NIGERIA: PLAN FOR DEPLOYMENT TO BURUNDI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 003039

SIPDIS


DEPARTMENT FOR AF: PDAS BELLAMY, PAS PERRY; AF/W BOOTH,
AF/RA BITTRICK


E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/27/2011
TAGS: PREL MOPS MASS NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: PLAN FOR DEPLOYMENT TO BURUNDI


Classified by Ambassador Howard F. Jeter. Reasons 1.5 (b)
and (d).


1 (C) Summary: During a November 23 evening meeting with
Ambassador Jeter, Minister of State Lawal Batagarawa
reaffirmed that the GON remained committed to deploy troops
to Burundi to assist the implementation of the transitional
arrangement between the Buyoya government and moderate Hutu
politicians. Batagarawa admitted that the work-out brokered
by President Mandela was frail, but worth trying. Mandela,
according to Batagarawa, had not only arm-twisted Buyoya and
the Hutu politicians to work with each other, but also
cajoled Obasanjo to deploy troops into what could potentially
be harm's way. End Summary.



2. (C) Batagarawa stated that the third Operation Focus
Relief (OFR)battalion had been tentatively ear-marked to
deploy to Burundi, satisfying Obasanjo's commitment to
Mandela. (We have subsequently learned that a non-OFR
battalion has now been selected.) The Minister of State
believed the Nigerian mission would be tripartite. Pursuant
to the Mandela-brokered agreement Buyoya would be the
transitional President for 18 months with a Hutu Vice
President; after that period, the offices would rotate for an
equal duration, with the Hutus gaining the Presidency and
the Tutsi taking the second chair. Given the extremist Hutu
and Tutsi opposition to the transitional compromise,
participating Hutu politicians, many of whom are exiles,
required security protection once in Burundi. This
protective detail would be the first element of Nigeria's
peace mission. The South African's contingent, which was
already deployed, was focusing heavily on this aspect of the
mission.



3. (C) As part of the transitional agreement, Burundi's army
would be reconfigured to achieve equal proportions of Hutu
and Tutsi throughout the ranks. Given the Tutsi's numerical
inferiority, Batagarawa termed this a "good deal" for the
Tutsi. If the Army's composition were to parallel the ethnic
distribution in Burundi's general population, the Hutu's
would predominate and eventually overrun the Tutsi, he
suggested. Thus, the second part of the mission would be
restructuring and training the new, ethnically balanced army.



4. (C) Traditional peacekeeping would be the third element
of the mission, according to Batagarawa. With the army being
drawn to the barracks for the restructuring, there will be a
security vacuum throughout the country. As the Nigerian,
South African and other troops deploy to different areas of
the country, security would devolve to them, he predicted.
Acknowledging the upsurge in fighting that followed the
November 1 inauguration of the transition, Batagarawa hoped
that events on the ground would not force a change from a
traditional peacekeeping presence to a more robust
peacemaking posture.



5. (C) Given Burundi's difficult political terrain and the
nature of the tasks assigned to the force, Batagarawa could
not estimate how long the deployment would last. The figure
of six months had been bandied about, but the Minister of
State dismissed that as diplomatic slight-of-hand, a figure
used to dampen opposition to the deployment and to engender
confidence by promoting the idea that peace is on the fast
track. However, Batagarawa argued, the job of restructuring
the army would be impossible to accomplish within that time
period.



6. (C) Batagarawa went on to state that the EU and Belgians
have promised to help fund the deployment of the African
contingents to Burundi. The Dutch had also expressed an
interest in supporting Burundi peace deployments, he
believed. Batagarawa said that while Nigeria had not asked
for any financial assistance to help fund its deployment, he
was sure Ghana and Senegal, the other two participating
states, would require and ask for financial and other help
before deploying troops.



7. (C) While Batagarawa did not seek funding for this
specific mission, he mentioned that Nigeria needed financial
relief to continue active participation in multiple
peacekeeping operations. Batagarawa raised the idea that
donor nations provide Nigeria debt relief in proportion to
Nigeria's outlays for peacekeeping. He said that Nigeria, in
participating in these far-flung operations, not only helped
to stabilize Africa, but was "doing the dirty work" that no
Western country wanted to do. While these efforts were in
Nigeria's interest as well, he felt the West should give
Nigeria credit for its peacekeeping endeavors. By receiving
debt relief, the GON could silence critics of Obasanjo's
foreign policy by showing that Nigeria's strategic
cooperation with the west, particularly the U.S., has
produced practical dividends.


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Comment
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8. (C) According to Batagarawa, the Burundi deployment is
imminent. While cognizant of the logistical and other
challenges of such a distant deployment in a harsh, unknown
environment, the Nigerians seem committed to fulfilling the
President's pledge to Mandela. This deployment is not only a
manifestation of Obasanjo's personalized diplomacy but, with
some prodding by Mandela also of his foreign policy vision of
Nigeria as a leading player in advancing continental
stability.
Jeter