Identifier | Created | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|
00THEHAGUE1940 | 2000-06-27 16:08:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy The Hague |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available. |
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 001940 |
1.(C) SUMMARY: THE DUTCH ARE DISMAYED, BUT NOT SURPRISED, BY THE RS WALKOUT FROM THE ARTICLE IV SRCC. IN OTHER MATTERS, THE HAGUE IS RECONSIDERING ITS VIEW OF THE OPPOSITION IN SERBIA. THE NETHERLANDS ALSO FEELS SHUT OUT OF DISCUSSIONS ABOUT THE FUTURE OF KOSOVO, BUT IS OPEN, ON A LIMITED BASIS, TO SOME ADDITIONAL SUPPORT FOR THE KPC, PROVIDED IT GOES THROUGH THE UNMIK REGULAR BUDGET. END SUMMARY. RS WALKOUT OF ART. IV SRCC -------------------------- 2.(C) POLOFF DISCUSSED REF. A WITH BALKANS OFFICE ACTING DIRECTOR JOEP WIJNANDS ON 6/27. WIJNANDS INDICATED THAT THE DUTCH WERE DISMAYED, BUT NOT SURPRISED, BY THE RS BEHAVIOR AND SAW THE WALKOUT AS PART OF A CONTINUING POLARIZATION TREND IN BOSNIA. HE SAID THAT THE DUTCH EMBASSY IN SARAJEVO WOULD BE INSTRUCTED TO IMPRESS UPON RS OFFICIALS THAT CONTINUING LINKS TO THE VJ WOULD BE PERCEIVED NEGATIVELY BY THE HAGUE. ADDITIONALLY, WIJNANDS NOTED THAT THE DUTCH WOULD MENTION TO OHR PETRITSCH THAT A SIMILAR LINE NEEDED TO BE PRESENTED TO BOTH RS POLITICAL LEADERS AND SERB BIH OFFICIALS. FINALLY, WIJNANDS SAID THAT HE WOULD USE THE OPPORTUNITY OF A PRE-EXISTING 6/27 APPOINTMENT WITH FRY EMBASSY OFFICIALS TO UNDERSCORE DUTCH DISPLEASURE WITH THE RS OFFICIAL'S BEHAVIOR AND THE NEED FOR THE FRY TO ENCOURAGE THE RS TO COOPERATE WITH THE DAYTON PROCESS. HE SAID THAT HE HARBORED FEW ILLUSIONS ABOUT PREDICTABLE FRY REACTIONS TO SUCH A MESSAGE, BUT NONETHELESS FOUND IT A WORTHWHILE POINT TO RAISE WITH THE FRY AS OPPORTUNITIES AROSE. WHITHER THE SERB OPPOSITION ? -------------------------- 3. (C) PASSING ON REPORTING FROM THE DUTCH HOM IN BELGRADE, WIJNANDS OBSERVED THAT DRASKOVIC SEEMS TO BE KEEPING A LOW PROFILE AFTER THE RECENT SHOOTING INCIDENT IN MONTENEGRO. HE NOTED THAT THE DUTCH IN BELGRADE HAD HEARD MANY RUMORS ABOUT WHO MIGHT BEAR THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE MURDER ATTEMPT AND FOUND FEW THAT CONVINCING (REFS. B/C). THE ONE CONCLUSION THAT HE SAID DUTCH AND SOME OTHER EU OFFICIALS IN BELGRADE HAD REACHED WAS THAT DRASKOVIC WAS EVEN LESS LIKELY THAN BEFORE TO BE A PRODUCTIVE PARTNER FOR THE ALLIANCE FOR CHANGE OR OTPOR. INCREASINGLY, WIJNANDS ADDED THAT THE DUTCH WERE DEFINING THE SERB POLITICAL SPECTRUM IN FOUR BROAD CATEGORIES: THE REGIME, DRASKOVIC/SPO, THE ALLIANCE FOR CHANGE, AND OTPOR. HE SAID THAT THE DUTCH AND SOME EU BALKANS SPECIALISTS STILL HELD HOPE FOR COOPERATION BETWEEN THE ALLIANCE FOR CHANGE AND OTPOR ON FUTURE COMMON ELECTION SLATES AND CAMPAIGN ORGANIZATION. DRASKOVIC, ON THE OTHER HAND, THEY SAW AS SELF-MARGINALIZING AND UNLIKELY TO STRIKE AN ELECTORAL ALLIANCE WITH EITHER ALLIANCE FOR CHANGE OR OTPOR LEADERS. THIS WOULD LIKELY PRODUCE FURTHER FRAGMENTATION THAT HE INTERPRETED AS A RECIPE FOR CONTINUING MILOSEVIC DOMINATION OF THE SERB POLITICAL SCENE. WIJNANDS ALSO WONDERED ALOUD WHETHER THE U.S. AND EU SHOULD REINVIGORATE TRILATERAL COOPERATION WITH THE SERB OPPOSITION BASED ON THIS ASSESSMENT. HE ALSO WAS CURIOUS AS TO WHETHER THE U.S. WOULD FIND IT USEFUL TO SEEK A SYMBOLIC RUSSIAN ROLE IN THE TRILATERAL PROCESS TO REDUCE WHAT HE SAW AS CONSIDERABLE CRITICISM OF THE OPPOSITION BY SERB NATIONALISTS FOR THEIR CURRENT COOPERATION WITH THE EU AND U.S. HE OBSERVED THAT INCLUDING THE RUSSIANS AT THE MOMENT MIGHT BE MORE PROBLEMATICAL THAN IT WAS WORTH, ESPECIALLY RECALLING THEIR WALKOUT OF THE PIC AND UN MEETINGS. NEVERTHELESS, HE SUMMARIZED SUCH A BRIDGE-BUILDING EFFORT SHOULD NOT BE AN OPTION ENTIRELY RULED OUT FOR THE MID-TERM. KOSOVO POLITICAL COORDINATION STILL A SORE POINT IN THE HAGUE -------------------------- -------------------------- 4.(C) FINALLY, POLOFF DISCUSSED THE REF. D KOSOVO PROTECTION CORPS (KPC) PROJECTED BUDGET SHORTFALL WITH WIJNANDS AND ASSISTANCE OFFICER NORBERT BOTH IN SEPARATE MEETINGS. WIJNANDS DEFERRED TO BOTH ON BUDGETARY ISSUES, BUT RECALLED THAT THE DUTCH FELT SOMEWHAT ESTRANGED FROM THE KPC AS AN INSTITUTION, HAVING NOT BEEN CONSULTED ON ITS CREATION OR PRIVY TO CONTACT GROUP DISCUSSIONS ABOUT ITS ROLE IN THE KOSOVAR POLITICAL PROCESS . HE ADDED THAT THE DUTCH CONTINUED TO FEEL EXCLUDED FROM CONTACT GROUP DISCUSSION OF A U.S.-DRAFTED "FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT" FOR INTERIM STATUS FOR KOSOVO. WHILE HE RECOGNIZED THAT PART OF THE FRICTION AROSE FROM WHAT HE CALLED "INADEQUATE EU DISCUSSION OF ISSUES TAKEN UP BY THE CONTACT GROUP," HE LEFT IT CLEAR THAT THE HAGUE ALSO RESENTS A PERCEIVED U.S. ROLE IN EXCLUDING THE DUTCH FROM DISCUSSIONS OF IMPORTANT BALKANS QUESTIONS FOR WHICH THEY ARE NONETHELESS REQUESTED TO PROVIDE MILITARY AND ASSISTANCE CONTRIBUTIONS. THIS ASIDE, HE NOTED THAT DUTCH REVIEW OF THE "SUBSTANCE OF THE U.S. FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT" WAS "LARGELY FAVORABLE." BOTH NOTED THAT THE PROJECTED KPC SHORTFALL WAS AN ISSUE ALREADY DISCUSSED WITHIN THE HIGH LEVEL STEERING GROUP AND THE DUTCH WERE WILLING TO CONSIDER UNMIK USE OF DUTCH BUDGETARY SUPPORT FUNDS FOR KPC SALARIES AND "REGULAR RECURRING COSTS," BUT NOT FOR CAPITAL INVESTMENTS. HE MENTIONED "GUNS, CONSTRUCTION EQUIPMENT, HEAVY TOOLS, AND CARS" AS EXAMPLES OF KPC CAPITAL COSTS THAT THE NETHERLANDS DID NOT WISH TO SUPPORT. TOKOLA |