Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
01ABUJA1006
2001-05-07 10:25:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Abuja
Cable title:  

Nigeria: Obasanjo Foreign Policy

Tags:  PREL PINR PINS ECON NI 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 ABUJA 001006 

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: 05/06/11
TAGS: PREL PINR PINS ECON NI
SUBJECT: Nigeria: Obasanjo Foreign Policy

Classified by Ambassador Howard F. Jeter. Reason: 1.5 (b)
and (d)


C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 ABUJA 001006

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: 05/06/11
TAGS: PREL PINR PINS ECON NI
SUBJECT: Nigeria: Obasanjo Foreign Policy

Classified by Ambassador Howard F. Jeter. Reason: 1.5 (b)
and (d)



1. (C) Summary. President Olusegun Obasanjo is his own
Foreign Minister. To understand how he has redirected
Nigeria relations with the rest of the world, we examine
his personal character and policy agenda. Obasanjo
military career, his
term as interim Head of State in the
1970s, and his years as a retired elder statesman and
political prisoner helped shape his character. Nothing
in his background prepared him to head the executive
branch of government in a constitutional democracy, and it
shows. Obasanjo does not like to engage in the give-and-take
of domestic politics and, consequently, he is not very good
at it. In the area of foreign affairs, however, he has been
able to establish and carry out his own policies, largely
unchallenged by politicians and public opinion. As the 2003
Presidential election approaches, criticism of his extensive
foreign travel and his neglect of domestic concerns will
likely increase. Obasanjo could respond to his critics by
either staunchly defending his record, including his
special relations with the United States, or by diverting
public attention with a new, unpredictable foreign policy
agenda. End summary.


Special Relations
--------------



2. (C) The United States and Nigeria have had a "special
relationship" since the May 29, 1999 inauguration of
President Olusegun Obasanjo. The U.S. delegation to the
inauguration, headed by the then Secretary of Transportation
and Rev Jesse Jackson, was given pride of place at every
event. Within weeks, an eighteen-member interagency team
visited Nigeria and established working relations with their
Nigerian counterparts. In the ensuing months, the
Secretaries of Energy, State, Treasury, Defense and

SIPDIS
Agriculture visited Nigeria, as did an eleven-member
Congressional delegation headed by Minority Leader Richard
Gephardt. The Clinton Administration designated Nigeria one
of four key countries to receive USG assistance in
consolidating democracy. Meanwhile, senior Nigerian officials
made reciprocal visits to the United States. The two countries
also formed and held the first session of a Joint Economic
Partnership Committee (JEPC) and signed agreements that

permitted OPIC and the ExIm Bank to resume operations in Nigeria.
In addition, an American consulting team headed by retired
Gulf War-era army chiefs began working with the Nigerian
defense establishment on a program aimed at strengthening
civilian oversight of defense and re-professionalizing
the armed forces.



3. (C) Visits by President Jacques Chirac, Premier Jean
Chretien and Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori showed that Nigeria
opening to
the outside world was multilateral. President
Obasanjo traveled extensively, visiting scores of countries
and setting a pace of foreign travel that in two years would
equal the foreign travel of all previous Nigerian Heads of
State combined. But the visit of President Bill Clinton to
Abuja in August 2000 highlighted the fact that relations
with the United States remained special. The two leaders
announced numerous bilateral cooperative initiatives, among
them Operation Focus Relief, which two months later brought
over 150 Special Forces soldiers to Nigeria to train two
Nigerian battalions for peace enforcement operations under
UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone. In FY2001, USAID programs kicked
into high gear with an average of sixty consultants arriving
each month to conduct programs in health, education, good
governance, and economic reform.


Continuity and Change
--------------



4. (C) Looking back over the three-year transformation of
US-Nigeria relations, one might conclude that it was
Nigeria change in government -- from a military
dictatorship to a democratically-elected civilian
administration -- that made all the difference. From the
U.S. perspective this would be a fair assessment. For the
United States, the oppression of Sani Abacha military
regime raised a host of legal, moral, ideological and human
rights barriers to normal bilateral relations. These
remained in place during the benign interregnum of LTG
Abdulsalami Abubakar, and began to be lifted only after the
election of the Obasanjo government. So as far as the
United States is concerned, the advent of a democratic
civilian government facilitated the dramatic improvement in
bilateral relations.



5. (C) Not necessarily so for Nigeria. Historically,
Nigeria foreign relations are affected less by its form of
government than by its national interests -- much of which are
rooted in its geography -- and by the personality and political
agenda of its Head of State. It was, after all, a military regime
that dismantled the oppressive legacy of Sani Abacha in the
eleven months following his death in June 1998. It was
Abubakar who established and then stuck to an ambitious
timetable for the holding of elections that brought Olusegun
Obasanjo to power. But despite the tectonic changes this
caused in bilateral relations with the U.S., the
Commonwealth, and other developed countries, many aspects of
Nigeria foreign policy remained unchanged from the Abacha
regime, through the Abubakar interregnum and into the
Obasanjo Administration. Despite these leadership changes
at home, Nigerian peacekeepers remained engaged in
West Africa, for example, carrying out an orderly draw-down
in Liberia and a corresponding build-up of ECOMOG operations
into Sierra Leone.



6. (C) It is Nigeria geographical characteristics -- its
location, size, population, resource base and level of
development -- that help shape its national interests and,
in turn, ensure a large measure of continuity in the way it
relates to its neighbors and to the rest of the world.
These factors explain why, in the three decades since the
civil war, despite dramatic changes in political leadership
and forms of government, Nigeria has consistently maintained
its standing as the paramount country in West Africa, a key
player in the OAU, and an important member of the OIC, OPEC
and the G-77. In order to maintain Nigeria's leadership
within these organizations, Nigerian Heads of State must
accept constraints on their conduct of foreign relations.
While, for example, Obasanjo might have wished to vote with
the Community of Democracies in support of the Cuba
resolution at the 2001 UN Commission on Human Rights in
Geneva, the pressure to vote with the G-77 was even greater.
Barring disintegration of the Nigerian federal state, it will
remain the most populous country in Africa and a major exporter
of oil. These realities, in turn, will continue to ensure
continuity, as well as a certain inflexibility, in Nigeria
foreign
relations.



7. (C) While Nigeria national interests help explain
aspects of its foreign relations that remain relatively
constant, changes in political leadership help explain
several dramatic shifts in foreign policy, like those that
occurred over the past three years. To understand the GON
currently warm
relations with the United States, therefore,
we need to consider the personal character and political
agenda of President Olusegun Obasanjo.


Obasanjo Modus Operandi
--------------



8. (C) Olusegun Obasanjo character and personality were
shaped by his quarter century-long military career, his
three-year term as a transitional military Head of State,
and his two decades as a retired elder statesman, spent
partly in prison and partly in the company of men like
Carter and Gorbachev, whom he considers his peers and
philosophical fellow-travelers. His leadership on democracy
and transparency issues, especially through organizations
such as Transparency International, the Commonwealth Eminent
Persons Group and the African Leadership Forum made him one
of the best known proponents of democracy and human rights
in Africa.



9. (C) None of that experience was helpful in preparing
Obasanjo for the role he must now play as head of the
executive branch of government in a constitutional democracy.
His soldierly belief in the importance of strategic and
tactical leadership exercised through a chain of command is
visceral, and it is augmented by his oft-stated belief that
his Presidency was divinely ordained (Obasanjo cites the fact
that he was not killed during the Abacha regime as proof).
When the National Assembly balked at his budget submission
in February 2000 or when it tinkered with details of his
Niger Delta Development Bill several months later, to cite
but two examples, Obasanjo viewed these actions as
insubordination. He responded by attempting to cajole and
even bribe legislators into deposing their leaders, but met
with only mixed success. Midway through his term as
President, Obasanjo has shown that he lacks the political
skills and the willingness to compromise that are required
to build a consensus in support of his domestic agenda.



10. (C) By contrast, Obasanjo has embraced his foreign
affairs portfolio as though it offers him a welcome respite
from the rough and tumble of domestic politics. In the area
of foreign affairs, he can behave as a general. He has a
great deal of latitude to shape both the style and substance
of Nigeria relations with the rest of the world, within
the constraints imposed by Nigeria geography. While he
cannot, for example, radically alter Nigeria Middle East
policy without offending Nigeria large Muslim population,
he ordered the Nigeria delegation to the 2000 session of the
Commission on Human Rights to abstain on an anti-Israel
Middle East resolution. The move signaled that, unlike the
late Sani Abacha, he would not engage in gratuitous America-
baiting.

11. (C) Public opinion hardly impinges on President
Obasanjo ability to conduct Nigeria foreign relations.
Early in his Administration, the defense establishment,
buttressed by little more than a few newspaper editorials,
cited strong public pressure on the government to bring
Nigerian troops home from Sierra Leone. When a resurgent
RUF took UNAMSIL peacekeepers hostage in May 2000, however,
these same officials readily agreed to a plan that would
have dispatched additional battalions to Sierra Leone with a
peace enforcement mandate. There was no consultation with,
and no hint of dissent from, the Nigerian public or from the
legislative branch of government. Similarly, Nigerian
legislators told visiting U.S. Justice Department officials
in April 2000 that the Nigerian public would not stand for
the extradition of Nigerian criminal suspects to the United
States. But when the Obasanjo Administration circumvented
the extradition process and rendered four suspects into U.S.
custody just six months later -- again without consulting
the people elected representatives here was no public
protest, and only limited dissent in Nigeria's rambunctious
press.

12. (C) Periodically legislators and media commentators
allege that Obasanjo extensive foreign travels have earned
Nigeria nothing, but have diverted the President attention
from pressing domestic problems. Obasanjo has responded
that foreign travel is necessary to repair the damage done
to Nigeria international reputation by the oppressive
Abacha regime. He points to Nigeria readmission to the
Commonwealth, the conclusion of an IMF standby agreement,
debt relief offered by some bilateral donors and the Paris
Club, and USG narcotics certification as examples of the
benefits of his foreign visits. For the time being, such
criticism has subsided. When Obasanjo asked the National
Assembly for supplemental funds for the purchase of a new
presidential jet, citing incidents that raised questions
about the air-worthiness of his current plane, legislators
eventually approved the request.



13. (C) President Obasanjo relies on a very small group of
long-time associates to advise him on foreign affairs. As
far as we know, the group does not include senior officials
of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs or Defense. Their
access to the President is generally limited to the weekly
meetings of the Council of State (Cabinet). On a daily
basis, Obasanjo turns to National Security Adviser LTG
(ret) Aliyu Mohammed Gusau for intelligence and advice on
both domestic and foreign security threats. The heads of
Nigeria various national security agencies channel their
concerns through the NSA. For advice concerning normal
diplomatic activity -- foreign visits, international
agreements, the GON position on issues coming to a vote in
international fora, etc. basanjo relies on his Foreign
Affairs Adviser, Ambassador Patrick Dele Cole. The MFA
counterparts to our Assistant Secretaries of State report to
Cole more often than they do the Foreign Minister Sule
Lamido. On foreign economic matters, Obasanjo accepts
advice from either Vice President Atiku Abubakar or Chief
Economic Adviser Philip Asiodu, at times appearing to play
one off against the other. When the President wants to
think outside the box, we are told he consults with such
figures as LTG (ret) Joe Garba (who served as Obasanjo
Foreign Minister
and UN Perm Rep from 1976-79 and who now
heads the National Institute for Policy and Strategic
Studies) or Chief Emeka Anyaoku (the former Commonwealth
Secretary General who now heads a panel to restructure and

SIPDIS
reform the Foreign Ministry).



14. (C) During his years as an elder statesman, Obasanjo
maintained contact with a large number of current and
former Heads of State whom he considers his friends or
colleagues. As the democratically-elected President of
Africa most populous country, he interacts with even the
most powerful Heads of State as his equals. Nevertheless,
he has a keen sense of power relationships, and interacts
easily with senior USG officials without evincing rank
consciousness. If time permits, he prefers to conduct the
business of foreign affairs face-to-face, but he has been
known to broker deals on the telephone. His relaxed,
informal style of conducting business occasionally leads to
slip-ups, however. He does not always inform his advisers
about all important details discussed in telephone
conversations or in one-on-one meetings. We have also
observed that, after agreeing to a certain course of action,
he occasionally issues oral instructions on-the-spot to his
Chief of Staff or to the Secretary to the Government of the
Federation, but does not always follow-up to ensure action
is taken.


Obasanjo Agenda
--------------



15. (C) President Obasanjo foreign policy agenda, as
gleaned from speeches and other public statements, is fairly
straight-forward: his top priorities are to obtain debt
relief for Nigeria and to promote regional stability and
economic development. Nigeria has no hegemonic ambitions
(it has a minor but potentially valuable territorial dispute
with Cameroon that it has referred to the International
Court of Justice, and a minor maritime boundary dispute with
Equatorial Guinea). It is preoccupied instead with
maintaining its own national unity. Among the most
demographically and ethnically diverse nations in Africa,
Nigeria experiences frequent outbursts of ethnic violence,
fueled by religious or local resource disputes. These
incidents revive the trauma of Nigeria devastating civil
war (1967-70),and keep the leadership alert to regional
threats to national unity. Obasanjo views ethnic strife in
Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea, and to a lesser degree in
Cote d voire, Guinea Bissau and the Cassamance as a possible
contagion. He aggressively promotes conflict mediation and
peacekeeping in West Africa, not only to maintain Nigeria
stature as the
preeminent country in the sub-region, but
because large Nigerian populations dwell in some of the
conflict-prone states, and because Nigeria itself is
vulnerable to such internal conflicts.



16. (C) Unlike Sani Abacha who used coercion, threats and
bribes to exercise influence within ECOWAS, Obasanjo seeks
to build consensus in the sub-region drawing on his stature
as a democratically-elected leader. He has used this
approach to support regional integration by, for example,
acknowledging and dealing with the Anglophone-Francophone
divide within ECOWAS and by favoring an accelerated timetable
for monetary union. Obasanjo also actively worked with other
ECOWAS Heads of State to ensure unified rejection of the coup
in Cote d'Ivoire that brought Gen. Robert Guei to power.
With Liberia, however, his use of inducements, his refusal to
resort to coercion and his avuncular treatment of Charles
Taylor have proven ineffective.



17. (C) Both President Obasanjo and National Security
Adviser Aliyu Mohammed Gusau have expressed deep concern
about threats to Nigeria national unity from outside the
sub-region. They are wary of possible covert support by
fundamentalist Islamic countries for the introduction of
Sharia criminal law in certain states of Northern Nigeria.
But they consider the spread of Libyan influence to be an
even greater threat, and view the Niger Republic as a
front-line state. Obasanjo has exhibited paternal concern
for Niger sovereignty and territorial integrity, for
example by bankrolling Niger Presidential election last
year and by depleting Nigeria own grain stocks to prevent
famine in Niger. Obasanjo has cultivated warm relations
with France and, unlike some of his predecessors, is not
paranoid about French ulterior motives in its Africa policy.



18. (C) Obasanjo foreign policy strategy for promoting
economic development focuses on achieving cancellation of
most if not all of Nigeria USD 30 billion external debt,
promoting diversified (by country and sector) trade and
investment relations and welcoming foreign aid that bolsters
GON efforts in the areas of education, health, public
security and economic restructuring. These goals, and
especially the goal of debt cancellation, go a long way
toward explaining why Nigeria is currently so well disposed
towards the United States and, to a lesser degree, towards
Europe and Japan. The President recognizes that the US
holds less than three percent of Nigeria's debt, but he
considers Washington's influence within the Paris Club
and the IFIs to be pivotal. His attitude is unlikely to
change as long as there is even a remote prospect Nigeria
will obtain some degree of debt cancellation.



19. (C) Obasanjo claims to agree with Nigeria foreign
creditors that state ownership, subsidized prices and
corruption are the major obstacles to Nigeria economic
development. But he appears to be even more aware that
there are vested interests bent on disrupting privatization,
price deregulation and anti-corruption campaigns that could
threaten their rice bowls. Moreover, a number of these
state-controlled enterprises were created under his
leadership during 1976-79, and he may have some sentimental
attachment to them. As a result, Obasanjo progress in
implementing these kinds of reforms -- reforms that are key
to achieving debt cancellation by Nigeria's creditors --
will continue to be incremental at best. Obasanjo's appeals
to foreign businessmen and foreign governments for increased
investment are, unfortunately, often little more than folksy
exhortations with little follow-up. His call for the
establishment of a US-Nigeria Binational Commission appears
to be driven more by a desire for parity with South Africa
than by a sense of economic necessity.



20. (C) President Obasanjo engages energetically on
continental and global issues with a view towards enhancing
Nigeria stature and influence in various international
organizations. He has forged what he calls a strategic
partnership with President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa. The
two presidents have described their countries as the twin
pillars of security in Sub-Saharan Africa, and they, along
with Algeria and Senegal, are carrying out a new strategy for
an African renaissance, known as the Millenium Action Plan.
Both Nigeria and South Africa view their informal alliance as a
counter-weight to Muamar Gaddafi continental ambitions.
Nigeria needs this partnership with South Africa because alone
Nigeria does not have the ability to project its power
continent-wide. The relationship could come under strain
if they are ever forced to compete for a single permanent
African seat on the UN Security Council.



21. (C) Nigeria's (Obasanjo's) efforts at conflict
resolution on the African continent are wide-ranging, if not
uniformly effective. Aside from its predominant role in
West Africa, Nigeria has sought for itself or has readily
accepted a central role in Burundi, Sudan, the DROC and
Zimbabwe. The GON actively participates in OPEC
(Presidential Petroleum Adviser Lukman just ended his term
as Secretary General),promoting sustainable prices and
production levels for a commodity from which Nigeria derives
over eighty-five percent of its revenue. President Obasanjo
views Nigeria membership in the Commonwealth, the
Organization of the Islamic Conference, and the G-77, and
his personal involvement in the World Economic Forum at
Davos, as stature-enhancing. His ultimate goal is to win
for Nigeria the stature, power and influence that go with
a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council.
UNSC permanent membership would validate Nigerian sense of
self-importance, enhance its influence over regional
peacekeeping in Africa, and give it much-needed ballast for
its dealings with creditor countries.


The Democracy Dividend
--------------



22. (C) At the outset, we noted that Nigeria transition
from a military dictatorship to a democratically-elected
civilian government had less impact on its foreign relations
that did its national interests and the personality and
political agenda of its Head of State. We also noted that,
midway through his Presidency, public opinion has had little
influence on President Obasanjo foreign policy. This is
likely to change as the 2003 presidential election
approaches. Obasanjo remains vulnerable to the charge that
he has spent too much time abroad and has achieved little to
show for it. Obasanjo has made debt relief the center-piece
of his relationship with the United States. His similarly
urgent appeals to Paris Club members and the IFIs for debt
cancellation have not resonated in the absence of far-
reaching economic reform.



23. (C) Other Presidential contenders will cite failure to
produce results in this key piece of his foreign policy
strategy as proof of his ineffectiveness. The unabashedly
close relationship Obasanjo has forged with the United
States also can be distorted and used against him. If
there is trouble in the Middle East, for example, political
opponents could easily whip up sentiment among Nigerian
Muslims. And though his track record in economic reform
has been disappointing, Obasanjo will face his toughest
challenge if he follows through with his stated intention
to deregulate fuel prices and privatize parastatals with
national importance. The National Labor Congress, the
group that has spearheaded strikes against fuel price hikes
in the past, may deride the President as a toady of the IMF.



24. (C) Assuming Obasanjo throws his hat into the ring, the
2003 Presidential election will mark only the second time in
Nigerian history that a President has stood for re-election
(President Shehu Shagari was re-elected, then overthrown in
1983). If political rivals are able to threaten Obasanjo
reelection by
criticizing his foreign affairs record, the
President may respond as any other political incumbent
would: by either staunchly defending his record, or by doing
something dramatic to deflect the criticism. Foreign
relations is one of the few areas that affords Obasanjo the
kind of free rein he needs to do something dramatic. There
is a chance, therefore, that Nigeria foreign relations
could take an unpredictable turn as Obasanjo term as
President draws to a close. His extensive foreign travels
may have suggested a number of options; options involving
other leading members of the G-77, OPEC or the OIC. Obasanjo
received red-carpet treatment in Iran and Russia and can
expect the same when he visits Indonesia and China. China,
in particular, has stepped up its overtures to Nigeria in
recent weeks. India or Pakistan are also potential suitors.
A foreign policy that focuses on other aspiring regional powers
may not enable Nigeria to obtain debt cancellation, but may
allow it to play an even larger role within the G-77 and become
a leading exponent of greater South-South collaboration.
JETER