NIGERIA: AMBASSADOR VISITS SOKOTO STATE: OFR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABUJA 001449

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/22/2011
TAGS: PGOV ECON SOCI KISL NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: AMBASSADOR VISITS SOKOTO STATE: OFR
SUPPORTED, SHARIA DISCUSSED

Classified by Ambassador Howard f. Jeter, reason 1.5 (B/D).


Summary
--------------



1. (U) In his first trip to the Northwest, Ambassador Jeter
travelled to Sokoto State on June 19 and 20 to hold meetings
with Governor Bafarawa, Sultan of Sokoto Maccido and Brigade
One Commander General Emejuru. The Ambassador thanked the
officials for their support for Operation Focus Relief Phase
I training that took place in Sokoto State last Autumn, and
asked for their support for future training in the Northwest
region. Governor Bafarawa described his Administration's
progress, and his low-key approach to Sharia (and the
limitations of his non-confrontational style). Both he, the
Sultan and General Emerju pledged support for OFR III. End
summary.




The Governor
--------------

2. (C) Governor Attahiru Bafarawa welcomed the Ambassador
and the Embassy delegation, including the USAID Director,
DATT and Poloff, with a State Dinner on the 19th, followed by
a private meeting on the 20th. The Ambassador began the
discussion by asking what gains democracy had brought Sokoto
State in the past two years. The Governor responded, "the
difference between military government and democracy is that
I am from Sokoto State, I am responsible to my people and I
am not going anywhere." This compared favorably to military
Governors from other parts of the country who, he said, did
not dare return to their former constituency, given their
wholesale theft of funds while in office. As an example of
his fiscal rectitude, Bafarawa said that Sokoto State,s
budget for the past two years had been approximately 8.6
billion naira (about USD 80 million). He said of that
amount, most of the money has gone to building roads,
schools, hospitals and rural development (usually potable
water) projects. The Governor noted, with some degree of
pride, that he had paid off 700 million naira in outstanding
debts from the former military administration and had set
aside one billion naira in an emergency fund. "Without
borrowing a penny," Bafarawa stated with a broad smile.



3. (C) On corruption, Barfarawa said that he is firmly in
control of State Government officials: "If the leader is
corrupt, the whole body will be corrupt--if the leader
steals, everyone looks to get his share." When asked his
assessment of the Obasanjo Administration's sincerity in its
anti-corruption efforts, Bafarawa said flatly that the
President's Ministers are corrupt. Foremost on his list of
corrupt officials was Tony Anenih, Minister of Works and
Housing. Bafarawa said that if Obasanjo meant to make
serious inroads into corruption, he would have to forego the
complicated zoning arrangements that keep certain Ministries
tied to certain states, and hire the most competent people he
could find. (Comment: Corruption within Federal Ministries
is indeed rife. Anenih appears untouchable, given his
position as one of Obasanjo,s key political &fixers.8 End
comment).



4. (C) Asked about the performance of local government
officials, the Governor opined that the Federal Government
was "complicit" in their "looting." The 20 percent
apportionment that Local Government Councils (LGC) received
from the federal government was paid directly to LGCs,
instead of being funneled through state governments as
required by the Constitution. "Since they have control of
their own money, there is little I can do to stop them from
stealing it." He complained bitterly about ALGON (All Local
Government Association of Nigeria),which had been set up by
the Federal Government in Abuja to direct LGA spending. He
repeated the well-publicized case of ALGON's purchase of
Toyota Prados for the 774 LGC's without their permission--a
contract alleged to have been arranged by Vice President
Atiku Abubakar, and to have netted roughly USD 30,000 per
vehicle in kick-backs to various federal officials.



5. (C) On Sharia reforms in the North, Bafarawa professed a
low-key approach. "If Sharia is done properly, no one will
notice. It has always been a part of our religion and
culture." Alluding to Governor Ahmed Sani of Zamfara State
andhis intrusive and controversial Sharia regime, Bafarawa
said that Sharia "only becomes dangerous when it is used for
political gain." Bafarawa noted the recent meeting in Abuja
between National Security Advisor Aliyu Mohammed and
Governors from eleven Northern states which had adopted new
Sharia legislation, a session devoted to "harmonization" of
Sharia approaches, in an attempt to prevent Sharia from being
used as a political tool by their opponents.



6. (C) Bafarawa mentioned that one local Sharia judge in
Sokoto had handed down a sentence of amputation for a
confessed thief, and that the defendant refused to appeal.
Bafarawa had set up a committee of Sharia scholars to review
the case, and to determine whether the case met all the
elements required for imposing amputation under classical
Sharia doctrine. The Governor said that he would allow the
sentence to be carried out if the committee sustains the
judge's decision. "It's not my business. I am not the
judge, and this is what the people have asked for." He said
he could over-ride the judgment of a Shari'a court--even if
no appeal was filed--only when there were proper grounds for
doing so in classical Sharia law.



7. (C) Ambassador Jeter said that the USG's concern was
primarily for the potential impact of Sharia on non-Muslims,
and the human rights consequences that would follow.
Bararawa replied, "It is something to be handled with care."
He said that in Sokoto State, consumption of alcohol by
Christians in private is not criminalized, and in fact
alcohol is sold freely at Sokoto's military and police messes
and military grocery stores. More importantly, none of the
laws regulating social comportment that had been passed in
Zamfara--requiring a dress code for women and banning
mixed-gender public transport--had been introduced in Sokoto,
the seat of the highest Muslim traditional authority in
Nigeria. Public school classes were divided by gender after
a certain age, and more girls were being sent to school since
this change was imposed, he said. Christian children in
Sokoto were taught "Christian religious knowledge," (CRK)
while their Muslim counterparts were instructed in the Koran,
he said (Comment: It is a long-running struggle throughout
Nigeria for religious minorities to be provided instruction
in their own faith in the public schools. End Comment).



8. (C) Governor Bafarawa articulated the perception by some
Northern governors and Northern populations--not often
expressed directly to USG officials--that the USG is more
interested in the South of Nigeria, and focuses more of its
energy and resources on Southern states. That Ambassador
Jeter made his first official visit to Kaduna and Kano, and
was undertaking a trip to Kebbi and Sokoto so early in his
tenure, was taken as a sign of encouragement to Northern
governors that the USG would have a more "balanced" focus in
its outlook and programs, according to Bafarawa. The
Ambassador stated that the USG regarded all of Nigeria as
worthy and deserving of support, and with the Embassy now
moved to Abuja from Lagos, including the recent transfer of
USAID operations to the capital, the USG would be able to
focus more attention and assistance resources in the North.
We want to help all of Nigeria, Ambassador Jeter emphasized.
USAID Director Tom Hobgood discussed with the Governor what
programs AID offered that provided assistance to the North
(there are too few),and what it could offer in the future.
Bafarawa replied that the primary needs of his state, and the
North in general, were in the areas of education, health
care, provision of potable water, and agriculture.


The General
--------------

9. (U) The Ambassador met June 20 with General L. Emejuru,
One Brigade Commander in Sokoto, who commands all Nigerian
Army units in Sokoto, Kebbi and Zamfara. The Ambassador
thanked the General for his assistance during Phase I of
Operation Focus Relief and asked for his continued support
for OFR III training in Birnin-Kebbi which would be
commencing in August. The DATT provided an overview of what
that training would entail, and the General promised his
continued support for the mission. He said that the training
and equipment would benefit the soldiers under his command,
and would assist them in enforcing peace in Sierra Leone. He
thanked the Ambassador for the courtesy call, and requested
that the Commanding Officer of the Birnin-Kebbi barracks be
made aware of the USG trainers' planned movements outside the
camp in order to provide adequate security.




The Sultan
--------------

10. (SBU) Sultan of Sokoto Mahammadu Maccido, the formal
leader of all Muslims in Nigeria, also received the
Ambassador June 20. The Ambassador, in a private sidebar,
thanked the Sultan for his support of last year's OFR
training in Sokoto. The Sultan said that he was "displeased"
by reports that "hoodlums" had hijacked and burned beer
trucks in Kano, Katsina and Zamfara in the past months. He
said that he was using the influence of his office to prevent
a recurrence of such incidents. "I do not want Christians to
feel threatened by Sharia, or hoodlums to take the law into
their own hands."


Comment
--------------

11. (C) Civilian support for OFR, as in neighboring Kebbi
State (septel),appears genuine and enthusiastic in Sokoto.
Governor Bafarawa, generally regarded as one of the more
successful Northern executives, spoke frankly of his
administration, including his attempt to keep Sharia reforms
within manageable bounds. However, his unwillingness to
overturn a sentence of amputation unless his committee of
religious experts deems it proper to do so shows the limits
he faces in an overwhelmingly Muslim state.



12. (C) The Sultan of Sokoto, formally the head of the
Muslim community in Nigeria, is in practice little more than
a figurehead (the Emir of Kano, for example, is far more
respected, and far more important). The Sultan's pledge to
reduce Sharia "incidents" in neighboring states will have
little impact. State Governors wield the real power, and
when they hesitate to act, or act at cross-purposes (as
Governor Sani of Zamfara) the Sultan can do little. However,
most Northern Governors pursue the same low-key approach as
Bafarawa, and so far they have been largely successful in
limiting tension and discord resulting from the Sharia
"reform" movement. End comment.



Jeter