NIGERIA: FORMER FOREIGN MINISTER KINGIBE SEES A

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABUJA 002974

SIPDIS


NSC FOR FRAZIER


E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/23/2006
TAGS: PREL MOPS PGOV CG RW UG NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: FORMER FOREIGN MINISTER KINGIBE SEES A
CRITICAL PERIOD IN THE CONGOLESE PEACE PROCESS



1. (C) Summary: During a November 4 encounter, former
Foreign Minister and informal peace process advisor Baba Gana
Kingibe told Polcouns that last month's Inter-Congolese
Dialogue (ICD) derailed primarily because of Kabila
government duplicity. The next ICD would not take place
until January. Kingibe worried that, during the interregnum,
the Congolese rivals would spend too much time flexing their
muscles and seeking military advantage. Kingibe claimed
Kagame and Museveni were malefactors in this process,
contributing not only to the martial air in the Congo, but
inching closer to an imprudent collision themselves. Kingibe
believed it incumbent on Nigeria, the U.S. and other nations
to pressure Kabila, the major faction leaders, Kagame and
Museveni to focus attention on the issues of peace instead of
grasping for balance of power advantages on the ground. End
Summary.


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Inter-Congolese Dialogue - A Stalling Game
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2. (C) The October Inter-Congolese Dialogue in Addis was
handicapped by several factors, Kingibe noted. Lack of
funding was a problem. Western donors pledged money but
actual funding was late or did not come at all. This
short-fall inhibited the ability to pay for the travel and
lodging of all participants; because of the funding gap, the
conference got off to a bad start and could never regain
momentum. African mediators, nonetheless, pushed the
conference forward, fearing that delay would send the wrong
signal to the international community and undermine donor
confidence in the peace process. Kingibe also felt that
Masire had not done sufficient preparatory work with the
major Congolese participants to make sure the conference
would yield results.



3. (C) Despite these problems, the conference might have
succeeded but for Kabila government duplicity. During
earlier stages of conference planning, Kinshasa wanted a
truncated ICD, gathering only the major faction leaders and a
few prominent representatives from civil society. At the
eleventh hour, however, Kabila's people did an abrupt
volte-face. The DROC security chief, who headed the
delegation, insisted that the Addis session only deal with
procedural or technical issues since all Congolese groups,
large and small, were not present. The Kabila team argued
that substantive discussions would be futile during an
abbreviated session, since the participants would have to
rehash the same issues once a more inclusive ICD took place.



4. (C) By the time more participants arrived, the Kabila
team simply began to stonewall, according to Kingibe. Their
change on the conference make-up was a willful dilatory
tactic. Kinshasa had asked them to stall because it was
expecting a large shipment of military equipment (helicopters
from France and weapons from China.) Kabila planned to arm
the Mai Mai "to the teeth" and dangle the promise of weapons
in front of factional warlord Mbusa, Kingibe stated. Once
the team in Addis received word the equipment had arrived,
they closed their briefcases and essentially deep-sixed the
ICD. The Kabila team believed the new arms would shift the
power balance, opening the door for them to win by force
concessions they could not then obtain at the negotiating
table.


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The Game of Shifting Alliances
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5. (C) Kingibe rued the unsatisfactory ending of the ICD.
While some talked of holding the next session in November,
Masire told him that time was required to pick up the pieces.
Masire did not contemplate another meeting until January,
particularly since that session had to be universal in
attendance. While the Facilitator would be slogging through
the tedium of conference planning, the Congolese factions
would be counting their weapons and looking to acquire more
real estate to exchange for more favorable political
concessions later, Kingibe predicted.



6. (C) While all the parties agreed that Kabila could remain
as a caretaker President, they also wanted to maximize their
positions in the interim government and, thus, situate
themselves for subsequent elections. Waxing philosophical,
Kingibe said that "Where you are in the afternoon, and how
fast you travel, will dictate where you rest in the evening.
Ultimately, all the faction leaders wanted to rest in the
biggest bed in the Presidential palace." Kingibe lamented
that the power-oriented focus of the Congolese leaders might
far outweigh Masire's ability to push the peace process by
himself.



7. (C) Adding Nigeria's confirmation to what we have
learned, Kingibe stated that Kabila and Museveni had struck
a deal, rendering Kagame the odd-man-out. The deal was good
for Kabila because it lessened the heat from Kampala. As a
by-product of the deal and of recent arms shipments, Kabila
resupplied the Mai Mai. Kabila and Museveni were also
enticing Mbusa. Meanwhile, Kagame has not been sitting idle
himself. He has brought Bemba's MLC and Onusumba's RDC-G
closer to him. He too is courting Mbusa, who, according to
Kingbe, is relishing his "nonaligned" role and concomitant
ability to pit both sides in a bidding war for his hand in a
marriage of convenience.


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Meddling Neighbors
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8. (C) Kingibe chastised Kagame and, to a greater extent,
Museveni for the irksome role they are playing in the Congo.
Kingibe thought Kagame's intervention was more understandable
than Museveni's, given the presence of the FAR and
Interahamwe and the tragedy that was Rwanda a few years ago.
Museveni, on the other hand, had let the scope of his
ambition exceed his sense of proportion and Uganda's national
interests. Moreover, several Ugandan generals were profiting
from illicit trafficking in Eastern Congo. These mercantile
officers encouraged Museveni's over-extension in the Congo to
perpetuate their enrichment, Kingibe offered. On a lesser
level, Zimbabwe still remained engaged despite its internal
woes. Kabila's Justice Minister, Kingibe pointed out, was
close to several Zimbabwean leaders, including Mugabe.
Because these Zimbabweans were making money in the Congo,
they would come to the aid of Kabila, politically and even
militarily, to the extent they could. Kingibe dismissed
Angola as progressi
vely disinterested and dwindling in importance.


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Raising the Problem of Peace
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9. (C) Kingibe believed that preventing major slippage in
the peace process during the IDC hiatus would require skilled
diplomacy. While not costing much materially, nations
claiming to support the Congolese peace process must
demonstrate political will at this time. Given the major
actors' proclivity for military diversions, he contended a
sustained diplomatic effort was needed to keep the issues of
peace on the front burner and to prevent the Congolese actors
from tinkering too heavily with the balance of power on the
ground. Every hour you force them to discuss peace is one
less hour they can play at war, Kingibe declared. Kingibe's
strategy included:


-- Pressuring Kagame and Museveni to play more positive roles
and not use the Congo as a proxy for bilateral power plays.
They must discourage the armed groups within their spheres of
influence from an escalation of hostilities.


-- Urging Masire to travel the region to discuss with all key
players the issues for the next ICD and solicit their views.


-- Encourage the Zambian government to hold a senior-level
conference in December to review progress on implementing the
Lusaka Accord.


Kingibe thought these efforts would help moderate the players
while filling in time until the ICP could resume. Kingibe
also felt the USG could best use its diplomatic weight to
encourage Museveni and Kagame to behave better. For its
part, Nigeria was arranging a meeting in Abuja of the Kabila,
Bemba, Onusumba trio as soon as their travel schedules
coincide.


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Comment
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10. (C) Kingibe confirmed, from the Nigerian perspective,
much of what we already knew. It is helpful to know that
Abuja views events in the Congo much the same as we do.
Kingbe's assessment that the ICD hiatus might invite a period
of heightened adventurism bears attention. Some diplomatic
pressure at this juncture may be worthwhile to prevent a
slide in the peace process. End comment.
Jeter