regarding land reform, Mbeki has been reticent
to exert pressure on Mugabe, according to Shonekan. However,
the time has come for Mbeki and other SADC leaders to
pressure Mugabe, Shonekan believed. Jeter concurred that a
unified chorus of neighbors might generate effective
political pressure that could not as easily be sidestepped by
an African leader as protestations from the West. The
Ambassador added that Nigeria might try to woo Namibia's
Nujoma to play an active and more positive role. Mugabe would
take notice if Nujoma, who at times has encouraged Mugabe's
antics, would now begin to counsel accommodation, Jeter
remarked.


--------------
Carrot, Stick, Or Both?
--------------



12. (C) Shonekan felt that "positive pressure" could be
most effective on Mugabe. Offering a roadmap of required
actions and parallel incentives (diplomatic and financial
reward) would have the best chance of getting Mugabe back
into the fold. Shonekan feared that the threat of sanctions
would be counter-productive at this point. He claimed
sanctions would only bolster GOZ hard-liners who are already
arguing that Mugabe should turn his back on Western nations
because they were engineering his ouster. A proposal that
highlights incentives would buoy moderates and help quiet the
hard-liners, Shonekan postulated. Ambassador Jeter mentioned
the proposed Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act on
the Hill contained a number of potential incentives but also
held out the suggestion of sanctions if Mugabe continued his
undemocratic conduct. Shonekan stated that the Democracy
Act seemed to strike the right balance; again, he stressed
that sanctions should not feature prominently at this moment
and shoul
d only be applied as a last resort. (Note: Shonekan asked
for a copy of the proposed Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic
Recovery Act, which we will provide on Shonekan's return to
Nigeria. End note.)



13. (C) A well respected businessman, Shonekan lamented
Zimbabwe's macroeconomic condition. Shaking his head after
Ambassador Jeter told him the inflation rate, Shonekan stated
that Zimbabwe used to export food but now needed humanitarian
aid to feed many of its people. Shonekan worried that
continued mal-governance and exacerbation of the political
crisis eventually could lead to a meltdown. It would be a
tragedy if Zimbabwe were to become a source of instability
and refugees in the SADC region, he declared. Ambassador
Jeter agreed that continued misrule could lead to political
and economic breakdown the tremors of which would be felt
throughout the region, particularly in South Africa. Not only
would its economy be hard hit by a Zimbabwean collapse, South
Africa would be asked to play host to thousands of refugees
who would see South Africa as their haven of first resort.


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Comment
--------------



14. (C) Preparing to fly to London that evening for
consultations with the British, Shonekan believed that
Nigeria, thanks to his good offices, can exert some pressure
on Mugabe. Whether that pressure will be sufficient to drown
out the hard-liners and give Mugabe the guidance needed to
walk out of the box in which he has placed himself is most
uncertain. However, Shonekan's selection seems like a wise
move on two scores. First, it increases GON bilateral
communication with Zimbabwe, making it much easier to sustain
diplomatic pressure than the periodic CMAG mechanism.
Second, that Shonekan may have a friendly relationship with
Mugabe, may make it easier for Shonekan to say some things
that would cause Mugabe to bristle if heard from another
source. Additionally, Shonekan likes working with the US. We
anticipate that he will remain true to his promise to consult
and share information with us. End comment.
Jeter