Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
01ABUJA2759
2001-10-29 14:42:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Abuja
Cable title:  

NIGERIA: SPECIAL ADVISOR BUGAJE HOLDS HIGH

Tags:  PREL PGOV SU XA NI IGAD 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 002759 

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/25/2006
TAGS: PREL PGOV SU XA NI IGAD
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: SPECIAL ADVISOR BUGAJE HOLDS HIGH
EXPECTAQTIONS FOR THE PLANNED ABUJA CONFERENCE


REF: A. NAIROBI 6602

B. CAIRO 6777


Classified by Ambassador Howard F. Jeter. Reasons 1.5 (b)
and (d)


C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 002759

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/25/2006
TAGS: PREL PGOV SU XA NI IGAD
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: SPECIAL ADVISOR BUGAJE HOLDS HIGH
EXPECTAQTIONS FOR THE PLANNED ABUJA CONFERENCE


REF: A. NAIROBI 6602

B. CAIRO 6777


Classified by Ambassador Howard F. Jeter. Reasons 1.5 (b)
and (d)



1. (C) Summary: During a brief October 22 meeting,
Presidential Special Advisor Usman Bugaje said the November
12-17 conference on Sudan was on track. He described the
"3-in-1" conference where the Southern and Northern groups
would first meet separately, then join in an all parties
session. He contended the Nigerians were not pushing a
substantive agenda except that they opposed Southern
secession. Abuja sought only to provide a forum where the
Sudanese could find their own way, he stated. This
procedural-substantive dichotomy may work in the abstract but
in practice the line is blurred. The composition of invitees
will influence the substantive agenda. While the smaller
parties and factions may welcome this wider tent, the
perennial antagonists - Bashir and Garang -- might experience
a rare moment of agreement. Both probably will not relish
sharing space around a negotiating table they now monopolize.
Despite these potential sticking points, we should encourage
the Nigerians in their effort. However, gauging the
emanations from Cairo and Nairobi, Bugaje may be
underestimating the difficulties inherent in the Nigerian
approach. End summary.



2. (C) During an October 23 meeting with PolCouns and
Poloff, Dr. Usman Bugaje stated the November 12-17 conference
was on track. Bugaje, Abuja's point man on Sudan, said he
was traveling to London that very evening. In London he
would meet with non-SPLA Southern opposition members October
23 in addition to seeing the Snyder/Oakley team October 24.
Bugaje, optimistic that Nigeria could push the Sudanese
process forward, outlined Abuja's "3-in-1" conference
scenario.



3. (C) Bugaje's formulation differed from what NSA Mohammed
told us most recently. Bugaje envisioned a meeting of all
Southern opposition groups, a separate session of all
Northern parties (including the government's party) and a
third meeting of all who participated in the first two
confabulations. (Conversely, Mohammed told us the second

meeting would convene all the opposition groups. We do not
know if Mohammed misspoke or if there is a disconnect among
the Nigerians.)



4. (C) Stressing that this formula was promising because it
promoted inclusivity, Bugaje characterized both the IGAD
process and Egyptian-Libyan Initiative (ELI) as inert. IGAD
had languished for nearly eight years with a controversial
document - the Declaration of Principles -- as its only noted
accomplishment, he declared. Additionally he cited IGAD as
structurally flawed because it only involved the SPLM and the
Bashir Government. Bugaje contended other Southern armed
groups also controlled territory. Although Garang's faction
was the largest, marginalizing the other groups would prove
inimical. They ultimately would be disruptive in order to
force a place at the table. Bugaje also explained that
Southern political party leaders have threatened to take up
arms unless they were included in the process. Overall,
other Southern groupings were tired of Garang's delaying
tactics. Garang was footdragging because he was more
comfortable with the status quo than with the political
uncertainty that progress toward peace might sow.



5. (C) Bugaje characterized the ELI as stillborn, claiming
the partnership between Cairo and Tripoli could not advance
the peace process because the Cairo-Tripoli bilateral
relationship was marked more by contention than concord.



6. (C) The Nigerian Special Advisor predicted that the
Nigerian approach could cure the faults of the two other
initiatives. By inviting all credible Sudanese parties,
including the Southern political organizations, the Nigerian
approach minimized the chance of minor parties uniting to
roll a boulder in the road because they were excluded from
peace talks. Second, the Abuja conference would not impose a
solution; it simply provided a conducive venue. Nigeria
neither endorsed nor opposed the substantive agendas of the
two other initiatives, he offered. Abuja will let the
Sudanese decide; they can adhere to the DOP, the ELI formula
or choose a third stream, asserted Bugaje. Nigeria's only
anathema was partition. Given its own history of destructive
civil war, Nigeria would not "preside" over the dismantling
of another state, Bugaje stressed. (Comment: While Bugaje 's
statement was retrospective, we cannot but feel that
Nigeria's current ethno-religious maelstrom figures in
Abuja's squeamishness about secession as well. End comment.)



7. (C) When asked whether Garang, whose personality houses
vast deposits of megalomania, accepted such a conference
arrangement that would seem to dilute his negotiating
position in the South and within the NDA. Bugaje, contended
that "sufficient pressure" was being placed on Garang to make
him amenable. However, Bugaje admitted that Nigeria must
delicately calibrate the numerical representation of the
other Southern parties to prevent them from acquiring a voice
exceeding their power and importance on the ground.



8. (C) Bugaje was also certain that Bashir would send high
level negotiators and that Northern elements of the NDA would
be well represented. When asked about the logic of an
all-northern meeting, Bugaje was momentarily nonplused. He
then declared that the conferences were geographically
structured to reflect political realities. Despite their
differences, the Northerners share a greater commonality of
interests notwithstanding the North/South makeup of the NDA.



9. (C) Comment: Bugaje tried to outline a simple
straightforward approach. His presentation was typical of
the Nigerian stratagem toward conflict resolution -- put the
parties in a room and let them hash it out; intervening only
to prevent a stalemate. Nigeria's intrinsic importance and
Obasanjo's personal stature suggest Nigerian efforts to
gather the parties could possibly energize the peace process.
Because of these attributes, we should encourage the
Nigerians toward a constructive role. However as the
preparations for the conference unfold, we must watch closely
that the formulation does not have the unintended
consequences of compounding Garang's recalcitrance and
escalating the North-South divide, testing the stability of
the NDA in the process.
Andrews