Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
00RIYADH3360
2000-12-03 08:50:00
UNCLASSIFIED
Embassy Riyadh
Cable title:  

SAUDI ARABIA: 2000 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT

Tags:  PTER SA 
pdf how-to read a cable
P 030850Z DEC 00
FM AMEMBASSY RIYADH
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3148
INFO GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 RIYADH 003360 

FOR S/CT REAP AND NEA/ARP

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PTER SA
SUBJECT: SAUDI ARABIA: 2000 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT

REF: STATE 217248

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 RIYADH 003360

FOR S/CT REAP AND NEA/ARP

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PTER SA
SUBJECT: SAUDI ARABIA: 2000 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT

REF: STATE 217248


1. THE FOLLOWING RESTATES AND RESPONDS TO QUESTIONS IN
REFTEL:

A) DESCRIBE THE RESPONSE OF THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM OF
EACH COUNTRY TO ACTS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND/OR
SIGNIFICANT ACTS OF DOMESTIC TERRORISM DURING 2000,
INCLUDING ANY HOST GOVERNMENT PROSECUTIONS RELATING TO
TERRORISM. PARTICULAR ATTENTION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO
HOST COUNTRY ACTIONS REGARDING ACTS OF TERRORISM
AGAINST OR AFFECTING U.S. CITIZENS OR FACILITIES.

RESPONSE: THE SAG CONTINUES ITS INVESTIGATION OF THE
KHOBAR TOWERS BOMB ATTACK OF JUNE 1996 THAT KILLED 19
U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL. THE SAG HAS PUBLICLY STATED
THAT IT IS STILL LOOKING FOR THREE SAUDI SUSPECTS
LINKED TO THE BOMBING. THE THREE ARE WANTED FOR
QUESTIONING AND ARE BELIEVED TO BE OUTSIDE OF THE
KINGDOM. THE SAG IS STILL HOLDING A NUMBER OF SAUDI
CITIZENS IN DETENTION IN CONNECTION WITH THE BOMBING,
INCLUDING SAUDI CITIZEN HANI AL-SAYEGH. CANADIAN
AUTHORITIES ARRESTED AL-SAYEGH IN 1997 ON CHARGES OF
INVOLVEMENT IN THE BOMBING AND DEPORTED HIM TO THE
UNITED STATES. SAUDI AUTHORITIES THEN REQUESTED HIS
RENDITION TO SAUDI ARABIA, AND AFTER A LENGTHY REVIEW
THE UNITED STATES RETURNED HIM TO SAUDI ARABIA IN

1999. NO PROSECUTION OR ANY OTHER PUBLIC LEGAL ACTION
BEGAN IN 2000 REGARDING THE BOMBING. SAUDI
AUTHORITIES ARE INVESTIGATING AN AUGUST SHOOTING BY A
LONE SAUDI GUNMAN WHO FIRED AT CARS CARRYING AMERICAN
AND BRITISH CITIZENS OUTSIDE OF THEIR RESIDENTIAL
COMPOUND IN KHAMIS MUSHAYT. A SAUDI GUARD WAS KILLED
IN THE ATTACK, WHILE THE GUNMAN AND TWO SAUDI GUARDS
WERE WOUNDED. NONE OF THE AMERICANS OR BRITISH
CITIZENS HAD SIGNIFICANT INJURIES. SAUDI AUTHORITIES
ALSO RESPONDED TO TWO HIJACKINGS. IN SEPTEMBER,
AUTHORITIES ARRESTED AN IRAQI MAN WHO HIJACKED A QATAR
AIR FLIGHT FROM QATAR TO JORDAN AND FORCED IT TO LAND
IN THE NORTHERN SAUDI TOWN OF HA'IL. THE SAG RETURNED
THE HIJACKER AND PASSENGERS TO QATAR. IN OCTOBER, TWO
SAUDI MEN FORCED A SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES FLIGHT FROM
JEDDAH TO LONDON TO LAND IN IRAQ. IRAQI AUTHORITIES
DETAINED THE HIJACKERS AND RETURNED THE PASSENGERS AND
AIRCRAFT TO JEDDAH. IRAQ DENIED AN EXTRADITION
REQUEST BY THE SAG. NO ONE WAS HARMED IN EITHER
HIJACKING. SAUDI AUTHORITIES ARE ALSO INVESTIGATING
TWO CAR BOMBINGS IN RIYADH IN NOVEMBER IN WHICH ONE
BRITISH CITIZEN WAS KILLED AND SEVERAL WERE INJURED.
AUTHORITIES HAVE NOT DETERMINED WHETHER THE MOTIVE OF
THE BOMBINGS WAS CRIMINAL OR POLITICAL.

B) DID THE HOST GOVERNMENT EXTRADITE OR REQUEST THE

EXTRADITION OF SUSPECTED TERRORISTS FOR PROSECUTION
DURING THE YEAR? PARTICULAR ATTENTION SHOULD BE GIVEN
TO HOST GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO U.S. REQUESTS FOR
EXTRADITION OR ASSISTANCE IN TERRORIST CASES.

RESPONSE: THE SAG REQUESTED THAT IRAQ EXTRADITE TWO
SAUDI MEN WHO HIJACKED A SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES PLANE
FROM JEDDAH TO BAGHDAD. IRAQ DENIED THE REQUEST.
SAUDI AUTHORITIES RETURNED AN IRAQI MAN TO QATAR WHO
HIJACKED A JORDAN-BOUND PLANE FROM QATAR TO HA'IL,
SAUDI ARABIA. THE SAUDIS HAVE REPEATEDLY CALLED ON
THE TALEBAN TO EXPEL USAMA BIN LADEN FROM AFGHAN
TERRITORY SO THAT HE MAY BE BROUGHT TO JUSTICE IN
ANOTHER COUNTRY.

C) DESCRIBE ANY SIGNIFICANT IMPEDIMENTS TO HOST
GOVERNMENT PROSECUTION AND/OR EXTRADITION OF SUSPECTED
TERRORISTS.

RESPONSE: NO LEGAL OR POLITICAL IMPEDIMENTS EXIST TO
THE SAG'S PROSECUTION OF PEOPLE ALLEGED TO HAVE
COMMITTED TERRORIST ACTS WITHIN SAUDI ARABIA.
HOWEVER, THE SAG HAS FEW EXTRADITION TREATIES OUTSIDE
OF THE MEMBER STATES OF THE ORGANIZATION OF THE
ISLAMIC COUNCIL (OIC) AND THE ARAB LEAGUE. THE
LEAGUE'S ANTI-TERRORIST AGREEMENT, WHICH SAUDI ARABIA
HAS RATIFIED, CONTAINS EXTRADITION ARTICLES.

D) DISCUSS HOST GOVERNMENT RESPONSES OTHER THAN
PROSECUTION. THESE WOULD INCLUDE, BUT ARE NOT LIMITED
TO, PUBLIC STATEMENTS BY GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS OR
OFFICIAL NEWS AGENCIES FOLLOWING A TERRORIST INCIDENT
(IN OR OUTSIDE THE COUNTRY) AND EFFORTS BY HOST
GOVERNMENT TO INVESTIGATE TERRORIST INCIDENTS OR TO
ASSIST WITH INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM INVESTIGATIONS.

RESPONSE: IN MAY THE SAG SIGNED A TREATY WITH MEMBER
STATES OF THE ORGANIZATION OF THE ISLAMIC COUNCIL
(OIC) TO COOPERATE IN COMBATING TERRORISM. AT A
SIGNING CEREMONY, A SAG REPRESENTATIVE DECLARED THAT
IT IS THE POLICY OF SAUDI ARABIA TO FIGHT ALL FORMS OF
TERRORISM. THE KING, CROWN PRINCE, MINISTER OF
DEFENSE, MINISTER OF INTERIOR, MINISTER OF
INFORMATION, SENIOR ULAMA, AND OFFICIAL NEWS MEDIA
PUBLICLY AND CONSISTENTLY CONDEMN TERRORISM IN
UNEQUIVOCAL TERMS, INCLUDING BY REFUTING IDEOLOGICAL
AND RELIGIOUS JUSTIFICATIONS FOR TERRORISM.

E) DESCRIBE MAJOR COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS
UNDERTAKEN IN 2000 BY THE HOST GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING
STEPS TAKEN IN INTERNATIONAL FORA.

RESPONSE: INTERNALLY, THE SAG CONTINUES TO INVESTIGATE
THE KHOBAR TOWERS BOMBING. IT HAS ALSO UNDERTAKEN
NUMEROUS MEASURES TO STRENGTHEN PROTECTION OF U.S.
MILITARY AND DIPLOMATIC PERSONNEL.

F) DESCRIBE ANY SIGNIFICANT HOST GOVERNMENT SUPPORT
FOR INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, TERRORISTS, OR TERRORIST
GROUPS, INCLUDING (BUT NOT LIMITED TO) POLITICAL AND
FINANCIAL SUPPORT OF TERRORISTS AND THEIR ACTIVITIES;
DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT THROUGH DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION;
MISUSE OF THE DIPLOMATIC POUCH AND OTHER DIPLOMATIC
POUCH AND OTHER DIPLOMATIC PRIVILEGES TO SUPPORT
TERRORISM; PROVISION OF SANCTUARY AND/OR THE PRESENCE
OF OFFICES OF TERRORIST GROUPS; PROVISION OF TRAINING
OR TRAINING SITES; PROVISION OF WEAPONS; AND POSITIONS
TAKEN ON TERRORISM IN INTERNATIONAL FORA.

RESPONSE: THE SAG DOES NOT POLITICALLY OR FINANCIALLY
SUPPORT INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS OR
ACTIVITIES. ITS REGULATIONS REQUIRE THAT NON-
GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS AND PRIVATE VOLUNTARY
AGENCIES OBTAIN GOVERNMENT AUTHORIZATION TO SOLICIT
CONTRIBUTIONS FOR DOMESTIC OR INTERNATIONAL CAUSES.
HOWEVER, IT IS NOT CLEAR THAT THESE REGULATIONS ARE
CONSISTENTLY ENFORCED. THERE CONTINUE TO BE
ALLEGATIONS THAT SOME INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST
ORGANIZATION REPRESENTATIVES SOLICIT AND COLLECT FUNDS
FROM PRIVATE CITIZENS IN SAUDI ARABIA.

G) HAS THE HOST GOVERNMENT MADE ANY PUBLIC
STATEMENTS IN SUPPORT OF A TERRORIST-SUPPORTING
COUNTRY ON A TERRORISM ISSUE? (THE SEVEN GOVERNMENTS
DESIGNATED BY THE SECRETARY AS STATE SPONSORS OF
TERRORISM ARE CUBA, IRAN, IRAQ, LIBYA, NORTH KOREA,
SYRIA, AND SUDAN.)

RESPONSE: THE SAG MADE NO PUBLIC STATEMENTS SUPPORTING
ANY OF THE SEVEN COUNTRIES ON THE USG'S TERRORISM LIST
REGARDING A TERRORIST ISSUE.

H) DESCRIBE ANY SIGNIFICANT CHANGE SINCE 1999,
POSITIVE OR NEGATIVE, IN THE HOST GOVERNMENT'S
ATTITUDE TOWARD TERRORISM, INTERNATIONAL OR DOMESTIC.
WHAT IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THIS CHANGE?

RESPONSE: THE ATTITUDE OF THE SAG TOWARD TERRORISM
DID NOT CHANGE DURING 1999.

I) DESCRIBE U.S. COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS AND
INITIATIVES WITH THE HOST GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING, BUT
NOT LIMITED TO, REQUESTS TO THE HOST GOVERNMENT FOR
SPECIFIC COOPERATION AND EFFORTS BY THE UNITED STATES
IN THE HOST COUNTRY TO ELIMINATE INTERNATIONAL
FINANCIAL SUPPORT TO TERRORIST GROUPS DIRECTLY OR IN
SUPPORT OF THEIR ACTIVITIES. DESCRIBE THE EXTENT OF
THE HOST COUNTRY'S COOPERATION WITH THOSE EFFORTS AND
INITIATIVES, INCLUDING THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE HOST
GOVERNMENT HAS SATISFIED THE SPECIFIC REQUESTS.

RESPONSE: FOLLOWING A 1995 BOMBING THAT KILLED U.S.
MILITARY PERSONNEL ADVISING THE SAUDI ARABIAN NATIONAL
GUARD (OPM/SANG),A USG INTERAGENCY COUNTERTERRORISM
TEAM VISITED SAUDI ARABIA TO BEGIN UNPRECEDENTED,
COORDINATED, INTERAGENCY CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN THE USG
AND SAG ON COUNTERTERRORISM AND SECURITY ISSUES. THIS
COOPERATION, WHICH ENGENDERED HIGH-LEVEL SAG INTEREST
AND THE PARTICIPATION OF MULTIPLE SAG MINISTRIES, HAS
CONTINUED THROUGHOUT 2000. THE USG AND SAG CONTINUE
TO EXCHANGE INFORMATION ON COUNTERTERRORISM AND
SECURITY ISSUES AFFECTING AMERICAN AND SAUDI INTERESTS
IN THE REGION. CONSULTATIONS AND TRAINING FOR SAUDI
COUNTERTERRORISM AND SECURITY OFFICIALS IN THE UNITED
STATES ALSO OCCURRED. U.S. AND SAUDI OFFICIALS HAVE
MET IN THE CONTEXT OF INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO
ELIMINATE TRANS-NATIONAL FINANCIAL SUPPORT TO
TERRORIST GROUPS DIRECTLY AND INDIRECTLY. COOPERATION
BETWEEN THE USG AND SAG INCREASED FURTHER AFTER THE
1998 EAST AFRICA BOMBINGS. THE FBI COORDINATES ITS
INVESTIGATIVE EFFORTS WITH THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR
AND MAINTAINS A PERMANENTLY STAFFED LEGAL ATTACHE
OFFICE IN THE U.S. EMBASSY.

J) IN ADDITION TO THIS GENERAL INFORMATION, IF THE
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT HAS SOUGHT COOPERATION FROM
THE HOST GOVERNMENT DURING THE PREVIOUS FIVE YEARS IN
THE INVESTIGATION OR PROSECUTION OF AN ACT OF
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AGAINST THE UNITED STATES
CITIZENS OR INTERESTS, PLEASE PROVIDE INFORMATION ON:

(I) THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE HOST GOVERNMENT IN
2000 COOPERATED OR IS COOPERATING WITH THE UNITED
STATES GOVERNMENT IN APPREHENDING, CONVICTING, AND
PUNISHING THE INDIVIDUAL OR INDIVIDUALS RESPONSIBLE
FOR THE ACT; AND

(II) THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE HOST GOVERNMENT IN
2000 COOPERATED OR IS COOPERATING IN PREVENTING
FURTHER ACTS OF TERRORISM AGAINST UNITED STATES
CITIZENS IN THE HOST GOVERNMENT'S TERRITORY.

RESPONSE: (I) THE SAG HAS SOUGHT TO APPREHEND,
CONVICT, AND PUNISH THE INDIVIDUALS RESPONSIBLE FOR
BOTH THE OPM/SANG AND KHOBAR TOWERS BOMBINGS AGAINST
UNITED STATES CITIZENS, ALTHOUGH EARLY COOPERATION WAS
NOT AT THE LEVEL EXPECTED BY USG OFFICIALS. SAUDI
OFFICIALS AND THE FBI CONTINUE TO WORK CLOSELY ON MANY
INVESTIGATION ISSUES RELATED TO BOTH BOMBINGS AND
CONSULT CLOSELY WITH EACH OTHER ON THE STATUS OF THE
KHOBAR BOMBING INVESTIGATION.

(II) THE SAG CONTINUES TO DEVOTE CONSIDERABLE HUMAN
AND FINANCIAL RESOURCES TO PROTECT USG PERSONNEL AND
INTERESTS FOLLOWING THE OPM/SANG, KHOBAR TOWERS, EAST
AFRICA BOMBINGS, AND THREATS TO THE U.S. EMBASSY,
CONSULATES AND OTHER U.S. INTERESTS IN 2000. IT MADE
AVAILABLE TO COALITION FORCES THE PRINCE SULTAN
AIRBASE AT AL KHARJ, WHERE MOST U.S. SERVICEMEN IN
SAUDI ARABIA ARE NOW LOCATED, AND A RESIDENTIAL
COMPOUND, KNOWN AS ESKAN VILLAGE, SOUTH OF RIYADH FOR
MILITARY AND CIVILIAN DOD PERSONNEL. THE SAG SPENT
MILLIONS OF DOLLARS IN FACILITY AND INFRASTRUCTURE
IMPROVEMENTS TO ENHANCE SECURITY. THE SAG ALSO WORKED
WITH AMERICAN SECURITY PERSONNEL IN AN ONGOING EFFORT
TO ENHANCE PROTECTIVE MEASURES AT ALL OTHER USG
FACILITIES IN SAUDI ARABIA, INCLUDING THE U.S. EMBASSY
IN RIYADH AND THE CONSULATES IN JEDDAH AND DHAHRAN.
USG AND SAG OFFICIALS CONTINUE TO MEET REGULARLY TO
REVIEW THE SAFETY OF AMERICANS IN SAUDI ARABIA.

K) IF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT HAS SOUGHT
COOPERATION DURING THE PREVIOUS FIVE YEARS IN THE
PREVENTION OF AN ACT OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
AGAINST U.S. CITIZENS OR INTERESTS, PLEASE DESCRIBE
THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE HOST GOVERNMENT IN 2000
COOPERATED OR IS COOPERATING IN PREVENTING ACTS OF
TERRORISM AGAINST UNITED STATES CITIZENS IN THE HOST
GOVERNMENT'S TERRITORY.

RESPONSE: THE SAG HAS PROVIDED TO THE USG INFORMATION
ON THREATS DIRECTED AT U.S. INTERESTS IN SAUDI ARABIA
AND CONTINUES TO WORK CLOSELY WITH USG AGENCIES TO
PREVENT TERRORIST ATTACKS AGAINST AMERICANS IN THE
KINGDOM. REPORTED THREATS HAVE REGULARLY LED TO THE
RAPID DEPLOYMENT OF EXTRA SECURITY PERSONNEL AND THE
PLACEMENT OF PERMANENT PHYSICAL BARRIERS, CHECKPOINTS,
AND OTHER VISIBLE DETERRENTS.


BRAYSHAW