Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
01ABUJA2986
2001-11-27 05:29:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Abuja
Cable title:  

NIGERIA: ARMY MINISTER DISCUSSES PKO PLANS, UNAMSIL, BENUE

Tags:  PGOV MOPS PINS SL BU NI 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 002986 

SIPDIS


DEPARTMENT FOR AF:PDAS BELLAMY AND DAS PERRY; AF/W AND AF/RA
NSC FOR MCLEAN


E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/26/2011
TAGS: PGOV MOPS PINS SL BU NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: ARMY MINISTER DISCUSSES PKO PLANS,
UNAMSIL, BENUE

REF: A. ABUJA 2653

B. STATE 197866


(U) Classified by Ambassador Howard F. Jeter; Reasons 1.5
(a/b/d).


C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 002986

SIPDIS


DEPARTMENT FOR AF:PDAS BELLAMY AND DAS PERRY; AF/W AND AF/RA
NSC FOR MCLEAN


E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/26/2011
TAGS: PGOV MOPS PINS SL BU NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: ARMY MINISTER DISCUSSES PKO PLANS,
UNAMSIL, BENUE

REF: A. ABUJA 2653

B. STATE 197866


(U) Classified by Ambassador Howard F. Jeter; Reasons 1.5
(a/b/d).



1. (C) SUMMARY: During a November 22 meeting with PolCouns
and PolmilOff, Army Minister Batagarawa confirmed that
Nigeria was planning to send an OFR Phase III battalion to
Burundi. He also reported that Ghana probably would seek
U.S. equipment support for its Burundi-bound battalion.
Batagarawa was uncertain of the quality of UN support for
Nigeria's UNAMSIL contingents, but said he would find out.
The Minister also asked for details on the support that PAE
has been giving. Finally, Batagarawa impugned Jukun militia
for the violence against civilians in Benue, but said the GON
would not speak publicly on the matter for fear of provoking
further violence in Benue. END SUMMARY.



2. (C) PKO PLANS: Batagarawa said that since only two NIBATTS
could go to Sierra Leone in December/January, the Ministry of
Defense was considering sending the third OFR-trained
battalion to Burundi. Responding to a suggestion that the
third Nigerian OFR battalion could go to Sierra Leone in
April and a different battalion to Burundi, he said he did
not want to rotate a battalion from Sierra Leone to Burundi
without that battalion having time back in Nigeria.
Batagarawa said the GON planned to deploy a battalion to
Burundi as soon as possible, since they had committed to send
one before November 1. (COMMENT: This is contrary to MOD
Danjuma's earlier statement to Ambassador Jeter that Nigeria
would be one of the last to deploy, since Burundi is out of
Nigeria's theater of operation and that South Africa should
be the first to put troops on the ground (Ref A). END
COMMENT.)



3. (C) Batagarawa confirmed that Ghana and Senegal were also
planning to participate in the Burundi operation. However,
Ghana was concerned about equipment for its unit, and would
likely seek an equipment package from the USG, similar to
that provided through OFR.



4. (C) UNAMSIL SUPPORT: In response to our query about the
quality of UN support to the Nigerian troops in Sierra Leone,
Batagarawa could not answer definitively, because he had
heard nothing from his commanders on this issue. He asked
for a list of the services PAE had been providing, and a copy
of the UN/PAE Agreement. Batagarawa then said that he would
do an assessment of whether the Nigerian battalions
logistical needs were being met. Meanwhile, he said that he
would seek information from within his Ministry.



5. (C) 505 & MOI: The Army Minister, surprised the OFR
Memorandum of Intent and 505 had not been completed, tried to
get the MOD Legal Director on the phone. She was
unavailable, but he said he would speak with her and provide
PolMilOff an answer as soon as he could.



6. (C) BENUE: PolCouns asked Batagarawa what had happened in
Benue and what the next steps might be, stressing the
importance of a transparent investigation of the killing of
the 19 soldiers and the subsequent alleged killing of
villagers by the military. Batagarawa implied that the
reprisal violence against civilians was carried out by Jukun
militia and not by the Nigerian military; nevertheless, the
government had to proceed cautiously in its investigations
because it did not want to do anything that might spark
further violence. For example, any public statement by the
GON that the military was not responsible might cause
reprisals by the Tiv against the Jukun.



7. (C) COMMENT: From the GON perspective, it is not
unreasonable to send an OFR battalion to Burundi. The
Nigerian military is spread thin on external and internal
missions, and the third OFR battalion is an already-formed
and readied resource. Juxtaposed with UNAMSIL reaching its
troop ceiling, the GON is seeking ways to meet all of its
peacekeeping commitments. However, OFR was established to
support ECOWAS participation in UNAMSIL, and the planned
deployment to Burundi would take one of the seven OFR
battalions far afield. That deployment, however, would still
seem to meet a core U.S. objective of encouraging African-led
peacekeeping operations.



8. (C) COMMENT CONTINUED: Batagarawa's comments on Benue were
intriguing. The Army Minister was sincere in his declaration
that the military was not responsible for the recent reprisal
violence in that state. However, his declaration is contrary
to what we have heard from other reliable sources.
Batagarawa's remarks indicate, however, that the GON likely
will move slowly with its investigations and that concern now
is that the investigation not have the unintended consequence
of fomenting more violence in the still volatile Benue
environment. END COMMENT.
Jeter