TFUS01: NIGERIA: EU TROIKA'S CALL ON THE

C O N F I D E N T I A L ABUJA 002686

SIPDIS


DEPT FOR DS/OP/AF AND DS/DSS/ITA


E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/19/2011
TAGS: PREL OFDP ASEC EU NI
SUBJECT: TFUS01: NIGERIA: EU TROIKA'S CALL ON THE
AMBASSADOR RE: SECURITY

Classified by Ambassador Howard F. Jeter; Reasons 1.5 (b),
(d),(g).



1. (C) On October 16, the EU Troika (the Belgian and Spanish
Ambassadors, and Head of the European Commission Delegation),
called on Ambassador Jeter to discuss ongoing events in
Nigeria in light of September 11 and the coalition response
in Afghanistan.



2. (C) Belgian Ambassador Jozef Smets, currently representing
the EU Presidency, informed the Ambassador that the Troika
had reached out to Muslim leaders, most recently the Chairman
of the Assembly of Muslims of Nigeria. They found the
Assembly Chairman to be moderate and reasonable, but very
interested in evidence against Bin Laden and Al Qaeda.
Unfortunately, a "smoking gun" was unavailable. Ambassador
Jeter recalled his similar experience with the Chief Imam of
the National Mosque in Abuja (septel). In addition to
seeking evidence, many interlocutors had the Middle East
peace process in the back of their minds, the Ambassador
continued. The Emir of Ilorin, on the other hand, had been
nothing but supportive (septel). The Troika and Ambassador
agreed on the need to get the message out to more moderate
Muslim leaders in Nigeria. (COMMENT: Embassy is developing a
list of 20 or so key Muslim leaders for this effort, and will
share information with EU colleagues, as appropriate. END
COMMENT.)



3. (C) Smets raised the possibility of periodic inter-Mission
meeting between senior personnel to manage issues related to
ongoing events, particularly to discuss evacuation scenarios
and security. Ambassador Jeter responded that his DCM had
met with counterparts from the British, Canadian, Dutch and
German Missions, and a group of RSOs also had started
meeting. This could be expanded to include other EU Missions
following consultations within this core group.



4. (C) GON support for the safety of diplomats and diplomatic
facilities appeared strong, Jeter stated. The will was
there, although one had to be realistic about GON
capabilities. If a domestic conflict spread to multiple
areas in the country, the GON's ability to respond could be
quickly eroded. However, after the riots in Kaduna and the
resulting attacks on Hausas in the East, the GON appeared
better prepared.



5. (C) Ambassador Jeter noted that President Obasanjo had
recently said he was most concerned about Kano, Zamfara,
Sokoto and Kaduna. He had asked the President to add Lagos
to his list. The Troika agreed strongly. The Spanish
Ambassador noted that Obasanjo dislikes Lagos, so he ignores
it. The Ambassador and the Troika briefly discussed the
conflict in Kano, agreeing that the causes were multiple,
including economic, ethnic and religious factors. The
Ambassadors agreed that they should meet periodically to
exchange views on security issues, perhaps at least once
every two weeks.



6. (C) COMMENT: This was the second meeting between the
Embassy and the EU Troika, the first being a condolence call
on the Charge shortly after September 11. We are pleased
that our European colleagues are equally focused on outreach
to moderate Muslim leaders, and interested in working
together toward this mutual objective. END COMMENT.
Jeter