NIGERIA: SECURITY ASSISTANCE MEETING CHAIRED BY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABUJA 002072

SIPDIS


DEPARTMENT FOR AF/W (BOOTH),AF/RA (BITTRICK),AND PM FOR
(PETERS)
JCS FOR HEIMERLE


E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/13/2011
TAGS: MARR NI MAS
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: SECURITY ASSISTANCE MEETING CHAIRED BY
ACTING MINISTER OF DEFENSE

REF: REF: ABUJA 2036


(U) Classified by Ambassador Howard F. Jeter; Reasons 1.5
(b) and (d).



1. (C) SUMMARY: On August 13, Ambassador Jeter accompanied by
DATT, Acting ODC Chief and PolMilOff met with Acting Minister
of Defense Lawal Batagarawa and other Ministry officials to
discuss security assistance programs. Ambassador Jeter
explained that he had requested the meeting due to slow
progress on many assistance cases, including MOD failure to
sign a number of significant LOAs, and continuing problems
with IMET. A lively and positive discussion followed,
facilitated by Minister Batagarawa, including an ODC briefing
on the role of ODC and the types of U.S. security assistance
programs.



2. (C) Batagarawa promised an improved relationship ("the
same as I did with OFR"). As a result of the meeting, the
participants agreed to have bi-weekly meetings between ODC
and the Ministry and Services. Additionally, Batagarawa
asked for training on security assistance for the Ministry's
Legal Department and Joint Services Department. The Ministry
agreed to give multiple names for all IMET slots in the
future. Finally, the Minister instructed the head of the
Legal Department to inform the Nigerian DATT in Washington,
Group Captain Ode, to sign the Amended LOA for MPRI (although
it appears that additional intra-Ministry discussions will
occur before this instruction is carried out). END SUMMARY.


==========
BACKGROUND
==========



3. (C) Numerous problems have plagued the security assistance
relationship between the U.S. and Nigeria since the inception
of democracy in May 1999. Lack of Ministry action, largely
due to stovepipe communication channels within the Ministry
and between the Ministry and Services, as well as
bureaucratic infighting over resources, have delayed
completion of LOAs and caused the loss of badly needed and
highly desired IMET slots. Moreover, the Nigerian DIA
insists that the DATT provide a notice of at least 30 days
before there is any contact between the DATT and GON
officials. DIA has included ODC in this highly restrictive
requirement, which has made it nearly impossible for the many
TDY ODC staff members to establish and maintain productive
relationships. (However, this has not prevented DIA from
returning ODC's letters seeking IMET course requests with
long lists filled only with intelligence courses.) As a
result, Ambassador Jeter requested a meeting between the
Embassy (including himself, DATT, ODC and PolMilOff) and
policy-makers in the Ministry, including the Minister, the
Ministers of State for Army, Navy and Airforce, the Chief of
Defense Staff and the three Service Chiefs.



4. (U) Ambassador Jeter was accompanied to the meeting by
DATT Nelson, Acting ODC Chief Kinser and PolMilOff. The
meeting was chaired by the Acting Minister of Defense
(Minister of State for Army),Lawal Batagarawa. Also in
attendance from the Ministry were the Permanent Secretary,
the heads of the Joint Services and Legal Departments and the
Directors of the Army, Navy and Air Force Departments. The
Chief of Defense Staff, Vice Admiral Ibrahim Ogohi appeared
during the last few minutes of the meeting.


================
A NEW BEGINNING?
================



5. (C) Ambassador Jeter explained the reasons he had
requested the meeting, and emphasized the importance of
opening lines of communication on security assistance.
Delayed response to LOAs was holding back assistance that was
clearly needed and desired by the Ministry and Services.
Dropped IMET slots resulted in lost money and training to
Nigeria. If the situation did not improve, it would be
difficult to convince Washington to maintain the current
level of security assistance to Nigeria.



6. (C) Minister Batagarawa explained that while he was aware
that the Ambassador had requested a meeting with
policy-makers, he felt it was more important to begin with
the civil servants that dealt with these issues on a daily
basis. Moreover, he noted, policy-makers can change, while
the MOD civil servants were less likely to be moved (and thus
could provide continuity in the security assistance
relationship). A policy-maker level meeting could follow, if
desired.



7. (C) Major Kinser gave a security assistance briefing, and
a lively discussion of the legalese of LOAs, including the
MPRI amended LOA ensued. The Head of the Legal Department
complained that the Embassy expected that the Ministry's
signature on LOAs was the perceived final step, whereas the
Nigerians were used to a three stage process, including a
letter of offer, a letter of acceptance and, after
negotiation, the signature of an agreement. She bemoaned
many of the legal details in U.S. LOAs, including the 2.5
percent fee and responsibility to pay any additional costs.
Somewhat surprisingly, the Minister suddenly interrupted his
Head of Legal Department's questioning, and accurately
explained the difference between direct commercial sales, FMS
cases, and FMS grant assistance. He emphasized the
advantages of working through the USG to procure equipment,
but noted it was discretionary. However, with FMS cases
where the USG grants were provided, the Ministry would be
mistaken not to take full advantage of the goodwill. Major
Kinser explained the difficulties the Embassy had had with
IMET. The Head of the Joint Services gave her commitment
that from now on the Ministry would supply multiple names for
each training slot, and do so in a timely manner.



8. (C) Ambassador Jeter noted that the MPRI amended LOA had
yet to be signed by the GON. This meant that the U.S. could
not access the money that Nigeria had transferred. He also
noted that due to payment delays and exchange-rate
fluctuations, the final sum had come up short by about USD
400,000. Batagarawa asked his Head of the Legal Department
if that were true. She explained that it was, that she had
concerns about the LOA language that she had raised with
Minister Danjuma, and that she had sent a letter to the
Nigerian DATT in Washington, Group Captain Ode, to send a
letter giving the USG access to the money, rather than
signing the LOA. Batagarawa directed that now that she had
clarification on the LOA process, she should immediately
write to Ode to sign the LOA. She complained that she had
planned to meet with other department heads to discuss the
case, and wanted to do so before carrying out Batagarawa's
instruction. He agreed, but told her to meet "quickly," and
bring him a recommendation by Thursday, August 16.



9. (C) DATT suggested a bi-weekly meeting between ODC and the
Ministry to discuss cases and IMET slots, and to avoid any
future misunderstandings. DATT, however, explained that this
might be a problem due to DIA's requirements for the DOD
personnel at the Embassy. However, DIA could certainly
attend the regularly scheduled meetings. The Minister
heartily agreed to the bi-weekly meetings (as did the MOD
staff in attendance). He waved off DIA as a problem, but
agreed that including DIA was acceptable. He also stated
that representatives of the CDS and the Service Chiefs should
also attend. The situation would improve, the Minister said.
I give my personal commitment, "the same as I did with OFR."



10. (C) The Minister then told the DATT that he wanted
security assistance training for MOD civil servants,
especially the Legal and Joint Services Department. He
explained that fewer problems would occur if there were a
better understanding in the Ministry of the U.S. process.
Colonel Nelson agreed to work on a security assistance
training plan that would involve bringing a small team to
Abuja to carry out the training for the Ministry. Smiling,
the Minister asked, "Colonel Nelson, do I have your word on
that?" and jocularly turned to the Ambassador, and said, "I
am going to hold you responsible for his commitment." (NOTE:
A slot was found for MOD personnel in October by the ODC.
END NOTE)


====================
COMMENT AND ANALYSIS
====================



11. (C) Due to the suspension of security assistance during
the Abacha regime, the Embassy and the Ministry of Defense
are in some ways creating a new relationship.
Understandably, any new relationship has problems. While the
Embassy has worked for the past two years to reform and
rebuild the security assistance relationship with Nigeria,
the Ministry of Defense is in many ways just now finding its
feet, and expanding its role in overseeing the Services. A
renewed effort to establish open and transparent channels of
communication between the Embassy and the Ministry, is an
important step. The recent meeting was extremely helpful in
this regard.



12. (C) For those that would engage in corrupt practices,
working with the USG presents serious problems. Because our
programs are so well defined and carefully managed, there is
little room for kickbacks. Therefore, the purchase of
military goods from others, such as Russia or China, holds a
much greater attraction for those MOD rent seekers. While
corruption of this sort will not go away any time soon,
improved communication and cooperation will make it more
difficult for those who would restrict and then criticize the
relationship with the U.S. for their own ends.



13. (C) Minister Batagarawa has consistently met his
commitments to the Embassy, and has served effectively as a
problem-solver for the bilateral relationship. His decision
to involve the Ministry's civil servants was well-considered.
We are also confident that he will do everything he can to
meet his commitment to us for improved coordination on FMS
cases and IMET.



14. (C) DAO COMMENT: A security-related follow-on meeting
between ODC and MOD, Service and DIA staff was held on August

14. The meeting established the bi-weekly schedule. At the
meeting, MOD Joint Services and Legal Departments stated that
unless the U.S. makes the voluminous legal changes to the
LOAs currently awaiting signature, they would not be signed.
ODC explained that it was very unlikely that any substantive
changes would be made but that our legal experts would review
the Nigerian requests. DAO pointed out that this would mean,
at best, further delays and at worst, the complete cessation
of the FMF program for Nigeria. DATT believes that when this
development is revealed to Batagarawa, the MOD Legal and
Joint Staff representatives will be told to cooperate. END
DAO COMMENT.



15. (U) This cable was cleared with DAO and ODC.
Jeter