Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
00KINSHASA8532
2000-12-23 10:47:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kinshasa
Cable title:  

KISANGANI OBSERVATIONS AND IMPRESSIONS

Tags:  CG PINS PREL ECON PGOV 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 008532 

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/23/2010
TAGS: CG PINS PREL ECON PGOV
SUBJECT: KISANGANI OBSERVATIONS AND IMPRESSIONS

CLASSIFIED BY WILLIAM LACY SWING FOR REASONS 1.5 (B) (D)


C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 008532

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/23/2010
TAGS: CG PINS PREL ECON PGOV
SUBJECT: KISANGANI OBSERVATIONS AND IMPRESSIONS

CLASSIFIED BY WILLIAM LACY SWING FOR REASONS 1.5 (B) (D)



1. (C) The following two-part series reports on Embassy staff
member's recent visit to Kisangani, capitol of Oriental
Province. Part one addresses the military and security
situation, and Part two the political and economic issues
facing Kisangani and the province.



2. (C) Summary: During visit to Kisangani November 28 to
December 1, Emboff spoke to local businessmen,
representatives of international and local NGOs, and MONUC
officers. Although Kisangani has been calm for months, there
has been fighting recently between RCD/Goma and MLC only
sixty kilometers north of Kisangani. Most viewed the
situation as still inherently unstable and precarious, as
access to diamond-rich areas appears to be a major objective
of the different local military and political actors. The
"governor" of Oriental Province emphasized support of the
Lusaka Peace Agreement, the Inter-Congolese Dialogue, and
Congolese territorial integrity. He urged the international
community to pay more attention to Kisangani given its
isolation and desperate economic situation, implying that
there was a tendency to favor Goma and Bukavu. The
"governor" said that the USG could stop the war if it only
wanted to. Civil society reps say the "governor" has only
very limited support in Goma.
Nearly all interlocutors in Kisangani had two
complaints: (a) that the city had become completely isolated;
and (b) that the province as a whole had been "balkanized" to
a regrettably large extent. Travel around the province was
virtually impossible, the province having become divided into
many small "spheres of influence." These divisions had
resulted in Kisangani's trade and communications options
being cut off eastward as well as westward. Within the city,
the problems of Hema-Lendu tension and NGO tax harassment
were cited.
The economy of Kisangani is in fairly dire straits, as
both eastern and western surface supply routes have been
completely cut and diamond trading has moved northward out of
the city. What little goods Kisangani is able to import come

only via small planes from the east, or, in the case of
agricultural produce, by canoe and bicycle. Most of the
diamond producing areas remain in MLC territory, and now that
the Ugandans have moved north of Kisangani, this trade
bypasses Kisangani, passing to Kampala via more northern
routes. As the diamond trade has been the basis for
Kisangani's economy for some time now, the city's economy has
collapsed, and money is in extremely short supply.
Civil Society members expressed gratitude to the US
Embassy in Kinshasa for having issued them documents which
facilitated their return to rebel areas after attending a
civil society conference in Kinshasa earlier in the year.
They were also appreciative that someone from the American
government had visited, and hoped that this was the beginning
of a closer relationship. Finally, they were extremely
gratified to learn that the US Embassy was very actively
supporting the idea of the establishment of a "humanitarian
corridor" along the Congo River between Kisangani and
Mbandaka. People proposed that in addition, an extremely
beneficial and possibly more practical interim measure would
be to broker the opening up of Kisangani and Goma airports to
commercial and humanitarian traffic, an initiative that could
potentially be monitored by MONUC. End Summary


Military/Security Situation



3. (C) Kisangani has not seen any combat in the city
proper since the withdrawal of Rwandan and Ugandan regular
troops, after three violent confrontations between them in
August 1999, and May and June 2000. Notwithstanding, all
agree that the security situation remains precarious and that
a new round of fighting could break out again at any time--at
least between MLC and RCD troops, if not by their respective
Ugandan and Rwandan backers. (The population was seriously
traumatized by the fighting earlier this year and remains
very jumpy-ready to run into the forest with the first sound
of gunshots.)
According to MONUC, both Rwandan and Ugandan armies have
withdrawn to distances some 100 km from the city of
Kisangani, in compliance with accords to this effect.
However, as RCD/Goma-appointed authorities continue to
administer Kisangani and the military force in and around the
city are "RCD/Goma" troops, Rwanda maintains considerable
influence in the city. The local population, in fact,
believes that many of the "RCD" troops are actually borrowed
RPA soldiers. They claim to see increasing numbers of
obviously Tutsi soldiers, especially in the local drinking
spots that used to be highly frequented by RPA soldiers when
they were living openly in the town. Kisangani residents
have difficulty accepting that all these could possibly be
"Banyamulenge" (or other Congolese Tutsis) as the RCD claims.
Uniforms are of little help in distinguishing soldiers of
the different armies at this point, since many RCD troops
have now been issued RPA-type uniforms. Having no way of
knowing who is Congolese and who isn't, MONUC officers say
they have to accept the RCD's explanation that these Tutsi
soldiers are Congolese and thus legitimate RCD regulars.
MONUC and local Civil Society groups assert that in many
ways, the population was better off under foreign (Rwandan
RPA and Ugandan UPDF) army control. RPA and UPDF soldiers
were regularly paid, relatively well disciplined, and
supervised by a professional officer corps. During that
period, the unpaid, less-well supervised and relatively
undisciplined RCD did not carry weapons. The RCD troops
were, however, issued arms by the RPA at the time of the
RPA's withdrawal, and RCD soldiers now largely live off the
population, confiscating food and other goods at will,
especially in supply areas just outside the city.


4.(C) RCD and MLC Clash


In mid-November, RCD and MLC armies clashed north of
Kisangani, on the road to Banalia and Buta. There were
reportedly three casualties and some wounded. RCD forces
captured approximately fourteen MLC policeman. The
skirmishes were apparently the result of an effort by RCD
troops to extend RCD control to Bengamisa, a town 48
kilometers from Kisangani and some 18 kilometers beyond the
village of Lindi (which had hitherto served as the border
areas of RCD control and MLC control). According to MONUC,
whoever controls the Bengamisa-Yangambi road is likely to be
able to control diamond traffic from the diamond-rich area
just north of Yangambi (approximately 100 kilometers west of
Kisangani).
Some three hundred RCD troops, many of whom are Tutsi
(and believed by the population to be RPA soldiers) suddenly
moved considerably north of the city of Kisangani and crossed
a river into the area north of Linda--normally territory
controlled by MLC police. Capturing MLC police on the other
side of the river in a surprise attack, the RCD troops
proceeded northward to capture Bengamisa, also protected only
by MLC police and headed toward Balaia on the Aruwini River.
At kilometer 62, however, they encountered the MLC army,
which headed southward from Banalia upon learning of the
invasion. Some fighting ensued and went on intermittently
for two days. MONUC, which was able to reach the area of the
fighting by the second day, had the impression that there had
already been meetings between commanders on both sides and
that some kind of a cease-fire/pull-back agreement had been
reached. This may have resulted from MONUC's earlier
communications with RCD/Goma and MLC/Gbadolite alerting their
respective leaders of the fighting and high potential for
another catastrophic clash of rebel and supporting foreign
armies. RPA and UPDF troops reportedly remained at a
considerable distance throughout the conflict and did not
participate in these skirmishes. In the pull-back agreement,
however, RCD appears to have retained control of Benganisa,
the town which may have been their original objective in the
offensive. MONUC and the population thus wonder whether the
MLC might not as some point try to recover this territory and
retaliate in an offensive.



5. (C) Local Attitudes Toward MONUC


There is considerable concern among the international
NGO community that MONUC will not be able to help them much
if real trouble breaks out. MONUC still has only thirty-five
people in Kisangani, and they do not attempt to monitor the
left bank of the river at all. Some residents' perception of
MONUC as doing little to free Kisangani from rebel occupation
leads them to the false conclusion that MONUC favors the RCD
and Rwanda. MONUC troops were not very visible in October
when the university students went on a rampage in the city
over school fees (which included throwing rocks at some of
the headquarters of international NGOs.) The international
NGO community found itself largely on its own to attempt to
ascertain what was happening.






SWING