NIGERIA: PRE-DEPLOYMENT ASSESSMENT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 002491

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/28/2011
TAGS: PREL MASS ASEC NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: PRE-DEPLOYMENT ASSESSMENT

REF: A. STATE 162318

B. ABUJA 2421

C. ABUJA NI2443

D. IIR 7 800 0307 01

E. IIR 7 800 0297 01

F. ABUJA 2331

G. ABUJA 2477


Classified by CDA Andrews; Reasons 1.5 (d/g)


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INTRODUCTION
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1. (C) Embassy received Ref A request for pre-deployment
assessment on 26 September. By this date, deployments for
Operation Focus Relief trainers were already well underway,
and training had already begun at Birnin-Kebbi (training in
Ilorin and Serti is scheduled to begin on 8 October).
Additionally, Mission has provided Department with a general
security and stability assessment for Nigeria (Ref B) and
Mission-wide tripwires (Ref G). However, Embassy gladly
provides the following analysis specific to the security of
OFR personnel, in the event of a negative public reaction to
U.S. action against terrorists.


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GENERAL ASSESSMENT
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2. (C) The likelihood of ethnic or religious unrest in
Nigeria in the wake of an eventual U.S. response to the
September 11 acts of terror is high. Such unrest would not
necessarily be targeted at American individuals or
institutions, but American lives and property could be at
risk. Tensions here remain elevated following recent events
in Jos and Wukari. Demonstrations -- either in favor of or
opposing U.S. military actions -- could spark renewed
ethno-religious fighting, especially in the Middle Belt, but
potentially almost anywhere. Major Muslim religious leaders
here have unequivocally condemned the attacks on the U.S.
However, many Muslims will be angered over any U.S. reprisal
attack that affects fellow Muslims, especially if there are
significant civilian casualties. Some Muslims can be
expected to stage protests, as they did during the Gulf War
and following our reprisals for the Embassy bombings in 1998.
The GON is willing to protect U.S. diplomats and
installations in Abuja and Lagos, but its ability to do so is
not unlimited. Outside of Abuja and the Lagos Islands, the
GON's means of controlling civil unrest are even less robust.
Recently, the GON has managed to quell serious unrest in Jos
only with the assistance of the military, and then after a
substantial loss of life.



3. (C) The Nigerian military is not seen as an effective
institution. Due to a long history of harsh military rule,
the military is viewed by most of the population with
suspicion. However, when civil unrest occurs in Nigeria,
at-risk populations regularly flee to military bases to seek
protection from this ethnically and religiously mixed (and
armed) institution. The military has historically welcomed
onto its bases and protected these fleeing populations.
While rioters may overrun police stations, they steer clear
of major military installations. Therefore, unrest is not
likely to threaten military bases, but bases could be faced
with streams of displaced persons seeking protection.



4. (C) Based on planning for force protection, all OFR
personnel, with the exception of 3rd Group LNOs who work out
of the Embassy and live in an Abuja hotel, live on or next to
Nigerian military installations. As noted above, general
unrest in Nigeria is unlikely to move against military
installations in a threatening manner. Therefore, unrest,
whether caused by ethnic tensions or a reaction to a U.S.
response against terrorists, OFR personnel are most secure on
the Nigerian military bases where they live and work. DATT,
as COR for OFR P3, recently garnered additional resources
from the Department of State for force protection at the
bases, and has instructed PA&E to begin the installation of
additional force protection measures.



5. (C) The Nigerian military began to take immediate steps to
provide additional force protection to OFR sites after the
event of September 11, in some cases adding additional
security without requests being made. The military is also
working to provide other types of additional force protection
support to 3rd Group personnel (Ref D).


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LOCATION SPECIFIC ASSESSMENT
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6. (C) FOB ABUJA: FOB Abuja is located at a Nigerian Air
Force installation within walking distance of Nnamdi Azikiwe
International Airport. There are no large population centers
near the base, and while the OFR base can be seen from the
airport road, visibility is largely obscured by a long row of
trees, a cement wall and other protection measures such as
containers. Because of the high amount of traffic in and out
of the FOB (due to its nature as a command center) and its
location near the airport, the FOB does have a higher profile
than the other bases. However, the Nigerian military has
augmented its protection detail at the base.



7. (C) BIRNIN-KEBBI: PolMilOff and DATT have had several
conversations with Kebbi Governor Mohammed Aleiro regarding
OFR and Mission concerns for the well-being of OFR personnel
in Kebbi State (Refs E and F). His assurances have been
significant. Kebbi State is sparsely populated, and has not
in the past been the site of any demonstrations of note. The
U.S. temporary base camp is located on the Nigerian military
base and is remote from the town of Birnin-Kebbi.



8. (C) ILORIN: Ilorin is politically restive, but this is an
ethnically-driven issue. The U.S. camp is toward the rear of
a Nigerian Army Base that is not close to the town.



9. (C) SERTI: The base in Serti is extremely isolated and not
located near any population centers of note. While Taraba
State has suffered bouts of ethnic conflict, Serti itself has
been tranquil.



10. (C) SAFEHAVEN: In the unlikely event of forced evacuation
from a U.S. temporary base, OFR personnel would move to Abuja
to the FOB. Depending on the situation, the personnel would
be moved by MI-8 helicopter (there is one MI-8 helicopter
stationed at each base) and/or road convoy.



11. (U) This message was cleared with 3rd Group Battalion
Commander LTC Sherwood.
Andrews