Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
01ABUJA2787
2001-11-01 04:48:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Abuja
Cable title:  

NIGERIA: THE LATEST IN THE IMF SAGA

Tags:  EFIN ECON PREL NI 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L ABUJA 002787 

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/31/2011
TAGS: EFIN ECON PREL NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: THE LATEST IN THE IMF SAGA


REF: ABUJA 2301


C O N F I D E N T I A L ABUJA 002787

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/31/2011
TAGS: EFIN ECON PREL NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: THE LATEST IN THE IMF SAGA


REF: ABUJA 2301



1. Classified by Charge d'Affairs Timothy D. Andrews for
Reasons 1.5 (b) and (d).



2. (C) EconOff spoke October 31 to Ernest Ebi, Deputy
Governor for International Operations at the Central Bank, to
discuss the IMF program. Ebi confirmed that the IMF had
decided not to extend the SBA and that a new IMF team would
arrive October 31 to begin discussions on a monitoring
program. On October 26, the IMF had dispatched Messrs.
Goodall Gondwe and Hiroyuki Hino to convey this message to
President Obasanjo.



3. (C) According to British colleagues in Abuja, President
Obasanjo agreed to discuss the details of putting in place a
monitoring program, similar to (but not called) a Staff
Monitored Program (SMP). A monitoring program would only
require approval by the IMF Managing Director, not the Board.
While it does not have the Board sanction it would carry
with it the financial discipline of an SBA.



4. (C) With a monitoring program in place, the IMF would then
look to develop either a new one-year SBA or possibly a
3-year Poverty Reduction and Growth facility program (PRGF).
A PGRF is a concessional facility with 0.5 interest rate,
with repayment of 10 years and grace period of 5.6 years.
The key to developing a PGRF is for the GON to produce an
IMF-approved Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PSRP).



5. (C) However, a PRGF would require significantly more time
to develop than a SBA. Moreover, with the 2003 elections
approaching, success over a 3-year period may be difficult to
achieve and early success difficult to ascertain. A new
one-year SBA may be the best way to proceed as it could be
put in place more quickly and is easier to monitor.
Undoubtedly, the GON will push for a medium-term facility,
such as the PRGF, that might allow the GON to initiate
discussions on debt forgiveness with the Paris Club.



6. (C) Without a SBA, the Paris Club is in uncharted
territory. A monitoring program does not necessarily provide
the assurances on reform sought by the Paris Club
governments. Consequently, the Paris Club may need to
reexamine the criteria for negotiating debt rescheduling
agreements. If negotiations are halted, Nigeria will face
accelerated debt service payments in 2002.


--------------
Background
--------------



7. (C) In the August 2001 review of Standby Arrangement (SBA)
the Fund found that serious macroeconomic imbalances had
emerged in Nigeria over the last year. Inflation has
accelerated to double-digit levels since August of 2000
(19.7% in July 2001),and instability has prevailed in the
foreign exchange market with the premium in the parallel
market rising to 19%. An index of the purchasing power of
the Naira (a rough indicator of changes in competitiveness)
has fallen to new lows as inflation has increased and the
IFEM has remained static. In September, the IMF had declared
talks on the SBA to be inconclusive (reftel). A high
ranking GON delegation visited the IMF in Washington in
September and convinced the Fund not to abandon the program
entirely. The GON also wanted the SBA continued until at
least December; that now will not happen. The SBA expires
today (October 31).
Andrews