NIGERIA SECURITY AND STABILITY ASSESSMENT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 002404

SIPDIS


OFFICIAL INFORMAL


LAGOS FOR ROBYN HINSON-JONES


E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/21/2006
TAGS: PREL ASEC PTER XA
SUBJECT: NIGERIA SECURITY AND STABILITY ASSESSMENT


REF: A. (A)SECSTATE 162454

B. (B) ABUJA 2347


Classified by Charge Tim Andrews for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d).



1. (C) Summary: The likelihood of ethnic or religious unrest
in Nigeria in the wake of an eventual U.S. response to the
September 11 acts of terror is high. Such unrest would not
necessarily be targeted at American individuals or
institutions, but American lives and property could be ar
risk. Tensions here remain elevated following recent events
in Jos (Ref. B) and Wukari. Demonstrations--either in favor
of or opposing U.S. military actions--could spark renewed
ethno-religious fighting, especially in the Middle Belt, but
potentially almost anywhere. Major Muslim religious leaders
here have unequivocally condemned the attacks on the U.S.
However, many Muslims will be angered over any U.S. reprisal
attack that affects fellow Muslims. Some can be expected to
stage protests, as they did during the Gulf War and following
our reprisals for the Embassy bombings in 1998. The GON is
willing to protect U.S. diplomats and installations in Abuja
and Lagos but is limited in its ability to do so. Outside of
Abuja and the Lagos Islands, the GON's means of controlling
civil unrest are less robust. Recently, the GON has managed
to quell unrest only with the assistance of the military, and
then after a substantial loss of life. End Summary.



2. (C) Nigeria, independent of events in the U.S., has just
suffered another paroxysm of ethno-religious conflict in Jos
(Ref. A). There is always a potential for violent unrest in
Nigeria in those places where there exist longstanding ethnic
or religious conflicts. In the past two years, Kaduna, Abia,
Lagos, Nassarawa, Bauchi, Taraba and now Plateau States have
witnessed civil unrest of varying degrees that has resulted
in a substantial number of deaths and sometimes provoked
reprisals elsewhere. Many Nigerians and expatriates believe
that recent violence in Jos was exacerbated by the terror
attacks in the U.S. Whether that assessment is accurate or
not is almost immaterial; the fact that it is so widely
believed creates a potential danger. Protests about U.S.
reprisal attacks could spark a new round of fighting, there
or elsewhere.



3. (C) The most likely venues for large-scale protests in
the North would be Kano, Gusau, in Zamfara State and Kaduna
and Zaria in Kaduna State. Protests could also materialize
in other places, including Jos, Suleja or Abuja. We believe
Gon security forces would be able to contain any
demonstration within the parts of Abuja frequented by
official Americans. The potential for civil unrest in
response to a U.S. reprisal is highest in Kano because it is
the largest predominantly Muslim city in the country, and is
home to local and transnational Muslim radicals who may try
to incite crowds to protest a USG military action. After the
fuel-price demonstrations 15 months ago left several dead,
the Kano State Government, in conjunction with the Emir of
Kano, the National Police Force and the SSS, has worked
successfully to prevent large-scale demonstrations and their
associated violence. It is unclear, however, that they would
be able to prevent, or to control, a spontaneous
demonstration in the Old City of Kano in response to U.S.
retaliation. The Old City could easily produce a spontaneous
protest numbering in the tens of thousands. USAID has an
office in Kano which has already been the subject of protests
by Muslims after a Johns Hopkins family planning program met
the disapproval of local Imams. While this office is a good
distance from the Old City, it could again become the target
of protests, as it is the only institution identified with
the USG north of Abuja. The British Council maintains a
large premises in the Old City of Kano, and that building
could be a target of protests.



4. (C) Gusau is a likely spot for anti-American protests,
but at present there is only one American there, a priest.
It is unlikely that the Zamfara state government would permit
a protest that would target the Catholic church in Gusau,
because Governor Sani does not want the public-relations
problems that would ensue. However, political demonstrations
in Gusau have sometimes turned violent there because of
fierce political rivalries. Zaria, the capital of Islamic
learning in Nigeria and home of the Nigerian Muslim
Brotherhood, would likely see some protests centered on
Ahmadu Bello University.



5. (C) While small protests in Sokoto are possible, there
are few Americans who might be targeted. The Sultan of
Sokoto has publicly condemned the terrorist attack on several
occasions, and would likely work with Governor Bafarawa to
prevent any large-scale protests there. While Kaduna could
have small demonstrations, it is not likely to see
large-scale protests, given its recent experience with
devastating mob-violence. Seven local police stations have
been built in the hotspots in and around Kaduna and are
staffed with paramilitary Mobile Police, who would serve as a
strong deterrent to any major protests. The recent violence
in Jos, the devastating loss of life there and the continued
presence of the military on the streets make it an unlikely
venue for protests. Jos could re-ignite, however, if
fighting starts elsewhere.



7. (C) The large, unplanned and often squalid urban
communities outside Abuja could see demonstrations by
Muslims. Since Abuja, like Jos and Kaduna, has a large
population of Christians and Muslims, protests here by
Muslims could potentially spark off violence simmering
between the two groups over events in Jos and elsewhere.
There are several USG identified institutions in Abuja,
including the Embassy, USAID's offices and the American
School. The USAID building, the Sheraton and the Hilton are
all within walking distance of the National Mosque, and could
see protests. The police maintain a strong presence in
Abuja, and can be expected to protect U.S. diplomatic
institutions. It is more likely that protests, and conflict,
would originate in the densely-populated outlying residential
districts, which have a collective population of over one
million.



8. (C) While Nigerians or transnationals could try to
attack U.S. installations or personnel in Nigeria, this has
not happened yet. Short of a targeted attack, the greatest
danger to Mission personnel in Abuja and Lagos, and Amcits
generally, is crime and civil unrest. We met with Amcits in
Kano and Abuja September 20 to discuss security issues, and
are planning to meet with or contact remaining Amcits in the
North and Middle Belt over the coming week.
Andrews