NORTHERN GOVERNORS ON SECURITY SITUATION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 002510

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/03/2006
TAGS: PGOV ASEC PTER PINS PINR KISL CASC EAID NI
SUBJECT: NORTHERN GOVERNORS ON SECURITY SITUATION


REF: (A) ABUJA 2421 (B) ABUJA 2347


Classified by Ambassador Howard F. Jeter for reasons 1.5 (b)
and (d).



1. (U) Summary: During a tour of Northern Nigeria the week
of September 23, Poloff discussed with six governors--Jigawa,
Kebbi, Zamfara, Sokoto, Kano and Kaduna--the security
situation in their respective states. Presently army troops
are responsible for order in Kaduna, Jos, and Tafawa Balewa
(Bauchi). The governors voiced concern about three separate
security issues: potential reprisals for the violence in Jos
and Tafawa Balewa (Bauchi State); protests sparked by the
eventual U.S. reprisal action for 9/11; and, on the more
distant horizon, political violence in the run up to 2003
elections (electoral violence will be addressed septel).
Although ethnic violence is the primary long-term concern,
Kano, Katsina and Zamfara may see demonstrations after we
respond militarily to the terrorist attacks. Governors there
are confident that they can prevent large-scale violence.
Most Amcits in the North are long-time residents, and are not
likely to be targeted if demonstrations turn violent. End
Summary.
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Aftermath of Jos Violence
--------------

2. (C) Governors Ahmed Makarfi (Kaduna),Rabiu Kwankwaso
(Kano) and Saminu Turaki (Jigawa) reported that their states
have been directly affected by the Jos violence. Frightened
Plateau residents have asked to relocate to their states.
Makarfi commented that, besides Hausa-Fulani, he has received
formal requests from members of Jos' Igbo and Yoruba
communities to relocate to Kaduna State. Both Kaduna and
Jigawa have allocated land for new settlements for the Jos
refugees.



3. (C) Northern and Middle Belt governors met with the
President during the Council of State meeting on September 26
to discuss containing ethnic violence. Makarfi said that
President Obasanjo spent the first portion of the meeting
taking Governor Joshua Dariye (Plateau) to task for not
quelling the violence. Makarfi recounted that Obasanjo's
lack of confidence in Dariye was evidenced by his creation of
a Federal judicial commission to investigate the Jos
eruption. "He never did that for Kaduna, because he trusted
we would be fair in our investigation." Makarfi commented
that Dariye looked "ashamed," and would not make eye-contact
with his Northern colleagues at the Council of State meeting,
because they were successful in preventing violence against
Christians in their states.



4. (C) The return of bodies to home states for burial has
been a traditional trigger for reprisal ethnic violence.
Consequently, the FG instituted a standing order prohibiting
the transportation of bodies across state lines, which was
implemented after the violence in Jos started. This order
and the rapid burial of bodies in mass graves helped prevent
violence from being sparked elsewhere, Gov. Kwankwaso
remarked. The governors also emphasized the importance of
co-ordination with traditional rulers and religious leaders
in their states to maintain order. Makarfi stressed the
importance of traditional rulers. According to him,
organized government only reaches to the level of the LGA's
(Local Government Areas). However, traditional rulers know
and control, to a limited extent, every village in their
domain. Makarfi and Kwankwaso averred that the Sultan and
Emirs, especially Kano and Zazzau, have worked hard to
prevent reprisals for Jos and have roundly condemned the 9/11
attacks.



5. (C) The ethnic groups that targeted the Hausa-Fulani in
Jos and Tafawa Balewa are not represented in significant
numbers in major northern cities. Due to their geographic
concentration, reprisals by the Hausa-Fulani against these
ethnic groups could only occur in the original loci of the
violence, which are now controlled by the military. This
geographic separation has also lessened the likelihood of
ethnic reprisals. According to eyewitness accounts, almost
all of the Hausa have left Tafawa-Balewa. Their exodus has
left the city without civilian local government
administration. The military has taken its place.



6. (C) Makarfi said that in both Jos and Tafawa Balewa, the
local ethnic groups "touched the wrong people." He said the
Hausa will let it go and go back to business. "If you touch
a Fulani man, they remember and they come back--maybe ten
years later--to touch you. Dariye is not going to sleep well
at night."



7. (C) While the "core" North seems to have prevented
further conflict, repercussions from the Jos violence
continue in the Middle Belt. A near riot was averted in
Makurdi, Benue State, after the prompt intervention of police
September 21. Residents of Kubwa, a reasonably affluent
exurb of Abuja, formed an inter-religious council to defuse
tensions and stem rumors of reprisals, which had heightened
tensions there considerably. Some residents of Kubwa and
other settlements surrounding Abuja had moved, fearing
imminent violence. The conflict in Nasarawa state in June
among the Tiv, Jukun and Hausa not only produced a
significant number of displaced persons, but has heightened
tensions in Kogi and Benue, where many of the displaced are
currently residing.
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Reactions to 9/11
--------------

8. (C) Regarding local reaction to possible U.S. military
action, Governors predicted demonstrations in Kano, Katsina
and Zamfara states, with possible demonstrations in Zaria.
With no USG institutions in the North, and with Americans
there being long-term residents, it is unlikely these
demonstrations will result in violence against Amcits. The
demonstrations may be instigated to serve local political
ends, some governors believe.



9. (C) In Zamfara, the VOA stringer in Gusau, Abdullahi
Tsafe, played a tape in Hausa for Poloff of the weekly sermon

SIPDIS
delivered by the Zamfara State Commissioner of Religious
Affairs following Juma'at prayers on September 21. He
translated it as saying that the Commissioner implored all
Muslims to "pray for the annihilation of the U.S. if they
attack our Muslim brothers in Afghanistan." We will report
on the situation in Zamfara in more detail (septel).



10. (C) Governor Kwankwaso believed that "radical Muslims"
in Kano would demonstrate, but he thought their efforts would
be small-scale and he was confident in his Government's
ability to prevent violence. He said he met regularly with
the mainstream Ullama and the Emir of Kano, and they have all
condemned the attacks on the U.S. He complained that talking
to congregations associated with Iraqi mullahs was futile,
but said that these were a minority, albeit an active one.
Kwankwaso expressed concern that U.S. action not be random
or result in needless civilian casualties, and he commented
that the only long-term solution was for Western assistance
to reduce the economic disparity between poor Muslim
populations and the West. The other northern governors
expressed similar sentiments: each expressed his profound
condolences, followed by an expression of concern that U.S.
retaliation be measured, well-considered, and avoid civilian
casualties.



11. (U) Comment: The ability of northern governors to
prevent reprisals in the wake of Jos represents significant
progress over the past two years. Northern governors seem
prepared for protests in response to USG military action, and
appear confident that possible violence can be contained.
Unfortunately, tensions in the Middle Belt remain high, as
multiple ethnic groups wrestle for limited economic
resources. (The competition in some hot-spots bears
religious overtones.) Middle Belt governors in Plateau,
Benue, Taraba and Nasarawa appear less prepared than their
northern counterparts to manage ethnic violence which may be
re-ignited by external events. In his address on Nigeria's
Independence Day, President Obasanjo called ethnic violence
the biggest threat his Administration faces, and vowed to
devote more resources to stemming the problem. Not only will
he have to devote material resources and security assets in a
more systematic way, Obasanjo must develop a political grand
strategy for dealing with this most nettlesome of Nigeria's
centrifugal forces. End Comment.
Jeter