NIGERIA: NSA MOHAMMED EAGER ABOUT SUDAN, PERPLEXED

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 002687

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/18/2006
TAGS: PREL PGOV SU CG XA NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: NSA MOHAMMED EAGER ABOUT SUDAN, PERPLEXED
BY DROC


REF: ABUJA 2562


Classified by Ambassador Howard F. Jeter. Reasons 1.5 (b) and
(d)



1. (C) Summary: During an October 16 meeting with Ambassador
Jeter, NSA Aliyu Mohammed stated that Nigeria, actively
engaged on Sudan, would host a "3-in-1" conference ultimately
bringing together the Southern factions, Northern opposition
and Bashir Government negotiators around one conference
table. Mentioning the USG would be invited to observe the
November 12-17 meetings, Mohammed suggested Special Envoy
Danforth visit Nigeria before going to Sudan. While animated
about Sudan, the NSA merely shook his head about DROC,
describing it as a thicket of internal and regional intrigue
from which Nigeria might disengage unless the parties
demonstrated more seriousness in their negotiations. End
summary.



2. (C) Visibly pleased with his country's efforts, Mohammed
declared that Nigeria had progressed far on the Sudan. Dr.
S.G. Bugaje, the President's Special Envoy on Sudan, had just
returned from talks in Cairo and London with various
opposition groups, Mohammed informed us, calling this the
last leg in Nigeria's plan to consult the various Sudan
players. Now, he asserted, Nigeria had the green light to
convene the "3-in-1" conference. The format would be an
initial meeting of Southern factions, then a second meeting
of the National Democratic Alliance would ensue. Afterwards,
the opposition (North and South) would meet Government
negotiators in the third conference. (Comment. Apparently,
the Nigerians have refined their thinking about the
composition of the second meeting. In reftel, Mohammed said
the second stage would be for the Northern opposition. This
time he stated it would be for the entire opposition. End
comment.)



3. (C) The NSA continued that President Obasanjo had drafted
a letter to President Bush asking for an official USG
observer presence at the talks. Mohammed added that IGAD
states, Egypt and Libya would receive similar letters.
Former President Carter, having expressed interest in Sudan
to his old friend Obasanjo, might also attend the conference.



4. (C) Ambassador Jeter, joined by PolCouns, asked Mohammed
if he could visit London October 24 for more detailed
consultations with the DAS Snyder/Bob Oakley team traveling
to East Africa for preliminary discussions that will pave the
way for Senator Danforth's November trip to Sudan. Grappling
momentarily with his schedule, Mohammed offered that Dr.
Bugaje would fly to London if he, Mohammed, could not break
free. The NSA then suggested that, once ready to visit
Africa, Special Envoy Danforth should consult in Abuja with
President Obasanjo prior to setting down in Khartoum. After
raising two possible time frames for a Danforth visit to
Abuja, November 11-12 (before Sudan) or November 17-18 (after
Sudan) Jeter and Mohammed decided a third alternative was
worth exploring - a November - 2 or 3 meeting in Washington
during President Obasanjo's working visit. (During a brief
October 18 meeting, President Obasanjo invited Dansforth to
come November 17-18 after being informed by Ambassador Jeter
that Danforth would not be in Washington November 2.)


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A HARD DROC
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5. (C) As discussion moved to DROC, Mohammed's face dimmed.
Opposition leaders Bemba and Onusumba, meeting President
Obasanjo last Friday, forecasted the Addis talks would yield
nothing significant. With 300 participants, the Addis forum
was too unwieldy for the intricate, detailed discussions
needed for a break-through, the opposition duo grumbled. A
senior Libya official Mohammed met in Paris provided the same
gloomy forecast that now seemed unfortunately accurate,
Mohammed said.



6. (C) The NSA commented that in Brussels, the Belgians were
also pessimistic. The Belgian Director of Military
Intelligence told Mohammed that Nigeria's
reconciliation/power-sharing ideas would not work, in part,
because the opposition and the Kinshasa government had both
overestimated their strengths. Bemba and Onusumba boast they
control 60 percent of the land between them while Kabila
trumpets that 70 percent of the population live under his
control. Each thinks he holds the trump card. While Kagame
and Museveni continue to suborn Bemba and Onusumba, Dos
Santos and Mugabe lend their support to Kinshasa. Mohammed
postulated that too many of DROC's neighbors derived
geo-political and economic benefit from the country remaining
the sick man of central Africa. Some neighbors were wary of
seeing a united DROC that might dwarf them. More troubling,
Kabila's once encouraging pace towards reform and
reconciliation had assumed a slower gait and might be in
danger of changing direction altogether, Mohammed lamented.



7. (C) Mohammed confided that Nigeria had found the DROC
peace process more multi-layered and complicated than
expected. Unless the parties started to negotiate seriously,
Nigeria might disengage altogether.


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WADE'S TERRORISM CONFERENCE
--------------



8. (C) The NSA mentioned Obasanjo was in Dakar for President
Wade's anti-terrorism conference. Mohammed characterized
Wade's conference as a good idea undermined by poor
implementation. Obasanjo went to Dakar to correct Wade's
procedural gaffes. Explaining further, Mohammed stated that
Wade erred by calling a Heads-of-State meeting first. The
correct sequence should have been an experts' session,
followed by a Ministerial, culminating in a Presidential
summit. Second, Wade stumbled into a minor firestorm by
inviting Morocco to a conference, which should have been
convoked under the aegis of the Africa Union (AU). Morocco
was not an AU member and those African states that support
Polisario say they would likely boycott the Wade session
because of the Moroccan invitation, Mohammed claimed.


-------------- -
DOMESTIC UNREST - A TALE OF CITIES - JOS/KANO
-------------- -



9. (C) Turning to matters closer to home, Mohammed stated
that he had just met a group of concerned citizens from Jos.
The group contended that the board of inquiry constituted to
investigate the recent violence in Jos was ethnically-biased.
After a long discussion, he believed the concerns of the
delegation were assuaged and that these prominent citizens
would now help, rather than hinder, the board's deliberation.



10. (C) Dismissing the violence in Kano as the work of
street youth and quasi-gangs, Mohammed breathed a sigh of
comparative relief, saying Kano was not nearly one-tenth as
bad as Jos. He estimated that less than 100 people were
killed in Kano, but admitted the GON estimate of 20 deaths
was an understatement.


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COMMENT
--------------



11. (C) NSA Mohammed appeared optimistic that Nigeria will
be able to push the Sudanese process along. We hope so.
However, he is quickly becoming disillusioned with the
process in the DROC. Now that it has become time to talk in
earnest about the substantive issues leading to peace, the
Congolese parties seem to be steering towards their
recalcitrant worst. We suspect that Mohammed may get a
similar jolt from the Sudanese in the near future. Right
now, progress may seem relatively easy as the Sudanese
parties probably see Abuja as another opportunity to forum
shop and while talks are basically focused on procedural
matters. However, when the thorny substantial issues hit the
table, Mohammed will likely find the Sudanese every bit as
stubborn as the contenders in the Congo.
Jeter